ML20059C275
| ML20059C275 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/31/1993 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059C261 | List: |
| References | |
| AEOD-S93-06, AEOD-S93-6, NUDOCS 9401050070 | |
| Download: ML20059C275 (12) | |
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that P&B had ceased to comply with 10 CFR 21 since the GE purchase order did not l
mention that compliance with 10 CFR 21 was required. P&B had adequately informed
'i other plants that the requirements of 10 CFR 21 would no longer be accepted, when i
purchase orders required compliance with 10 CFR 21.2a l
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J.11 Waterford Unit 3 I
On December 8,1991, a P&B MDR-7034 rotary relay used as the EFAS-2 Actuation Relay K-112, which controlled the emergency feedwater turbine steam valve EFAS-2 actuation, failed to drop out of the actuated position ~during a surveillance test. The licensee removed the relay and found the shaft would not rotate either electrically or l
manually." The MDR-7034 relay had been in service at 32 V dc (28 V de design) in a j
horizontal shaft configuration.
The relay was hand carried to P&B for disassembly and inspection on December 17, i
1991. P&B found varnish outgassing deposits readily visible on the top bell bearing i
surface, top and bottom spaces, top and bottom shock plates, and rotor assembly bearing l
surfaces and shims, consistent with those found in similar, previously analyzed MDR j
failures.
l CE also sent HRL one MDR relay for failure analysis. HRL used Energy Dispersive i
Spectroscopy to identify the foreign material as typical corrosion and coil outgassing products, including, chlorine, copper, sulfur, zinc, aluminum, carbon, and oxygen on the lower bushing. In addition to these elements, iron, chrome, titanium, calcium, i
a' i
phosphorous, silicon, and magnesium were found on the bearing surfaces on the rotor shaft.
i CE concluded that:
l i
Past analyses on similar failures of these relays has shown that over life, material used in coil construction outgasses due to elevated temperatures.
j The outgassed materials (moisture, chlorine, sulfur, etc.) then corrosively t
attack the metallic components of the relays. The corrosion of the by-j products then combine to effectively " penetrate" the bushings surface and l
prevent the operation of the relay.
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It should be noted that some chemical contaminants may have occurred I
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during manufacturing or disassembly of the relay prior to the failure analysis
.l by HRL Therefore, the chemical contaminants given in this analysis may include elements not resulting directly from the outgassmg.
CE recommended that it would be useful to examine additional relays which operate at
'l different temperatures.
i On December 17,1991, Waterford 3 personnel scanned all eight ESFAS cabinets with an f
infrared thermal imaging system, when the plant was at 100 percent power and the MDR
~
j relays were in their normal energization states. The operational and spare relays were j
9401050070 931230 PDR MISC 19 9401050061 PDR
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- H n p g gpyy y gggypqn;rg ggjggg mounted horizontally in two vertical columns of up to 9 relays with wires wrapped around them. In each cabinet, the hottest relays were in the upper half; the hottest relays found ranged from 147* F to 152* F.
Four additional operational MDRielays (-7034 [two], -7033, and -7032) were removed and evaluated by CE and HRL to determine the effect of air temperature and voltage.
Two high-temperature and two low-temperature relays were selected based on the thermographs provided by Entergy Operations. Selection of the relays by using thermal imaging failed to reveal a correlation of relay damage with temperature.
Three of the relays did not meet original electrical performance specifications. An MDR-7034 and an MDR-7032 relay were the most severely degraded in performance.
Both required greater than 24 V to latch and less than 3 V to drop out, yet the MDR-7034 had the most foreign material in the motor cavity while the MDR-7032 had the least in the 4 relays. The contacts on the MDR-7032 reopened between the initial closure and latching.
Inspection of all 4 relays found outgassing products and scoring on the bearing surfaces.
One relay's contacts discoloration was found to have been caused by sulfur, an outgassing product. The MDR-7033 relay had a moist, paste-like foreign substance rather than the dry dust noted in the other relays. Scanning electron microscope examination / energy dispersive spectrometry found carbon, oxygen, sodium, calcium, potassium, zinc, silicon, sulfur, chlorine, copper, iron, and chrome in varying amounts on the shaft bearing surfaces.
On May 1,1992, CE concluded that this and similar analyses showed a tendency for the coil varnish to outgas over the life of the relay. They could not determine which environment or electrical conditions would be more likely to exhibit outgassing that could eventually result in failures of MDR relays. CE recommended that Waterford 3 change to newer MDR relays, which alleviate the problem of outgassing and consider increasing the surveillance testing frequency for those MDR relays that could be tested without interruption of service.
On October 2,1992, an event occurred at Waterford Unit 3 that shows the potential i
affect of an MDR relay failure on multiple systems. While Waterford Unit 3 was in refueling, an improperly placed electrical jumper, during replacement of an MDR relay, resulted in the de-energization of 10 other ESFAS actuation relays, which affected the component cooling water, chilled water and safety injection. systems.2 Voltage checks made just after the event showed some voltage on the terminal board downstream of the break in the circuit, but apparently not enough to prevent the relays from de-energizing.
Part of the alligator clip was attached no more than one eighth of an inch out of position onto the terminal lug insulator.
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i 3.12 Information Notice No. 92-04. " Potter & Brumfield Model MDR Rotary Relav l
Failures" On January 4,1992, the NRC issued IN 92-0%, which discussed the P&B MDR relay failure investigations at Palo Verde'land River Bend, and P&B modifications to alleviate f
the rotor binding and contact problems noted in Section 3.9 of this study.
,11] Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-92-02-Ra On January 24,1992,E issued Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-92-02-RO,
" Misapplied Relay Contacts." SeveralE reactor sites had reported misapplied P&B MDR rotary relay contacts in solid state protection cabinets or auxiliary safeguard cabinets. Continued arcing after opening of the contact generated heat which melted a nylon cam in the MDR relay and burned the contacts. This situation occurred in
' Valcor or Target Rock solenoid valve circuits (or any other high normally enerf x
current de ind-.. _
ds) when the contacts were used to interrupt current beyond its rating.
The E bulletin noted that the de rating of the MDR contact was 0.3 amps inductive at 143 V de (expected equalizing charge). It indicated that two contacts in series would approximately double the rating. E recommended that specific reactors review any i
circuits with high de inductive loads to ascertain contact ratings had not been exceeded.
It noted that some plants had increased contact interrupting capability by adding a free wheeling diode in parallel with the solenoid coil and by connecting two contacts in ~ series (P&B did not recommend connecting two contacts in series - see Section 3.14 of this study). The bulletin noted two methods involving phcing a contactor between the relay contact and the de load and resistor-capacitor suppressors in parallel witl. the relay contacts to reduce or eliminate the arcing.
3.14 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Information Notice No. 92-19.
"Misappli_ cation of Potter & Brumfield MDR Rotary Relays" On March 2,1992, the NRC issued Information Notice No. 92-19, " Misapplication of Potter & Brumfield MDR Rotary Relays," which identified that MDR relays may have been misapplied to switch direct current or low level loads, when there was a substantial difference between the ac and dc current rating of the contacts and inductive loads were not included in the circuit design. Intermittent failures in status lights, computer input and display lights and switch low level loads, that could not be duplicated during subsequent testing, occurred at Shearon Harris and Waterford 3. P&B quoted the Engineers' Relay Handbook in explaining that:
D.C. loads are more difficult to turn off than A.C. loads because the DC voltage never passes through zero. As the contacts open, an arc is struck and may be sustained by the applied voltage until the distance between the opening contacts becomes too great for the arc to sustain itself. The arc energy can seriously erode away the contacts. Frequently arc extinguishing 21
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capabilities for D.C. inductive loads can be enhanced by connecting two-contacts in series. This provides a larger total contact gap and a faster rate of contact separation, thereby providing improved performance.
i Paralleling sets of relay con,6 cts to switch loads greater than a single set can handle is often unsuccessful. Lack of absolute simultaneity of contact opening results in one contact taking all the load causing early failure.
A relay contact rating does not necessarily apply for all loads from zero up to the magnitude specified. The fact that a contact can reliably switch 10 amperes does not necessarily mean it can reliably switch 10 milliamperes.
The MDR contact structure is designed for 10 amp 115 V ac 50 percent PF, 3 amp 28 V de resistive and 0.8125 V de resistive load switching. It does not have the contact structure design configuration necessary for low level switching applications that inhibit' contact resistance build up.
115 Millstone Unit 3 An NRC region 1 inspection in March 1992 of Millstone Unit 3's P&B MDR relay use found 266 MDR relays used in safety-related applications: 176 in the solid state protection system to provide automatic initiation of safety-related equipment and 90 in the control circuits for the 12 RCS loop isolation and bypass valves. Millstone 3 had replaced all normally energized P&B' relays after consideration of an industry report with relays from a different vendor. Since then one P&B relay failure occurred due to a design misapplication, which was corrected during the initial plant startup pgogram.
Based on this, the licensee calculated an P&B MDR failure rate of 8.1 x 10 per year at Millstone 3. Aside from this failure, none of the failures described in NRC IN 92-04 have occurred in 7 ye'rs of plant operation.21 3.16 Combustion Engineering TechNote No. 92-05 On August 20,1992, the Waterford 3 licensee notified the resident inspectors of problems CE found during qualification testing of 90 imp 2 roved MDR relays they had ordered, which resulted in P&B reworking an entire lot.
On September 4,1992, CE issued Combustion Engiacering TechNote No. 92-05, " Potter and [ sic] Brumfield MDR-series Relay Deficiencies."23 During the Environmental Qualification test, one of 15 relays failed to respond to input signals while at 137* F ar.d a second relay was sluggish to respond to input signals at 40* F. The first faibre was caused by insufficient end. play of the shaft caused by an oversized coil, over-shimming. and tolerance stackups, which resulted in binding of the rotor. The oversized coil reduced the rotor end play as it changed shape during heating.
In a subsequent conference call with the author of this study, CE representatives indicated they had learned from P&B that the allowable MDR relay rotor shaft end play was about.10" to.20", but that this had not been specified in writing by P&B.
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6 The second failure was caused by uncured Thermoset-103 epoxy on the stator interfering with rotor movement. This epoxy did not impede movement at higher temperatures, but slowed the rotor response time at 40 F to 12 seconds. CE noted the importance of a i
commercial grade dedication process.which contains all of the elements necessary to assure the item will perform it intbnded safety function. _
P&B rebuilt all affected relays. This consisted of disassembly, determination of epoxy cure, inspection under UV light for evider.ce of mi'splaced epoxy, removal of misplaced
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or uncured epoxy, coil size measuremer.1, and replacement of the stator assembly.
j P&B indicated they planned to notify their other customers if there was evidence that l
assemblies previously delivered may have been similarly affected. The resident inspectors referred the generic implications, that other plants' relay orders, such as River l
Bend, a BWR, may have been affected, to Region IV.
i 3.17 Susouchanna Units 1 and 2 In September 1992, Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 issued an evaluation of its P&B MDR relays as a result of NRC Information Notice 92-04.24 It found that the plant experienced 14 MDR relay failures (in 585 MDR relays-239 of which were normally energized) since 1984. Susquehanna had 69 work authorizations issued since 1982 which l
requisitioned MDR relays from their stores. Sixteen MDRs were replaced after failing in service. Three pairs of simultaneous failures occurred, one of which was the result of l
construction errors and therefore not included here. The study assumed that only continuously energized relays, as found during normal plant operations, were subject to l
the failure mechanism. Thus, safety-related relays which were de-energized during normal plant operations were not addressed, at that time.
In February 1984, a continuously-energized, MDR-5062 failure prevented a breaker from opening during a bus load shed surveillance test before commercial operation, and affected the timing of the 1D core spray pump start after a LOOP.
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t in July 1985, two MDR-4094 relays providing safety relief valve (SRV) position indication operated intermittently during a surveillance test.
In April 1986, a normally de-energized MDR-5062 relay's contacts stuck open preventing i
the "C' essential service water pump and the "1 A" residual heat removal pump from starting during a loss of power surveillance test (from NPRDS database, but not in the Susquehanna report).
In September 1986, an MDR-4094 relay's failure to de-energize kept an ESW pump l
supply fan running in automatic, when it should not have been.
I In February 1987, an MDR-4094 relay stuck caused the "D" ESSW pump fan to remain running after the "D" ESSW pump was shut down.
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In July 1988, an MDR-4094 relay was replaced along with several other relay and switches, when reactor building chiller "B" would not run.- The relay was in the energized '
condition but the cause of failure could not be determined.
In January 1988, an MDR-4094-I telay stuck preventing a control room operator from opening the feeder breaker for the *2A" reactor water cleanup pump to shutdown the pump.
In May 1992, a normally energized MDR-5151 relay stuck in its energized position, preventing indication of the correct position of a containment atmospheric control monitoring valve.
In September 1992, two, normally-energized, MDR-5062 relays stuck.in their energized positions, preventing the 1A and IB reactor recirculation pump motor-generator set drive motors from tripping during a surveillance test.
In September 1992, an MDR 5062 providing alarm indication of loss of control power to Core Spray "C', Div.1, stuck in its energized position.
The licensee study required replacement of all continuously energized, safety-related MDR relays with varnished coils, whose failure could have deleterious effects on plant safety function or system operation (or perform an indication function, as an enhancement).
An environmental qualification report on MDR relay designs was issued in December,
~
1992. This took into account the effects of the plants' 130 V to 134 V de float charge -
and 140 V to 145 V de equalizing charge on the 125 V de batteries and addressed each model based on the percentage of time an MDR relay was energized. This analysis specified a varied replacement schedule, as short as 17 years, for several improved MDR series relays, depending upon a relay's percentage of lifetime energization and -
environment, due to NYE Nyogel 718B grease end bell bearing lubricant and Exar 400 coil leadwire and shading insulation aging.
3.18 Arkan..as Nuclear One Unit 2 On September 9,1992, another example of an MDR relay failure affecting multiple systems occurred. While in cold shutdown, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 experienced an-inadvertent start of one EDG, the opening of two high pressure safety injection valves and isolation of ventilation to the shutdown cooling heat exchanger room, when an MDR relay was being replaced.2s This occurred because the jumper installation instructions did not provide full guidance for about 25 percent of the existing relays.
3,19 Combustion Engineerinn 10 CFR 21 Report On Januay 13,1993, A158 CE Nuclear Power submitted a 10 CFR Part 21 Report" to the NRC resulting from an MDR Model 170-1 failure experien'ced by Waterford 3 on 24
+
APPENDIX C l
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APPENDIX C (Cont.)
P&B MDR relay failure data MDR Call failure Inservice Fall NSSS System Results of Failure Relay Failure Mechanism Model Volts Vatts State Date Date Time No.
(yr)
MDR-170-1 13-Jan-92 0.0 CE RCS LOST PRZR MTR CONTROL CIRCUIT ROTOR STUCK VMEN SFRING BROKE FDR-170-1 115VAC E
03-Det-91 17-Sep-89 2.1 CE RP$
~B" RPS 8REAKER KEPT TRIPPING NORMAL VIAR CUT OF RELAY MDR-170-1 115VAC E
01-Oct-91 17-Sep-89 2.1 CE RPS MASTER RFS RELAY DIDM'T TRIP-ST NORMAL VEAROUT OF RELAY MDR-170-1 115VAC E
01-Oct-91 17-Sep-89. 2.1 CE RPS "D" RPS BRKR CONTINUOUS TRIP-ST MASTER RELAT VOULDN'T ENERGERIZE MOR-170-1 115VAC E
11-Jun-91 22-Jun-90 1.0 CE RFS "C" RPS FAILED TO RESET - ST RELAY FAILED TO RESET MDR-170-1 12VDC E
13-Aug-87 01-Apr-84 3.4 CE RPS SPURIOUS TRIP OF RX BREAKERS FEEDER CABLE NOT MOR-170-1 12VDC~
E 22-Sep-86 01-Apr-84 2.5 CE RPS
05-Jun-84 25-Ma r-80 4.2 CE RPS FALSE RPS CHANNEL 2 TRIP 1 0F 3 RELAYS ACTING ASNORMALLY MDR-4094 115VAC-8.
E 15-Jan-e8 01-May-84 3.7 GE RVCU ~ RVCU PUMP COULD NOT SRUTDOVN RELAY STUCK 1.
MDR-4094 115VAC.
8.
E 09-Feb-87 01-Sep-82 4.3 GE ESSV ESSW PUMP FAN DIDN'T SHUTDOVN RELAY STICKING MDR-4094 115VAC 8.
-E 11-Sep-86 01-Sep-82 4.0 GE ESV ESV PUMP FAN RUNNING IN AUTO RELAY CONTACTS STUCK M34-4094 115VAC 8.
D C6-Jul-85 01-Jan-85 0.5 GE MS SRV POSITION INDICATION INCP INTERMITTENT OPERATION IN ST MDR-4094 115VAC 8.
0 06-Jul-85 01-Jan-85 0.5 GE MS SRV FOSITION INDICATION INOP INTERMITTENT OPERATION IN ST MDR-4103 1 ll8VAC E
15-Sep-89 10-0ct-85 3.9 V RPS CHRG PP MIN FLOV VALVE OPENED-ST STUCK IN ENERGlZED POSITICE
$)
MDR-4121-1 120VAC 5.5 0
04-Oct-87 06-Jun-78 9.3 V MS MSIV DION'T SHUT IN TIME RELAY OPERATED SLOVLY "J
MDR-4130-1 120VAC E
01-Jun-92 01-Oct-86 6.7 GE RPS CH A/RPT A TCV SCRAM RESPONSE >TS SLOV OPENING CONTACTS MDR-4130-1 120VAC E
01-Jun-92 01-Oct-86 6.7 GE RPS CH 8/RPT A TCV SCRAM RESPONSE >TS SLOV OPENING CONTACTS MOR-4130-1 120VAC E
16-Cec-87 15-Jan-85 2.9 GE RPS BACKUP SCRAM VALVE FAILED RELAY FAILURE
-MDR-4134-1 120VAC 7.1 E
09-Jan-93 23-Jun-89 3.5 GE RPS RPS/MSIV CLOSURE TIME >TS LIMIT
" EXPECTED VEAR" MDR-4134-1 120VAC 7.1 E
14-Jun-92 01-Oct-86 6.8 GE RPS CM 8/B2 TCV SCRAM RESPONSE > TS SLOV OPENING CONTACTS MDR-4134-1 120VAC 1.1 E
14-Jun-92 01-Oct-86 6.8 GE RPS CH B/B1 TCV SCRAM RESPONSE > TS SLDV OPENING CONTACTS MDR-4134-1 120VAC 7.1 E
12-Jun-92 01-Det-86 6.8 GE RPS CH B/B1'fCV SCRAM RESPONSE > TS SLDW OPENING CONTACTS MDR-4134-1 120VAC 1.1 E
12-Jun-92 01-Oct-85 6.8 GE RFS CH B/B1 TCV SCRAM RESPONSE > TS-SLOV OPENING CONTACTS MOR-4134-1 120VAC 1.1 D
21-Sep-90 11-Apr-86 4.4 GE ESV BACKVASH VALVE DIDM*T CLOSE-ST BURNED OUT RELAY C0!L MDR-4134-1 120VAC 7.1 E
15-Sep-88 15-Jan-85 3.7-GE RPS PREVENTED RPS HALF SCRAM
$ MALL END COVER lt0LE BOUND SHAFT -
MDR-4135-1 120VAC 7.1 E
03-Aug-91 28-Jun-86 5.1 GE RPS
~8' APRM RPS TRIP INPUT - PM EXCESS HOISE: EXPECTED FAILURE MDR-4135-1 120VAC 7.1 E
13-Nov-89 18-Feb-86 3.4 GE RVCU RVCU CONT ISO VALVE DIDN'T OPEN CONTACTS DIDN'T CLOSE-CORROSION 2
MDR-4135-1 120VAC-7.1 E
"D" MAIN STEAM MI RAD TRIP SLDV DEFECTIVE RESPONSE TIME MDR-4135-1 120VAC 7.1 E'
02-Apr-88 28-Jun-86 1.7 GE RPS RPS DIV. 2 & 4 RELAY FAILED ST
-RELAY OPERATED SLOVtY MDR-5059 125VDC' 10.3 i
11-Jan-92 OI-Jan-84 8.0 V A rV.
CHANGED AFV STEAM TO ALT SUPPLY-- FAILED TO DE-ENERGlZED POSITION MDR-5060 125VDC 10.3 D.
03-Sep-85 08-Aug-83 2.1 CE CIS ' SAMPLE. CONT 150 VALVE INOP - ST PREMATURE END OF LIFE MDR-5061 125VDC 10.3 0
29-May-89 24-Sep-85 3.7 CE
'MVAC - EDG ROOM EXHST FAN DAMPER INOP COIL HAD CPEN CIRCUIT MDR-5062 125VDC -10.3 E
02-Nov-92 01-Jan-90 1.8 GE CAC ISOLATION VALVE POSITION INOP RELAY STUCK MDR-$062-125VDC 10.3-E 29-Sep-92 01-May-84 8.4 GE RCS RECIRC PUMP IB VOULON'T TRIP RELAY STUCK IN ENERG POSITION -
MDR-5062 125VDC 10.3 E Sep-92 01-May-84 8.4 GE RCS.
RECIRC FUMP 1A WOULON'T TRIP
. RELAY STUCK IN ENERGlZED STATE MCR-5062 12SVOC 10.3 E
13-Sep-92 01-May-84 8.4 GE CS NO Olv 1 CONTROL PVR LOSS ALARM. RELAY STOCK IN ENERGlZED STATE.
- MDR-5062 125VDC 10.3 D
05-Apr-86 08-Jun-83 3.8 -GE ELECT ESV/RNRESV PPS INOP ON EDG -ST
' SEQUENCER CONTACTS STUCK OPEN MOR 5062 125vDC. 10.3 0
15-Feb-84 01-Sep-82 2.4 GE CS ' CS PUMP BKR DION'T OPEN IN ST NOT VORKING FROPERLY l
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APPENDIK C (Cent.)
P&B MDR relay failure data MOR Coll Failure Inservice Fail NSSS System Results of Failure Relay Failure Mechanism Model Volts Vatts State Date Date Time No.
(yr)
MDR-5076 12SVDC E
22-Mar-91 22-May-76 14.8 V Cl FRT 150 VALVE DIDN'T CLOSE - ST RELAT FAILED CLOSED MDR-5095 12SVDC D
30-Dec-89 03-Jan-85 3.9 GE ELECT DIV 1 EDG FAILED TO START MISAPPLICATION / CURRENT LOAD LOV MOR-Sill-1 22VDC 8,6 E
23-Jul-91 IS-Jan-85 6.6 GE ESF CONT 150 0F RCU SAMPLE VLV-ST RELAY STUCK MOR Sill-1 22VDC 8.6 E
19-Jul-91 IS-Jan-85 S.6 GE ESF CIS. SBGT START. CRMVAC ACT.
HIGH CONTACT RESIST. BUT TEST OK MDR-5146 28vDC E
12-Apr-91' IS-Jan-88 3.2 CE ELECT B ECVS PP FAILED TO RUN - 57 CONTACTS FAILED TO CLOSE
- MDR-5147 32VDC E
06-Jul-90 19-Sep-85 3.7 CE RPS A MS!S RPS TRIP DION'T RESET-ST ALL CONTACTS FOUND OPEN 904-5151 10.3.
E 09-May-92 01-Jan-91 1.4 GE CAM CONT ATM VALVE POSITION INOP RELAT STUCK MDR-6091 118VAC E
25-Jul-90 01-Mar-88 2.3 V ESFAS EDG - ST 2 CONTACTS FAILED TO CLOSE MDR-7032 28VDC 18.7 E
25-Sep-92 30-Sep-91 1.0 CE ESFAS ISFAS CHANNEL INOP - ST SHAFT BINDING: MANUFACTURE DEFECT, MOR-7032 28VDC 18.7 E
Il-Nov-89 25-Mar-80 9.6 CE CS CSAS BTPASS DIDN'T STOP Na0M PP.
CONTACTS CLOSED SLOVLT MDR-7032 36VDC-30.8 E
28-Mar-89 27-Jan-86 3.2 CE ESFAS VALVE OVERRICE ]NDICATION INOP OVERVOLTAGE OUTGAS $1NG FAILURE MDR-7032 35VDC - 3D.8 E
25-Jan-89 18-Jan-88 1.0 CE ESFAS B LPSI PP RECIRC VLV INOP-ST OVERVOLTAGE OUTGASSING FAILURE MDR-7032 36VDC 30.8 ' E 10-Jan-89 18-Jan-88 1.0 CE ESFAS ESFAS CVERRIDE SVITCH Ih0P - ST-OVERVOLTAGE OUTGASSING FAILURE
'i, MDR-7032 36VDC 30.8 E
09-Jan-89 18-Seo-85 2.2 CE ESFAS. SIAS TRAIN $1GNAL FAILED - ST OVERVOLTAGE OUTGASSING FAILURE 9
MDR-7032 36VDC 30.8 E
02-Aug-88' 18-Sep-86 1.8 CE ESFAS "B" AFAS SIGNAL FAILURE - ST OVERVOLTAGE 0UTGAS$1NG FAILURE w
MDR-7032 36VDC 30.8 E
03-Jun-87 27-Jan-85 1.3 CE ESFAS "B" CONT. SPRAY SIGNAL INOP OVERVOLTAGE CUTGASSING FAILURE MDR-7032 36VDC 30.8 E
26-May-87 18-Sep-86 0.7 CE..ESFAS "8" SIAS $1GNAL FAILURE - ST
.0VERVOLTAGE OUTGAS $1NG FAILURE HDR-7032 36VDC 30.8 E
26-Nov-86 IB-Sep-86 0.2 CE ESFAS "B" AUX W SIGNAL FAILURE - ST OVERVOLTAGE OUTGAS $1NG FAILURE MDR-7032 28v0C 18.7 E
07-Mar-85 01-Apr-84 0.9 CE ESFAS ESF TESTING FOUND 8AD RELAT END OF LIFE MDR-7032 28vDC 18.7 E
12-Sep-84 01-Apr-84 0.4 CE EFV RELAT FOUND 8AD IN ESF ST "END OF LIFE" MDR-7032 28VDC 18.7 E
13-Aug-84 08-Aug-83 1.0 CE ESFAS PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE NOT OPERATING PROPERLY MDR-7033 28vDC 18.7 E
07-Nov-87 08-Aug-83 4.2 CE
-ESFAS "A" SIAS TRAIN INOP - ST VEAROUT DUE TO AGING' i
MDR-7034 36VDC 18.7 E
08-Dec-91 27-May-85 6.5 CE EFV "B" EFW INOP - ST ROTOR STUCK:0UTGASSING/ CORROSION MDR-7034 28VDC 18.7_
E 27-Jun-89 24-Sep-85 3.8 CE CIS' EFV & S/G 8LOVDOVN VLVS INOP -ST STUCK IN ENERGIZED POSITION l
MDR-7034 28VDC. 18.7 E
22-Jan-89 08-Aug-83 S.4 CE ESFAS DIDN'T ACT. ALL ~B" SAls EQUIP RELAY NOT VORKING PROPERLY MOR-7034 36VDC 3D.8 ~ E 19-Dec-88 18-Sep-86 2.3 CE ESFAS MSIS CHANNEL INCP IN BYPASS -ST CONTACT CORROSION - 0FFGAS$1NG MOR-7034 28VDC 18.7 E
07-Nov-88 08-Aug-83 S.2 CE ESFAS LFSI PLFP FAILED IN 2ND TEST CTCLING/ CONTACT RESIST.
MDR-7034
-36VDC 30.8 E
05-Aug-88 18-Sep-86. 1.9 CE ESFAS "B" MSIS INOP -ST OVERVOLTAGE OUTGASSING FA! LURE MGR-7034 36VDC 30.8 E May-88 18-Jan-83 0.3 CE ESFAS "A" CSAS INOP -ST OVERVOLTAGE OUTGASSING FAILURE y
NOR-7034-36VDC 30.8 E
03-May-88 18-Seo-85 1.6 CE ESFAS
~B" RECIRC ACT SIG FAILED - ST OVERVOLTAGE OUTGAS $1NG FAILURE MD1-7034 28VDC 18.7 E
07-Apr-88 25-Mar-80 8.1 CE NSV EMERG POND SW VALVE IN00 - ST
. OVERVOLTAGE OUTGASSING FAILURE-RELAY STUCK ON DE-ENERGIZATION MDe7034 36VOC 30.8 E
31-Dec-87.
18-Sep-86 13 CE ESTAS
~8" SIAS SIGNAL FAILURE.- ST MDR-7034 28VDC 18.1 E
01-Apr-87 01-Apr-84 '3.0 CE ESFAS INTERMITANT CONT. 150. SIGNAL SPURIOUS $!GNAL MDR-7034 36VDC -30.8
- E Il-Feb-87 18-Seo-86 0.4 CE ESFAS CHILLED VATER VALVE INOP.
OVERVOLTAGE OUTGA.SSING FAILURE MDR-7034 28VDC' 18.7 E
09-Nov ' 08-Aug-83 3.2 CE ESFAS' "B" C]AS INOP - ST
" W CONTACT RES!$TANCE MDR-7034
-28vDC 18.7 E
Il-Feb-86 25-Mar-80 S.9 CE ESFAS REACTOR TRIP ON "A" MSIV CLOSUGE,. w CONTACT CHMS-5 MDRS REPLACE 0 l
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