ML20058F985

Forwards for Implementation,Augmented Insp Team Charter for Insp of Facility 901004 Loss of RCS Inventory.Charter Prepared Per NRC Insp Manual Chapter 0325

ML20058F985
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	10/04/1990
From:	Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20058B955	List: IR 05000456/1990020 ML20058B953 ML20058F985
References
NUDOCS 9011090269
Download: ML20058F985 (8)

Text

ATTACHMENT 1 UNITED ST ATES

+ p t4 Coq,, $* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMtsslON RtolON Hi

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OCT 0 41990 t'E!!DRAllDUl' FOR: W. D. Shafer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1 (Braidwood AIT Tean Leader)

FR0!1: Edward G. Greennan, Director, Division of Peactor Projects

SUBJECT:

AUG11ENTED illSPECT10ft TEAf1 (AIT) CHARTER Enclosed for your inplementation is the Charter for the inspection of the events associated with the Braidwoed Unit 1 Loss of RCS inventory which occurred on October 4,1990. This charter is prepared in accordance with the 11P.C Inspection Panual Chapter 0325. The objectives of the AIT are to conmunicate the facts sbrrounding this event to Regional and Headquarters ~

managenent, as well as to identify and communicate any generic safety concerns related to findings and conclusions of the onsite inspection, if you have any questions regarding implementation of the enclosed Charter, please contact ne directly. @

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' Edward G. Greenna fDivisionofReactorProjects

Enclosure:

Ali Charter cc w/ enclosure:

A. B. Davis, R111 C. J. Paperiello, Rll!

H. J. Miller, Rlli C. J. Haughney, NRR ,

Z. A. Zwolinski, NRR J. W. Clifford, EDO E. L. Jordan, AE00 C. E. Rossi,llRR R. J. Barrett,llRR 9011090269 901023 PDR ADOCK 05000456 Q PDR ,

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L Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Charter Braidecd Unit 1 Loss of Reactor Coolant inventory You and your team are to perform en inspection to accomplish the following:

1. Develop and validate the sequence of events associated with the loss of reactor coolant inventory that occurred on Unit 1 on October 4, 1990.

2. Deternine the adequacy of the licensee's response to this event and whether the inmediate actions taken end subsequent investigation was appropriate.

3. Independently determine the root cause for the opening of the RHR Het leg isolation Valves with the RHR Suction Line Vent Valve open.

4. Determine and validate the flow path and volume of water discharged from the RCS to the Auxiliary Building.

5. Assess the adequacy of operator performance and supervisory overview during the incident by review of records and logs; and through interviews with the personnel on duty.

6. Idertify and determine the adequacy of the applicable operating procedures, communications, and administrative controls for coordinating surveillance testing activities related to this event.

7. Review the loss of coolant event of 11 arch 18,1990 described in 1R No.

50-547/90012 (DRP) dated April 18, 1990 for similarities and to determine if the corrective action put in place for that event should have prevented the October 4, 1990 event.

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ATTACHMENT 2 i TABLE OF ACRONYMS i

i AE00 Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data AIT Augmented Inspection Team '

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineering AUX Auxiliary (Building)

Bw0P Braidwood Operating Procedure CECO Commonwealth Edison Company .

DRP Division of Reactor Projects '

ENS- Emergency Notification System GSEP General Site Emergency Plan 1N NRC Information Notice INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MODE 5 Cold Shutdown N0D Nuclear Operations Directives NRC- Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

NRR- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations j 055 =0ut of-Service i PZR- Pressurizer RCP: Reactor-Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System '

RH RHR System Designators

-: RHR- -Residual Heat Removal '

Rill- Region 111 NRC  ;

SRI Senior Resident inspector S1 Safety injection

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. Temperature-TS . Technical Specifications i

W- . Westinghouse

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ATTACHMENT 3 OCT 4 RHR EVENT TIMELINE l , PRELIMINARY REV 1 I .

10/3/90 0700-Bwv5 4.6.2.2 1 IDENTIFIED TO BE PERFORMED IN ENTIRETY 0900-TECH STAFF PRIMARY GROUP LEADER INFORMED 'IO SELECT COLD SHUTDOWN VALVE STROKE SURVEILLANCES.

-TECH STAFF SELECTS DwvS 0.5-2.RH.2-1/2, 0.5-2.S1.2-2

-ENGINEERS ARE SELECTED TO PERFORM 4.6.2.2-1 (FERKO, BEDFORD.

WESTRICH, LAMBERT) 1000-IDENTIFIED PERSONNEL DEVELOPED STRATEGY.

-4.6.2.2 1 SCHEDULED ON SH1FT 2 OH 10/3 AND COMPLETED ON SHIFTS 2/3 ON 10/4.

1200-GRZEMSTI ASSUMES TERKdS ROLE AS TECH STAFF TEAM MEMBER.

1500-4.6.2.2-1 DETERMINED TO BE CRITICAL PATH (IE CONTINUOUS COVERAGE REQUIRED UNTIL SURVEILLENCE IS COMPLETED).

-TECH SURVEILLANCE TEAM DIVIDES TO PROVIP' 4 HOUR COVERAGE.

1$15 4.6.2.2-1 DISCUSSED AT SHIFT BRIEFING.

1645-4.6.2.2-1 COMMENCED TOR 1A RH TRAIN.

2100-TECH STAFF ENGINEERS DECIDE RELIEF CREW IS NOT NEEDED TO COMPLETE SU RVEILLENCE.

2200-RELIEF CREW HOTIFIED NOT TO COME IN.

PRIOR TO 23OO-1A RH PORTION OF 4.6.2.2-1 COMPLETED AND RH TRAINS SWAPPED.

2342-B RH TRAIN PUMP IS PLACED IN POLL TO LOCK. LEAK CHECK OF 1 RH 8702 A COMMENCED.

10/4/90 0120-TECH STAFF ENGINEER AT 364 ELEVATION REPORTS 0 LEAKAGE FOR STEP 2.20 OF SURVEILLANCE.

-CONTROL ROOM TECH STAFF ENGINEER TELLS TECH STAFF AT,364 ELEV. TO CLOSE RH 028B AND REHANG OOS.

0121-CGETROL ROCBd TECB STAFF ENGINEER REQb3STS AUX RSO *to OPER RE 8702 8.

0122-AUKILI ARY NSO OPENS RB 8702 B FOR STROKE 'IEST PER DwvS 0.5.2.35.2-1

-5% PRESSURIZER LEVEL DROP.

-EQUIP ATIENLANT STARTS CLOSING RH 028 B.

-HOSE FRO 4 RH 028 B BLOWS OFF AND AREA IS SPRAYED.

0123-RH 8702 B CLOSED WHICH TERMINATED EVENT.

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.. , ATTACHMENT 4 Revistaa 91 e' EPSC1AL OFDATING ORDOt Special Operating Order No.$o-ST-0039 nov 1 Effective Date 01-22-90 TN8 Heightened Level of Awareness (HLA) of Control Roon Activities The purpose of this meno is to enhance the concepts which exist in BwAP 300-1. Conduct of Operations, regirding commincations and control of activities. It describe the minimus acceptable level of discuss'.rsns that will occur prior to any non-routine or infrequent activity or event performed by Control Room Personnel. This Heightened Level of Awareness will consist of three parts:

1. As a minimum those evolutions or operations related to the evolutions identified in Appendix A will have a Heightened Level of Awareness applied. This Itst is not all inclusive and can be modified or added to 6s necessary by the SE/SCRE.

2. The SE/SCRE has the responsibility to identify events or evolutions which will require a Heightened Level of Awareness

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by control room personnel. This list of qualifying events will be presented at the Shift Briefing for those that are planned to occur during the shift. This list will also be updated during the Shift as new evolutions are identified.

The SCRE will maintain this list at his desk. The SE and SCRE will include a discussion of the list during their turnover.

3. The NSO's are tasked with implementing a Heightened Level of Awareness, on all activities on the SCRE's list, but are not '

limited to those events only. The Heightened level of Awareness should be applied to any additional events or evolutions with which the NSO is unfamiliar, uncomfortable or N '

otherwise decides that this level of awareness is applicable ,

' Ise6 The Heightened Level of Awareness is defined as: eY e A minimum of two NSO's (unit and another) must discuss '

the event or evolution in detail. ...

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specut ersaMrtue cuoct Special operating order so. DIMD ""

22-M affective Date gg n : Heightened Level of Awareness (HLA) of Control Room Activities

• There must be a clear understanding of all the actions and expected results among those involved in the discussion.

• The discussion will include all actions that will be taken during the event or evolution.

• a continuous review or awareness As the event is ongoing, tog expected results are observed must be maintained ensur in response to actions taken.

This Heightened Level of Awareness is intended to provide the additional support an individual needs, to assure that infrequent or particularly difficult operations are well understood prior to performance of the evoluilans.

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I ff h lG.R.hsters Asst. Supt. Operating ,

Braidwood Station Attachment e

(Final) ppRoyiD gp jyt, 'l 4' N (0594Q/00219) 4 ,pyg, 9019z

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• % her MO-373 Revisten 31

' SPECIAL QPIBATIIC Ompts f

Special Operating Droer no.

OM240 affective Date l

TITL.E APPENDIX A l HLA Activities

- Operations involving manipulation of system isolations between high and low pressure systems.

- Operations involving CC heat exchangers especially when swapping from unit to unit.

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- Any evolutions involving RH train such as recircing, placing in shutdown cooling, swapping train to train or filling or draining the Reactor Cavity.

- Upon recommencing procedures that are presently in progress but .

have required little or no operations over a significant time

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t l, - Operations involving reduced RCS inventory.

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- Solid operations including placing the RCS in a solid condition

! and drawing a bubble in the pressurizer, t

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ATTACHP.ENT 5 1HTERVIEW LIST Direct Participation:

John Chojnicki Shift Engineer Jeff Bailey SCRE Wayne Carlson U 1 NSO Brent Redomski Auxiliary NSO

• - Dove Braglia Shift Adviser m-

' Tom Horn.en 'B' Operator Chris Bedford Tech Staff Engineer-Phil Westridge Tech Staff Engineer  ;

Dwayne Lambert Tech Staff EA Jim Grzemski Tech Staff Engineer Indirect A$sociation:

-Terry Eckert' k Planning Tec. Snider:

<oti Planning

" Jack Neljewaka -Tech Staff:

' Gory Ba1. Tech Staff Roger:Francoeur Tech Staff

- Ron Yungk- Operating Engineer t

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