ML20059N209
| ML20059N209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah, Pilgrim, Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1990 |
| From: | Chaffee A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OREM-90-023, OREM-90-23, NUDOCS 9010100250 | |
| Download: ML20059N209 (20) | |
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September < 21',.1990 4
.MEMORdNDUMFOR:'
Charles.E. Rossi, Director Division of; Operational Events' Assessment--
'FROM:
Alfred E. Chaffee', Chief Events Assessment' Branch i
Division of Operational Events' Assessment
SUBJECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING'
-SEPTEMBER-19, 1990-- MEETING 90-23 u
OnSeptember19,_160,weTeonductedanOperatingReactorsEventsmeeting(90-23) to inform senior managers from.NRR, ACRS,..AE00, RES, Commission staff, and i
regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on September 5, 1990. ' lists the attendees. Enclosure 2 presents the significant elements of the discussed events.
Enclosure.3 contains reactor scram' statistics for'the weeks ending 09/09/90 and 09/16/90.. Enclosure 4 tabulates three significant events-which were identified for-input into the NRC performance indicator program.
s jriginal signed by l
Alfred.E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch
. Division of Operational Events Assessment
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ Encl.:
See Next Page i
M iDISTRIBUTION:
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'd DATE :09/,t//90
- 09/g/90
- 09/2; /90 W:
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.Septen ber 21, 1990 4
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MEMORANDUM FOR:.
Char.les E. Rossi, Director
- I
/*
Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:
Alfred E.~Chaffee, Chief
. Events Assessment Branch
. Division of Operational Events Assessment Wm SU" JECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS-EVENTS MEETING h
/
SEPTEMBER:19, 1990 -' MEETING 90 23 On September'19, 1990, we conducted.an Operating Reactors Events meeting ~(90-23) to inform senior managers f om NRR, ACRS, AEOD, RES, Comission staff, and-regional offices'of selecteo events that occurred since our last briefing;on j
September 5, 1990. lists the~ attendees. presents the significant elements of the discussed events.
s 'contains reactor scram statistics.for the weeks ending 09/09/90 and.
0 2
09/16/90. Enclosure 4 tabulates three significant events which tere identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.
i Sriginal signed by y
' Alfred E. C'haffee, Chief
. Events Assessment Branch
,(
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ Encl.:
e See Next.Page DISTRIBUTION:
1 Central File c
EAD Reading File Circulating Copy, EAB Staff MLReardon, EAB 1
o LKilgore, SECY PDR 4
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- 09/g/90
- 09/2 /90 4
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T. Murley, NRR:
J. Donohew, NRR
'F. Miraglia, NRR F. Hebdon, NRR' W. Russell; NRR R. Eaton, NRR
'F. Gillespie, NRR-R. Wessman, NRR
-J. Partlow, NRR 4.-Bournia, NRR 3
1S.;Varga, NRR,
R.:Wessman, NRR-G. Lainas, NRR~.
'D' Crutchfield, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR-B. Eoger,;NRR W. Travers,'NRR-3 J.~ Richardson,.NRR 4
A. Thadani, NRR-F. Rosa ~, NRR' B; Grimes, NRR'
-F. Conges, NRR J. Roe,-NRR T. Martin, RI-'
W. Kane, RI.
t C. Hehl, RI
- 3. Ebneter, RII, a
L.- Reyes.. RII -
B. Davis, RIII E. Greenman, RIIIc S. Collins, RIV-R.D. Martin, RIV--
J.B. Martin, RV '
R. Zimmerman, RY
'P. Eaehnert,-.ACRS E. Jordan,-AEOD
-T. Novak, AE00
=L. Spessard, AEOD E. Weiss, AE00-S. Rubin, AE00-M.: Harper, AE0D W. Bateman,-EDO
--R. Newlin, GPA
.J. Cowan, INPO E. Beckjord, RES A. Bates SECY-9 1
L----.- --
--. ----~-----
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n'J ENCLOSURE 1 r
1 1
s LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (90-23) 1
, September 19. 1990.
l
~ NAME 0RGAN12ATION NAME ORGANIZATIOF
'l P. Bochnert;
>ACRS A. Chaffee
'NRR/DOEA 1
R. Karsch NRR/DOEA-J. Thompson NRR/D0EA-B. Boger?
NRR/ADR4/5 D. Fischer NRR/00EA C.-Rossi NRR/DOEA W. Minners RES/DSIR G. Hsii
'NRR/SRXB L. !!nrrhnlm OCM/KC D. Norkin NRR/DRIS R. VanHouten SECY t
' V. Benaroya-AE0D/DSP S. long NRR/DREP M. Reardon-NRR/DOEA J.'Bradfute NRR/DP-5 C. Thomas NRR/DLPQ G. Holahan!
NRR/ DST A. Bournia' NRR/PD4-1 R. Li
'NRR/EMEB N. Fields NRR/DOEA M. Case NRR/DLPQ o
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i OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING'90-23
[
EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH-1 1.
LOCATION:
10B-11, WHITE FLINT-WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1990, 11iOO A,M.
I'
'1 SEQUOYAH UNITS 1 a-2 P'2_PUILDUP IN COOLING CHARGING PUMP SUCTION LINES I
2 PILGRIM-FEEDWATER PERTURBATION OF SEPTEMBER 2, 1990 FORT CALHOUN POTENTIAL EMERGENCY D1ESEL GENERATOR INOPERABILITY a
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90-23 x
m ui; SEQUOYAH UNITS-1 &'2-
[
-}]2l BUILDUP >IN COOLING CHARGING PUMP SUCTION LINES AUGUST 22:&-SEPTEMBER 6, 1990 q
s m
PROBLEM:.
to THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED HYDR 0 GEN GAS BUILDUP'IN THE CHA8'41NG SYSTEM ON BOTH UNITS GREATER THAN THAT ASSUMED ACCEPTABLE BY t
THE WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSIS (6CF) 4 1
k CAUSE:
.o.
PROBABLE-CAUSE FOR BOTH EVENTS WAS INADEQUATE REVIEW 0F IN 3"
88-23, " POTENTIAL FOR GAS BINDING 0F HIGH-PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS DURING A LOCA",
I
' SAFETY S'1GNIFICANCE:
o. GAS BINDING OF THE HIGH PRESSURE SI PUMPS DURING THE RECIRCULA-
-T10N' PHASE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE RISK FOR A SMALL-BREAK LOCA.
o-IN SPITE OF-REPEATED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS, INDUSTRY HAS FAILED TO-IDENTIFY AND: CORRECT SITUATIONS THAT COULD RESULT IN GAS' BINDING OF ECCS PUMPS
-UNIT 2 EVENT:
- 0 0N' AUGUST 22, 1990, UNIT 2 AT 70 % POWER, Wi1H THE "A" PUMP IN OPERATION, "B"
PUMP IN STANDBY.
LICENSEE PERFORMING T/S-
. SURVEILLANCE ON "B" PUMP, o
o WHEN THE "B" PUMP WAS STARTED, THE OPERATOR OBSERVED FLUCTUATION OF=THE PUMP's MOTOR AMPS AND LOW FLOW, THIS CAUSED THE LICENSEE TO SUSPECT THAT GAS HAD ACCUMULATED ON THE SUCTION-SIDE OF THE "B" PUMP, CONTACT:
J. THOMPSON (49-21171)
SIGEVENT:
YES I
REFERENCES:
10 CFR 50.72 # 19292 AND 19182
l i.....
SEQUOYAH UNITS 1 & 2 -
90-23; p
-o VENTING 0F THE-SUCTION PIPING REVEALED ACCUMULATION OF GAS IN THE SUCTION PIPING OF-THE "B" PUMP IN EXCESS OF 6 cF, THE AM00flT ASSUMED ACCEPTABLE IN THE WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSIS, (5,3 cF' 0F. GAS WAS VENTED FROM THE SUCT10ft-SIDE OF THE PUMP PLUS THERE j
WAS 4.75 CF 0F THAT COULD NOT BE VENTED).
o THE GAS'WAS ANALYZED TO BE 98 PERCENT HYDROGEN, 1
UNIT-1 EVENT:
o ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1993, UNIT 1 ALSO FOUND A HYDR 0 GEN BUBBLE (LARGER THAN 6 CF) ON THE SUCTION-SIDE OF THE CilARGING PUMPS,
.THE GAS WAS COLLECTIh3 IN THE PIPING-BETWEEN THE "A" RHR PUMP l
AND THE CHARGINE PUMP 3, o
LICENSEE CALCULATED THAT VENTING WAS: REQUIRED EVERY 8-HRS. TO MAINTAIN HYDROGEN ACCUMULATION BELOW-6 CF WHILE AT POWER, DISCUSSION:
j
.o WESTlflGHOUSE ICE CONDENSERS ARE AT HIGHER RISK BECAUSE OF THE L
SMALLER CONTAINMENT VOLUME - CONTAINMENT SPRAYS ARE REQUIRED TO START S0ONER AND THUS THE RWST MAY BE DRAINED WITHIN 30 MIN, i
SUMP RECIRCULATION VIA RHR-T0-CHARGING PUMPS MAY BE REQUIRED WITHIN 20 MIN, o
POTENTIAL GAS BINDING.0F CHARGING PUMPS PROBLEM IS NOT LIMITED 3
T0' WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS o
EXISTING WEST STANDARD T/S ON ECCS PUMP SURVEILLANCE REQUIRES THAT ECCS PUMP CASES AND DISCHARGE PIPING IS CHECKED F'R GAS ACCUMULATION, NOT SUCTION-SIDE u
o IN 88-23, " POTENTIAL FOR GAS BINDING 0F HIGH-PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS DURING A LOCA" (5/88) DISCUSSES THE FEB. 26 FARLEY EVENT
~
o IN 88-23, SUPPLEMENT 1 WAS ISSUED 1/89.
SUBJECT WAS CHARGING PUMP GAS BINDING EVENTS AT SOUTH TEXAS, NORTil ANNA, AND SURRY-AND WAS SIMILAR TO THE FARLEY GAS BINDING EVENT, o
IN 88-23, SUPPLEMENT 2 8 3 DATED 1/90 AND (9/90 EST) DESCRIBE DIFFERENT WAYS TO GAS BIND CHARGING PUMPS, l
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'$hL OSEQUOYAH' UNITS 1 8.2
- 90-23
%v
. x FOLLOWUP:.
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-o EAB IS PREPARiflG ANOTHER SUPPLEMENT'TO IN 88-23 THAT. DESCRIBES I,,
THE EVENTS Jrf SEQUOYAH AND THEIR PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, c' REACTOR' SYSTEMS BRANCH, (WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE RISK APPLICATIONS BRANCH, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING' BRANCH, REGION 11, AND DOEA) ARE CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES (SUCH AS ISSUANCES 0F 3
i s
50,54 F LETTERS) FOR DETERMINING:
[,
o THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF GAS ACCUMULATION IN. CHARGING PUMP SUCTION PIPING, o
THE ADEQUACY OF LICENSEE ACTION (IF ANY) TAKEN IN RESPONSE-
^
T0.PREVIOUSLY ISSUED ins, o
APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED-T0 i
7 RESOLVE THIS CONCERN.
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'. c ll v-V Ei4ERGENCY CORE COOLING-SYSTEMS.
i
-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a..
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves q
are in the indicated positions with power lockout switches in the l
lockout ~ position:
Valve Number Valvo Function Valve Position HV-8835 SI Pump Cold Leg. Inj.
OPEN HV-8840 RHR Pump Hot Leg. Inj.
CLOSED HV-8813 SI Pump Mini. Flow Isol.
OPEN HV-8806 SI Pump Suction from RWST' OPEN HV-8802A, B SI Pump Hot Leg Inj.
CLOSED HV-8809A, B RHR Pump Cold Leg Inj.
OPEN h.
At least once per 31 days by:
1)
Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the-ECCS pump casings and accessible discnarge piping high points, 2)
Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise-secured in position,-is in its correct position.
c.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the Containment-Emergency Sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions.
This visual inspection shall be performed:
-1)
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establish-ing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2)
Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of-each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
i d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1)
Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring.that:
a)
With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 377 psig the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, and b)
With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant Systen pressure, [-
signal less than or equal to 750 psig the interlo~cks will cause the valves to automatically close.
2)
A visual inspection of the Containment, Emergency Sump and verify-ing that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no h
evidence af structural distress or abnormal corrosion.
9 V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-4
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90-23 m
s PILGRIM UPDATE:
FEEDWATER PERTURBATION EVENT SEPTEMBER 2, 1990 n
- PROBLEM:
o '0VER-PRESSURIZATION OF THE RCIC-SUCTION P.IPING BY THE SAME.
MECHANISM AS THE EVENT ON 11/12/89 WHICH CAUSED AN APRIL 13, 1989'AIT.
i o
HYDRODYNAMIC EVENT IN THE SUCTION PIPING TO THE RHR PUMPS DURING INITIATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLING CAUSE:
o LEAKING RCIC PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE..
o IMPROPER RHR PUMP' SUCTION VENTIhG.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
o SOME POTENTIAL FOR HIGH PRESSURE TO LOW, PRESSURE SYSTEM LOCA IF FEEDWATER-ISOLATION VALVE FAILS AND RCIC DISCHARGE MOVs CANNOT-BE CLOSED AGAINST FULL SYSTEM D/P.
O POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE RESULTING IN REDUCED DECAY HEAT REMOVAL-CAPABILITY.-
- DISCUSSION:
o-ElGHT INSTANCES OF MATERIAL DEFICIENCY CAUSED THE INITIAL PROBLEM OR COMPLICATED THE POST TRIP RECOVERY.
PART I:
o THIS IS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PRESENTED BY THE LICENSEES MULTIDISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION TEAM TO REGION I ON 9/12/90.
't o-FOLLOWING THE MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON 9/2/90 THE OPERATORS MANUALLY STARTED RCIC PER A PROCEDURE THAT WAS REWRITTEN AS A RESULT OF AIT FINDINGS DOCUMENTED IN A REPORT DATED 5/8/89.
o THIS PROCEDURE HAD NEVER BEEN VERIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.
CONTACT:
R. KARSCH SIGEVENT:
+
REFERENCE:
10 CFR 50.72 # 19270
'j 'I -
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PILGRIN-90-23.
L o' A DEFICIENCY lN THE MECHANICS OF'THE PROCEDURE RESULTED IN FAILURE OF THE RCIC TURBINE'S THROTTLE VALVE, DURING AN ATTEMPTED RESTART THE SUCTION LINE WAS OVERPRESSURIZED,
[
o
^
, - o LEAKAGE-PAST THE PUMP'S DISCHAPGE CHECK VALVE AND THROUGH THE PUMP. PRESSURIZED THE SUCTION PIPING, o
THE SUCTION.PlPING RELIEF VALVE LIFTED WHEN ITS SETP0 INT WAS EXCEEDED, BUT IN-LEAKAGE EXCEEDED THE RELIEF CAPACITY.,
TL1THE SUCTION PIPING WAS PRESSURIZED-T0 BETWEEN 600 AND 800 PSI FOR ABOUT AS SECONDS, o
THE 0VER PRESSURIZATION WAS TERMINATED BY CLOSURE OF THE PUMP I
DISCHARGE BLOCK VALVE, o
THE PRESSURE RATING OF THE SUCTION PIPING IS 80 PSI AT i
170*F t 150 PSI 8 500*F, THE LICENSEE REPORTED NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE PIPE OR ASSOCIATED PIPE HANGERS, o
THE LICENSEE CONSIDERS THIS OVERPRESSURIZATION EVENT TO BE LESS SEVERE THAN-THE'1989 EVENT, PART II:
o' THE LICENSEE CHARACTERIZES THE RHR-SUCTION PIPING EVENT AS A i
" HYDRODYNAMIC EVENT" VS.A WATER HAMMER, o
THE AFFECTED TRAIF (TRAIN "A") 0F RHR HAS.A HISTORY OF OVER PRESSURE ISOLATIONS DURING ALIGNMENT TO THE : SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE, d
o A LOOSE PIPE HANGER WAS DISCOVERED, BUT MAY HAVE PREVIOUSLY.
- EXISTED, o
THE LICENSEE WILL MODIFY PROCEDURES T0 PREFERENTIALLY USE THE OTHER RhR TRAIN FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING, o
REMOTELY OPERATED HIGH POINT VENTS WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE d
INACCESSIBLE-AREAS OF SUCTION PIPING FOR THE AFFECTED TRAIN, l
I
90-23
PILGRIM' THE LICENSEE REPORTS THE RESULTS OF TH FOLLOW UP_:
INVESTIGATION TEAM TO REGION I WHO DEC o
THE LICENSEE'S INVESTIGATION AND CORR AND PLANT RESTART IS JUSTIFIED.
ON 9/17/90 DURING PPFPARATIONS FOR ST TRANSIENT WHILE SECURING THE RHR o
A VESSEL LEVEL INCE:
THE MECHANISM FOR SYSTEM FROM THE SHUTDCWN COOLING MODE.
THIS TRANSIENT IS UNDERGOING EAB REVIEW I
s [..
1.
I FORT CALHOUN UNIT 1 POTENTIAL EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABILITY TJUNE 25, 1990
-PROBLEM 0
A POTENTIAL COMMON MODE FAILURE RESULTING FROM ELEVATED AMBIENT TEMPERATURES IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR-(EDG)-ROOMS, o
POTENTIAL EDG DERATING DUE TO ELEVATED AMBIENT TEMPERATURES.
l CAUSE o
ORIGINAL DESIGN INADEQUACY, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE o
POTENTIAL LOSS OF EDG CAPABILITY l
DISCUSSION o
ON JUNE 25, 1990, DURING AN EXTENDED RUN, FULL LOAD TEST OF-THE EDG-1, UNDER HIGH AMBIENT TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS, FAILURE OF A COMP 0NENT IN THE STATIC EXCITER VOLTAGE REGULATOR (EXCITER / REGULATOR) CIRCulTRY CAUSED GENERATOR OUTPUT-CURRENT TO SURGE TO ABNORMALLY HIGH LEVELS RESULTING'IN A FUSE BLOWING IN THE GENERATOR FIELD CIRCUIT.
THE DIESEL WAS SHUT DOWN AND DECLARED INOPERABLE.
o SUBSEQUENT' INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT TEMPERATURES IN THE REGULATOR CABINET HAD REACHED 140 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT (THE CABINET IS TOTALLY ENCLOSED AND UNVENTILATED).
THE FAILURE i
OF THE CIRCulT COMPONENT HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO THIS ELEVATED TEMPERATURE, o
TO REESTABLISH'THE OPERABILITY OF EDG-1, THE LICENSEE REPLACED THE FAILED CIRCulT COMPONENT AND INSTITUTED A-TEMPORARY MODIF1-CATION TO REMOVE THE D0 ORS TO THE CABINETS HOUSING THE EXCITER /
REGULATOR CIRCulTRY-FOR BOTH THE EDG-1 AND EDG-2.
A PERMANENT LONG TERM MODIFICATION FOR THE CABINETS IS UNDER REVIEW o
A RECENTLY COMPLETED ENGINEERING ANALYSIS VERIFIED THAT A COMMON MODE FAILURE (INADEQUATE CABINET VENTILATION) 0F BOTH EDGS HAS LIKELY EXISTED SINCE INITIAL STARTUP CONTACT: NICK FIELDS SIGEVENT:
YES
REFERENCE:
EVENT 19354, 19395,
~
'fCRTCdLHbuNLUNIT;l
~ 90-23 T*
o AS A RESULT OF THIS. EVENT,31T HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE EDGS COULD BE SUBJECT.TO CAPACITYLDERATINGS WITH INCREASING AEBIENT AIR' TEMPERATURES.
TURB0 CHARGER INLET TEMPERATURE AND JACKET WATER OUTLET TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS REQUIRE THAT AMBIENT-AIR TEMPERATURES? DO.NOT EXCEED 107 DEGREES F FOR EDG-l' AND.
103 DEGREES F FOR EDG-2, 4
OTHER EVENTS
- c. ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1990, THE LICENSEE FOR WNP 2' REPORTED TO THE NRC AN INTENT TO REMOVE THE DOORS TO THE STATIC EXCITER V0LTAGE REGULATOR CABINETS'WHEN EDG'R00M TEMPERATURES EXCEED 90 DEGREES F (LICENSEE'IS WRITING DEVIATIONS TO PLANT PROCEDURES REQUIRING REMOVAL 0F THE DOORS AS A TEMPORARY SOLUTION TO THELPROBLEM.
3 A LONG TERM SOLUTION HAS NOT BEEN FORMULATED) o OTHER PLANTS AT'WHICH. ELEVATED AMBIENT ROOM TEMPERATURE HAVE RESULTED IN ADVERSE IMPACTS ON THE OPERABILITY OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT-INCLUDE TROJAN, RIVER BEND AND SUSQEHANNA o :AN AE0D CASE STUDY PUBLISHED IN DECEMBER 1986 IDENTIFIED FOUR l
EVENTSEINVOLVING FAILURES AND DEGRADATION OF ELECTRONIC CIRCullic.
COMPONENTS IN SAFETY-RELATED CABINETS DUE TO OVERHEATING.
ONE 0F THE EVENTS INVOLVED THE TOTAL LOSS OF CONTROL AREA VENTILA -
T10N AT THE MCGUIRE STATION LEADING TO SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATION.
" POTENTIAL LOSS'0F SOLID-STATE INSTRUMENTATION FOLLOWING FAILURE OF CONTROL ROOM COOLING", NOVEMBER 1985 WAS ISSUED WHICH-DOCUMENTS THE MCGulRE EVENT 1
FOLLOWUP o
REGION IV HAS DRAFTED AN INFORMATION NOTICE DESCRIBING THE FORT CALHOUN EVENT
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ENCLOSURE 3 m,
- 1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA
' MTE., Slit '
UNIT POWER 518NAL CAUSE COMPLI-YTB YTD YTD
,g' CA110NS AB0VE BELON TOTAL 151 151 w
09/10/90 LIMERICK 2 100 A'.
E0'JIPMENT
- NO '
4 2 --
0
-2
- 09/10/90 COMNCNE PEAK 1
91 A PERSONNEL NO -
7 8
09/10/90 SALEM 1
79 A PERSONNEL NO 3
1 4:
09/10/90 DUANE A U LD 1
25 A PERSONNEL NO 2
0 2
.09/12/90 LASALLE 2 100 4 EQUIPMENT-N0 2
0 2
09/13/90 OCONEE-2 0M EDUlPMENT NO 0-1
-1 09/13/90PALOVERDE 1
17 M EQUIPMENT NO
-2 0
2 l
09/13/90 DUANE ARNOLD 1
37 M EQUIPMENT NO.
3 0
3.
1 09/14/90 MILLSTONE 1 100 A EQUIPMENT NO 1
0 1
09/14/90 SE000YAH 1
100 A EQUIPMENT NO 1
1 2
09/15/90 SOUTH TEIAS-2 100 M PERSONNEL NO 4
0 4
09/15/90 COMANCHE PEAK.
1 54 M PERSONNEL
' NO -
8 1
9 3
09/16/90 6AAND SULF 1
93 A EDUlPMENT IND 2
0 2
1 1
i i
--t f1EACTOR SCRAM
SUMMARY
NEEK ENDIN6 09/09/90
- 1. PLAN 1 ".raC DATA i
DATE SITE UNIT PONER 516NAL CAU5t COMPLI-YTD YTD Y10 CA110NS ABOYE BELON T OT.'.L 151 151 09/03/90HADDAMNECK 1
80 M EQUIPMENT NO 1
1 2
09/04/90 SALEM 2 100 A EDUlPMENT NO 2
0 2
09/05/90 NINE MILE POINT 2
64 A EQUIPMENT NO 2
0 2
09/07/90 COMANCHE PEAK 1 100 M EQUIPMENT NO 5
1 6
09/07/90 110N 2
98 A EQUIPMENT NO 2
0 2
1 09/08/90 COMANCHE PEAK 1
38 A EQUIPMENT NO 6
1 7
+
_ _ _ _............ ~.
w
.30 COMPAR2 SON OF WEEKLY SYATtSTICS WfTH 3NDUSTRY AVERASLS SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 09/16/90 J'
SCRAM CAUSE POWER
AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE A')ERAGE YTD (3)(4)
- POWEh >15%
.EOUIP. RELATED
>15%
7 3.4 2.9 3.1 3.9 4.3 p.
PERS. RELATED(6) >15%
3 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8 OTHER(7)
>15%
0 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.4
- Subtotal **
12 4.0 4.0 4.6 6.4 6.5
- POWER <15%
'EDUIP. RELATED
<15%
i O.4 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 f
PERS. RELATED.
<10%
0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 OTHER
<15%
0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 g
- Subtotal **
1 0.5 1.4 0.9 2.1 2.4
- Total ***
13 4.5 5.4 5.5 8.5 8.9 MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAM 5 E-TiPE NUMBER 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD
{
MANUAL SCRAMS 5
1,3 o,9 3,o.
1.4 1.0 AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 8
3.2 3,9 4.5 7.'O '
7.9 u
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=-
=.
- .1
'Ik.COMPCRISON.0FWEEKLYSTATISTICOWITHINDUSTRYAVERAGE SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 09/09/90 BCRAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS (5)
AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD L3)(4)
- POWER >15%
EODIP. RELATED
>15%
6 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.9 4.3-i PERS. RELATED(6) >15%
0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8 OTHER(7)
>15%
0 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.4
- Subtotal **
6 3.7 4.0 4.6 6.4 6.5
- POWER <15%
EQUIP. RELATED
<15%
0 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 PERS. RELATED
<15%
0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 CTHER
<15%
0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2
- Subtotal **
O O.5 1.4 0.9 2.1 2.4
- Total ***
6 4.2 5.4 5.5' O.5 8.9 MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NUMBER 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY-WEEKLY-WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD MANUAL SCRAMS 2
1.2 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.0
' AUTOMATIC SCRids 4
3.1 3.8 4.5 7.0 7,9 1
L 1
p w-e
7.-
4*.
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NOTES 1.
PLANT SPECITIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK Of INTEREST.
PERIOD.IS HIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF FLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.
THERE ARE 11.1 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.
2.
COMPLICATI?NS: RFC0VERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
3.
PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
4.
"0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES(LIGHTNING),SYSTEMDESIGN,0RUNKNOWNCAUSE.
)
OEAB SCRAM DATA Marual and Automatic Screms for 1986 -----------------
Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1987 ------------------ 439 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1988 ------------------ 287 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 196) ------------------ 244 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1990 (YTD 09/16/90) --- 158 u
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C/12/90 ENCLOSURE 4 PERFCfX ' T INDICATORS S!6N!FICANT EVENTS
! N NAME '
EVENT EVENTDESCRIPi!0N DTR !!6NIF]C E E
)RUNSWICK 2 08/19/90 4 TECHN]C]AN TESTING THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLAT10N 0SCRAMWITHCOMPLICAil0NS.
LD61C iRIPPED THE NEIT CHANNEL BEFORE THE PREVIOUSLY iniffED CHANNEL NAS RESET. FIVE 3RVs FAILED TO LIFT AFTER THE MSIVs CLOSED.
PEACHB0110M2 08/13!S9 LICENSEE OPERATED UNii 2 W!iH NO EMER6ENCY SERVICE WATER 0DPERA110NDUTSIDETHELIM115DFTHE AUTOMAtlCALLY AVAILAPLE.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICA110NS.
SUSOUEHAWA 1 07/24/90 A 11NBLE FAILURE COULL FRIVENT AUIDMAi!C INITIAT10N OF 0 P01ENTIAL FOR DR ACTUAL MBRADATION C00LIN6 TO THE EMER6ENCV SWiiCHBEAR RODMS DURING A LOSS OFSAFETY-RELATEDFDuiihiNT.
n
[-
0F 0FFSITE FDNER OR A LDSS OF C00LANT ACCIDENT.
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