ML20058K072
| ML20058K072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1989 |
| From: | Bates R VIKING SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17202U800 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-87-028, CON-NRC-3-87-28 GL-88-01, GL-88-1, NUDOCS 8907110294 | |
| Download: ML20058K072 (49) | |
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4-ENCLOSURE 3 FINAL TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT ON RESIVNSE FROM COMMONWEALTN EDISON
'IO CENERIC LEITER 88-01 j
PERTAINING 'ID THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2 Published June, 1989 P
b prepared by Robert C. Bates Armand Lakner Viking Systems International 2070 Wm. Pitt Way Pittsburgh, PA Prepared for:
e U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 under Contract No. NRC-03-87-028 Task Order 005 FINAL 102h Ab N
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i ABSTRACT i
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Thir, report contains an evaluation of the licensee (Commonwealth Edison) submittal for Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 which was submitted i
inresponsetotheNRCGenericLetter88-01inwhichCommonwealthEd(son was requested to (1) Furnish their current plans relating to piping replacement and other measures to mitigate IGSCO, inspection, repair, 7
and leakage detection.
(2) Indicate whether they plan to follow the NRC Staff positions, or propose alternative measures. Commonwealth Edison's plans are evaluated in Section 2 of this report in teras of compliance to NRC Staff positions. Section 3 contains an evaluation of an alternative position concerning a change to the Technical i
Specification on ISI and c6ncerning exceptions to the NRC Staff position on leakage detection.
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L SUHHARY l
The Licensee, Commonwealth Edison, submitted a responce to the NRC Generic Letter 8B-01. Commonwealth Edison's response pertaining to the austenitic stainless steel piping in the Dresden Nuclear Power i
Station, Unit 2 (o BWR nuclear power plant) was evaluated in terms oft (1) Their previous and planned actions to mitigate IGSCC to provide assurance of continued long-term service.
(2) Their Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program.
(3) Their Technical Specifications pertaining to JSI and their plans to ensure that leakage detection will be in conformance with the NRC Staff position.
(4) Their plans to notify the NRC of significant flaws identified (or changes in the condition of the velds previously known to be cracked) during inspection.
I Commonwealth Edison endorses 12 of the 13 NRC Staff positions which are outlined in Generic Letter 8B-01. They applied exceptions to one of the NRC Staff positions, i.e. that pertaining to leakage detection.
Extensive programs of piping replacement, solution treating, str.ess improvement, and application of weld overlays (to repair flawed welds) have been applied at Dresden 2.
Although Dresden 2 has 90 IGSCC Category D, 17 ICSCC Category F, and 6 IGSCC Category G (out of a total of 276 velds), Commonwealth Edison claims that crack initiation and growth are controlled through Hydrogen Vater Chemistry (HWC).
Additional stress improvement is being considered, and additional weld overlays will be applied as needed.
An augmented ISI program was initiated in 1988.
All except six non-resistant welds (four of which are inaccessible for UT inspection and will be monitored visually or with acoustic emission) have been inspected. Future plans incorporate credit for HWC.
Commonwealth Edison presented an alternative position to the NRC Staff position requesting a change to the TS cn ISI. This position and their exceptions on leak detection are evaluated.'c Section 3 of this report.
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CONTENTS ABSTRACT I
SUMMARY
il 1.
INTRODUCTION 1
2.
EVALUATION OF RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 88-01 2
2.1 Documents Evaluated 2
1 2.2 Review of Commonwealth Edison's Responses to Staff Positions and Impicmentation of Those Positions.
3 2.3 Review of Classification of Welds, Previous Mitigating Actions, and Pre
- Inspections 4
2.3.1 Current 1GSCC Class 10 cations 4
s 2.3.2 Justification for IGSCC Classifications 9
i 2.3.3 Mitigating Actions Prior to the 1988 Refueling Outage 9
2.3.4 Mitigating Treatments During the 1988 Refueling Outage 10 2.3.5 Ilydrogen Water Chemistry 10 2.3.6 Presious Inspection Programs 11 2.3.7 Evaluation of Previous Mitigatirg Actions and Inspections 13 2.4 Current Pir.ns for Mitigating Actions 14 2.4.1 Evaluation of Conformance to Staff Positions and Recommendation 14 2.5, Plans for Future Inspections 15 t
2.5.1 Summary of Inspection Schedule 15 2.5.2 Inaccessible Welds 18 2.5.3 Methods and Personnel 18 l
2.5.4 Sample Expansion 19 2.5.5 Evaluation and Recommendation 19 2.6 Changes in the Technical Specification Concerning ISI 20 111
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2.7 Confirmation of Leak Detection in Technical SpeelGcation 20 2.8 Plans for No:iGeation of the NRC of Flaws 20 2.8.1 Evaluation and Recomrpendation 21 3.
ALTERNATIVE POSIT 10NS AND EXCEPTIONS 21 3.1 Alternative Position Concerning ISI in the Technical Specification 21 3.1.1 Commonwenhh Esison's Position 21 3.1.2 Evaluation and Recommendation 21 3.2 Exceptions Concerning leak Detection 22 3.2.1 Commonweahh Edison's Position 22 3.2.2 Evaluation and Recommendation 22 4.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23 5.
REFERENCES 27 APPENDIX A A.1 '
APPENDIX B B1 t
APPENDIX C C1 h
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- 1. INTRODUCTION Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) near weldsents in Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) piping has been occurring for almost 20 years. Substantial efforts in research and development have been sponsored by the BWR Owners Group for ICSOC Research, and the results of this program, along with other related work by vendors, consulting firms and confirmatory research sponsored by the NRC, have permitted the development of NRC Staff positions regarding the ICSCC problems.
The technical basis for NRC Staff positions is detailed in Reference 1 and further background is provided in Reference 2.
The results of these research and development programs prompted the NRC to issue Generic Letter 88-01 (see Reference 3) requesting all licensee.: of BWR's and hb1ders of construction permits to (1) Furnish their current plans relating to piping replacement, inspection, repair, and leakage detection.
(2) Indicate whether they:
(a) Plan to follow the staff positions, or (b) Propose alternative measures.
Specifically, Generic Letter 88-01 stat.ed that an acceptable licensee response would include the following 4tems:
(1) Current plans regarding pfpe replacement and/or other measures taken or to be taken to mitigate IGSCC and provide assurance of continued long-term piping integrity and reliability.
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L (2) An inservice inspection (ISI) program to be implemented at the next refueling outage for austenitic stainless steel piping, i
(3) A change to the Techr; cal Specifications to include a statemr.nt 1
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in the section on ISI that the inservice inspection program for piping will be in conformance with the staff positions on schedule, methods and personnel.
(4) Confirmation of plans to ensure that the Technical Specification related to leakage detection will be in conformance with the Staff position on leak detection.
(5) Plans to notify the NRC, in accordance with 10CFR50.55a(o),
of any flaws identified that do not meet IWB-3500 criteria of Section XI of the ASME Code for continued operation without evaluation, or a change found in the condition of the welds previously known to be cracked, and an evaluation of the flaws for continued used operation and/or repair plans.
4 This report contains a technical evaluation of the response which Commonwealth Edison (sometimes called CE in this report) submitted in response to the NRC Generic Letter 88-01 pertaining to the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (hereafter called Dresden 2).
- 2. EVALUATION OF RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 88-01
)
This evaluation consisted of a review of the response to NRC Generic Letter 88-01 of January 25, 1988 by Commonwealth Edison pertaining to Dresden 2 to determine if their performance and plans are in conformance with the NRC Staff positions or if proposed alternatives are acceptable. Proposed inspection achedules and amendments to the Technical Specification were included in the review.
2.1 Documents Evaluated Review was conducted on the information pertaining to Dresden 2 l
provided by the Licensee in the following documents.
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'"Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2, (Response to)
Generic letter 88-01, Docket Nos. 50-237/249,254/265,373/374 License DPR-35," Commonwealth Edison, One First National Plar.a.
Chicago, Illinois 60609, July 29,1988.
"Dresden Station Unit 2. Additional Information on the Fall 1988 1GSCC Inspection NRC Docket No. 50-237," Letter to NRC from Commonwealth Edison, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois 60609, October 5, 1988.
"Dresden Station Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information on Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Docket No. 50 237,"
Commonwealth Edison, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois 60609. December 21, 1988.
"Dresden Station Uni't 2 Response to Request for Additional Information on Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Docket No. 50-237,"
Commonwealth Edison, One First National Plar.a. Chicago, Illinois 60609, March 1, 1989.
4 Hereafter, in this report, this documents will be referred to as the CE Submittal No. 1, No 2, No. 3, and No 4, respectively, and collectively as the CE Submittals.
2.2 Review of Cemmonwealth Edison's Responses to Staff Positions and Implementation of Those Positions.
Cyneric Letter 88-01 outlines thirteen NRC Staff positions pertaining to (1) materials, (2) processes (3) water chemistry, (4) weld overlay, (5) partial, replacement, (6) stress improvement of cracked weldments, (7) clamping devices, (8) crack evaluation and repair criteria, (9) inspection methods and personnel, (10) inspection schedules, (11) sample expansion, (12) leak detection, 3
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and (13) reporting requirements. Generic Letter 88-01 states that the licensee should indicate in their submittal whether they endorse these NRC Staff positions or propose alternative positions. The l
CE Submittal did not specifically state acceptance or rsjection of most of the thirteen NRC Staff positions, but the Commonwealth Edison positions on several of the thirteen items were implied in discussions in the CE Submittal No. 1, and additional information was provided in CE Submittal No. 4.
These positions are presented in Table 1.
t Note that C>mmonwealth Edison indicated endorsement of twelve of the thirtera NRC Staff positions and applied exceptions (as discussed 3ater) to the NRC Staff position pertaining to leakage detection. Concerning inspection schedules: Commonwealth Edison takes credit for hydrogen water chemistry and accordingly applied reductions in the numbers of certain IGSCC Category welds to be inspected. In addition, although not indicated in Table 1, Commonwealth Edison submitted an alternative to changing the l
Technical Specification pertaining ta Inseryce Inspection.
2.3 Review of Classification of Welds, Previous Mitigating l
2 Actions, and Previous Inspections i
2.3.1 Current IGSCC Classifications l
Table 2 provides a summary of the IGSOC classifications of welds at Dresden 2 prior to a refueling outage which began l-in September, 1988. This table is based on a similar summary.
provided in CE Submittal No. 1.
Table 3 contains a summary of IGSCC classifications following the September, 1988 refueling outage, during which numerous mitigating treatments were applied which affected the IGSCC classifications. The information in Table 3 is based on weld-by-weld list which 4
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Table 1 Summary of CE's Responses to Staff Positions j
i CE Has/Will CE Accepts WRC Applied Consider for Staff Position Staff Position In Past Future Use
- 1. Materials yes yes yes
- 2. Processes yes yes yes
- 3. Water Chemistry yes yes yes
- 4. Weld Overlsy yes yes yes yes(*)
- 5. Partial Replacement yes yes
- 6. Stress Improvement of Cracked Weldments yes yes yes
- 7. Clamping Devices yes no yes
- 8. Crack Evaluation and Repair Criteria yes yes yes
- 9. Inspection Method and Personnel yes yes yes yes(b) l
- 10. Inspection Schedule yes yes
- 11. Sample Expansion yes NI yes
- 12. Leak Detection yes(c) y,,(c) y,,(c)
- 13. Reporting Requirements yes NI yes
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i (a) System removal is being considered for some piping rather than actual replacement.
(b) Commonwealth Edison requested a 50% reduction in inspection requirements based on the use of hydrogen water chemistry.
See text for discussion.
(c) Commonwealth Edison applied provisions (exceptions) to their endorsement of the NRC Staff position on this item. See text for discussion.
NI Not indicated.
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Table 2 Summary of IGSOC Classification of Welds at Dresden 2 (Prior to the 1988 Refueling Outage)
Dia.
No. of Welds of Indicated ':CSOC Catenorr System Inch A
B C
,_JE, 3
F G
Totals Recirulation Outlets 28 2
0 0
9 0
2 18 31 Noz-SE 28 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
2 Header 22 8
0 0
7 0
0 5
20 Risers 12 0
0 0
19 7
2 12 40 l
Noz-So 12 0
0 0
2 0
0 8
10 Bypass 4
9 0
0 4
0 0
0 0
11 0
0 14 25 SDC 16 2
0 0
5 0
0 1
8 Isolation Condensor Supply 14 0
0 0
11 0
0 15(*)
26 12 0
0 0
2 0
0 11(b) 13 4
34 Return 12 0
0 0
10 0
0 6
Core Spray 10 6
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 5
0 0
5 10
- Jet Pump Inst RWCU 8
17 0
0 7
2
?(a) 28 N-18 A, B Nozzles 6
4 0
0 0
0 0
3 4
Head Vent 4
0 0
0 1
0 0
2 3
CRD 6
0 0
0 4
0 0
2 6
Totals 48 0
0 98 9
4 115 274 (a) Includes one inaccessible weld.
(b) Includes two inaccessible welds.
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Table 3 1
Summary of IGSCC Classification of Welds at Dresden 2 (per CE Submittal No. 4, after 1988 Refueling Outage)-
Number of Welds of Indicated ICSCC Catetnory System Diameter A
B C
D E
F
_G_
Totals Recirc.
28 2
0 10 22 0
1 0
35 22 8
0 2
6 1
1 0
18 12 0
0 16 15 11 8
0 50 4
7 0
0 19 0
0 2
28 RHR-LPCI-SDC 16 2
0 20 11 0
0 0
33 ISOC 14 0
0 21 4
0 0
1 26 12 0
0 27 0
0 0
2 29 Core Spray 10 6
0 0
0 0
0 0
6 Jet Pump Int Loops 0
0 5
5 0
0 0
10 RWCU 8
17 0
0 1
2 7
1 28 RPV Head Noz, Vent 6
0 0
1 0
0 0
7 CRD Return 4
0 0
0 6
0 0
0 6
Totals 48 0 101 90 14 17 6
276
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a conte?.ns both the IGSOC classifications and justification for those classifications (i.e., material, mitigating treatments, and inspection) of each veld that is within the scope of Generic Letter 88-01. Although that wald-by-weld listing is not reproduced in this report, Appendice. A and 1
B contain greater detail than that provided in Table 3.
Note that Tables 2 and 3 are significantly d$fferent. Most of the differences are due to mitigating treatments applied
- during the September,1988 refueling outage (described below),
but some differences occur that cannot be attributed to such treatments. Included are:
F (1) The total number of welds is listed as 274 in Table 2 and,276 in Table 3.
The difference arises in the number of wolds listed for certain lines in three systems as fcilows:
Number of Welds per i
System Submittal No. 1 Submittal No. 4 Recirculation Outlets (28" dia.)
31 33 Header (22" dia.)
20 18 Isolation Condenser Supply (?2" dia.)
13 15 L
(2) Prior.to the 1988 refueling outage, two welds (SPM-45-25 and SPH-45-19) in the Recirculation bypass lines were mistakenly classified as IGSOC Category A.
Corrections were made following the 1988 refueling outage. -Tho two tables reflect this difference.
(3) CE Submittal No. 4 lists two Head Vent velds, N8(A) 8 t-m
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and 4A-1(A), as IGSCC Category A welds and states-j af that these two welds contain' resistant materials.
'L CE Submittel No.-1 lists these two welds as IGSCC Category G.
No explanation of this difference was~
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provided.
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Since a detailed weld-by-weld list of IGSCC classifications UY was provided in CE Submittal No. 4 while only a summary was provided in CE Submittal No. 1, it is presumed in the remainder of this report that the correct i.arbers are reflected in the list presented in CE Submittal No. 4 (summarized in Appendices A and B and Table 3) rather'than Act presented in CE Submittel No'. 1 (Table 2).
2.3.2JustificationfeLJUSCCClassifications
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As noted earlier, CE Submittal No. 4 also contains l
justificatioa for the IGSCC classification of each veld in terms of material, mitigating treatments, and inspecti,ons.
A review of these items revealed that the IGSCC classifications, as presented in CE Submittal-No. 4 were correctly applied by Commonwealth. Edison. The mitigating-y treatments are summarized in the following sections.
1 2.3.3 Mitigatina Actions Prior to the 1988 Refueling Outane Prior to the 1988 refueling outage, mitigating actions were taken which included: (a) partial replacement (resulting in most of the IGSCC Category A welds), (b) solution heat
't treating (res::1 ting in the remainder of the IGSCC Category A welds), (c) repair of several flawed welds with standard weld overlays (resulting in IGSCC Category E welds), and (d) temporary repair of several flawed welds with non-standard overlays which are designated as leak barrier overlays 9
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,,4 (resulting in several IGSOC Category F welds).
2.3.4 Mitigatina Treatments During the 1988 Refuelina Outane CE Submittal No. 4 contains the following statements:
" Stress Improvement was applied to 104 welds during the Fall 1988 refueling outage. Additional stress improvement will be considered in the future if permitted by outage,
constraints. At this time, no detailed information on future strees improvement is available."
" Weld Overlay has been and is being used. as necessary, to reinforce welds that have flaw indications in excess of the ASME Section XI, Subsection IWB-3500 limits.
Most of the weld overlay reinforcements have been applied and inspected in accordance with NUREG 0313. Revision 2.
Those weld overlay reinforcements that do not conform to NUREG 0313, Revision 2 criteria on-standard thickness and/or inspection will be built up to standard thickness and/or inspected tu accordance with NUREG 0313. Revision, during the next refueling outage (presently scheduled for the Fall of 1990).
2.3.5 Hydrogen Water Chemistry Commonwealth Edison has applied Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) at Dresden 2 since April, 1983. Prior to the use of liWC, conductivity averaged about 0.2 micromho. Since that time, according to CE Submittal No. 1, exceptionally-low conductivity (averaging about 0.06 micromho) has been achieved.
A table showing conductivity and dissolved oxygen during March and April, 1988 is contained in CE Submittal No. I s'ich shows conductivity ranged from 0.057 to 0.066' 10
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ricromho and dissolved oxygen usually ranged from 1.2 to 5.4 ppb tith occasional excursions to readings in the range.
of'98 to 207 ppb. Additional data are contained in CE
' Submittal No. 2 which supports the Commonwealth Edison contention that exceptional water chemistry has been maintained..
'As discussed later, ultrasonic test (UT) results revealed stability of both flawed and unflawed welds, and these excellent results are attributed to the use of hydrogen water chemistry.
2.3.6 Previous Inspection Programs The'CE Submittal'No I did not disclose their previous inspection schedules; however, CE Submittal No. 4 contains a list of the welds inspected in the 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1988 refueling outages. The list iis not reproduced in this report, but the number of welds inspected during the 1986 and 1988 refueling outages for each of the lines in each.
of the systems to shown in Appendix B-of this report. The t
inspection schedules are condensed =in Appendix C which shows the number of welds inspected in each' diameter piping in each of the systems at Dresden 2. ' Finally, Table 4 compares the number of welds of each IGSCC Category that were inspected during the 1986 and 1988 refueling outages with the requirements of Generic Letter 88-01.
Note that only six non-resistant welds at Dresden 2 have not been inspected. Two of these missed inspection because they were incorrectly classified as IGSCC Category A welds.
This mistake was found only after completion of the 1988 refueling outage, and they will be inspected during the next refueling outage. The other four are inaccessible for 11
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$t Li-Table 4-Summary of Inspection Schedule for Dresden 2 for 1986 and 1988 Refueling Outage I
IGSCC No. in No. Inspeted Required by Caten.
Caten.
1986 1988 Generic Letter SS-01 A
48 10 3
25% every 10 years (at-least 12% in 6 years) 50' every 10 years (at least B
0 25% in 6 years)
C 101-
, 28 101 All within the next 2 refueling
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cycles, then all every 10 years (at 50 % in 6 years)
D 90 43 50 All every 2 refueling cycles
-- E 15 10 15 50% next refueling cycle, then all every 2 refueling cycles F
17 14 17' All every refueling outage G(8) 6 0
0 All next refueling cycle (a) Two of the IGSCC Category G weld;. iere mistakenly classified as IGSCC Category A.
The mistak:.was not discovered until after
'the 1988 refueling outage was completed. These welds will be inspected during the next refueling outage. The other four IGSCC Category G welds are inaccessible for inspection. See text for discussion of plans for these welds.
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ultrasonic inspection. PlansforthesewNdsarediscusse'd-later. 1he list of inspections supplied in CE Submittal No. 4 also lists inspection results on a weld-by-weld' basis, although Cnese data are not reproduced in this report. Flaws.
(most of which have been repaired with either stendard overlays or' leak barrier overlays) have been found only in.
the IGSCC Category E and F welds.
Both CE Submittal No. I and CE Submittal No. 2 maintain that' stability of both flawed and unflawed welds has been achieved due to WC. For example, CE Submittal No. I contains the following statement:
" Excellent ultrasonic testing (UT) results from repeated.
examinatiops of flawed and unflawed welds,-except in one case on a Reactor Water Clean Up weld, confirm the effectiveness of the WC and of UT performed between 1983 and 1985. Note that the scanning sensitivity _ level of the CECO's UT procedure used in 1983 and 1984 examinations met the current EPRI recommended irrei for the detection of IGSCC."
Similar statements are contained in CE Submittal No. 2.
In addition, this submittal provides discussions'on specific welds including one weld in which a crack was found for the first time in 1988. Commonwealth Edison's conclusion concerning that weld is that the crack was present, but not detected during earlier inspections. The implication is that it initiated prior to the implementation of HWC.
2.3.7 Evaluation of Previous Mitigatina Actions and Inspections An extensive program has been conducted at Dresden 2 so that 13
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more than half of the welds'within the scope of. Generic Letter 88-01 are either IGSCC Category A, C, or E welds. More than 100 non-resistant welds remain, but all except two of the those welds have been inspected. Flaws were found in several 1
we)ds. Most were repaired with either structual or leak' tarrier overlays. Those not yet repaired have.been approved for temporary service..In addition, HWC has been effectively :
implemented, according to Commonwealth Edison, with the result
'that stability of the welds has been achieved.
2.4 Current Plans for Mitimatinn Actions The CE Submittals do not list any. specific plans for future; 4
mitigating actions..They do, however, indicate the following ge eral plans:
(1)' Additional stress improvement treatments are being considered, although no detailed information on future stress improvement is presently available.
(2) Weld overlays will be used as needed.
(3) System removal is being considered. A potential candidate is the CRD Return line.
2.4.1 Evaluation of Conformance to Staff Positions and Recommendation Since extensive mitigating actions have already been applied at'Dresden 2 and since the use of Hydrogen Water Chemistry will be continued, Commonwealth Edison's current plan l
concerning mitigating treatments are reasonable. Therefore, acceptance or Commonwealth Edison's plan is recommended.
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- l' 2.5 Plans for Future Inspections Commonwealth Edison No. I states that an augmented inspection program was developed and scheduled to.begin during the 1988 refueling outage. The inspections conducted in the 1988 i
refueling outage, as otit11ned in Commonwealth Edison Submittal No. 4 and summarized in Table 4, confirms that the inspection program has been isp3 sented.
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s 2.5.1 Summary of inspection Schedule i
CE Submittr.1 No. I requests a 50% reduction in the inspection schedule (compared to the schedule specified in Generic Letter-1 88-01) for welds in IGSOC Categories B, C, D, and E.
The schedule that. Commonwealth Edison followed in 1988 did not l:1 reflect such a reduction, but the request is reflected in summary of plans for future inspections in CE Submittal No.
3 (summaries of the 1990 to 1994 schdules are shown in Table 5 of this report). It should be noted that Commonwealth a
did not submit detailed, weld-by-veld inspection plans, although such a list was requested in the RAI. In addition /
even their summary is not current because it does not reflect the changes in the IGSCC Classifications due to the: mitigating treatments applied during the 1988 refueling outage.
L Commonwealth Edison's request for a 50% reduction of the 1
number of inspections of certain welds is based on credit for HWC (Hydrogen Water Chemistry). The number of IGSCC i
Category D, F, and G welds that benefit, as reported in CE l'
Submittal No. 1 are shown in Table 6.
CE Submittal No. 4
.dtes that list, but since their inspection plans are not 4
L current, the updated version is not included in this report.
Note that no reductions are proposed for IGSCC Category F or IGSCC Category G, but there categories are included in i
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' fable 5 Summary of Inspection Schedule for Dresden 2-1990, 1992, and 1994 Refueling Outage (*)
for the IGSCC No. in No. Sched. for Insp.
Required by i'
Caten.
Caten.
1990 1992 1994 Generic Letter 88-01 A
48
_2 2
2 '-
25% every 10 years-(at least 12% in 6 years)'
50% every 10 years (at least B
0 25% in 6 years) r All within the next 2 refueling C
0 cycles, then all every Id years (at 50 % in 6 years)
D 209 52 52 52 All every 2 refueling cycles E
9 2
2 2
50% next refueling cycle, then 7
all every 2 refueling cycles F
4 4
4 4
All every refueling outage G(b) 4 0
0 0
All next refueling cycle (a) The number of welds in each IGSCC Category do not reflect the mitigating treatments applied during the 1988 inspections, but they do reflect inspections during that outage.
. (b) 'lhe four IGSCC Category G velds shown in this table are inaccessible for inspection.
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I Table 6 Effect of Hydrogen Water Treatment on Welds in Dresden 2(*)-
No. of Welds of Indicated IGSCC Category that do and do not Benefit from HWC i
Dia.
Caten. D Caten. F Caten. G-1 Caten. G-2 System Inches yes - no m no-yes no m
no Recirulation Outlets 28 9
0 2
0 7
0 11 0
Nor-SE 28 1
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 Header 22 7
0 0
0 2
0 3-0 Risers 12 19 0
2 0
12-0 0
0 Noz-SE 12 2
0 0
2 8
0 0
0 Bypass 4
4 0
0 4
12 0
3 0
11 0
0 6
1 4
3 SDC 16 5
0 0
0
~ 1 0
0 0
Isolation Condenser Supply 14 0
11 0
0-0 5
.0 9
12 0
2 0
0 0
0 0
11 Return 12 3
7 0
0 1
1 0
0 Jet Pump Inst.
12, 8, 4 5
0 0
0 5
0 0
0 RWCU 8
7 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
- ad Vent 4
0 1
0 0
0 2
0 0
6 4
0 0
0 2
0 0
0
- v...
Totals 66~
32 4
0 58 9
21 23 (a) Welds that only partially benefit from HWC are included with 1
those that do not benefit.
G;-1 indicates IGSCC Category G velds that were inspected in 1983/84.
G-2 indicates IGSCC Category G welds that were inspected prior
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to 1983.
Although not included in the above table, Dresden 2 has four IGSCC Category G-3 welds (IGSCC Category G welds-that are not accessible for inspection). Two of these welds receive benefit from HWC.
17
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Table '6 for completeness. Also, Table 5 reflects
' reclassifications of the IGSCC Category G welds because of 1988 inupections of those welds. - Also, note' that reduced inspections are proposed for IGSCC Category E welds which r
benefit from HWC according to CE Submittal No. 4 but not according to CE Submittal No.1. (the basis of fable 6).
ri-
. =
2.5.2 Inaccessible Welds
~
Four IGSCC Category G welds at Dresden 2 are inaccessible for Ultrasonir, Inspection (UT). These includes Two branch pipe connections (one on the Isolation
-r Condenser Condensate Return piping and one on the Reactor Water Clean up suction piping) which should receive the o
h-full benefit of HWC, These welds are reinforced by
.+
l reinforcement-saddles which strengthen the joints and reduce the stresses on the welds, but the saddles preclude 4
the UT. Visual inspections are planned.-
g Two welds located inside.the containment penetration assemblies (one on the Isolation Condenser Condensate i.
Return piping and one:on the: Isolation Condenser Supply a
piping). Acoustic emission monicQring at'these locations is under investigation.
1:
l l-j 2.5.3 Methods and Personnel i
L The augmented inspection program will be conducted using l.
! I-methods and personnel in conformance with the NRC Staff positions as delineated in Letter 88-01, o
1:
18 L
1
9
~f*y
.z a
f'C 2.5.4 Sample Expansion CE Submittal No. I states that the Sample Expansion'in the augmented inspection program will conform to the NRC Staff position as delineated in Generic Letter 88-01.
P 2.5.5 Evaluation and Recommendations r
Concerning HWC, Generic Letter 88-01 states:
l
" Staff criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of water chemistry improvements are under development, and will be available prior to general use of the NWC option.
If fully effective HWC is maintained, a factor of two-in-reducti,on of-inspection frequency may be justified L
for IGSCC Categories B, C,-D, and E weldsents."
?
Since the NRC Staff must make the determination of whether-or not fully effective HWC is being maintained at Dres, den L
2, approval for the proposed reduction of inspection I
frequencies must await the NRC Staff determination.
Meanwhile, until that determination is made, the following recommendations are made:
i Tentative rejection of the proposed 50% reduction of l
l-required inspections.
e i-Commonwealth Edison should revise their inspection plans to tentatively reflect the full requirements of Generic L
l
' Letter 68-01.
Since Commonwealth Edison plans-to follow the guidelines of Generic Letter 88-01 concerning inaccessible welds, inspection methods and personnel, and sample expansion, 1
19
Y s-
'l acceptance of their plans concerning these aspects'of their 1
14 Inservice Inspection (ISI) program is recommended, j
2.6 Channes in the Technical Specification Concerninn ISI-i Commonwealth Edison proposed an alternative position to the NRC Staff position concerning a change to the. Technical Specification.
a This alternative position is discussed in Section 3 of this report.
i 2.7 Confirmation of Leak Detection in the Technical Specification i
.i; :
Commonwealth Edison plans to revise the Dresden 2 Technical Specification pertaining to leakage to be'in conformance with the
,h NRC Staff position with certain exceptions which are discussed j
in Sectionl3 of this report.
i I:
L 2.8 Plans:for Notification of the NRC of Flaws CE Submittal No. I states:
1.
"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be notified of the following conditions identified during the course of examinaiton li-in accordance with Generic Letter 88-01: (1) Flaw indications 1
exceeding the acceptance criteria of applicable Section XI, Subsection IWB-3500.
(2) Change ic9nd in the condition of
. the welds previously known to have flaw. indications.
(3) The o
@+
evaluation by the CECO Engineering Department for the above l, '
conditions for continued operation and/or the necessary corrective action to be taken."
" Notification vill be made by the CECO Nuclear Licensing 20
t s,-
c)
I Department'to the appropriate NRR project manager-2.8.1 Evaluation and Recommendation Commonwealth Edison's position complies with the NRC Staff position, so acceptance of their position is recommended.
- 3. ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 3.1 Alternative Position Concerning ISI in the Technical Specification 3.1.1 Commonwealth Edison's Position
-CE Submittal No. 1 states that since the Station is currently reviewing and revising the Technical Specifications under the Dresden Station Improvement Program - Technical Specification-Action Plan, that a statement insuring compliance with-the ISI provisions of Generic Letter 88-01 will be included in the Dresden 2 ISI program.
3.1.2 Evaluation and Recommendation Generic Letter 88-01 discloses that the Inservice Inspection and Testing Sections may be removed from the Technical Specifications (TS) and included in the ISI Program in the future. Despite this consideration, the NRC Staff included a requirement in Generic Letter 88-01 to change the TS to include a statement that the on ISI program will conform with the NRC Staff position on inspection. Thus rejection of the Commonwealth Edison position is recommended, and the Technical Specification for Dresden 2 should be changed to include the required statement on ISI.
21
=
=
~
^
y'r-t
.r:
=,
t I'
3.2 Exceptions Concernini Leak Detection
.E 3.2.1 Commonwealth Edison's Position The following exceptions to the NRC Staff positions concerning r
leakage decection are stated in CE Submittal No.1 pertaining W"
to Dresden 2.
They noted that these exceptions are needed to avoid unnecessary plant modifications or' unnecessary _
a t
restrictive plant operating conditions..
r t
(1) " Individual identified leakage is not flow-metered, l
but all identified leakage is collected and-conducted-1 i
to a separate collection system from unidentified
~ t leakage. Total identified leakage is monitored via the drywell equipment drain sump pump discharge flow totalizer meter."
1 L
(2) " Sump operability is' defined by the station as the ability to measure reactor coolant leakage rath,er than strictly depending on the operability of a L
leakage measurement instrument. Since only one-channel exists for unidentified leakage monitoring,
[
strict compliance with the-staff positions will not occur."
c l
(3) "The increase in unidentified leakage shall.be 2 Lj gpm over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> average. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> average will preclude shutdown due to variations-in measured coolant leakage between 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> intervals."
O
(
3.2.2 Evaluation and Recommendation 1
Although Commonwealth Edison states that sump operability 4
is defined as the ability to measure reactor coolant leakage, 22 i
3 i
go;;
- l
' i they do.not identify any methods of measurement other than it a monitoring instrument. Thus, rejection of Provision 2 1s-recommended, and requirements concerning operability of f
e, l'
measurement instruments like those required in Generic Letter L
88-01 should be added to the Technical Specification.
a Provision'3 is not as restrictive as that required by Generic i
Letter 88-01; thus, rejection of this provision is also t
recommended, and the Technical Specification should be changed in line with Generic Letter 88-01 which requires: " Plant-shutdown should be initiat'ed for inspection and corrective action when,'within any period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or less, any
. leakage detection system indicates ofi icrrease.in rate of unidentified leakage in excess of 2 spa or its equivalent."
i D
Provision 1 is reasonable so acceptesce of this provision
- is recommended.
l
- 4. CONCLUSIONS AND' REC 0!9fENDATIONS Concerning the thirteen NRC Staff positions as delineated in Generic q
Letter 88-01: Commonwealth Edison endorses twelve of the thirteen NRC Staff positions (i.e., those pertaining to materials, processes, water
- chemistry, weld overlay, partial replacement, stress improvement of j
cracked weldments, clamping devices, crack evaluation and repair criteria, inspection methods and personnel, inspection schedule, sample expansion, and reporting requirements). They presented exceptions 7
to one,of the positions (i.e., that pertaining to leakage detection).
- e
- Dresden 2 contains 48 IGSCC Category A welds as the result of piping replacement and piping solution treating. In addition, Dresden 2 contains 101 IGSCC Category B welds (treated with MSIP), 14 IGSCC Category E welds (flawed welds which were repaired with full structural 23 i
i y
e-
.~
P p';
l
- e t f(,-.
w 4
overlays), 17 IGSCC Category F welds (some with non-standard overlays),
a Ninety-six non-resistant welds remain, although 90 of these h' ave been
. inspected, and six (four of which are inaccessible for UT inspections) 4 have not.
No' specific plans exist for additional mitigating treatments, although additional stress improvement treatments are being considered, i
weld overlays will be' applied as needed, and hydrogen water chemistry has been implemented for several years.
i An inservice inspection program (ISI) has been developed for Dresden
[
2 which comp 1:les with the-requirements of Generic Letter 88-01 pertaining to schedule, methods and parsonnel, and plans for reporting flaws, providing that a credit for HWC (allowing a 50% reduction of 1
the number of required inspections of certain welds) is allowed.
However, only a summary of the planned schedules for future refueling 1
outages was presented by Commonwealth Edison for Dresden 2, and that summary was not current' inasmuch as it did not reflect changes of IGSCC classifications of welds treated with MSIP.
Since guidelines for judging the effectiveness of HWC are not contained
'in' Generic Letter 88-01 or NUREG 0313, Revision 2,.the decision of the effectiveness of HWC at Dresden 2 must be judged b.v the NRC Staff.
Dresden 2 contains six'IGSCC Category G welds. Two of these were not scheduled for inspections during the last refueling outage because they were incorrectly classified as IGSCC Category A welds. They will be inspected during the next refueling outage. The other four-are inaccessible for UT inspection. Currently, visual monitoring is planned for two and acoustic. emission monitoring is planned for the other two.
Commonwealth Edison declined to change the Technical Specification j
l on ISI. Rather they proposed to include such a statement in the Inservice Inspection Program, Such action was specifically rejected in Generic Letter 88-01.
1 24 2
t o.,
g z o.
1 Commonwealth Edison also applied exceptions to the NRC Staff position requesting a change in the Technical Specification for Dresden 2 pertaining to leakage ^ detection because-they clair ?. hat such a change would impose unnecessarily restrictive plant operating conditions.
In particulars.(1) They do not flow meter individual identified leakage.
(2) They stated that sump operability is defined as the ability to measure reactor coolant (but they did not provide descriptions of alternate leakage measurements methods) rather.than stability depending on the operability of a leakage measurement instrument.
(3) Plant shut down for excessive unidentified leakage would be based.on an increase.of 2 gpm over the average of the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> rather than over any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period or less as required by Generic Letter 88-01.
As a result of this technical evaluation, the followtig recommendations are made.
(1) Acceptance of Commonwealth Edison'a classifications of welds as presented in CE Submittal No. 4 (their reply to the Request for Additional Information dated March 1, 1989).
(2) Tentative rejection of Commonwealth Edison's inspection plans, pending a decision by the NRC Staff concerning the effectiveness of hydrogen water treatment at Dresden 2.
(3) Commonwealth Edison should revise its inspection plans to reflect the current IGSCC classifications of welds, and those schedules should reflect the total requirements of Generic
, Letter 88-01' (rather than applying credit for INC) until such time as the NRC Staff renders a decision concerning the effectiveness of HWC.
(4) Acceptance of Commonwealth Edison's plan for visual and acoustic emission monitoring of the inaccessible welds.
25
3 I
4
'?
r ij
? ()
{"'
r D.;
Jm T,..
-(5) Rejection of Commonwealth Edison's position concerning changes to the' Technical Specification on ISI.
Commonwealth Edison hould add the required' statement to the Technical Specification L
s on ISI.
. (6) Rejection of the exception pertaining to plant shut down due to inoperable monitoring instruments, since Commonwealth' Edison did not present alternate "ethods of leakage measurement.
Commonwealth Edison should a'end their Technical Specification accordingly.
(7) Commonwealth should modify th: Technical Specification to reflect requirements of Genert: Letter 88-01 concerning an increase-of unidentified leakage of 2 gpm as decribed in Sectiok 1
3.2.2 of this report.
l (8) Acceptance ofLthe remaining portions of the Commonwealth Edison t
Submittals pertaining to Dresden 2.
4
.I W
f h
Il 26
_ _y. _.
r F
11-
- 5. REFERENCES 1.
" Technical report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping," NUREG 0313. Revision 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, January, 1988, 2.
" Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Light Water Reactor Plants," NUREG 0531, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission, February, 1979.
3.
"NRC Position on 1GSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping,"
Generic Letter 88-01, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January
~!5, 1988.
I e
0 e
l 27 e.
tl pg 4
i p
.s l
e c
Appendix A A:
Summary of IGSCC Classification.of Welds at Dresden'2 Number of Welds of Indicated ? 100 Catetnory t
System Line A
B C
D i
F G
Total
- Rectre, 2-0202A-28" 1
'5 5
,11 2-0201A-28"
-6 1
7' 2-02028-28" 1
2 7
10 2-0201B-28" 3-4-
7 Total:
2 0
10 22 0
1 0
35.
i 2-0201A-22" 4
1 2
1 8
(
2-0201 -22" 1
1 2
2-0201B-22" 4
3 1
8
- l Total 8
0 2
6 T
1 0
15 I:
2-02010-12" 1
2 1
1 5
i 2-0201D-12" 2
1 2
5 2-0201E-12" 3
1 1
5 2-0201F-12" 2
1 2
5 2-0201G-12" 2
1 2
5 2-0201H-12" 2
1 2
5 i
2-0201J-12" 2 1 1
5 2-0201K-12"-
4 1
5 2-0201L-12"
-3 2
5 l
2-0201M-12" 2
l' 2
5 Total-0 0
16 15 11 8-0 50 2-0203A-4" 4
9 1
14 2-0203B-4" 3-10 1
14 Total 7
0 0
19 0
0 2
28 RRR-LPdI-SDC 2-1506-16" 11 2
13 2-1519-16" 9
3 12 2-1001A-16" 1
2 3
2-10018-16" 1
4 5
~T 0
0 0
33 Total 2
0 20 1
A-1 e
a:
r : ;-5,
i Appendix A (continued)
' Number of Welds of Indicated IGSCC Catetnory System Line A
B C
D E
_?_
G Total ISOC 2-1302-14" 21 4
1 26 Total 0
0 21 4.
0 0
1 26 2-1302A-12" 8
8 2-1302B-12" 7
7 2-1303-12"-
12 2
14 Total 0
0 F
0 0
0 2
29 Core Spray 2-1403-10" 3
3 2-1404-10" 3
3 Total-6 0
0 0
0 0
0 6
Jet Pump Int' A Loop 5
5 B Loop 5
5
-~
Total 0
0 5
5 0
0 0
10 RWCU 2-1201-8" 11 L
2 7
1 22 2-1202-8" 6
6 Total 17 T'
O 1
2-7 1
28 RPV Head N18A Noz 2
2 N18B Noz 2
2 Head. Vent 2
1 3
-Total 6
0 0
1 0
0 0
7 o
CRD Return 2-0388-4" 6
6 Total 0
0 0
6 0
0 0
6 A-2
1 1
'l Appendix B Summary of Inspection Schedules at Dresden 2 ICSCC No. of.
No. Inspected in a
S3, tem Line Caten Welds 1986 1488 1
Recirc.
2-0202A-28" A
1 0
0 2-0201A-28" 0
2-0202B-28" 1
0 0
2-0201B-28" 0
Total 2-O.
0 2-0201A-22
A 4
2 0
- 0201 -22" 0
2-0201B-22" 4
2 0-Total 8
4 0
l 2-0201C-12" A
0 2-0201D-12" 0
2-0201E-12" 0
l
'2-0201F-12" 0
2-0201G-12" 0
2-0201H-12" 0
2-0201J-12" 0
2-0201K-12" 0
.2-02011-12" 0
2-0201H-12" 0
1 Total 0
I 2-0203A-4" A
4 0
0 2-0203B-4" 3
0 0
Total 7
0 0
RHR-LPCI-SDC.
2-1506-16" A
0 2-1519-16" 0
t 2-1001A-16" 1
0 0
2-1001B-16" 1
0 0
Total 2
0 0
i B-1
- (
^'
(
h Appendix B (continued)
-No. of No. Inspected in Svstem Line Caten Welds 1986 1988 s
ISCO 2-1302-14" A
0 1
Total.
A 0
2-1302A-12" 0
2-1302B-12" 0
2-1303 -12" 0'
l Total 0
a Core Spray 2-1403 -10" A
_3 0'
O 2-1404 -10" 3
0 0
Total 6
0 0
Jet Pump Int
'A Loop.'
A 0
B. Loop 0
Total 0
Rk'CU 2-1201 -8" A
11 2
0' 2-1202 -8" 6
1 0
Total 17 3
0
.RPV Head N18A Noz
-A 2
1 1
N18B Noz 2
1 1
Head Vent 2
1 1
.1 Total 6
3 3
f
'CRD. Return 2-0388 -4" A
0 Total 0
I.
B-2
- \\
s t
o!
Appendix B'(continued)
^-
IGSCC No. of No. Inspected in.
System-Line Caten Welds 1986 1988 is:
Recire.
2-0202A-28" C
5 0
5 2-0201A-28" 0
2-0202B-28" 2
-0 2
2-0201B-28" 3
3 Total 10.-
0 10 4
2-0201A-22" C
1 0
1 2-0201>-22" 1
0 1-l 1.
2-0201B-22" 0
L Total 2
0-2 2-0201C-12" C
1 0
1 l
L 2-0201D-12" 2
0 2
l L
2-0201E-12" 0
i 2-0201F-12" 2
0 2
'i 2-0201G-12" 2
0 2
l-2-0201H-12" 2
0 2
- l l
2-0201J-12" 2
0 2-l 2-0201K-12" 0
0 2-0201L-12"
-3 0
3 2-0201M-12" 2
0-2-
Total 16 0
16-ei 2-0203A-4"'
C 0
l 2-0203B-4" 0-Total 0
4 o
l RHR-LPCI-SDC 2-1506-16" -
C 11
.7 -
11 l
h 2-1519-16" 9
2 9
1 i
2-1001A-16" 0
2-1001B-16" 0
1 Total 20 9
20 L-L B-3 i
l-
c,h :
~l" s:
s J
'.y O'
g..
l Appendix B (continued)
IGSCC No. of No. Inspected in System Line Caten-Welds 1986 1988 ISCO 2-1302-14" C
21 9
21, Total 21 9-21 t
2-1302A-12":
C 8
2 8
)
2-1302B-12" 7
0-7 2-1303 -12" 12 10 12 Total 27 12 27 Core Spray 2-1403 -10" C
0 2-1404 -10" 0
Total 0-Jet Pump Int A Loop C
0 B Loop--
5 0
5 Total 5
0 5
l RWCU 2-1201'-8" C
0 b
2-1202 -8" O~
t E
Total 0
RPV Head N18A Noz C
0-N18B Noz 0
Head. Vent 0
Total-0 l'
CRD Return 2-0388 -4" C
0 t
l Total 0
B-4
' x; g
I-I Appendix B (cont.inued)
-1 IGSCC No. of No. Inspected in System Line Caten yelds 1986 1988 e
a Recire.
- 2-0202A-28" D
5 2
3 l'
2-0201A-28"-
6 6
0 2-02028-28" 7
4 4'
2-0201B-28" 4
0 4
.j,
i Total.
22
-12 11 l
2-0201A-22" D
2 2
0
.. 0201 -22" 1
0 1
2-0201B-22" 3
3 0
+
c Total 6
5 1
lj 2-02010-12" D
2 2
2 l'
.2-0201D *12" 1
1 1
' 5-L 2-0201E-12" 3
1 3
2-0201F-12" 1
1 1
2-0201G-12" 1
1 1
2-0201H-12" 1
1 1
2-0201J-12" 1
1 1
2-0201K-12"
-4 4
4' 2-0201L-12" 0
2-0201M-12" 1
1 1
Total 15 13 15 i'
J 2-0203A-4" D
9 2
8
[
! ~
- 2-0203B-4" 10 2
8 1.
Total 19-4 16 la >
~RHR-LPCI-SDC 2-1506-16" D
2 2
2 2-1519-16" 3
0 3
l-2-1001A-16" 2
2 0
t lj-2-1001B-16" 4
3 1
li.
Total 11 7
6 L
- e
.f.
B-5 L
Y
U. 7 - 5;
.i l'
p..
.l Appendix B (continued)-
IGSCC No of.
No. Inspected in System Line Caten Welds 1986 1988 ISCO 2-1302-14" D.
4 2'
4 u
Total 4
2 4
l 2-1302A-12" D
0 2-1302B-12" 0
l 2-1303 -12'?
O_
i Totc1-0 i
= Core Spray.
2-1403 -10".
D 0
2-1404 -10" 0
Total 0
i Jet Pump Int.
.A Loop D
5 5
0 B Loop 0
Total 5
5 0-t RWCU 2-1201 -8" D-1 1
1-2-1202 -8" 0
j Total 1-1 1
RPV Head N18A Noz D
0 N18B Noz 0
Head Vent
,1 0
1 Total 1
0 1-CRD Repurn 2-0388 -4" D
6 4
2 Total 6
4 2
I
}
B-6
m r<
y q.
,,n,
"..f 4 '
.f i
-l Appendix B:(continued)
[
IGSCC No. of No. Inspected in System Line' Caten Welds 1986 1988 y
- Recirc.'
2-0202A-28" E
0' 2-0201A-28" 0
2-02028-28" 0'
2-0201B-28" 0
Totall O
+
2-0201A-22" E
-1 1-l' 2-0201 -22" 0
~2-0201B-22"
_0 Total 1
1 1
Y' 2-02010-J2" E
1 1'
1 2-0201D -12" O
t 2-0201412" 1
1 1
2-020'.F-12" 2
1 2
2-0201G-12" 2
0 2
1 0201H-12" 2
2 2
2-0201J-12" 1
1 1
2-0201K-12" 0
2-0201L-12" 0
2-0201M-12" 2
1 2
Total 11 7
11 2-0203A-4" E
0' 2-0203B-4" 0
Total 0
n.
RHR-LPCI-SDC 2-1506-16" E
O 2-1519-16" 0
2-1001A-16" O
-I 2-1001B-16" 0
Total 0
.i B-7 i
r o,
i 1, >>
(,
Appendix B (continued)
IGSCC No. of No. Inspect.pgin System Line pgtfeg yelds 1986 194,
b l,
ISCO 2-1302-14" E
O Total 0
2-1302A-12" E
O 2-13025-12" 0
2-1303 -12" 0
Total 0
~
I Core Spray 2-1403 -10" E
O 2-1404 -10" 0
l Total 0
~ ~~ T~
'1 Jet Pump Int A Loop E
O B Loop 0
Total 0
RWCU 2-1201 -B" E
2 2
2 2-1202 -8" 0
- 21 2
2 2
i
. )
i RPV }{ead N18A Not E
O N18B Noz O
Ilead Vent 0
Total 0
l l
CRD Return 2-0388 -4" E
O Total 0
P l
B-8 1
g,.,,
5 I
4 i
[ [-
Appendix B (continued)
,4 IGSCC No. of No. "nspec<:ed in i
- , fi,
Srstem Line
_Cggg Welds 1980 L98_8_
Recire.
2-0202A-28" F
0 2-0201A-28" 1
1 1
2-02028-28" 0
~
2-02018-28" 0
Total 1
1 1
2-0201A.'2" F
0 2-0201 -22" 0
2-02018-22" 1
0-1 Total 1
0 1
2-02010-12" F
1 1
1 2-0201D*12" 2
2 2
2-0201E-12" 1
1 1
2-0201F-12" 0
2-0201G-12" 0
2-0201H-l'.
0 2-0201J-12" 1
1 1
2-0201K-12" 1
1 l'
2-0201L-12" 2
1 2
6 2-0201M-12" 0
Total 8
6 8
2-0203A-4" F
0 2-0203B-4" 0
Total 0
RRR-LPCI-SDC 2-1506-16" F
0 2-1519-16" 0
2-1001A-16" 0
1 2-1001B-16" 0
Total 0
L.
B-9 7
.+
b I
Appendix B (continued)
IGSCC No. of No. Inspected in System Line h
Welds 1986
.988 l
IS00 2-1302-14" F
0 Total 0
2-1302A-12" F
0 2-13028-12" 0
2-1303 -12" 0
Totei 0
Core Spray 2-1403 -10" F
0 2-1404 -10" 0
Total 0
Jet Pump Int A Loop F
0 B Loop 0
Total 0
RWCU 2-1201 -8" F
7 7
/
2-1202 -8" 0
Total 7
7 7
4 l
RPV Head N18A Not F
0 l
N18B Noz 0
Head Vent 0
Total 0
l l
CRD Repurn 2-0388 -4" F
0 t
1 Total 0
i; I
l' B -10 l
1'
- u 1
4 Appendix C Summary of Inspection Schedules at Dresden 2 Diameter IGSCC Wo. of No. Inspeci:ed in System Inch Ce_ ten Welds 1986 988 Recire.
28 A
2 0
0 22 A
8 4
0 1
1 A
0 4
A 7
0 0
RHR-LPCI-SDC 16 A
2 0
0 ISCO 14 A.
0 12 0'
Core Spray 10 A
6 0
0 Jet Pump Int A
0 RWCU 8'
A 17 3
o RPV Head A
6 3
3 CRD Return 4
A 0
Total 48 10 '
3 lt l '
l H
h l-6 1
l C-1
m __
4 l
lI Appendiz C (continued)
)
Dianeter IGSCC No. of No. Inspected in System Iuch h
Welds 1986 1
,_ 988 i
Recire.
28 C
10 0
10
+
3 22 C
2 0
2 12 C
16 0
16 i
4 C
0
/
RHR-LPCI-SDC 16 C
20 9
20 ISCO' 14 C
21 9
21 12 27 12 27 Core Spray 10 C
0 Jet Pump Int C
5 0
5 s
l RWCU 8
0 0
r RPV Head C
0 CRD Return 4
C 0
l Total 101 28 W
i l
4 9
I I
1 il t
C-2 l
i I
l
p.
r 3
i I
Appendir C (continued)
Piameter IGSCC No. of System Inch Q_t_eg Wa10s
~No, Inspected in e
1986 1988 Recire.
28 D
22 12 11 22 D
6 5
2 12 D
15 13 15 4
D 19 4
16 RHR-LPCI-SDC 16 D
11 7
6 f
ISCO 14 D
4 2
4 12 0
Core Spray 10 D
0 Jet Pump Int D
5 5
0 RWCU 8
D 1
1 1
RPV Head D
1 0
1 CRD Return 4
D 6
4 2
r Total 90 43 50 4
1 l,
l l
I e C-3
i y
l l
. Appendix C (continued) l Diameter ICSCC Wo. of No. Inspected in System Inch Salgg Welds 1986 1988 Recire.
28 E
O 22 E
1 1
1 i
12 E
11 7
11 4
E 0-RRR-LPCI-SDC 16 E
O ISCO 14 E
O 12 0
Core Spray 10 E
O Jet Pump Int E
O RWCU 8
E
'2 2
2 RPV Head E
O O
g CRD Return 4
E O
Total 15 10 15
[
.c 4
I l
' I.
I j-i
(
l l\\i C-4
t lf' l
o.. 4
'i l
Appendix C (continued)
Diameter ICSCC No. of No. Inspecte( in System Inch h
_1986 1968 Recire.
28 F
1 1
1 22 F
1 0
1 12 F
8 6
8 4
F 0
t RHR-LPCI-SDC 16 F
0 1500-14 F
0 l
12 0
Core Spray 10 F
0 Jet Pump Int F
0 RWCU 8
F 7
7 7
RPV Head F
0 CRD Return 4
F 0
Total 17 14 17 0
4
- 1-C-5
,