ML20062F671

Proposed Tech Specs Clarifying Requirements for Containment Spray & RHR Spray Operability

ML20062F671
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	11/20/1990
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
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ML20062F670	List: ML20062F667 ML20062F671
References
NUDOCS 9011280109
Download: ML20062F671 (12)

Text

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'4 ENCLOSURE 1 q

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE o SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 t

i DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 -

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Unit 1 -

Index Page VII s 3/ * * -16 t B3/4 6 t Unit'2 3 >

Index Page VII

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, INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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SECTION PAGE 3/4.5 EMERGtNCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS Cold Leg Injection Accumulators........................... ,

1/4 5-1 Deleted................................................ .. 3/4 5-3 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg greater than or equal.to 350*F..... 3/4 5-4 R144 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg less than350*F.............. ..... 3/4 5-8 3/4.5.4 OELETE0................................................... 3/4 5-10 .

3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK...........................'... 3/4 5-11 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTE_MS .

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Containment Int 3grity..................................... 3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage....................................... 3/4 6 Containment Air Locks..................................... 3/4 6-7 Internal Pressure......................................... 3/4 6-9  ;

Air Temperature........................................... 3/4 6-10 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity................... 3/4 6-11 Shield Building Structural Integrity...................... 3/4 6-12 Emergency Gas-Treatment System (Cleanup Subsystem)...... . 3/4 6-13 Containment Ventilation System............................ 3/4 6-15 1 3/4.6.2 OEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS SubstSTEMs Containment Spray Sy-ter..................................

3/4 6-16  :

Lower Containment vent Coo 1ers............................

3/4 6-16b .

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 VII Amendment No. 67, 69, 116, 140 May 11, 1990

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i

! 3/4.6.2 '0EPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS -

CONTAINMENT SPRAY ZTN SuosySTEMS l

l i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION _

! 3.6.2.1 Two independent sussn

.:entainment sprayp n. u mra;ii.1 -

l h::t r;;;;:1 :pr:y shall be OPERABLE with ea:h tr:f r ycomprised of:

i sussysitm l a. A Containment Spray train with:

l 1. One OPERABLE Containment Spray pump.

2. One OPERABLE Containment Spray heat exchanger.

bramsm stew Amr l

3. An OPERABLE ^ flow path capable of taking suction from the i refueling water storage tank and transferring sucti.on to the containment sump, and R73

b. A RHR Spray train with:

1. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump,

2. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger, and l Rasiounu by Rrmovat. hme

3. An OPERABLE ^ flow path capable of taking suction from the con-tainment sumpx No Sutetyiut. Row 'To Tus Seny Hawom. '-

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.*

ACTION: i su69 l

With one tr:f r Of c ntagnt spray..ysnre Or r::i &rl h::t r::: :1 :pr:y inoperable, restore the inopera it.r..y tr::n to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT ST \NDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable +peaySuoysrr m 4+e4+ to OPERAB.E status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l SURVEILLANCE PdQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1.1 Each Containment Spray train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a73

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

• 0PERABILITY of RHR Spray trains is not required in MODE 4. R73 '

April 4, 1988 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-16 Amendment No.12,69 '

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• CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

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3/a._6.1.8 EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (EGTS)

The OPERABILITY of the EGTS cleanup subsystem ensures that during LOCA conditions, containment vessel leaka e into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoa adsorb U meet t the atmosphere. This requirement is necessa,er trains prior to discharge tory. to the accident analyses and limit the site boundaiy radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions. Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters. ANSI N510-1975 R118 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.6.1.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM Use of the containment purge lines is restricted to only one pair (one supply line and one exhaust line) of purge system. lines at a time to c.nsure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss of coolant accident during purging operations. The analysis of this accident assumed purging through the largest pair of lines (a 24 inch inlet line and a 24 inch outlet line), a pre-existing iodine spike in the reactor coolant and four second valve closure times.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTE" StaSYSTC M5 TheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraN[y5Nensuresthatcontainment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

l 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING FANS The OPERABILITY of the lower containment vent coolers ensures that ade-quate heat removal capacity is available to provide long-term cooling following a non-LOCA event. Postaccident use of these coolers ensures containment tem-peratiires remain within environmental qualification limits for all safety

• R71 related equipment required to remain functional.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the ,

event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or'-

pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. By letters dated March 3, 1981, and April 2, 1981, TVA will submit a report on the operating experience of the plant no later then startup afte.r R8 the first refueling. This information will be used to provide a basis to re-evaluate the adequacy of the purge and vent time limits.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 67. 114 May 5, 1989

IN0y LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _

SECTION _PAGE 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS ColdlegInjectionAccumulators........................... 3/4 5-1  ;

UpperHeadInjectionAccumulators......................... 3/4 5-3 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg greater than or equal to 350*F..... 3/4 5-5 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg less than 350'F.................... 3/4 5-9 3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM Boron Injection Tank..................................'.... 3/4 5-11 Heat Tracing.............................................. 3/4 6-12 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK.............................. 3/4 5-13 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Containment Integrity..................................... 3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage......................................, 3/4 6-2 Containment Air Locks..................................... 3/4 6-7 Internal Pressure......................................... 3/4 6-9  ;

Air Temperature........................................... 3/4 6-10 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity................... 3/4 6-11 Shield Building Structural Integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-12 Emergency Gas Treatment System (Cleanup Subsystra)........ 3/4 6-13 Containment Ventilation System............................ 3/4 6-15 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS' s

Containment Spray ys.smtrns.j;t=................. ................ 3/4 6-16 ,

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) Lower Containment Vent Coolers...,......................... 3/4 6-16b P.6 : I April 4, 1988 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 VII AmendmentNo.//,61

C'NTAINMENT O SYSTEMS 1/4. 6. 2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS .

[ l CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTE" SLA6 SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIOW 3.6.2.1 Two independent.tr : Of hth ik containment spraygosyss nnps.... re: duel h::t I

-remeel :pr:y shall be OPERABLE with each tr& comprised of * '

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a. A Containment Spray train with: ,

1. One OPERABLE Containment Spray pump. -

2. One OPERABLE Containment Spray heat exchanger.- g3 temnwmsm SeaAy Amr

3. An OPERABLE ^ flow path capable of taking suction from the .

refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the containment sump, and

b. A RHR Spray train with: '

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, 1. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump.

2. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger, and Resibus. Hany Removs hme l 3. An OPERABLE ^ flow path capable of taking suction from the con- (

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tainment sump, Fwo Suet.ymt, Fw To Tu $rnAy Wrn oc1t.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.*

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l ACTION:

1 Su6mTem tainment spray 4 7 r;;ida:1 h::t r a: vel ;;r y inoperable, restore the With one inoperabl tr & cf cog # "I'% trair,-to OPERABLE status withi at least HOT STANDBY wit 1in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, restore the inoperable .r._, .r n to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1.1 Each Containment Spray train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: R61

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

• 0PERABILITY of RHR Spray trains is not required in MODE 4.-

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SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-16 Nr'i$mentN61

.l .o CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS f

BASES 3/4.6.1.8 EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (EGTS) f The OPERABILITY of the EGTS cleanup subsystem ensures that during LOCA conditions, containment vessel leakage into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere. This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in, the accident analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within '

the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions. Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters. ANSI N510-1975 will be' used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.6.1.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM Use of the containment purge lines is restricted to only one pair (one supply line.and one exhaust line) of purge system lines at a t,ime to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss of coolant accident during purging operations. The analysis of this accident assumed purging through the largest pair of lines (a 24 inch inlet line and a 24 inch outlet line), a pre-existing iodine spike in the reactor coolant and four second valve closure times.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

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3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSi m Cs u MV ST Ems The OPERABILITY of the containment spray k N ' ensures that containment  !

depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. .

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING FANS The OPERABILITY of the lower containment vent coo- ensures that ade-quate heat removal capacity is available to provide long-term cooling following a non-LOCA event. Postaccident use of these coolers ensures. containment tem. R$!  ;

peratures remain within environmental qualification limits for all safety-related equipment required to remain functional.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES I

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'The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the-containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the i l.

event of _ a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the S environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

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l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 59 j February 11, 1988 l

. t ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECENICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328;

-(TVA-SQN-TS-90-16) ,

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CLARIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND RESIDUAL HFAT REMOVAL SPRAY OPERABILITY l

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ENCLOSURE 2 l Description of Change  !

TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs) to revise the containment spray system Limiting Condition for Operation (Lco) 3.6.2.1. The wording for TS 3.6.2.1 LCO is being revised to clarify the operability requirements for containment spray (CS) and residual heat removal (RHR)' spray. This  ;

clarification ensures that an entire train of CS and RHR spray (i.e.,

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l comprised of all A Train or all B Train CS and RHR spray components)'is i operable when in the' action for TS 3.6.2.1. This is achieved by using the

. subsystem approach (similar to TS 3.5.2 for emergency core cooling ~ system)

! that requires two independent subsystems compriaed of a pump, heat exchanger, and flow path for both CS and RHR spray. The action stat 3 ment associated with this LCO is revised accordingly to support the subsystem-approach.- In addition, the index and bases have been revised to' reflect the title of " Containment Spray Subsystems." ,

Reason for Change '

The present wording for LCO 3.6.2.1 has ',ed to confusion as to which pumps are allowed to be inoperable and be within the action statement requirements. The wording has caused Operations' personnel to be unsure-of when TS 3.0.3 would be applicable. This revision will resolve this confusion.

Justification for Change _ i By implementing this revision, assurance will be provided that an entire containment spray subsystem is'available when.in=the action statement'for LCO 3.6.2.1. The requirements of TS 3.0.3 will be complied with for loss of equipment in both subsystems. This clarification ensures that the - .;

required CS system components are'available as. assumed in'the accident 3 analysis to-supply a spray flow of 6,750 gallons per minute (gal / min).

This flow is achieved by having at least one complete subsystem witn a CS pump capable of delivering 4,750 gal / min of spray and an.RHR pump capable of delivering 2,000 gal / min.of spray. The title changes in.the index and bases have been made to provide consistency with the LCO. This change does not alter the-operation, testing, or maintenance of the CS system or compromise. nuclear safety.

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Environmental Impact Evaluation l

The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental .  ;

question because operation of SQN Units'1 and 2 in accordance with this change would nott ,

1. Result in a significant-increase in any-adverse environmental impact , j previously evaluated in the Final-Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by'the staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or ,

decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. l

2. Result'in a significant change'in effluents or power levels. ,

3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis-for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.

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' ENCLOSURE 3 j

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~ PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE- '

- SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR. PLANT UNITS'1. LAND J2ILin .

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DOCKET Nos 50-327 AND~50-328,;. , '

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1 h DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION- 1- "

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' ENCLOSURE 3 Significant Hazards Evaluation l

TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has determined that it does not represent a;significant; hazards consideration.

based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Oseration of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) in accordsnee with the_ proposed amendment will nott ,

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l 1.- Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This clarification to Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)j3.6.2.1  ;

will provide operators the requirements to ensure SQN's accident

analysis is maintained by the containment spray'(CS) system. There-is_no change to'the equipment or method of operation, but only wording. enhancements are utilized to ensure proper application of.the-TSs. These changes to LCO 3.6.2.1 requirements are explicitly consistent with the SQN design criteria and the Final Safety" Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis _ loss of coolant accident analysis. The index and bases changes to use the title " Containment Spray Subsystems" have been made to ensure consistency with the LCO. This revision will not increase the probability or-consequence of an accident but will ensure' adequate CS capabilities to-support the Onalysis.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of' accident from any previously analyzed.

No changes'to plant design Jtesting, or operation are-involved'and therefore no possibility exists.for a.new orfdifferent kind of-accident being created. This clarification will ensure proper application of LCO 3.6.2.1 action-requirements.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

• By clarifying the operability requirements, this' revision ensures ,

that two independent containment spray' subsystems are delineated' '

-each with the-ability-to supply spray flow of'6,750 gallons per J minute (gal / min). While under LCO'3.6.2.1 action requirements, at least one complete subsystem will be maintained or :the requirements of TS 3.0.3 will be applicable. The'6,750 gal / min spray flow meets the required capacity for the FSAR accident' analysis, and'therefore.

the margin of safety for containment integrity is maintained'without any reduction. !The index and bases revision provides consistency ~for "

the " Containment Spray. Subsystems" title.

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