ML20058K379

Requests Commission Approve DOE Proposed Retransfer of Pu from France to Switzerland.Doe Analysis of Retransfer Encl

ML20058K379
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/29/1990
From:	Hauber R NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA)
To:
References
TASK-PINV, TASK-SE SECY-90-233, NUDOCS 9007050123
Download: ML20058K379 (41)

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.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee POLICY ISSUE 1

(Notation Vote):

June 29, 1990 SECY-90-233 l

For:

The Commissioners

' Em:

Ronald D.=Hauber, Director l

International Programs 1

Office of Governmental'and Public Affairs 1

.Sub.iect :

PROPOSED. RETRANSFER OF PLUT0NIUM FROM-FRANCE TO SWITIERLAND-Puroose:

To:obtain Commission approval of a proposed response to the-l Department _ofEnergyL(00E),

i 4

Discussion:

On June 12,.1990, the_staffreceivedarequest(Enclosure 1)'_

from DOE of: fissilcovering a proposed tran~fer totaling -132' kilograms e plutonium derived from U.S.-origin material from

France to-Belgonucleaire; Dessel,' Belgium for fabrication of mixed uranium plutonium oxide (M0X) fuel assemblies and subsequent retransfer to Switzerland. The material will be-used'for' fuel in the Beznau-power reactors.- DOE--has indicated that it' plans to approve the proposed-retransfer.

The Commission has reviewed three-previous requests for the 4

retransfer of separated plutonium derived from U.S.-origin material ~ to Switzerland since passage of the' Nuclear. Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

The =most recent retransfer involved 150 kilograms of plutonium-to Switzerland for use in-the'Beznau _ reactor, approved by DOE -in early 1990.

It.

was reviewed by the Commission in SECY-89-187 dated June 21, 1989 (Classified).

The current requests (three-separate MB-l0 requests) mark a l

new phase in the use of plutonium recycling in light-water reactors in Switzerland. While' the previous requests were

' for experimental-programs in the use of M0X fuel, the-feasibility of plutonium recycling' now has been successfully i

demonstrated in the Beznau plant, Consequently, all-Swiss utilities are planning to' recycle plutonium in their reactors on a regular basis, with a M0X fuel load up to_ one.

l third of the reactor core.

CONTACT:

NOTE:

TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE E. Hemby, IP IN 10 WORKING DAYS FROM THE x20341-DATE OF THIS PAPER b

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l The Commissioners

' 2-l Qjicy,sion.

Statutory Requirements:

l.

(Continued)~

.Section 131b of the Atomic Energy Act of'1954,.as amended, sets forth the statutory requirements of approval of transfers of any plutonium in Quantities greater than 500 grams,.resulting.from reprocessing, to a non nuclear. weapons state.

Section 131b.2 of the.Act requires that-prior to approval,;

00E and the Department.of State must judge-that the i

retransfer will'not result in a significant-increase in the risk of-proliferation.beyond that.which exists at the.

.present time. Among allz the factors to be considered in reaching this' judgment, foremost.considerati0n is given as to..whether the activities will take place under conditions-that will ensure timely warning to-the U.S. of any diversionf well in advance of. the time at which any diverted material could be transformed.into a nuclear explosive device.

As.

was.done in the nrevious analysis for_the plutonium retransfer requot to. Switzerland approved in 1990, DOE has provided substantial details on IAEA and EURATOM safeguards at the facilities of primary interest. DOE has concluded that the requirements of'Section 131b.2 are met and the staff. finds no reason to disagree.

Normally when U.S. origin material ~ is exported or

-retransferred to the EURATOM community, each member state is free to transfer it further to any other member state without additional U.S. approval. However,cthe U.S. has been c etrolling this material by obtaining from the shipping country (Switzerland) assurances that. after the spent fuel has been reprocessed,-the recovered mate-ialcwill be retained by the reprocessor'(France) subject to ihe-direction of the shipper;:and that any direction by.the shipper to the. reprocessor for subsequent use or retransfer of; the recovered special, nuclear material' will be subject' to the prior approval of,the U.S.

Accordingly, Switzerland must obtain-the-approval of the U.S. for.the movement of the separated: plutonium from France to Belgium and ultimately to Switzerland.

In'that~ way, Switzerland will have the '

necessary assurances for the subject transfers.

_Under Section 133 of the Act, which was added.in August l

1986, DOE-may not approve the retransfer of more than two l

kilograms of-plutonium unless it consults with the Department of Defense (D0D).on'whether the physical protection of the material'during export or transfer will be adequate to deter theft, sabotage and other acts of I

international terrorism which would result in the diversion of the material. Although D00 has not provided its formal I

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The Commissioners

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Discussion-views to DOE on the subject transfer, the staff has beer,

.(Continued) advised by DOD staff that D0D has no objection to its approval.

Policy Considerations:-

In support of its plan to approve the request, DOE has cited-the President's general statement of July 16, 1981 on the y

nonproliferaticn cf nuclear explosives.. While that statement does not directly address these subsequent arrangements, it has been the Executive Branch policy to review subsequent arrangements involving transfers'of plutonium on a case by-case. basis.

In view of the approvals of three previous,. similar cases for Switzerland,: the staff believes the request clearly. falls within the Administration's policy on thermal recycle activities in Switzerland.

International International Safeguardsi Safeauards and Foreian Physical ~ Belgium and Switzerland are both parties to the Non-Security Review:

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, as.such, accept IAEA safeguards on all source and special nuclear materials in their nuclear activities. Additionally, EURATOM. safeguards are applied-to all Belgian nuclear activities pursuant-to the IAEA/ EURATOM Agreement.

The latest IAEA Annual Report shows that IAEA Facility Attachments have been negotia' ad. and are 'in force for-the Belgonucleaire MOX fuel fabrication facility:in Belgium and for both Beznau power' reactors in. Switzerland.

L The IAEA' Annual Report states that "...the Secretariat...did not detect any event which would indicate the diversion of a-significant amount of safeguarded nuclear' material....

It is considered reasonable to conclude that the nuclear material under Agency safeguards in 1988 remained in j

peaceful. nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately-l accounted for."

Information covering calendar year.1989 should be available within the next few weeks and we expect the same conclusion to be reported.

l Physical Protection:

i We have reviewed the physical protection programs within the I.-

jurisdictions' of. Belgium and Switzerland and have determined that they are consistent with the' recommendations of:IAEA' INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.

Further, the staff. review indicates-that these p~rograms are consistent with the additional recommendations for physical protection of nuclear facilities and Category I nuclear materials contained in 1

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is The Commissiccers -

t International INFCIRC/225/Rev. 2.

These determinations are based on Enfeauards:

physical protection evaluations performed during visits to (Continued)

Belgium and Switzerland in October 1988 and subsequent information received.to date, none of_which indicates any degradation of physical protection in either country.

==

Conclusion:==

Based on the above considerations, the staff believes all statutory requirements are met for the proposed subsequent arrangement and policy considerations taken into account and agrees with DOE that the approval of the subject request would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S.

Accordingly, the staff believes the Commission should not object =_to its approval.

Recommendation:

That the Commission approve the attached response to DOE which does not object to DOE's plan to-approve the request.

t Schedulina:

It is noted that the Embassy of Switzerland has specifically i

requested that it is now more crucial than ever that future similar retransfer requests are processed in a timely manner. Delays would cause the Swiss considerable technical complications and high costs for the utilities

^

!<"R D.Ha'udeY, Director International Programs Office of Governmental and Public Affairs i

l

Enclosures:

1.

DOE ~ltr dtd 6/7/90 and analysis 2.

Proposed response to DOE l

l Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of'the Secretary by COB' Monday, July 16, 1990.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should'be submd tted to the Commissioners NLT Monday, July-9, 1990, with an 11for-mation copy to the' Office of the Secretary.

If'the' paper.is 4

of such.a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat-should be apprised of when comments may 1se expected.

DISTRIP'JTION:

Cominissioners OGC OIG GPA I

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SECY

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Department of Energy

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Washington. DC 20585 s

WN 7 199u MEMORANDUM TO: Mr.-George Kuzmycz Office of Export Asi'r.istration=

Department of Commr te OTPA Room 4056

- Washington-D.C.

20230 Mr. Gerald Brubaker -

OSD/ISP/NP NPP, The Pentagon 1

Room 20453 Washington, D.C. 20301-2600 j

' Mr. Carlton Thorne i

OES/NEC Department of-State E

Washington, D.C.

20520--

MQ D.

Fm Mr. Michael D. Rosenthal mo US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency:

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=j NWC/INA, Room 4678 r

Washington, D.C.

20451 Mr. Marvin Peterson i

Ofce-of International Programs 3

Nu.. ear Regulatory Comission

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Washington, D.C.

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SUBJECT:

Request for oubsequent Arrangement Under the NNPA 5978 2

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.x Enclosed for your rev'ew is-.a draft Federal Register notice 'and an %alysis concerning a proposed subsequent arrangement,,as well as copies of the incoming requests.

RTD/SD(EU)-56, 57, and 58 We would appreciate your coments withi.n 20 ' days, l

rW!

f SalvadorNfCea-eting Director Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy-Office of International Affairs

- i Enclosure I

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs i

and Energy Emergencies PRDPOSED SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT Pursuant to section 131 of the' Atomic Energy Act-of 1954, as 6 mended (42 U.S.C. 2160), notice is hereby given of a proposed t

' subsequent arrangement" under the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, as amended, and the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Governnent of

. Switzerland concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, at amended.

The subsequent arrang'ement to 'be carried stat under the a

above mentioned agreements involves the transfer of 132 kilograms of plutonium from Franc.e to Belgonuc1'eaire Dessel. Belgium, for l

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fabrication of mixed uranium plutonium oxide fuel and subsequent retransfer of the fuel to Switzerland for use at the Be'znau power reactors. Retransfer documents RTD/SD(EU)-56, 57,.and 58 have been assigned to this subsequent arrangement.

In accordance with section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of.1954, as l

amended, it has been determined that this subsequent arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

i This subsequent arrangement will take effect no sooner than fifteen

' days after the date of publication of this notice and after fifteen days of continuous session of.the Congress, beginning the day af ter the date on which the reports-required by section 13)(b)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended-(42 U.S.C. 2160), are submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foraign Relations of the Senate. The two time periods referred to above may run concurrently.

For the Department of Energy.

Date:

l'

' Richard H. iiilliarison

, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs ~

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ANALY$15 0F PROPOS(0 SUBS [ OVEN 1 ARRANC[M[N1 CONC [RNING TH[ TRANSFER OF PLUT0NIUM FROM FRANC [ 10 l

8[LGONUCl[ AIR [, DES $[L, BELG10M FOR F ABRICA110N Of El1[D ORANIUM PLU10NIUM OX1DE FUEL AND SUBS [QU[NT RETRANSF[R 10 i

I 591TZ[RLAND FOR U$[ IN THE R[ CYCLING OF PLUTONIUM IN THE BEZNAU POWER PLANTS l

l 1.

Nature of Proposed Subsecuent Arrangement The Government of Switzerland has requested United States approval for the transfer of 132. kilograms of plutonium that has been 4

recovered through the reprocessing of U.S.. origin spent reactor fuel in France to Belgonucleaire, F8FC, Dessel, powerBelgium for fabrication of mixed uranium plutonium oxide (M0X) fuel assemblies and subseqnnt transfer to Switzerland for use in a demonstration prograFat the Bezrau power reactors.

,(Note-Staff contacted DOE regard l

The Swiss have been conducting a ceries of demonstration and use of fuel in a experimenta' programs with respect to utilization of MOX fuel in demonstration prograi ;

l thermal recycle. They have now determined that utilization of MOX DOE staff indicated fuel may be used in light water power Peactors on a regular basis, the request is for u! I as fuel and that the J experimental program' ;

!!. Relevant Cases of a Similar Nature have been completed)

In 1988, based on a 1986 request from the Government of Switzerland, the United States approved the retransfer of 108 kilograms of plutonium to Switzerland for use.in the Bernau reactors. The caterial involved separated flutonium that was i

retransfered from the reprocessing facility at La Hague, France, j

and was fabricated into MOX fuel at Alkem, the Federal Republic of Germany. Additionally, in 1985 based on a 1983 request, the

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United States approved the retransfer of 120 kg of plutonium tc.

Switzerland for.use in the Beznau reactors, and the timultaneous i

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retransfer of. 80 kg of plutonium for use ir. the Proteus Research Reactor, which was subsequently approved for use in the Beznau reactors.

In early 1990 the United States approved the retransfer of 150 kilograms'.of plutonium for une in the Beznau reattors.

The current requests total 432 kgs of plutonium for use in the Beznau

reactors, e

l FollowiAgfullinteragency'rev!ewofthesecases,theSecretaryof Energy approved the soesequent arrangements and they were submitted to the Congress es required by law.

Federal Register Notices concernir.3 the arrangements were also published prior to final approval.

Additionally, the transfer of the spent fuel from Switzerland to La Hague for reprccessing was previcusly authorized by the United States on several occasions. The plutonium resulting from reprocessing was recovered from irradiated power reactor fuel, and is subject to U.S. prior consent for its subsequent retransfer to Switzerland.

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111. $tetement of Administration Policy j

i The policy of the United States on peaceful nuclear cooperation l

with other nations and its relationship to the nonproliferation of 1

nuclear explosives was outlined by President Reagan in his statement of July 16, 1981. He stated that:

- l

'The United States will cooperate with other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ine'luding civil j

nuclear p a press to meet their energy security needs, under a-l 1

regime of adequate safeguards and controls...

l We must re establish this nation as a predi6 tame and I

reliable partner for peaceful nuclear coopere'.1on under adequate safeguards. This is essential to our nonproliferation goals.

If we are not such a partner, other countries will tend to go their own ways and car influence will diminish.. This would reduce our effectiveness in gaining the support'we need to deal with proliferation t

problems, i

l To attain this obh:tive, I am:

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Instructing the E;ecutive Branch agencies to undertake innediate efforts to ensure expeditious. action on exrort requests and approval requests utider agreements I

for peaceful nuclear cooperation where the necessary stttutory requirements-are met.

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o ReqLesting that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission act f

expeditiously on these matters.

i The Administration vill also not inhibit or setback civil i

reprocessing ~.and W.

Mr reactor development abroad in j

nations'with advance, nuclear power programs where it does '

not constitute a proliferation risk.'

This policy has been consistently applied.since 1981.

In'addAtton i

to the transfers to Sw.itzerland and to the FRG previously mentigned, the U.S. clso has approved the retransfer of 189 kilograms of fijsile plutonium from France-to Japan for use in Japan's fast b Seder program..

IV.

Legal Framework of this Subsequent Arrangement i

This analysis serves to review the proposed subsequent arrangement under applicable criteria of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

' amended ('the Act").

In particular, under Section-131 it will l

consider whether approval of the proposed subsequent arrangement i

u would result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the present time.

In i

this analysis, and as required by Section 131b(2) of the Act, e 2.

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foremost consideration is given as to whether the activities will take place under conditions which will ensure timely warning to the' United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which any diverted mate;ial could be transformed into a nuclear Further, and as required by Section 131a(1 of the Act, a determination will be made as to whether the approv)al explosive device.

of the reoposed subsequent arrangement would be inimiral to the comon defense and security. Finally,-the criteria contained in Sections !!7 and 128 of the Act will be addressed.

i A,_n,3 ytical Method l

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V.

The Atomic. Energy Act (Section 131b) establishes the standards to be applied in the consideration for transfers of any plutonium in quantitles greater than D0 grams resulting from reprocessing.

These standards incorporate the requirement that the Secretary of Energy rt.ach a judgment that the reprocessing 'will not result in j

a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that j

which exists at the time that approval is requested."

Among all the factors to be censidered in reaching this judgment.

1 the $ecretary of Energy is required to give ' foremost i

consideration...to whether or not the... retransfer will take place I

under conditions that wiU ensure timely warning to the United i

States of any diversien weli in advance of the time at which the non nuclear weapon state could transform the diverted material l

into a nuclear explosive device.'

[

The following sections are intendeci to provide information relevant to consideration of this ' timely warning" factor.

i' Although the statute does not specify in any detail the I

information to be considered under the ' timely warning' factor, it i

is clear that a wide variety of technical, political, and other. '

j matters can be relevant.

Thenatureoftheeffortthatwouldberequiredtidevelop'a

. nuclear explosive device is considered. The analysis next i

discusses the availability of technical, industriel, material and l

human resources available were a diversion decision to be I

implemented. Thereaft.er, the. analysis focuses on. indicators that could provide timely warning of such a sten, incibding the 3

l application of IAEA safeguards in these countries. The analysis

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also treats in some detail the strong political and other i

indicators, which taken together could provide an early alert to i

the United States of activities attendant to a national decision to abrogate these commitments and, in the words of the statute, l

• transform diverted material into a nuclear explosive device."

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VI. Anal sis of Activities to be Performed at the Belconucleaire l

_ a r tc at ion F acility. in B], gig A.

Nuclear Facilities and programs of Belgium Belgium is an original partner in the European Atomic Energy Comunity (EURATOM). The nations of EURATOM have some of the world's most extensive and advanced nuclear programs encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium enrichment facilities through reprocessing, breeder programs and the recycling of plutonium in light water reactors. Belgium's significant nuclear programs also include facilities for the fabrication of mixed uranium plutonium fuels (M0X). The Belgian nuclear sector has l

Played a very important role in the development of Belgium's economy by providing reliable electric power and the attainment of greater energy self sufficiency.

From 1975 to 1985 a very rapid growth of the Belgian nuclear program occurred, with seven power reactors being comissioned, with a total capacity of 5,148 MWe for the country.

In France, near the Belgian border, two additional power plants are being i

built jointly with the French.

These reactors are planned for operation in the early and mid nineties.

Because of this tremendous surge in nuclear capacity, nuclear generated electricity accounts for more than half of the total electricity produced in Belgium.

Since 1986, this share is has remained around 675. Around the Lcn of the century, two plants'will be decomissioned, so the percentage of nuclear generated electricity might drop to 50s of total

.t electricity production, depending upon the coming on line of the other nuclear plants mentioned above.

Sincetheeariystagesofitsnuclearprogram,Belgiumhasbeena provider of selected nuclear services for its partners in EURATOM.

It was the site of Europe's first pilot civil reprocessing plant (EUROCHEMIC), which has been in a shut-down status for several years.

Belgonucleaire is a 28 year old commercial tirm that has acquired extensive capabilities in the areas of fuel fabrication.

Included in its work has been the fabrication of plutonium fuels for use in 'reeder reactors and recycle experiments in the o

L European development program in cooperation with other European countries (Federal Republic of Germany and France).

Belgonucleaire.is also ex>ert in the field of radioactive waste disposal.

In addition, tie three largest. Belgian utilities are associated under the firm Synatom, which provides comercial fuel cycle services for irradiated fuel as well as financing for these..

operations.

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In sum, Belgium has a mature, full service nuclear industry which provides over 50% of the country's electricity needs, and is closely linked to the European nuclear activities through the i

provision of fuel cycle services.

B.

teleonucleaire's M0X Fuel Fabrication Operations At Desse)

As was mentioned earlier, Belgium has over a quarter century's experience with plutonium fue fabrication,:first on a laboratory scale, and since 1973 at Belgonucleaire's plant at Dessel, nur Mol. This is an industrial plant desi capacity of 30 36 tons of heavy metal gned to allow a production (HM) per year, but has not i

operated at full capacity.

It has fabricated M0X fuels both for.

i recycle in thermal reactors and for fast breeder reactors.

Since-i 1980, Belgonucleaire has been a French CEA licensee for the

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fabrication of fast breeder reactor (FBR) fuels, and as of 1983 produced a total of some 25,000 mixed oxide fuel rods, equivalent to the handling of about 2 tonnes of plutonium, its primary customer for FBR fuel has been the $NR 300 Kalkar breeder reactor in the FRG, which is a joint British, Belgian, West German project still awaiting start up approval. Belgonucleaire has also supplied FBR fuel to experimental breeder hr; tors including the German KNK reactor, the French MA5URCA, RAPSODIE and PHENIX and the English DFR and PFR fast reactors.

C.

Evaluation of the Risk'of' Increased Proliferation with i

Reference to " Timely Warning" Fabrication at Beloonucleaire e

l.

Weaoons Related Research, Development and Production in examining the requirements for a nuclear weapons program, it is first appropriate to discuss briefly.the process of developing nuclear weapons and a description of various types.

The complexity and difficulty of producing nuclear weapons-increases considerably from the relatively simple fission devices to the advanced thermonuclear devices.

Nuclear weapons can be categorized'as being one of three general types: fission (gun, or implosion), boosted, and thermonuclear. The technical requirements, skills, numbers of q

personnel, equipment, materials, facilities and the financial, organizational and managerial resources that are required to develop, produce and test the three types are quite different.

As concluded in a 1977 report prepared by the Office of

, Technology Assessment of the Congress, " Nuclear Proliferation i

and Safeguards," even a minimal program to clandestinely produce, without~ testing, low technology fission weapons --

given the availability of fissionable material at the' outset =

-- would still call for specific organizational-structures and dedicated resources of personnel, equipment and funding.

if

2.

Industrial Capacity as Related to Weapons Research.

Development and Production Program _s Belgium is a modern highly industrialized nation with an advanced commercial nuclear industry.

Its nuclear related f acilities include research and power reactors, and fuel fabrication (including M0X factitties).

Construction of Belgium's first power reactor, the BR3, 10.5 MWe unit, began in 1955.

It was Europe's first PWR.

Presently Belgium's power reactors provide over 505 of the country's electricity and that figure may rise to 605 in 1986.

In 1984 they had an average capacity factor of B6.65.

In its nuclear power program, Belgiue has often benefited from international joint ventures.

For example, the Choot and the Ththange I reactors are France Belgium power stations (505 505), and two units currently under construction, Chooz B1 and B2, are also jointly owned with Electricite de France (755) and the Belgian utilities (255) (this ratio also defines the participation of Belgian industry in the cor.struction of these units). Fabrication of low enriched fuel (LEU) fuel and some assembly of MOX fuel assemblies is performed by the French company F8FC (Societe France Belge de Fabrication de Combustibles) which is presently owned by the French firms Uranium Pechiney (505), Framatome (255) and Cogema 255). The Dessel plant fabricates fuel for comnercial reactors.

Similarly, Belgian participation in the European breeder program has been substantial. A cooperation agreement with the Federal Repablic of Germany.and the Netherlands led to'the construction of the SNR 300 breeder reactor at Kalkar in Germany. Belgium's main contribution to the SNR 300 has been

- the fabrication of the fuel by Belgonucleaire, in addition, a series of cooperative agreements with France beginning in

+

1977, led to Belgian participation in Superphenik Even with this industrial capability, however, there are major technologies that are unique to a nuclear weapon program, and 1

which are not present in Belgium.needed for initiating a nuclear weapons program. gies I

These technolo Such key tech ~nologies include enrichment facilities, for which Belgium does not have an indigenous program.

Assuming a sourc'e of plutonium or HEU' a number of skills, technologies, and processes must be orchestrated in order to turn special nuclear material (SNM) into a weapon.

Some of these skills and technologies can be developed or derived from work conducted in the nuclear fuel cycle, such as neutron physics computer codes. Others may derive from the mil.itary or industrial sectors and be adapted for nuclear weapons development. These technologies include high energy explosives, precision detonators and firing sets,

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hydrodtagnostic testing equipment, such as flash x rays and high speed cameras, and precision eachine tools.

It is evident that Belgium has these requisite skills, technologies, and processes in its nuclear, industrial, and military sectors. But while possession is important, what is critical is that these skills, technologies, and processes be organized

]

and managed effectively toward the goal of weapons i

development.

For example, in the U.S'. there is a basic seven step process by which nuclear weapons are produced:

1.

Concept formulati u - formulation cf a military requirement for a weapon of a specific yield, configuration, delivery mode, etc.

2.

Preliminary design technical design of a concept to meet the military requirement.

3.

Experimental testing a comprehensive multi phase i

test series including i

non nuclear high e:tplosives testing to ascertain design problems.

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4.

Fabrication actual produ: tion of a

. prototype device.

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Testing

-- nuclear testing of the et prototype device',

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6.

Production.

- production of the required-

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number of weapons.for deployment.

7.

Retirement

- retirement and disassembly of the weapons.

1 Althou'h a potential proliferant's approach probably would n't g

o mirror-image the U.S., an organized, methodical, step by step process would be required to harness the various skills and resources in the various sectors of a country to produce nuclear weapons. Depending on the type of program there would likely be indicators to provide warning time for increased vigilance or diplomatic action. Should Belgium make the decision to implement a weapons program, activities which reveal these types of organization could serve as an indicator of a weapons effort. After an evaluation of information available to the U.S., DOE has concluded that no such effort is underway in Belgium.

5.

Availability of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 8'1

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Although Belgium does not possess the national capability for enrichment or active reprocessing facilities, it does possess significant quantities of specia nuclear material.

The U.S. EURATOM agreements for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy permit reprocessing within the turopean Comunity of U.S. ori exported by the U.S. directly gin material that i.as been to the Comunity and, as well, the reuse of the special nuclear saterial (uranium and plutonium) recovered from such reprocessing.

There are significant amounts of such separated plutonium and uranium within the Comunity (which includes Belgium).. In addition to material of U.S. origin..which is subject to peaceful uses assurances in the Agreements for Cooperation, there are significant quantitles of special nuclear materials not subject to the U.$. EURATOM Agreement.

Some of the separated plutonium _available includes plutonium separated from spent fuel discharged from nuclear power reactors. Plutoniun; recovered from this source to date is of high burn up and not especially attractive for nuclear explosive purposes, in addition, considerable amounts of plutonium remain in unreprocessed spent fuel at Belgian reactors. Some of this plutonium could, in principle, be recovered and used for nuclear weapons, although it is under safeguards and has a high PU 240 content.

The U.S. also supplies Belgium with HEU which is used' i

exclusively for research reactor fuel.

Belgium possesses significant amounts of special nuclear material which could in theory-be used for a nuclear weapons-program.

For plutonium, this amount will increase through the end'of the century, while for HEU this amount is likely to e

decrease steadily through the ont af the century, as new. >

low enrichment research fuels are introduced.

Belgium has so far not embarked upon the pursuit of nuclear weapons, given an internal supply of plutonium, which is an indication of its non nuclear. weapon intention and the 132 kg of plutonium involved in this retransfer would not result in a.significant risk of proliferation, as they could entertain such a course without this.. material-,.

l In sumary, Belgium has the technical capability'.to engage in the production of nuclear weapons, and possesses' sufficient amounts of special nuclear material to support such a program, without the need to divert the material covered by this case.

However, it is the opinion of DOE that the activities involved in acquisition or diversion of material and development of nuclear weapons would be difficult to accomplish without 6

o.

detection.

Such activities could, as noted above, provide clear indication of plans to acquire nuclear weapons relevant to ' timely warning.'

4.

nformation Concerning Warning Time, including Political

'ndicators Even given its technical capabilities, a decision by Belgium to enter into a nuclear weapons development program would necessarily require a political decision to do so.

Accordingly, an exa.atnation of the political indicators that could serve to give notice of such a decision is appropriate in reaching a conclusion with respect to the proposed subsequent arrangement.

Belgium has, since the end of World War !!, demonstrated its overall political stability through several changes in government. There has been support for nonproliferation and no significant voice has been raised in favor of a nuclear weapons program.

Belgium is a party of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and all of its nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA and EURATOM safeguards.

It is a member of the g

Zangger Comittee, which is a central element-in implementing the nonproliferation regime, and is also a member of the Nuclear Fuppliers Group and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

e Belgium's democratic, open society makes it likely that any shift in its nonproliferatian policy would be evident. The consistently strong support of the Belgian Government and all leading Belgian political parties to the principle of

'4 nonproliferation are important considerations in considering the timely warning provision of the Atomic Energy Act.

There is no basis for believing that Belgium will not respect its NPT or EURATOM commitments or engage in nuclear weapon related activities. Any such move would-become known within Belgium's politkal circles in a relatively short e

period and it is expected that the strongest possible opposition would arise in those vocal elements in Belgian society that favor reductions in nuclear arsenals. Any Belgian move to acquire nuclear weapons, however inconceivable, would also most likely create an extremely serious breach of Belgium's relations with a number of other countries (includin Community partners)g the United States and Belgium's European that are strongly committed to nonproliferation values. All of the foregoing factors suggest that the United States would receive an early indication of activities in Belgium pointing towards development of a nuclear explosive program, i

The U.S. and Belgium have a close diplomatic and military relationship, with U.S. military forces (including nuclear

.W *l

I i

sissiles) being stationed there.

Belgium is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

These factors, plus Belgium's membership in the European Comunity- (with its i

interrelated economic and political ties) should make any i

decision to divert nuclear material or to develop nuclear explosives obvious long before the fact.

5.

)iscussion of Safeouards at the Belconuclestre Facility in

)essel, Belgium j

As noted, earlier, the plutonium that is the subject of this proposed subsequent arrangement is to be fabricated into MOX fuel at the Belgonucleaire facility. Such fuels have been fabricated in this facility since 1973. This facility has a capacity of 30 35 tonnes of heavy metal per year.

Belgonucleaire has a femal IAEA safeguards facility attachment in place and is subject to both EURATOM and IAEA safeguards, in practice, IAEA inspectors undertake inspections jointly with EURATOM inspectors.

The facility is i

subdivided into a large number of working units for which inoividual, nuclear accountancy records are maintained and the specific physical location of items included in the ingentory at any time are available for safeguards purposes.

Belgonucleaire's plutonium fuel fabrication plant is subject to joint IAEA EURATOM safeguards inspection.

These are

' presently performed by'a joint IAEA EURATOM team in accordance with,ificant' quantities of weapons usable material, and the the IAEA facility attachment.

Because of'the, presence of sign fact that 831gonucleaire is a bulk handling facility,-

timeliness of safeguards information is an important criterion.

To minimize interference by the safeguards regime with the produc. tion activities, the Belgonucleaire accou W.cy system j

is based on the following principles:

1.

For. safety as well as for accountancy reasons, the plant is subdivided into a ltrge number of so called r

" working units" for which individual nuclear material accountancy files are-kept. Since the records of the working units involved are i mediately updated to l

reflect any movement of material into or out of such

^

un,its, the nuclear ma~terial accountancy system can produce at any moment a complete book inventory of the nuclear materials in the plant, specifying their location, quantity, quality, measuring codes, etc.

2.

For inspection purposes, the plant is subdivided into storage areas (input and output) and process areas where a limited number of check points (strategic 1

ID

}

s points) are defined and where all the nuclear l

materials present in the process can be checked by the inspectors.

The inventory quantities of special nuclear material in storage ar.d si.: nature of the fabrication process at i

Belgonucleaire dictate a high frequency of safeguards inspections..Therefore, a veristy of nuclear materials inventory controls are organized by the IAEA/(URATOM Joint Team:

L 1.

"Short term detection

• activities for flow verification taks place on a weekly basis, usually a two day inspection of input and output records of storage facilities. This type of inspection sometimes interrupts the fabrication process.

2.

'Short term detection" activities concerning in process inventory take place every two weeks and aim at estimation of the plant's inventory of nuclear material.

The detection goal is a quantity of 8 kg Pu (significant quantity) including the quantities 4

which at the time of the inspection tre temporarily not able to be verified witnin a period of four weeks.

3.

' Physical inventories' are performed twice a year and consist of 'a oetailed physical invutory during which all nuclear material present at the plant is verified.

7 Safeguards expe'rts have consid,ored that the application of adequate verification techniques are most complex'and difficult at bulk handling' facilities, such as plutonium fuel fabrication plants. Nevertheless, the application of joint IAEA EURAT0M safeguards at Belgonucleaire has not revealed l

.significant unresolved problems of safeguards application at s

this facility.

6.

Conclusion DOE believes that the foregoing paragraphs address the wide variety of matters relevant to the fabrication of MOX fuel at i

Belgonucleaire and that, taken together, they give evidence that the U.S. would have timely warning of any diversion of the material to be transferred to Belgium as envisioned in Section131b(2).

7 D.

Evaluation of the Risk of increased Proliferation With Reference to Other Factors The standard set forth in Section 131b(2) of the Act for this case is whether an approval would result in a significant l

increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that existing at the time of the request.

Having given " foremost i

W il I

v

consideration' in the foregoing paragraphs to the issue of l

• timely warning', the following section addresses other relevant factors that have been considered.

1.

Overall U.S. Belgian Relationshios Belgium is an ally of the U.S. with respect to defense, trade, i

and-financial issues and a member of NATO

.The substantial ties between Belgium and the U.S. are also demonstrated by the strong support given to the IAEA and the Tre-t on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The strong relationships between the two countries would clearly be jeopardized if Belgium were to take steps to develop a nuclear weapons program.

2.

Nonoroliferation Credentials

~

Belgium is a party to the NPT and is a fim supporter of the.

international nonproliferation regime.

In the IAEA, Belgium has supported the safeguards program.

Belgium is also a 4

member of the Zangger Comittee, and a member of the nuclear suppliers group.

Belgium has a me. dest program of technical assistance to safeguards with the IAEA.

'It is the view of DOE that Belgium's nonproliferation i

credentials support a conclusion that approval of this l

transaction will not give rise to a significant proliferation risk.

3.

Economic / Trade Factors Belgium is a member of the European Community (EC) and, as such, has close and important ties to other member states.

Any indication that Belgium was entering into a nuclear 4

weapons development program would seriously affect its l

relationships with other EC states. The economic growth and health of Belgium is to large degree dependent on its continued good relations within the EC. This factor alone is sufficient reason for believing that there is little incentive a

(an,d powerful disincentives) for a decision to develop nuclear weapons.

l 4.

Military / Security Factors Belgium has '>een a strong supporter of U.S. military policies in Europe, '.n spite of well-organized objections from some segments o' its society.

Belgium is an active and supportive member of NATO.

The n uional security benefits to Belgium resulting " rom its-NATO membership are of vital importance to Belgiur.

A Belgian decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program w uld jeopardize these benefits.

I

6.

[xtent and Quality of Ir. formation I

DOI believes that the inforestion about Belgium's nuclear programs and intentions fully support the conclusions reached in this analysis.

6.

Physical Security Factors Belgium has accepted IAEA INFCIRC 225/ REY. 1 (' Physical Protection of Nuclear Mater 141') and INFCIRC 254 (pertaining to nuclear transfers), and has a government program to see that effective physical _ security measures are implemented at all facilities in Belgium having Category 1, 11 and 111 naterials.

Based on the discussions with the Belgian government, nuclear facility personnel and the opportunity to visit representative nuclear facilities having Category I material, DOE believes that physical security measures in Belgium are consistent with standards and reconnendations contait:2d in INFCIRCs It5/Rev.1

. and 254 and are fully adequate, i

1 7.

Conclusion Basedonourreviewoftherelevantfactorsaitheyrelateto Belgium, and the activities to be undertaken under this proposed subsequent arrangement, it is concluded that approval of this request will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation as contemplated under Section 131b(2) of tie Act.. In reaching this conclusion, foremost consideration was given to whether or not the United States

'~

could have timely warning of any diversion of the nuclear material, well in advance of the time it could be transformed into a nuclear explosive device.

VII. Anal sis of Activities to be Performed in the Use of MOX ue n Switzerland After completion o' fuel fabrication in Belgium, the f

fabricated M0X fuel is to be transferred to Switzerland, for l

use in the Beznau power reactors. The following sections follow the same pattern for evaluation of the risk of j

proliferation associated with these activities as was used above for Belg n and give foremost con;ideration to the l

' timely warning-factor.

It was the Department's conclusion.in the 1990 analysis and is our conclusion in this analysis, that Switzerland does not constitute a proliferation risk and that the approval of the requested subsequent arrangement will not increase the risk of proliferation as contemplated in the Act.

A.

Review of the Nuclear Facilities and Programs of Switzerland O

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Since 1978 when four mixed. oxide (M0K) fuel assemblies were introduced into the core of the Bernau 1 reactor, the $wiss government has comitted itself to a long range program of test and evaluation of the use of M0X fuel in light wa.er 4

reactors.

4 According to the Swiss, the information gained from this experimental program will be used to plan a technically feasible, economically attractive plutonium recycle program for the large quantities of plutonium which will become available. The $wiss now plan to utilize MOX fuel in their-power reactors.on a regular basis, i

4 Switzerland is a highly industrialized nation with heavy demand for dependable supplies of electric energy for its economy.

It is dependent to a large extent (approximately 52 percent) on imported fuel.

To meet its anticipated needs for electricity without increasing its dependence on foreign e.ner y sources, $witzerland embarked in the early Ig70's upon a si nificant nuclear power program (based on light water tech ology) with five nuclear power plants in operation and i

two under construction with a total generating capacity of approximately 5,000 MWe. At present, nuclear pt.wer provides about 30 percent of Switzerlands' electrical needs.

Seitre; land has a sophisticated nuclear infrastructure with excellent research facilities and capabilities. Although 4

undoubtedly having the technical know how to engage in reprocessing, Switzerland has chosen to forego the domestic reprocessing option and depends on other C.ntries for its reprocessing as well as for uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication needs.

The Swiss view plutonium contained in the spent fuel from their nuclear reactors as an indigenous resource that can reduce their import dependency. Their decision to use plutonium in light water reactor) is an integral part of their long ters nuclecr power program.

The nuclear industry in Switzerland is advanced (but not self contained). The Swiss are competent:in various areas of the nuclear industry and have a well developed industrial and scientific capability.

l Switzerland has five operating power reactors, with a total electrical capacity of approximately 3000 megawatts.

it also l

has a research reactor utilizing highly enriched uranium. As mentioned previously, Switzerland has no enriching or reprocessing facilities.

B.

Evaluation of the risk of increased proliferation with reference to " timely warning" l

l

$N 1

I

~-

i Following the pattern used atove with respect to activities 41 j

telgonue estre, the following paragraphs review the analytical i

factors relevant to

• timely warning'.

1.

Industrial Capability as Related to Weapons Research.

l Development and Production Proerans The discussion of steps and resources needed to conduct a nuclear explosives program, given above with reference to telgium, is relevant also to this anal.ysis, it is act repeated here, and the reader is invited to review those materials. The. following conclusions are based upon that framework.

Like Belgium, Switzerland is a modern, highly industrialized i

nation, with an advanced nuclear industry, its nuclear-related facilities include research reactors, power reactors, i

advanced nuclear laboratories and research facilities. The Swiss industrial sector contains specialized indus' rial i

facilities that are typical of an advanced nation. 'n many i

fields, including conventional explosives and instrumentation, Switzerland equals or exceeds the capabilities of most l

countries.

In short, given sufficient special nuclear material, Switzerland possesses the technical capability to fabricate nuclear weapons.

2.

Availability of Plutonium 4,nd Highly Enriched UrarJ 6.

i Switzerland has a small amount of highly enriched uranium for i

use as fuel in the Saphir research reactor, and as previously mentioned, the U.S. has previously approved-the transfer of l

approximately 450 kilograms of plutonium contained in M0X fuel I

for use in the Bernau reactors. Switzerland also possesses l

plutonium not sub, ject to U.S. controls.

While Switzerland has the technical capability to engage in the production of nuclear' weapons, and probably possesses l

sufficient special nuclear material to support such a program, j

it is the opinion of DOE that the activities involved in acquisition or diversion of material and develo> ment of nuclear weapons would be difficult to accomplis 1 without detection. Such activities could provide a clear indication of plans to acquire nuclear weapons relevant to timely j

warning.'

j 3.

Information Concerning Warning Time. Including Political i

Indicators i

i Even given its technical capabilities, a decision by Switzerland to enter into a nuclear weapons oevelopment L

program would necessarily require a political decision to do e

j so. Accordingly, an examination of the political indicators i

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thet could serve.to give notice of such a dec181on is appropriate in reaching a conclusion with respect to the proposed subsequent arrangement.

$wiss national policy has acved over time, to even stronger support for nonproliferation. No significant voices are raised in favor of a nuclear weapons program and, as the following actions underscore, none are expected.

Switzerland is a party to the Treaty on the Non Preliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)..and all of its nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards.

It is the ' founder

• and remains a key member of the 'Zangger Committee', formerly headed by Swiss Professor Claude Zangger, that is a central element in implementing the nonproliferation regime.

Switzerland is also a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)feration goals of the IAEA.and a strono supporter of the safegu program and nonproli It is the view of DOE that the major shifts in the political structure of Switzerland attendant to a decision to embark i

in a nuclear weapons development program would be readily detectable and that such changes would provide to the U.S.

early information concerning any Swiss weapons development program.

4.

Safeguards at the Bernau Reactors in Switzerland The IAEA has 188 power reactors under safeguards and of these, seven utilize M0X fuel elements. The MOX fuel considered in this case is destined to be used in thermal recycle at the Swiss power reactors at Beznau, When fresh MOX fuel elements are stored at a reactor, the IAEA employs procedures for the verification of ' direct use material' (plutonium and highly enriched uranium).

The Agency verifies the inventory of fresh M0X fuel two times per year by item count, checking of serial numbers, and qualitative non destructive analysis. Where seals are used, the MOX elements are verified yearly, if the amount of plutonium is greaterthana'significantquantity'(8kgsofplutonium),

the stored fuel elements are inspected monthly.

Once the fresh fuel is inserted into the reactors it is treated in the same manner as irradiated nuclear material for IAEA purposes, because after irradiation, it has similar characteristics and would require reprocessing to again i

separate the contained plutonium, it has been of some concern that the Agency did not attain its inspection goals in 1988 on a number of LWR reactors, including some that contained fresh h0X fuel. The reason i

given for the lack of goal attainment for reactors which have fresh MOX fuel, was the lack of equipment accepted for routine IE l

use by the agency to measure fresh W fuel at reactors.

Nevertheless, the IA[A has been able to conclude that no anomalies existed relating to these f at 111 ties which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of special fissionable material.

The foregoing concern, which is a generic one covering light water reactors, does not prevent the reaching of safeguards conclusions by !AEA. As noted above with respect to Belgium, the IAEA has not detected any anomaly indicating the diversion i

of a significant amount of nuclear material. This conclusion I

also covers Switzerland. The IAEA concluded that safeguarded material (including that in Switzerland) remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for.

Conclusion DOE believes that the foregoing paragraphs address the wide variety of matters relevant in this instance and that, taken together, they give evidence that the U.S. would have timely warning as envisioned in Section 131b(2).

C.

Evaluation of the Risk of increased Proliferation With Reference to Other Factors The standard set forth in Section 131b(2) of the Act for this case is whether an approval would result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that existing ai the time of the request. Having given " foremost consideration" in the foregoing paragraphs to the issue of

' timely warning *, the following section addresses other relevant factors that have been considered.

1.

Overall U.S. - Swiss Relationshios Switzerland is a neutral nation, a status which the Swiss have protected and cultivated for centuries. The substantial cooperation ties between Switzerland and the U.S. are reflected in the strong support given to the IAEA and the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by-the Swiss.

The present Agreement for Cooperation for the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States and Switzerland entered into force in 1966. Switzerland and the U.S. have cooperated actively under this agreement since its inception.

2.*

Political / Defense issues Switzerland has one of the world's most stable governments and has demonstrated a strong commitment to neutrality for hundreds of years. History has shown Switzerland's ability to remain out of conflicts that have overwhelmed other l

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+.

nations, tven during widespread conflict. Swiss neutrality has been respected.

There is little reason to assume that the $wiss feel threatened by any nation and, thus, would have little reason to add nuclear weapons to a strong conventional military capability.

3.

Nonoroliferation Credentials As previously mentioned, Switzerland is a party to the NPT, a member of the nuclear suppliers group and formerly served as o

Chairman of the nuclear export group known as the.langger Committee.

Its overall nonproliferation stance is supportive of U.S. policy.

I 4.

Physical Security Factors Switzerland has accepted IAEA INFCIRC 225/REV. 1 (' Physical Protection of Nuclear Material") and INFCIRC 254 (Pertaining I

to Nuclear Transfers) and has a government program to see i

that effective physical security measures are implemented at i

all facilities in Switzerland having Category 1, !! and 111 materials.

Based on the discust, ions with the Swiss government, nuclear facility personnel n.a on the opportunity to visit representative nuc' ear facilities having Category I material, DOE believes that } Tysical security measures in Switzerland are consistent witr standards and recommendations contained in INFCIRCs 225/Rev. I and 254 and are fully adequate.

5.

Incentives /Disincentives The incentives and disincentives previously outlined for Belgium apply in large part to $wimrland. Although not a member of NATO, or indeed any sd M11ance, Switzerland has a tradition of neutrality and miinary security. Based on present circumstances as well as Switzerland's history of neutrality, it would appear that Switzerland has no significant incentive to develop or to secure nuclear weapons and, indeed, that such a program would be a negative security factor.

Vill.

Safeguards implementation The IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Annual Report for 1988 that in carrying out the safeguards program of the Agency, it did not-i detect any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material, or the r.isuse of facilities or equipment for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. The Secretariat concluded that nuclear material under Agency safeguards remained in peaceful activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for.

I 16

D0l has no reason to believe that the IA[A Secretariat's report is not valid, in light of this and other factors associated with the proposed transfer. 00[ believes the framework of coteitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of the proposed subsequent arrangement.

IX.

Section !!7 of the Atomic [nergy Act of 1954, as amended with respect to Belgium (EURATOM)

Section127(4)providesthattheUnitedStatesmayapprovea retransfer only if the recipient agrees that the transfer will be subject to the same condition set forth in that section that would apply to export from the United States in the quoted export criteria.

Therefore, the word ' export' (or a variation thereof) in the following discussion is used as an equivalent to the word

' retransfer' (or a variation thereof).

A.

Criterion (1)

'IAEA safeguards as' required by Article !!!(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be axported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof."

All of the non nuclear weapon state members of the European Community and the United Kingdom are parties to the Treaty on the Non proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Each of these ten states (Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy', Luxembourg, the Netherlands Portugal and Spain) thus undertook the obligation in Article 111(1) of the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in all its peaceful nuclear activities and.to enter into an agreement with the IAEA to that effect.

As permitted by Article 111(4) of the NPT, those ten states elected to adhere to a single agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/193). Since*as parties to the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy community (EURATOM), they had ' assigned to EURATOM the responsibility and authority to apply safeguards within their territories. EURATOM is also a party to that agreement. The agreement, after approval by the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the European Community and ratification 4

by each of the then seven non nuclear weapon member states, entered into force February 2, 1977.

As in the case of all safeguards agreements between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states pursuant to Article 111(1) of the NPT, the agreement with EURATOM and the ten non nuclear weapon member states includes a provision for the completion by the parties of

" Subsidiary Arrangements,' setting forth in detail the manner in which the safeguards procedures called for in the agreement are to be carried out.

38 11

I IA[A safeguards as required by Article 111(2) of the NPT will be applied to any material and facilities exported to [URATOM. to any material and fact 11 ties previously txported and subject to the Additional Agreement, and to any n ecial nuclear material used in l

or produced through the use thereof.

As nuclear weapon states (NWS). France and the United Kingdom are not subject to IAEA safeguards as required by Article !!!(2) of the Treaty.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (1) is met with respect to exports to France and the United Kingdom.

In addition, all member states are obli 1

safeguards applied to nuclear material, gated to accept EURATOM equipment and devices subject to the Additional Agreement in each of the member states of the Community, includinn France, the U.K. and Spain.

Under Article V of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation of 1960, as amended, which incorporates Article XI, XII and Annex 8 of the November 8, agreement, EURATOM has the responsibility for establishing and implementing a safeguards and control system designed to give maximum assurance that any material supplied by the U.S. or generated from such supply will be used solely for peaceful purposes (* EURATOM Safeguards System'.

bound to consult and exchange experiences with)the IAEA with theThe Community i objective of establishing a system reasonably compatible with that of the safeguards s.rstem of the Agency.

The Community is responsible for establishing and maintaining a mutually satisfactory and effective safeguards and controls system in accordance with stated, principles.

]

EURATOM safeguards are being applied to material and facilities previously exported and subject to the Additional Agreement.and to i

special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

The agreement requires these safeyuard: te be appited to such material and facilities and special' nuclear material produced through its use.

Furthermore, U.S.-supplied nuclear mater'ial and special nuclear material generated through the use thereof in France may be subject to the application of IAEA safeguards under the agreement between France, EURATOM, and the IAEA for application of safeguards to certain nuclear material in France which entered into '1rce on September 12, 1981 (INFCIRC/290).

Such material in the U.K. may be subject to the application of IAEA safeguards under the agreement between the U.K.,

EURATOM, and the IAEA for i

the application of safeguards in the U.K. which entered into force on August 14, 1978 (INFCIRC/263).

J We would note that the EURATOM safeguards system, because of its continuing accountancy and materials control function for the EURATOM Community countries, will remain one of the factors l

l 2D

_.._._ j

i relevant to the judgment of the [mecutive Branch, under Section

!!6(l), that a proposed export to one of these stater, will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

Therefore, it is the [xecutive tranch view that criterion (1) is met with respect to Belgium, i

i

8. Criterion (t) i

'No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported'or previously exported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, facilities or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device.'

T hi proposed export, and any special nuclear material produced through its use, is subject to the Additional Agreement for Cooperation.

Article XI(l) and (3) of the November 8, 1958 Agreement for Cooperation provide that 'no material, including equipment and devices, transferred pursuant to this Agreement and

'no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of material, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this Agreement' and 'no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced' i

as a result of the use of material, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this agreement...will be used for atomic weapons, or for research or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose.'

The U.S.-- with the support-of most other major nuclear supplier states -- consistently has taken the position that nuclear explosive devices are ' atomic weapons,'

within the meaning of this guarantee, renardless of the intended end use of such devices.

The U.S. and other major nuclear 4

suppliers have agreed in the London Nuclear Supplier Guidelines to authorize the export of trigger list items "only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding uses j

which would result i n any nuclear explosive device * (underlining supplied)', and each notified the IAEA to this effect.

On November t

20, 1984, the members of the Community adonted a, common nuclear export policy accepting the London Nuclear Supplier Guidelines and stated'that the principles of the Guidelines form a basic common discipline for the member states for their nuclear exports.

This undertaking evidencos the fact.that all these nations equate any nuclear explosive device, regardless of function, as essentially equivalent to an " atomic weapon.'

Each non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) of the Community is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT As such, they are pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear).

explosive devices for any purposes.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (2) or its equivalent is met with respect to Belgium.

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C.

Criterion (3)

' Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear materiti used in or produced through the use thereof.

Following the effective date of any regulatson promulgated by the Commission pursuan'. to Section 304(d) of the Nutlear Non Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the official regulations.'

It is the judgment of the Executive Branch that Belgica has established physical security measures which, as a minimum, meet those recommended in the IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev.), 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.'

Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is set.

D.

Criterion (4)

'No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such.

retransfer.

In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees'that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section.'

Article'XI(2) of the November 8, 1958 Agreement for Cooperation, which the Additional Agreement for Cooperation incorporates by reference by Article V, provides that no material (including -

equipment and dev. ices) may be transferred beyond the control of the EURATOM Community, unless the United States agrees.

Article I bis D of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation provides that special nuclear material produced through the use of U.S.-supplied material may be4 exported to any nation outside the Community or to a group of nations, provided that such nation or group of nations lhas an appropriate Agreement for Cooperatio.n with the United States or guarantees the peaceful use of the produced material under safeguards acceptable to the Community and the United States.

The European Community's interpretation of this language is set out in an April 15, 1977 letter to the Department of State from Fernand Spaak,' Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities.

This interpretation

.is that the European Community Supply Agency will, prior to any proposed transfer, consult with the United States to find out whether, ir, the view of the U.S.,

the proposed recipient of such produced special nuclear material has an Agreement for Cooperation with the United States which is ' appropriate.'

l 4421-

i l

t During discussions with representatives of the Community held in Washington on November 1, 1978, the European Community confirmed that material subject to Article 1 bis O could not be transferred outside of the Community unless the U.S. agreed that the recipient countries or group of nations had an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation with the U.S. or safeguards acceptable to both parties.

Therefore, it is the Executive tranch view that, with regard to the proposed export and special nuclear material produced through l

its use, criterion (4).is set.

The U.S. will also be previoing requisite consent as a part of this subsecuent arrangement to permit the transfer of the material from Belgium to $witzerland.

4 i

With respect to transfers within the Community, it should be noted i

that the use of the words ' group of nations' in criterion (4) makes clear that no retransfer consent right is required within a group of nations under this criterion.

With respect to this provision the Senate report states:

It should be noted that under the U.S. EURATOM Agreements, the U.S. does have e right of prior approval on retransfers of certain material outside of the EURATOM Community.

It should also be noted that paragraph 4 does not require prior approval with respect to transfers within the community, consistent with United States policy of treating that 1

Community as a single entity'.

The Congressional intent not to require U.S. consent rights for transfers within the.'ommunity is also clear in Section 123a(5) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, since it requires that the U.S.

seek a guarantee "by the cooperating. party" (which in this case is EURATOM as a whole).

E.

Criterien (5).

"No such matefial proposed to be exported and n'o special nuclear material produced through the.use of such material will be reprocessed and no irradiated fuel' elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prioriapproval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration."

The proposed retransfer does not involve reprocessing, Criterion (5) is, therefore, not applicable.

l F.

Criterion (6)

'No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or group the use of l

any such exported sensitive nuclear technology."

l l

J+ 2.3

+e ev- - -,

,.e,,,,--,.-

, ~

+ -.

. i lhe propo'.ed retransfer does not involve sensitive nuclear technology.

Criterion (6) is,.therefore, not applicable.

X.

Section lt? of the Atomic Eneray Act of 1954, as amended; with i

Resoect to 5mitterland Section 127 (4) of the Act provides that the United States may l

approve a retransfer only if the recipient agrees that the transfer will be subject to the same conditions set forth in'the section that would apply to export from the United States in the quoted export criteria.

Therefore, the word ' export

• used in the following discussion is. equivalent to the word ' retransfer.'

l Switzerland has agreed that the material proar o: s' be l

transferred will becore subject to the U.S. tvf*tr 1-td Agreement i

for Cooperation and, therefore, fo, the pu<p. 4

> ! 11 ; discussion below, the material is treated under this or

.4c1 it if it had i

been transferred from the United States.

{

A.

Criterion (1) il l

'IAEA safeguards as required by Article !!!

be applied with respect to any such material (2) of the Treaty will or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities 1

i l

previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for

]

l Cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in cr-produced through the use thereof."

i l

Switzerland is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deposited its instrument of ratification on March 9, 1977.

Switzerland has concluded an NPT safeguards agreement with the lAEA pursuant to INFCIRC/153.

IAEA safeguards are applied in Switzerland to all materials'or facilities proposed to be exported, &s well as to any such material or facilities l

previously exported pursuant to the U.S. Switzerland Agreement Cooperation and to any U.S. supplied special nuclear mater,ial ufor sed in or produced through the use thereof.

.Therefore, it is the Executive Branch v.iew that criterion (1) i s

" met with respect to Switzerlan,d B.

Criterion (2)

'Ne such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear. technology l

proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear 4

I material produced through the use of such materitis, facilities, i

or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or research on or development of any nuclear explosive-device."

l As-a party to the NPT, Switzerland has pledged:not to manufacture, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive 4

__,._,,-.,__,,,._..,m.

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,y,

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l l

l device.

Moreover Article IX of the Agreement for Cooperation i

between the U.S. and $witzerland states, in part:

'No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to j

the Government of Switzerland or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement...and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, equipment and devices will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.'

i Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (2) is set.

l C.

Criterion (3) i

' Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exportes and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the i

use thereof.

Following the effective date of any regulation promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the official regulations.'

i It is the judgment of the Executive Branch that Switzerland has 4

established physical security measures which, as a minimum meet those recommended in the IAEA's-INFCIRC/225/Rev.1 "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material'.

Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is met.

i D.

Criterion (4)

'No such materials, facil'ities, or sensitive nuclear technology.

proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material pro 6uced through the use of any such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obn ined for such retransfer.

In addition to other requirements of law..the United l

States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to retaive such retransfer agrees that it shall

)

l be subject to the conditions required by this section."

j l

Article IX A.(3) of the 1966 U.S.-Switzerland Agreement for Cooperation, as amended in 1974,-stipulates that: "No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of Switzerland or authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or_ the superseded Agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, equipment, or devices, including any such special nuclear material held under the superseded Agreement, will be transferred to L

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4.

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unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of $witzerland, except as the United States Commission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or group of nations. and then only if, in the opinion of the United States Commission, the transfer of the material is within the scope of an Agreement for 1

Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations.'

l Insofar as special nuclear material produced in these' reactors is concerned Article Vll Bis [.

provides that:

'No soecial nuclear

]

material produced through the use of material transferred to the Government of $witzerland or to authori:ed persons under its i

jurisdiction, pursuant to this Agreteent or the superseded j

Agreement, will be transferred t; the jurisdiction of any other nation. er group of nations, er.ept as the Commission may agree to such a tr(nsfer.'

These articles give the U.S. an unqualified approval right over the transfer of material supplied by the U.S. or produced through the use of such material from Switzerland and allow retransfers only if it is determined to be within the scope of an agreement for cooperation with the recipient country.

This right would 1

apply to irradiated fuel because it contains U.S. supplied j

material.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, criterion (4) is met with respect to Switzerland.

l E.-

Criterion (5) l

'No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be l

reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in for,m or content, unless the prior approval of the United States obtained for such reprocessing or alteration.'

Article VII Bis C of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement for Cooperation states, 'when any special nuclear material received from tne United States of America requires reprocessing, or any, irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States of America are to be removed from a reactor and-are to be l

altered in form or content, such processing or a1teration shall be perform.ed in facilities acceptable to both parties upon a joint determination that the provisions of Article X may be effectively applied."

Since any reprocessing or alteration requires a determination by the U.S. that provisions of Article X of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement l

for Cooperation regarding safeguards may be effectively applied, this provision meets criterion (5) with respect to Switzerland.

F.

Criterion (6) l 26

.... m I

'No such sensitive n'.: lear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any exported sensitive nuclear technology The proposed subsequent arrangement does not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology.

Criterion-(6) is, therefore, not applicable.

XI.

Analysis of Section 128 Section 128a(1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following-i additional criterion:

'As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear meterial, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive r.uclear technology to non nuclear weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export '

Belgium and Switzerland, as parties to the NPT, have agreed to accept IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities and have implemented that commitment through agreements with the IAEA.

XII Procedures For Processing of Subsequent Arrangement Section 131a(1) of tha Act requires that subsequent arrangements have the concurrence of the State Department, and-consultation with the Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Defense (D0D), ar.d the Department of Commerce (DOC).

ACDA may, if.it deems necessary, prepare a Nuclear Proliferation AssessmentLStatement.

None has been deemed necessary for this case.

A proposed subsequent arrangement can be approved only upon the written determinrtion of the Secretary of Energy that the I

arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

A notice of the proposed subsequent arrangement must be published in the Federal Register and'a period of 15 days elapse.

A proposed subsequent arrangement that is subject to Section 131b(1) of the Act cannot be approved until the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee j

on Foreign Relations of the Senate have been provided with a report containing the reasons for entering into the arrangement-and a period of 15 days of continuous session has elapsed, in accordance with established interagency procedures with regard to the handling of subsequent arrangements,~ DOE has obtained the concurrence of the State Department and also has consulted-with l

ACDA, NRC, 000, and D0C.

A notice of this arrangemcot and'a non-inimicality determination m'11 be published in the Federal M s?

L

1...

Register for atLleast 15 days before thAs' request is granted.

Also,-before approving the proposed,uses, the Committee of Foreign 1

Affairs.of the House of~ Representatives and the Committee on-

-icteign Relations of the.5 enate, as required b,* section 131b(1)-,

will be provided with a copy of this report containing the reasons i

for entering into this arrangement-X111. ' Analysis of Section 133 The Department of.Defens'e(s$4 required by~section-133-of thepletedi'tsrevi Atomic Energy Act,=has'c

' physical security and whether a ge#!uine terrorist threat exists for the proposed transfe'r.

Based on its review,-D0D has no objections to the proposed r e t r a.n s f e r. -

2b

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SCHWi 17.l RISCHI HOTSCH Art nau eiwou.

AMil A% A!)l lil st'Issi 6.6.1990

'*'*~" ' W a4

• m.

i-met HE/LW Mr. Salvator Ceja.

I Acting Director of the Offict

~of Nuclear'Non-Proliferation i

Policy.

P U.S. Department of Energy-Forrestal; Building Room 7G046 1000:2ndependence Avenue S.W.

Washington, D.C.

20585 Transfer of special nucleer material-of U.S. origin from. Euratom to Switzerland l

Dear Mr. Ceja t

[

Please find enclosed, for DOE *s approvel', threelsets of'MB 10; for.

concerning the transfer-.of special nuclearcmateriali'of'U.S.

origin from Euratom to Switzerland.-

TheLapplications cover the-amount of plutonium which will;be1 separated at Cogema'sLUP3 plant.

in.1990 from spent fuel originally shipped to'Cogema by Bernische f

Kraftwerke BKW, Kernkraftwerk Goesgen:KKG and Nordostschweize-j rische Kraftwerke NOK.-

MOX.fabriention-will be carried'out by-l Belgonucleaire and the fabricated MOX fuel:will--be'recycladiat

[

NOK's Beznau plant.

L

[

The encioned requests mark the beginning'of a new phase in:?the il peacefulouse of nuclear energy _in Switzerland.

The feasibility b

of plutonium recyclir.g.< light water reactorsshas1 been success-fully demonstrated in European utilities in general and in-the Beznau. plant in particular. -As a consequence,-all' Swiss i

utilities are planning to recycle plutonium in their reactors on

)

a regular basis,-with an MOX fuel _ load up to one third of the-i-

i s

2-

~

reactor core.

Under these circumstances a timely approva) is j

more crucial than ever; delays would cause-considerable technical complications-and high costs'for the utilities involved.

In order to allow f or: proper-planning,. approvals f or the. enclosed i

MB 10 should be received no later than mid-December 1990. ;Any delay would force the' Swiss utilities to fabricate some of the MOX fuel at BNFL, which would result in a-new MB 10 approval:

procedure.

In view of these +.imo constraints, we are providing you today with MB 10 forms not'yet countersigned'by Euratom; the i

preper forms will be sent to you as soon-as we have received them from Brussels, i.e. in approximately three weeks.

'Thank you for your attention'to this matter h

1 Sincerely yours, k)

Ha Pete Hertig Se nee a d Technology Counselor I

6 i

4 '* *.

Nuabe r ft7 o/so(sta. J

aslo APPROVAL FOR RITRANS TER CT $PECI AL NUCLE AR KAttRI AL OF UNITED STATES ORIGIN the approval of the United States Departs; t of Energy is he reby tequeste to the transfer fro: Euratom Supply' Agency (for Belgonucleaire FBFC.Dessel, Belgium) 1 (Trans f e ro r) l l

to The Government of Switzer. land (for Kernkraftverk Goessen AG)

(Transferee) of United States supplied special nuclear material in the quantity and eveting the specifications described belov (hereina f ter called "s peci fie d caterial") which the t rans f e ror ob tained pursuant to its Agreetent for Cooperation Jor Civil Uses with the United-States.Covernment.

Material was-ortginal;y ob c ained by t rans f e ror f rom US-AEC under ceotrast o r O rd e r Nu=be r AT-(49-14 ) UES/SD/102 and shipped in spent fuel e l e m e n '. s to La Hague'On'de'r RID /EU(5P" 39 S P E C I FI E D M> "

(Till in where s cable)

,Identificaties Marking.

To'tal U U-235, U-233 Isotopic percen Twel Yyse No.,

etc.

(In Cra:s) or pu (In Crams )-

_U-235, U-233, or 1

MOX fuel Pu fissile assemblies 63'000. g The specified material, wh/ 5 is nov located at COGEMA.La Hague

, vill upon app roval he reby by the United States Department of Energy be t rans fe rt on or about February 1942 for use at Beznau Nuclear Power Plant and will b e ac cep te d fo r the folieving spe cified purpos e: recycling of the recovered Plutonium The t rans fe ro r, vich the concurrence of the transferee, vill notify withis l

30 days af te r the afor es aid d ate, the-Unite d S tates Depar tment of Energy of the actual date and quantity of sacerial transferred.

Ic _ is agreed by the t ran s f e re r and' t rans f eree that as of that date'the specified mate rial vill ceas e to be subject to the Agree =ent f'or Cooperation and contract indica te d ab ove and vill be subj ect to the t ran s f e re e 's Ag re e:e..c f o r Coope ration f o r Civil Us as with the Unite d : S t at es ' Cove r c=e n t.

4 BUt AMT FOR ENERWi\\'ilB1SCliAR D.Y.%C)

(T ra ns f e ro r)

(Date)

(Tr an s f e r e e'y (Date) i Above requested transfer under Article of transferee's Agree ect f or Coope ra tion for Civil Uses with the United St at es Cove rnme nt p r ovi d e d physical 't rans fe r is consummated by app rove d,

6 4

(Fo r t he United States Department of Energy) i i

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.33#10 DK. [

N u a b e rf 9/J p( 6 ed -.r-APPROVAL F5R RETRANSFE A OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR KATERI AL OF 0N!!ED STAf t$ ORICIN

.The app roval of the United States Department of Energy is he reby requested I

to the transfor f roa _ Euratom Supply Agency (fo'r Beltonucleaire FBFC,Dessel, Belgium)

(Transf e ro r) to The Government of Switrerland (for Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerke AG (I'*"'I'#**)

NPP Bean'au) of United ~ States supplied special nuclea r aste rial in th eL qua ntity and se e ting th e spe cifications des c ribe d below (hereinafter called "specified

?

caterial")'which the t rans fe ror ob tained pu rsuant to its Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses-vich the United-States Cove rn=en t.

Material was originally obtained by t rans feror f rom US-DOE under Coctract or Order Nusbeg,AT-(49-14)'UES/SD/1=and shipped in spent fuel elements to La Hague ug g gpyg g gggy,41 (Till in where applicable)

E Ideneificatios T'tal 0 U-235, U-233 Isotopic. Percent

Marking, o

Tuel Tyse No.,

etc.

(In Crats) or pu (In Cra:s)* U-235, U-233, or F MOX fuel Pu 11ssile assemblies 34'000. g I

The specified material, which is nov located at COGEMA.la Hague vill upon app roval he reby by the United States Depart =ent of Energy be t r ans f e r re-en or about February 1992 for use a t Beznau Nuclear Power Plant and will be accep ted fo r the f ollowing spe cified purp os e:

recycling of.the recovered Plutonium The t rass fe ro r, with the concurrence o f the.t ra:s f eree, vill notif y withis 30 days a f t e r t h e..s f o r e s ai d d a t e, th e Unite d States Dep ar t=e:t of' Energy of the actual date-and quantity of material trans f e rred.

It is agreed by the t rans fe re r and' t rans feree that as:of that date 'the specified ma te rial vill ce as e to be subject eo the Agree:ene l'or Cooperation and contract ind'.cated above and vill h e s ubj ect to the transferee's Agreement f o r co o p e ra t io n fo r Civil Us es vitii che Un it e d. S t a t e s Covere ent.

BUND AMT FOR ENERGIEWlRTSCHAFT I

SD.b.DD l

(Tra ns f e ro r)

(Date)

(Transferee)

(Date) l Above reques ted t ra ns f e r under Article

. of transleree's Ag re e ze s t for Cooperation for Civil Uses with the Uni c e'd S t a t e s Cove rnae n t app rove d, j.

P rovided physical t rans fe r is consu==a,ted by (Fo r the United States Depart ment of Energy) w,--m

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.M5010 APPROVAL TOR.RETRAN$ f ER OT $PECI AL NUCLE AR KATE RI AL CT UNITED STATES ORICIN 1

Thi app roval. o f the United States Department of Energy is hereby requested i

to the transfer fro: _E u r a t o m Supply Agency (for Belmonucleaire FBFC,Desse),Belatum)

(Transf e ro r) l l

to The Government of Switzerland (for Bernische Kraftverke AG)

(Transferee) of. United States supplied special nuclear sacerial in the quantity and o

seeting the specifications described'belov (hereinafter called "s peci fied i

l naterial") which the t r ans feror ob tained pursuant to its Agreement for l

Cooperation f or Civil Us es with the Unit ed S tates Covern=ent.

Hatetial was originally obtained by t rans f a ror - f rom US-ERDA under Contract o r O r d e r Numb e r, AT-(4 9-14 ) UES/SD/2 ar.d shipped in spent fuel elements to La Hague ugggg g g g gp (Till in where applicable)

Identification T' tal D.

U-235, U-233 Isotopic Percent ;

Harking, o

Fuel Tyoe No.,

etc.

(In Cra:s)

,or-Pu (In Cra:s)- U-235, U-233, or MOX fuel Pu fissdie assemblies 35'000. g The specifiec material, which is nov located at _COGEMA.La Hague

, vill

.upon app roval he reby by the United States Department of. Energy be transferr.

o n' or ab out February 1992 for i

use at _ Bernau Nuclear Power Plant and vill ba ac cep te d ' fo r f

the following specified purpose recycling of'the recovered Plutonium I

The t rans fe ro r, with the concurrence of the tra:s f e ree, vill: nc tif y withis 30 days af te r the.afores aid date, the United States Departme:t of Ecergy of the actual date and quantity of material trans fe rred.

It is agreed by th e t ran s tpo r and' t rans f e ree. th at as of that date'the specified material vill. cease to b e subj ect to the Agree:ent f'orLCooperation and contract indicated above and vill be subject to the t ran s f e ree 's ' Ag re e:en t f o r Coope ra tion fo r Civil Us es. with the United States Coverc=ent.

'T 'DESAMT FOR ENERGIEWIRISCHAFT M

D.EN (T ra ns f e ro r)

(Date)

(Transfer 4e)

(Date)

Above requested tradsfer under Article of t rans f e ree's Ag reste st for Cooperation fo-Gvil Uses with the United States Covernment app rove d, provided physicai.ransfer is consu==ated by (for Use United States Department of Energy)

.', eu.

1 D'R A F T Mr. Salvador N.' Ceja.

Acting Director-Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Office of International Affairs q;

-U.S. Department of Eaergy..

i Washington, DC 20585 i

Dear Mr. Ceja:

This is to advise you:that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed the request to-transfer 132 kilograms of-plutonium derived _ from U;S.-origin 1

material from France to Belgonucleaire, Dessel, Belgium,- for fabrication of 1

mixed. uranium-plutonium oxide-fuel and subsequent retransfer o' the fuel to Switzerland for use in the Beznau light-water power reactors-(RTD/SD(EU)-56, 57, and 58).

The Commissi_on understands:that the Department of.; Defense has completed its review requirements under Section 133 of.the Atomic Energy Act'and has.no objection to the approval.of the subsequent arrangement.

Based.on this understanding, the Commission does not object to thelproposed transfer..

' Sincerely, Marvin R. Peterson, Assistant Director for International'Sec nity, Exports, and. Material Safety International' Programs Office.of-Governmental' and Public Affairs i

e 1

-]

_