ML20059H549
| ML20059H549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1990 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059H546 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9009180054 | |
| Download: ML20059H549 (3) | |
Text
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PROPOSEDBASESFORTECHNICALSPECIFICATION 3/4.9.11.2 s
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AL-90/or REFUELING OPERATIONS-8ASES 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL M UPPER CONTAINMENT FUEL STORAGE POO The rastriction-on movement offloadsLin excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly over other fuel assemblies in the storage pools ensures that in the event this" load-is dropped (1) the activity-release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in-
-the storage racks will not result in a critical array.
This assumption is
'l consistent with the activity release assumed,in the safety analyses, f
3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9.9 - WATER.EVEL - REACTOR-VESSEL and WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL AND UPPER CONTAIMENT FUEL arDRAGE PUU.5 The restrictions-on einlaus water-level ensure that sufficient water depth' j
3 is available to remove 995 of the assumed 105 iodine gap activity released from 1
the rupture of an irradiated. fuel assembly., This minimum water depth is consistent.with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.10 CONTROL R00 REMOVAL These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or control rod drives will-be performed under conditions that limit the' probability i
of inadvertent criticality.
The requirements for simultaneous-removal of more than one control rod are more stringent since the $HUTDOWN MARGIN ~ specification
.provides for the core to remain suberitical with only one control rod fully withdrawn. yggg.g 3/4.9.11 RE5100AL' HEAT REMOVAL AND C00LANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal loop.be OPERA 8LE and in' operation or that an af ternate nethod' capable of decay heat removal t:e demonstrated and that an alternate method.of coolant mixing be in operation; ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to' remove decay heat y
and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140'F as required.
i during REFUELING, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation would-be available
.i through the reactor core to assure accurate temperature ~ indication-and'to distribute and prevent stratification of the poison'inlthe event it becomes i
necessary to actuate the standby liquid' control'systes.,
The requirement to have two shutdown cooling. mode loops OPERA 8LE when there is less than 22 feet 8 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a completo loss of residual heat removal capability.
With the reactor vessel head removed and-22 feet 8 inches of. water above the reactor vessel flange,-a large heat sink.is available for core cooling.
Thus, in the event a failure of the operating-RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay heat rasoval or emergency procedures to cool the core.
3/4.9.12 H0RIZONTAL FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM The purpose of the horizontal fuel transfer systes specification is-to-control personnel access to those potentially high radiation areas.iemediately adjacent to the system and to assure safe operation of the system.
tMAND GULF-UNIT 1 8 3/4 9-2 Amenht b.-
n INSERT 1 TO BASES 3/4.9.11
. Page B3/4 9-2 An OPERABLELresidual heat' removal-(RHR) system shutdown cooling mode _ train consists.of at least one.0PERABLE RHR pump and one OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger train.
-INSERT 2 TO BASES-3/4.9.11 Page B3/4 9-2 1
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The alternate decay heat removal system (ADHRS)Lis designed'to provide decay; heat removal via the plant service water system.
ADHRS is capable of4 maintaining reactor coolant temperatures below technical specification limits during REFUELING operations.
For specification 3.9.11.2 additional' requirements a
are imposed during ADHRS o)eration since'ADHRS is not designed as a-i safety-related system and. las no onsite power supply capability.
An OP LE ADH i
the raactor coolinLmod_e consists of__two _0 PEP,ABLE ADHRS p_u aking uction_ rom _ r_eac_ tor rec rcuratioii system Toop 'B", passing the water through CSeat e'xMei3>and returning the water to the reactor ~ vessel twF 0PERA JBLE-6T I
I ection "C" injection liinef-In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, simultaneous operation of the ADHRS in the reactor-l cooling mode and RHR system shutdown cooling mode trains "A" and "B" is prohibited for certain alignments of these systems.
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