ML20058G214
| ML20058G214 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18059A549 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 GL-82-33, NUDOCS 9312090131 | |
| Download: ML20058G214 (2) | |
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.7f UNITED STATES j
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.. j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 4 001
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l SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR P.EACTOR REGULATION PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS SAFETY INJECTION TANK PRESSURE AND VOLUME INSTRUMENTATION l
RELAXATION OF REGULATORY GUIDE I.97 ENVIRONMENTAL OVALIFICATION RE0VIREMENTS l
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Section 6.2 of the Generic Letter 82-33 requested licensees to provide a report on their implementation of Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.97 (Rev.2),
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" Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," and methods for complying with the Commission's regulations including a supporting technical justification of any proposed alternatives or deviations. A review of the licensees' submittals was performed by the staff and a safety evaluation (SE) was issued for each plant. These SEs concluded that the licensees either conformed to, or adequately justified deviations from, the guidance of the Regulatory Guide for each post-accident monitoring variable except for the variables identified in the SE.
Excepticas were identified for the safety injection tank (SIT) level and i
pressure n.onitoring. A large number of the exception requests were for relaxing I
the equipment qualification (EQ) requirement from Category 2 to Category 3 qualification that allows commercial grade instruments to be used in certain applications. However, none of the submittals requesting the exceptions provided sufficient justification for granting the exception.
These requests were denied for the licensees and applicants whose R.G.1.97 compliance SEs were issued by the staff before 1987. Since 1987, exceptions for the SIT instrumentation were considered by the staff as an open item until a generic resolution could be found. Thirty-two plants requested relaxation of EQ requirements from Category 2 to Category 3 for the SIT level and pressure instrumentation.
2.0 EVALUATION The Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 50.49 requires licensees to establish a l
program for qualifying certain post-accident monitoring equipment for which l
specific guidance concerning the types of variables to be monitored is provided in revision 2 of R.G. 1.97.
This guide identifies the SIT instrumentation as a type l
D variable that provides information to indicate the operation of individual l
safety systems and other systems important to safety, to help the operator in selecting appropriate mitigating actions. The guide lists Category 2 qualification for this instrumentation. The Category 2 qualification criteria require the instrumentation to be qualified in accordance with R.G.1.89,
" Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," and the methodology described in NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment."
Additionally, the instrumentation with Category 2 qualification should be 9312090131 931129 PDR ADDCK 05000255 P
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' i energized from a high-reliability power source, not necessarily standby power.
In contrast to this, the Category 3 qualification criteria require only an offsite power source and the instrumentation to be only of high-quality commercial grade to withstand the specified service environment (mild environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49, paragraph c).
Qualification criteria for instrumentation are established based on the safety function of the system whose variables are being monitored. The selection criteria for R.G.1.97 variables qualification category is based upon whether monitoring of system parameters is needed during and following an accident and j
whether subsequent operator actions in the operating procedures are dependent on the information provided by this instrumentation.
The SITS are pressure vessels filled with borated water and pressurized with i
nitrogen gas.
Being a passive system, it provides a fast acting, high flow rate, cold leg injection during the injection phase of an emergency core cooling system operation.
Both volume and pressure are monitored to assure the SIT's i
function in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report safety analysis.
During normal operation, the SIT is isolated from the reactor coolant system (RCS) by two check valves in series. To prevent inadvertent closing, each SIT'S motor-operated isolation valve (MOV) is normally open with its power removed, and the status of the MOV is assured by the Technical Specification surveillance requirements.
Should the RCS pressure decrease below SIT pressure (as during a loss of coolant accident), the check valves open and the nitrogen gas pressure will force the borated water into the RCS. Thus, a mechanical operation of the swing-check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the SIT to the reactor core. No external power source or initiating signal is needed for t" ".T to perform its safety function. The operator can only control the ration of the MOV which is used to isolate the SIT from the RCS.
s Isolation from the RCS is not a safety function of the SIT. Additionally, the SIT is not designed to perform any post-accident safety function.
The above discussion establishes that the SIT instrumentation does not perform a safety function during or in a post-accident environment and operator actions to mitigate the effects of an accident do not depend on the information provided by the SIT instrumentation. Additionally, successful performance of core cooling systems can be inferred from environmentally qualified instrumentation.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Based on our review, we conclude that the post-accident monitoring of the SIT volume and pressure does not perform a safety function and no operator action is based on the information that will require Category 2 qualification of the instrumentation.
In lieu of Category 2 qualification, Category 3 qualification of this instrumentation is acceptable.
Principal Contributor:
I. Ahmed Date: November 29, 1993
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