ML20059L431
| ML20059L431 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1994 |
| From: | Durr J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | J. J. Barton GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| References | |
| GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9402070027 | |
| Download: ML20059L431 (3) | |
Text
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JAN 2 71994 Docket No. 50-219 Mr. John J. Barton Vice President and Director GPU Nuclear Corporation Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station P. O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731
Dear Mr. Barton:
SUBJECT:
SUPPLEMENT 3 TO GENERIC LETTER (GL) 89-10, " SAFETY-RELATED-MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE TESTING AND SURVEILLANCE" In response to NRC-sponsored tests, the NRC staffissued Supplement 3 to Generic Letter
-(GL) 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," which requested licensees of Boiling Water Reactor nuclear nower plants to evaluate the capability of mctor-operated valves (MOVs) in lines connected directly to the reactor coolant system.
q Ast, sui of a Region I inspection at the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant on October 21 to ",1991, NRC staff members from NRR and Region I met with your staff at the Region I offict on February 21,1992, to discuss concerns raised regarding your response to Supplement 3 to GL 89-10 and other aspects of your GL 89-10 program. Our March 11,1992, letter documented a summary of the discussions and conclusions of this l
meeting and stated that the NRC staff would determine the acceptability of several assumptions made in your reassessment of Supplement 3 valves in the isolation condenser lines.
q Our specific concern was that you had determined that several MOVs in isolation condenser l
lines might not be capable of closing under the original design-basis differential pressure.
For each of those MOVs, the original design-basis differential pressure was lowered by relying on the presence of a timer to initiate automatic closure of the valve 35' seconds after i
I the postulated occurrence of a break in the line outside containment. Attempts by the control room operator to close the MOV earlier in the transient at a higher differential pressure might result in the MOV failing in a partially-open position if the motor was unable to
. deliver sufficient torque to trip the torque switch and the thermal overload device had been
'l
-l sized to allow motor burnout while trying to close the valve. You asserted that a control room operator could not recognize an isolation condenser line break and, therefore, would j
not attempt to close the valve within 35 seconds.
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i PDR ADOCK 05000219 P-PDR.
JMil 2 71994
~ GPU Nuclear Corporation 2
Our July 20,1992, letter notified you that the NRC staff had reviewed the issue and disagreed with your assumption that the control room operators would not take action to close these MOVs for a period of 35 seconds unless appropriate procedures and training, or physical restraints were in place to prevent the manual action. In that letter, we requested that you provide us with your planned action regarding the issue.
You responded to this request and provided additional clarifying information by letters dated September 25,1992, and June 28,1993. Subsequently, on. August 18, 1993, you notified the NRC staff that the Oyster Creek licensed operator training program was being updated to identify that the isolation condenser return line MOVs are sized to close based on the maximum differential pressure across the valve resulting from upstream reactor coolant system pressure decay over the 35-second isolation signal delay time.
The NRC staff has determined that your justification for proper operator action after the 35-second delay for closing the isolation condenser return line MOVs is acceptable. Based on inspection efforts, discussions with your personnel, and review of the information submitted, we conclude that you have met the intent of Supplement 3 to GL 89-10 and your action is-sufficient for the near term. However, these marginal MOVs must be modified by the committed end date of the GL 89-10 program to allow the MOVs to be capable of performing their design function without reliance on operator inaction for 35 seconds.
Further, you will need to continue to evaluate the MOVs within the scope of Supplement 3 to GL 89-10, and all the other MOVs within the GL 89-10 program, at Oyster Creek to ensure that new plant and industry test information does not raise questions regarding their j
capability. The completion of these actions and your implementation'of GL 89-10 will continue to be the focus of future inspections.
Your cooperation with us in this matter has been appreciated.
l Sincerely,
{
Jacq > P. Durr, Chief Engineering Branch.
i Division of Reactor Safety l
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. JAN 2 7 !994 GPU Nuclear Corporation 3
l cc:
M. Laggart, Manager, Corporate Licensing l
G. Busch, Manager, Site Licensing, Oyster Creek Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) l NRC Resident Inspector 1
State of New Jersey-1 bec:
.i Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
J. Rogge, DRP j
V. McCree, OEDO J. Stolz, NRR/PD l-4 i
A. Dromerick, NRR/PD l-4 J. Wermiel, NRR J. Norberg, NRR i
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Scarbrough Durr 4YNf
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OFFICIAL PICORD COPY A:OCMOVLTR.FLB i
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