ML20062C835
| ML20062C835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1978 |
| From: | Durr J, Toth A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062C822 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-78-12, NUDOCS 7811140249 | |
| Download: ML20062C835 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000322/1978012
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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Region I
Report No.
50-322/78-12
Docket No. _ _50-322
License No. CPPR-95
Priority
Category
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Licensee:
Long Island Lighting Company
175 East Old Country Road
Hicksville, New York 11801
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Facility Name:
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1
Inspection at:
Shoreham, New York
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[ nspection conducte : Au . 8-11
197
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I spectors:
- f###*
/ k[I M
A. D? Toth, Rea'ctoF Inspector
- date' signed
nrO
7/d R/1W
g.P.Durr,ReactorInspector
c' ate tigneo
date signed
Approved by:
Al
M/ s
//)M/W
H. W. Ficliaugny.fyMt, Projects 5ection
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te rigned
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Reactor ConstructTon & Engineering Support Branch
Anspection Summary:
spection on August 8-il, 1978 (Report No. 50-322/78-12)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by two regional based inspectors,
of work activities for reactor coolant pressure boundary piping welding; and
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quality verification records for licensee actions on NRC issued Bulletins, and
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licensee actions to resolve construction deficiencies reported und,er 10 CFR 50.55(e).
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The inspectors also performed daily plant tour-inspections, reviewed licensee
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action on previous inspection findings, and performed follow-up action as necessary
to resolve questions which arose during the course of inspection of the above
areas. The inspection involved 50 inspector 'nours onsite by two NRC regional office
based inspectors.
The inspection comenced 6:15 P.M. outside the normal dayshift
working hours at the site.
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Results: Of the 3 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in
two areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one area, and one
other apparent. item was identified during the general plant tour activities.
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Region I Form 12
'I 811 l
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(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS
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1.
Per_ sons Contacted
Eong Island Lighting Company
- 0. M. Durand, Operating QA Engineer
- T. F. Gerecke, Engineering QA Manager
R. Gutmann, Lead Startup Engineer
- R. M. Kascsak, Project Engineer (UNICO)
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- L. C. Lilly, Site Manager (UNICO)
- A. R. Muller, QA Engineer
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- A. W. Wofford, Vice President
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Stone and Webster
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- T. Arrington, Superintendent, FQC
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P. Badger, Resident Engineer (UNICO)
- T. F. Burns, Materials Engineer
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- R. S. Costa, QA Program Administrator
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J. Coughlin, Site Engineering Office (Electrical)
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R. Cardella, Purchasing Agent
- W. N. Doldorf, Construction Superintendent (UNICO)
- W. Hassett, Senior Inspector, FQC
J. Riess, Assistant Superintendent, Electrical (UNICO)
C. Wright, Materials Engineer
Courter and Company
- A. B. Czarnowski, Project Manager
- W. Hunt, Assistant Project Manager, Engineering
B. Nicholas, Chief Inspector
- D. W. Papa. QA Manager
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- A. B. Turturro, Project Engineer
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General Electric Company
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- J. M. Cockroft, QC Representative
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Hartford Steam Boiler I&I Company
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- G. F. Cocuzzo, Authorized Nuclear Inspector
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In addition to the above, the inspectors interviewed various contractor
supervisory, administrative and craft personnel during the course
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of the inspection, relative to records retrieval, status of work,
and general site activities.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) and Stone and Webster (S&W)
personnel participate in the joint UNICO construction management
organization mentioned in this report.
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2.
Plant Tour
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The inspector observed work activities in-progress, completed work,
and plant status in several areas of the plant during general
inspection of the plant. The inspector examined work items for any
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obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or
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license conditions.
Particular note was taken of presence of
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quality control inspectors and quality control evidence such as
inspection records, material identification, nonconforming material
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identification, equipment calibration tags.
The inspector in-
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terviewed craft personnel, supervision, and quality inspection
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personnel as such personnel were available in the work areas.
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Where more detailed inspection of an area was conducted, the in-
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spection scope and findings are described in other paragraphs of
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the report.
During a second shift inspection, the inspector inter-
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viewed a Courter Company field engineer who was performing independent
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checking of field routing of a 1"-drain line for an RHR system
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control valve. The inspector interviewed several welders regarding
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quality control activities and parameters relative to their work.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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3.
(0 pen) Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings - Noncompliance
(322/78-02-03) Failure to maintain preheat on RHR pipe weld Ell-
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IOC017 FW3. During the plant tour, the inspector observed several
weld joints that were prepared for resistance heating. He verified
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that the preheat and interpass temperature of the weld joint 1821-
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IC176-FWO1 met the procedural requirements (see Details paragraph
6.).
Reference reports Nos. 322/78-03 and 78-06.
This item is not
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yet resolved, pending additional future implementation verification.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (322/78-08-02)-Deviations from AWS Welding
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Code. The inspector examined five stone and Webster Engineering &
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Design Coordination Reports (E&DCR) which describe instances where
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S&W engineering has approved deviations from specific requirements
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of the AWS Code D1.1-72. The licensee commitments to this Code are
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described in the Shoreham FSAR Sections 3.8.1.2, 3.8.3.2, 3.8.4.2.3,
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and 3.8.4.6.
The E&DCR's were each reviewed / approved by S&W design,
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materials, quality assurance and project management representatives
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as appropriate.
The specific deviations are as follows.
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A.
Primary Shield Wall (ref. FSAR Section 3.8.; 3.8.3) E&DCR F-
9257: This permits misalignment of cover plates as 3/16"
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maximum. The AWS Code Section 3.3.3 establishes "in no case
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more than 1/8 inch".
E&DCR F-1746: This permits mismatch of shell plates for butt
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welds as 3/16", and for stiffener butt welds for 2" plate as
5/16". The AWS code Section 3.3.3 establishes "in no case
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more than 1/8 inch"
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E&DCR F-9926: This permits 3/16-inch weld reinforcement. The
AWS Code Section 3.6.2 established that " reinforcement shall
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not exceed 1/8".
B.
Pipe Supports (No FSAR Specific Commitments).
E&DCR-F11766 A-
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W: This permits use of welding procedure W200A for ASTM-A515
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Grade 70 material for pipe supports.
The AWS Code Section 8.2
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does not recognize this ASTM-ASIS material as prequalified.
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However, ASTM-A515 is recognized as P-1 category material
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grouping along with the ASTM-A516 of the AWS Code and this
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was used as the basis for accepting procedure W200A as pre-
qualified for this material.
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C.
Cable Tray and Instrument Line Supports (No FSAR Soecific
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Commitment)
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This permits welding of Unistrut and Powerstrut
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materials designated as ASTM-A569, A575 Grade C-1008, A-570
Grade C and A446 Grade A, using AWS procedurez prequalified
for ASTM-A36. The AWS Code Section 8.2 does not recognize
these materials as prequalified.
The S&W materials engineer
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evaluated materials chemistry and properties as a basis for
acceptance.
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The E&DCR's for the shield wall included appropriate basis
information, such as the fact that analysis by the structural
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analysis group indicates that the plate mismatch will not
adversely affect the design stress, or the reinforcement will"
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not be detrimental to the intended function of the structure.
These changes appeared to be within the intent of the AWS Code
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requirements. The E&DCR's regarding materials were consistent'
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with FSAR comitments, and compatible with requirements of
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recognized welding Codes. The inspector had no further
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questions regarding these items. The questions regarding
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undercut (322/78-08-01) are considered a separate matter and
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will be reviewed at a future inspection.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (322/78-02-01) - Failure to control
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weld material in accordance with procedures. The inspector
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examined weekly QC inspection reports, (May 8-July 28,1978)
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and the graph of amount of loose electrodes found during QC
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surveillance between January 6 and July 28, 1978, as maintained
by the S&W Q'c Superintendent. This information, in conjunction
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with that obtained during IE inspection No. 50-322/78-06, and
observations by other IE inspectors during plant tour and
other work activity inspection, represents basis for concluding
that effective corrective action his been taken in this area.
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4.
Licensee Action on NRC Issued Bulletins
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The inspector reviewed site records relating to NRC issued Bulletins,
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and discussed the followup actions with the responsible site
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individuals in the licensee and the constructor's organizations. He
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verified that the Bulletins were assigned for action to appropriate
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management as provided by LILCo project procedure P202, and that
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responsibility for subsequent future actions was delegated.
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The
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inspector considered accuracy of the licensee's response, timeliness,
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evidence of described corrective action, and provisions to assure
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completion of defined corrective actions.
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For the following listed Bulletins, the licensee response was
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within the required time frame, the required responsibilities were
assigned, and corrective actions taken where required.
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The inspector
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found that where future procurement control responsibility had been
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defined, the monitoring controls had been assigned to S&W field QC.
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No provision had been made for followup by LILCo operations staff
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for replacement parts procured after system turnover to LILCo.
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Also, the S&W field QC system did not assure that the assigned
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monitoring responsibility would be discharged.
The individual
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assigned the responsibility has left and his replacement is not yet
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fully oriented. The correspondence subject file to be used by the
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individual did not include all three of the Bulletins (78-01,
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78-05,78-06)
for which action was required.
The FQC and
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Operations QA matters are unresolved.
(322/78-12-03)..
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(Bulletin 78-01) - Flammable contact-arm retainers in GE CR120A
relays. The ins
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in the licensee'pector verified actions and the evaluation described
s March 14, 1978 reply to NRC. The evaluation was
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reviewed as discussed in IE Inspection Report E0-322/78-06. Relevant
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documents examined included the following
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Memcranda:
FQC/ FED
dated March 7, 1978
FED /FQC
dated March 6, 1978
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QC Inspection Report
dat&d March 6, 1978
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(Bulletin 78-05) - Auxiliary contact mechanism in GE model CR105X
The inspector verified actions described in the licensee
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breakers.
June 14, 1977 reply to NRC. The inspector also advised the staffs af
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S&W FQC and LILCo 0QA of a similar problem involving loose plunger
Relevent documents examined included the following site
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screws.
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memoranda:
- SE0/FQC
dated June 23, 1978
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- Project Office /SE0
dated June 16, 1978
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(Bulletin 78-06) - Clearing-contact arc-gap in Cutler-Hammer type M
The LILCo project office obtained contractor design evaluation
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relays.
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to ascertain that this type relay was not specified for-this plant.
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A copy of-this Bulletin was not available at the responsible S&W
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field,QC office for followup, as discussed above.
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5.
Licensee Actions to Resolve Construction Deficiencies Reoorted
Under 10 CFR 60.55(e)
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A.
Vulnerability of GE model NGV undervoltage relays to failure
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from repeated adjustment of ohmite potentiometers:
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The inspector examined records of actions described in the
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licensee's letter to NRC dated April 1, 1978, and interviewed
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responsible engineering, procurement and quality control field
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personnel regarding such actions.
The licensee has requested
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GE to provide 22 replacement relays; ten have arrived at the
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site and are pending installation.
The inspector had no
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further questions on this item.
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The inspector examined the following specific documents relative
to the above:
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Interoffice Correspondence -
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LILCo Startup Group /GE IS&E dated April 3,1978
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LILCo Startup Group /LILCo Project Office dated March 1,
1978
GEIS&E/LILCo Startup Group dated July 21, 1978
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Startup form 7.9 (Revision 3) "NGV Voltage Relay Test"
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Inter 1ffice Memorandum -
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S&W Assistant Project Engineer /S&W Field QC dated April
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20, 1978
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S&W Field QC/S&W Assistant Project Engineer dated June
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19, 1978
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LILCo Deficiency Report - #0164
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Bent fuseholder clAgt ca GE switchgear
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The inspectot v.gai
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licensee's le(cer tu itiiC dated May 1,1978, and interviewed
responsible operations QA staff regarding this matter.
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Records and interviews indicate that the corrective actions
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have been completed and inspected by site QC staff.
This work
was handled under the Operations QA program and appeared
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effectively controlled and documented.
The inspector had no
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further questions on this item.
The inspector examined the following specific documents
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relative to the above:
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LILCo
Repair / Rework Request
- R-22-26
4/13/78
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LILCo
Verificat1on keport
- RRR 22-26
8/1/78
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LILCo
Revolve Request. Checklist
- R-22-26
4/13/78
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LILCo
Deficiency Report
- 0168
4/6/78
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50.55(e) Report 5/1/78
4/13/78 verbal 4/6/78.
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6.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Welding Work Activities
The intermediate weld passes of the nuclear class I, 12" diameter,
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feedwater pipe, designated 1821-IC176 - R401 were observed by the
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inspector. He verified the weld location and identification, the
proper welding procedure was being used, the preheat /interpass
temperature, the welders qualification, the proper weld material,
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the appearance of the weld, and evidence of quality control checks.
The foregoing activities were being conducted in accordance with
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the ASME III and IX Codes, specification SH1-056 Field Fabrication
and Erection of Piping, and regulatory requirements.
No items of
noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Discharge Piping Flange Weld Size
During plant tour activities the inspector noted that the weld size
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on the inside diameter (front weld) of the slip on flange (SOF) for
the safety relief valve discharge pipe spool 1B21-SLP-211-3-1 did
not appear to be large enough.
Measurements by the licensee and
the NRC inspector disclosed that the weld is less than specified by
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the ASME III Code, subsection ND.
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welds on the outside diameter (back welds)pector measured the SOF
of the pipe spools 18214LP-211-3-1
and 1821-SLP-203-3-1
and found these to be less than 3/8" in
some areas.
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The vendor form NPP-1 for these spools shows them to be designed to
ASME III Code-1971 edition, class 3, as 10" diameter, standard
weight seamless pipe.
The wall thickness of this pipe is .365".
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The ASME III Code, subsection ND-3661.1 requires that the inside
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diameter (front) weld size for a SOF be equal to the nominal pipe
wall or 1/4", whichever is smaller,
in this case 1/4" .
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This same subsection requires that the outside diameter (back) weld
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size for SOF be equal to 1.4 times the nominal pipe wall thickness
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or the thickness of the hub, in this case 1.4X .365" = .511".
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In both cases, the weld sizes are less than those prescribed by the
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ASME III Code for Class 3 SOF. This is an item of noncompliance
(322/78-12-01).
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8.
Pipe Break Restraint Weld Joint Angles
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During the plant tour, the inspector observed that the weld joint
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angle for the feedwater pipe break restraint W.15 appeared to
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have an included angle approaching 30*.
Further inspection disclosed
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that the welding document package utilized the welding technique
sheet W70H(0) which is an AWS D1.1-72 prequalified procedure.
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weld joint is designed to satisfy the prequalified joint configura-
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tion prescribed by AWS Dl.1-72, paragraph 2.9. and figure BU-4.
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The AWS Code limits the included weld joint angle to 45" (+10 -0).
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Measurements of the weld joint angles verified that they were 30 .
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A review of the drawing no. M-12307 (S&W No. FV-40D-2), detail P,
shows that the parts were designed to provide a 30* angle. This
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drawing series, FV-40, depicts the construction details for the
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control rod drive, feed.mter, main steam, reactor water cleanup,
and high pressur coolant injection systems.
The design, fabrication, and installation of seismic category I
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pipe break restraints, using a prequalified AWS Dl.1-72 welding
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procedure for weld joints that do not meet AWS requirements, is an
item of noncompliance (322/78-12-02).
9.
Impact of 10 CFR 21
The licensee site representatives met with the inspector to discuss
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the impact of 10 CRF 21 requirements on the project. They advised
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that some vendors would not accept purchase orders with statements
of part 21 applicability included.
Purchases of the following
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types were described as particularly troublesome.
Catalog, non-engineered items
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Supplements to existing (non-part 21) purchase orders
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Sub-tier vendors in special cases
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Spare parts purchases from original (non-part 21) vendors.
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The inspector advised that the construction permit was subject to
compliance with all applicable provisions of NRC regulations, and
formal correspondence regarding this matter should be addressed to
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Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC. Results of IE inspection 50-
322/78-05, and current interviews with site purchasing and project
staff, indicated that 10 CFR 21.31 is being implemented.
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10. Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is
required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items,
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items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item dis-
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closed during the inspection is discussed in Paragrap'h 4.
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11. Exit Interview
At the conclusion of the inspection on August 11, 1978 a meeting
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was held at the Shoreham site with representatives oi the licensee
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personnel whose names are indicated by notation (*) in paragraph 1.
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The inspectors summarized the results of the inspection as described
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in this report.
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