ML20058F074

Proposed Tech Specs Re Containment Sys

ML20058F074
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/25/1990
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20058F058	List: ML20058F056 ML20058F064 ML20058F074
References
NUDOCS 9011080078
Download: ML20058F074 (17)

Text

-...

1 ATTACHMENT A Revise ~the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 183.

Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:

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Egmove Paces.

Insert Paaes j

b 3/4 6-6 3/4

'6-6 3/4 6-7 3/4 6-7

~3/4 6-14 3/4 6-14 t

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i 90110s0079 901025 jDR ADOCK 05000334 PDC

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1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OP M TION 3.6.1.4 Primary containment internal air partial pressure shall be maintained 2

8.9 PSIA -and within the acceptable operation o"

range _(below and' to the left of the applicable-containment temperature limit shown on FiTure 3.5-1 as a function of river water temperature APPLICABILITY:

MODES.1, 2, 3 and 4.

&GZ1GE8 Nith the containment internal air partial. pressure < 8.9 PSIA or above _the applicable containment' temperature limit h onown on Figure 3.6-1, restore the internal pressure-to within the limits E

within 1

hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within.the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and.!n COLD SNUTDONN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

='

J l'

SURVEIT 72"CE REQUT*E-~E-G.

4.4.1.4 The primary. containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at.least'once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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t BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-6 (fro pSed d o N

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.T H S ERT 'h" n

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.t!91El' 10.g

1. RW5T TCWPERATURE SCTWEEN AST AND SST..

10.6

2. WAXMUW ALLDWASLE CONTMNWCW f

TEMPERATURC 1004.

10.4

3. WINIMUW ALLOWA8i,C CONT 4NWCNT

. 'p.

AsR PARTIAL PRC55URC 8.9 PSIA.

10.3

4. WAXMUW RNCR WATER TCWCRATURE 90T i

10.2 i

CONT hlNMEPlT l

l TEMP IRATUllE R T SiF

. 10.0

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UNSCCEP"ASLE

.8 OPIRATicN ACCEPTAS.E l,

gy h..

OPERAT1001 R !

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9.4

\\

\\=5 C >NTAlmMENT TEMPT IATURil3949 %

9.2 M w 9.1 9.0 6.9 i.

30 SS 40 46 60 SS 60 66 70 76 30 SS

- 90 i

RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE (*P) l Fl0URE 3.4 1 MAXIMUM ALLOWASLE PRIMA.9v CONTAINMENT AIR PREtsuRE VERSUS RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE

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=

SEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 /

(I% pes, b U3 od m)

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-. -... = ~. ~.

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I_nsert #AO t-

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NOTES:

E 10.6

1. RWST TWPERATURE BETWEEN i.

451 ANO 55 T.

10.5

2. MANUM ALLOWABLE COMANMEM TEMPERATURE 105 v.

WCMABLE OPERATION 9 10.4 3 MNMUM ALLOWABLE CONTANMENT JWITH AVAllABLE RIVER V A AIR PARTML PRESSURE 8.9 PSA.

'10.3 7ENATER FLCW TO RSS' M4\\

4. MANUM RNER WATER i

1 HEAT E3CH mL80C0 GPIAi n uERATuRE80y 10.2

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E.,

E 10.1'

dik, I

10.0

\\.-I! ~ k E

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CCINTAINMENT 9'8 TE WPERATUR'E=76Ps N

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UNACCEPTABLE l g-9.7 OPERATION

'l ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 3=:

wiin waii.pete p gygg g

g WATER FLO N TO RSS -

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HEAT EXCH. = 6000 GPM 9.5 9.4 C'

a

";4 9.3 Q

CONTAINMENT TEMPERATUREa: 95 'F N

Mi:5 7A 9.1 9.0 8.9 30 35' 40 45 50 =55-60. 65 70 75-80 85 90 RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE (T)

FIGURE 3.64 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR PRESSURE VERSUS RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE

• The 6000 GPM is applicable until the eighth refueling outage (8R) only and then reverts to 8000 GPM following 8R.

- BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1

_(Proposed Wording)

h,*.

t CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

.,dRVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

At-least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

e.

i 1.

Cycling each ' power _ operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

2.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test signal.

1 3.

Initiating flow through each River Water subsystem and its two

'l associated recirculation spray heat exchangers, and verifying a flow rate of at least "g^^^ ;;.

9 f.

At least once per 6, years by performing an air or smoke flow test

'through each-spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

Boots p

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leut ecok h g ed g e, oS 8o0o pm tw.y

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- BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 t

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J ATTACHMENT B

]

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 l

proposed Technical Specification Change No. 183 REVISION OF1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.6.1.4 AND 3.6.2.2 A..: DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST:

The. proposed amendment. would revise the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) heat exchangers river water flow requirement of j

surveillance. requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 to allow a reduced flow of greater than or equal to 6,000 gpm per train, until the_ eighth (8th) refueling

outage, provided that additional operating i

restrictions are applied.

These additional operating.

restrictions were added to Figure 3.6-1 of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 and

. consist of a

maximum allowable containment air partial pressure of 10.1 psia and a maximum allowable river water temperature of 75'F.

-B.

BACKGROUND-The ; Containment Depressurization System is designed, as discussed R

in Section 6.4.2 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1

.UFS AR, _ to reduce the containment pressure below atmospheric

. pressure'.in.less.than 60 minutes following a LOCA and to maintain these conditions-for a

minimum of thirty (30) days.

The Recirculation Spray. System draws water.from the containment sump and delivers it_.to spray headers.

The recirculated spray. water-is_. cooled-by heat exchangers, located inside the primary containment

building, which-use river water (RW) as a cooling.

. medium.

There are two (2). heat exchangers per train.

The heat removal provided by.the heat exchangers augments the Quench Spray

~ System during depressurization and prtvides long-term heat m

. removal to maintain sub-atmospheric conditions.

The minimum design basis accident river water flow requirements for _various components using river water cooling is provided in UFSAR-Table' 9.9.3.-

The minimum flow required, under worst case initial conditions,.

for the two RSS heat exchangers associated with-each river water subsystem is 8,000 gpm.

This design requirement is reflected in Technical Specification Surveillance J

requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3.

Surveillance requirement (4.6.2.2.e.3) is performed once per 18.

. months to demonstrate adequate flow exists through. the recirculation _ spray heat exchangers.

During the seventh.

refueling

outage, which ended December 25, 1989, this test was performed' and a

flow of S400 gpm was recorded through each recirculation spray Train A and B cubsystems.

Other surveillance testing is performed on a quarterly frequency to _ demonstrate pump and valve operability in accordance with the Inservice Test Program requirements.

Since flow is established through the recirculation spray heat exchangers~ durina this quarterly testing, we incorporated a flow measurement step within the~ surveillance test in December of 1989.

This provides an opportunity to more closely monitor changes in flow conditions-through the heat exchangers.

e

' ATTACHMENT B,-continu2d Proposed-Technical Soecification Change No.-183

?

~Page 2 It was ' observed

~during the quarterly test conducted October 3,

1990, that 'the "A"

Train (1A and 1C heat exchanger) flows were approaching the limits of surveillance requirement 4. 6.2. 2.e.3.

As a

result, additional testing was performed on the "A"' train using-the swing river water pump.

.This also indic~ted a

significant reduction in flow as compared to the-last cespleted test performed with this arrangement.

In order to better

~

quantify the apparent degrading flow as compared to the last completed test performed with this arrangement we performed the

'18 month-surveillance test which provides a more-representative R

. alignment of' -plant equipment for DBA conditions.

This~ testing was conducted' on October 12, 1990, and provided the basis for declaring the-"C" heat exchanger of the "A" Train-inoperable..

During this

cycle, the "B"

Train recirculation. spray heat exchangers continued to show acceptable flows with less significant

. flow degradation observed.

Flow information is shown on TABLE 1 for each quarterly pump test.-

g TABLE 1 l

A' Train (GPM)

B Train (GPM)

Notes

~A PumD:

-C Pumo B Pumo C Pumo 12/89 9,400 9,400 1

01/90 8,900 02/90 8,600 8,700 9,200 05/90-8,700 8,700 9,100 08/90

7,400/8,500 8,700 8,600 2,

3 10/90-7,900/8,050 7,600/8,100 3

Note 1:

Clean system following refueling outage Note 2:

Peak. clam infestations occurred. during July,-August, and.

September L

Note 3:, Flushed-system for 3

hour and obtained adequate gpm flow rate b

i L

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m' y.'~ ': ATTACHMENT B, continu d Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 183 Page 3 f'\\

The' test data suggests that the peak clam infestion period had some impact on heat exchanger performance,

however, video inspection of the tube sheets does not support excessive flow blockage' due to clams.

We cannot determine the extent of tube y

plugging beyond the tube sheet without shutting _down and opening the heat exchangers.

The "C"

heat exchanger is downstream (parallel')

of the "A" heat exchanger _and has shown a propensity 5

to. foul earlier than the "A"

heat exchanger.

The "A" Train

[

testing in October indicates a significant unexpected increase in system resistance following flushing of the heat exchangers.

This resulted in efforts which eventually lead to declaring the "C" heat exchanger of the "A" Train inoperable.

A Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 - was issued to Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No.

1,'

on October 19, 1990, to allow continued plant operation with less than 8000 gpm'. river water flow to the RSS heat exchangers i

until-a one-time amendment request can be issued.

This amendment

-request is the follow-up to the above mentioned Temporary Wavier.

l C.

JUSTIFICATION L

The system design basis is defined by the minimum performance L

necessary to satisfy the acceptance criteria for the containment

. analyses.-

.These acceptance criteria are maintaining the peak 4

L containment pressure less than the design pressure of 45 psig for H

all accidents,. achieving sub-atmospheric conditions wi' ir, one hour following a

design-basis

accident, and mair.taining

-sub-atmospheric containment conditions for an oxtended period p

following depressurization.

-Additional criteria are linked to

.this-design basis due to dependencies on the system performance.

These-are maintaining adequate NPSH for the low head safety

. injection pumps and the recirculation spray pumps.

Each L

criterion has specific' limiting conditions which'are comprised of I

system configuration, assumed

failures, operations

limits, initial conditions, and safety system performance.

The effect of reduced river water flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers -was evaluated-for each criterion.

Where necessary, y

compensating restrictions-on operating limits were investigated.

p H

Analyses were performed. to demonstrate acceptable results.for each case using the LOCTIC computer program.

The limiting cases.

-have been established ~ by sensitivity analyses.

The sensitivity to reduced heat removal capability by the recirculation spray-system-is generally well understood and can be evaluated qualitatively for some cases.

For other cases, LOCTIC program o

calculations must be made to determine the effects.

The containment peak pressure analysis is not affected by changes

.in; the. _ recirculation spray system.

The peak pressure occurs at approximately 12 seconds post-accident while the recirculation spray system is not activated until 300 seconds following a CIB.

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ATTACHMENT-B, continued j

MN 'ProposedtTechnical Specification change No. 183 l

Pago'4 i

The recirculation spray pump NPSH analysis is minimally affected by changes in the heat removal capability.

However, reduced heat removal tends to improve the results since the limiting case

!~

assumes maximum heat removal to reduce containment pressure.

I For these two cases, no additional analyses are necessary.

For

^

thel remaining cases,_ lDOCTIC runs were required due to the sensitivity of these cases to reductions in the heat removal.

The following discussion describes the approach taken to perform these analyses.

l' The LOCTIC input can be characterized by those parameters which define. the physical characteristics of the systems and those which are defined by-operating limits and system performance o

requirements.

This characterization is made to distinguish betweea those parameters which are basically fixed and those ovar which some control can be exercised within practical limits.

The river ' water flow limit is a

system performance requirement.

1 L

Allowance for degradation of the system is the only practical At '

control that: exists without physically changing. the system.

However,1f this allowance cannot be shown to be acceptable within

.the envelope of all other current operating limits,, then this allewance must.be rejected unless other limits can be changed to 1

l compensate ifor the effects.- Therefore, the approach taken :was a

to-decide, based on past analyses, vhat other operating limits provide 'the-greatest sensitivity to heat removal capability in

-the. rive r - water temperature range of interest and investigate what changes-must-be made to provide acceptable results at reduced flows.

l This approach -led to the conclusions that the depressurization B

. time ~analysis was the. limiting-analysis for the river water temperature range of interest and that the operating limit which L

.is~ most-sensitive to changes in heat removal capability is;the L

containment air partial pressure.

1This limit-is shown on J

Proposed Technical. Specification _ Figure 3'.6-1.

The development of.this curve - essentially maximizes' the allowable air partial pressure by taking advantage of the: increased' heat removal lprovided-t lower river' water temperatures.

Therefore, lowering the ~ limit reducta the heat removal requirement and allows reduced

-flow.

LOCTIC runs were performed'to determine the new limits-which provided acceptable results at' reduced river water flow-of o

6000 gpm per train.

The results are shown as a new limit on F

Proposed Figure 3.6-1 and in Table 2.

1 U

Additional runs were made to demonstrate that the NPSH for the low. head-safety injection pump is adequate and that the peak D'

pressure which occurs following-RWST depletion remains Sub-atmospheric.

For both. cases the results-were-acceptable.

D.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

]

Reduction of the river water flow thru the recirculation spray D

heat exchangers does not effect the containment peak pressure 4

analysis from a

LOCA, but-does effect the capability of the p

i a1.

L cATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed: Technical Specification Change No. 183 Page 5 containment

.depressurization system to dispressurize the containment following the accident.

A re-analysis of the containment depressurization following a LOCA has been performed using-LOCTIC computer code (details of analysis are contained in Table 2)..

This analysis reduced the assumed river water flow for one train of recirculation spray heat ex; hangers to 6,000 gpm.

The results of this analysis demonstrated that the design basis requirement for the containment Depressurization System continues to be met at.a reduced river water flow of 6,000 gpm provided additional restrictions are placed on allowable river water temperatures and allowable operating containment air partial pressure.

As seen in proposed Figure 3.6-1, (Maximum allowable i

primary containment air pressure versus river water temperature),

.when the river water flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers is. less than 8,000 gpm but greater than or equal to 6,000 gpm,,the maxiuum allowable river water temperature is 75'F and the maximum allowable containment air partial pressure is 10.1 psia.

With these additional restrictions on plant parameters, analysis has shown that with a river water flow to one train of recirculation spray-heat exchangers reduced to 6,000

gpm, the Containment Depressurization System continues to be capabl'e of reducing the containment pressure to sub-atmospheric pressure.within one hour and maintaining the containment pressure

-sub-atmospheric following a LOCA.

In order-to casure that the RSS heat exchangers.will continue to P9et the_ required river flow requirement of greater than or equal 6000

gpm, assumed in the analysis,. we will increase our A:;nitoring of the river; water flow to a

monthly ' basis and continue.this test frequency, on any train which exhibits a flow of: less than 8,000 gpm, until the eighth (8th) Refueling Outage.

If our monitoring indicates that a trend exists illustrating a rapid degradation of' river-' water

flow, we-will take the

. appropriate actions to place.the plant in a safe condition.

Therefore, this change-is considered safe based-on the fact that

.the proposed amendment-will continue to ensure that the design basis.'rr;ui:tsments of the Containment Depressurization System will-cont;nur to be met.

E.

NO SIGNIFICANT' HAZARDS EVALUATION The no significant hazards considerations involved with-the

'I proposed amendment have been~ evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 (c) as quoted below:

The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to l

the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed. amendment L

to an operating license for at facility licensed under-paragraph-50.21(b)~ or paragraph 50.22 cr for-a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1

ATTACHMENT B, continu2d Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 183 Page 6 (1) Involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a 'new or different kind of e

l-accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The. following~ evaluation is provided for the no significant 1"

hazards consideration standards, tv

't

'1.

Does the change involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequerres of an accident previoucly evaluated?

1 4

Decreasing the river water flow requirements thru. the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers will not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

To ensure l

4 E

that the consequences of any accident previously evaluated 1

4 will not be' increased, the effected plant safety analysis has

-been re-evaluated.-

This evaluation has determined that the g g

@i design. basis requirements of the containment depressurization j

4 systems.

will-continue to be met with the revised l

Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger river water flow. -The H ',

proposed Technical-Specification change will ensure that the j

assumed river

' water-flow in the revised containment m

depressurization analysis wi'll' remain valid..

c m

HI' Therefore,.the proposed change does not involve a significant L

increase-in the probability of consequences of an accident W

previously evaluated.

a nu

~

["

2.

Does. the change create the possibility of a new or different H

kind of-accident form any previously evaluated?

i y

L The proposed change ~does not involve any plant equipment or (f

operating configurations changes within the plant.

l P

Therefore,

_the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated.

3.

Does the change involve a.significant reduction in a margin

'h Lof safety?

1 The. revised Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers river water flow requirement is based.on a re-analysis of the containment depressurization safety analysis.

This analysis has determined that with the-revised river water flow q

requirement, the containment depressurization systems will be capable-of depressurizing the containment-within one hour and L

maintaining the containment at sub-atmospheric pressure.

The i

j

. proposed Technical Specification changes will-ensure that the assumptions of tJ41s re-analysis will remain valid.

1 e

r w-

ATTACHMENT B, c ntinutd Proposed-Technical Specification Change No. 183

- Page 7-1 Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant

{

reduction in a margin of safety.

F.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that the~ activities associated with this license amendment request-satisfies the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c)

and, accordingly, a

no significant hazards h

consideration finding is justified.

' 5

-G.-

ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION The proposed changes have been evaluated and it has been determined that the changes do not involve (1) a significant

[

hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or j

t significant increase in the amount of any effluents that may be released off. site, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or-cumulative-occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed changes meet the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22'(b), an environmental assessment.of the proposed changes is not required.

i 1

l 1

k

.~

ATTA0iMDTI B-1:

~ FxW Technical-Specification Change 183 Page 1-l TABLE 2 SO99RY OF LIMITDC CASES ANALYZFD entaiment River Initial Contiarment Dwty Sub-At - ~; -rjc UEI 3

Type of Analysis Water Air Pressure Init-ial Temp.

Time ~

Peak Pressure -~

NPSH Case (T.imitirn Result)

Teno (*F)

(psia)

(*F)

(Sec.)

(osia)

(feet) 1 Depressurization Time 57 10.1 75 3560 2

Depressurization Time 75 9.37 75 3500 3

Sub-Atmospheric Peak 75 9.37 75

(

.22 )

4 IH3I NPSH 75 8.9 105 11.3 NCTIES:

1.

DEp ~'isurization Tiune must be less than 3600 Sec. (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).

2.

Sub-Ar-Weic peak pressure must be less than 0 psig.

3.

IHSI NPSH available, must be greater than 10.6 feet.

i 4.

All cases run with 6000 GM River Water Flow per RSS train.

S.

RSS heat Exchangers cabined UA=4373404 at 6000 GM.

i l

6.

Incl

• RSS Heat Exchanger tube plugging margin.

.6 4

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ATTACHMENT C

' ~'-

l'.

Beaver. Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 183

-)

Typed Pages:

3/4 6-6 j.

3/4 6-7 3/4 6 14 i

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS INTERNAL - PRESSJJJ3E -

LIMITING CON."3

"'?

FOR OPERATION d

3. 6.1.' 4.. Primary Containment internal air partial pressure shall be maintained.2 8.E PSIA and within the acceptable operation range (below and to the left of the applicable containment temperature-

. limit' line(s))

show.

v?,

Figure 3.6-1 as a function of river water temperature.

APPLICABILITY:: MODES 1, 2,

3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment internal air partial pressure < 8.9 PSIA or above the applicable containment temperature limit line(s) shown on Figure 3.6-1, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1

hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within tne next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

t

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.4 The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

I L

. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT-1 3/4 6-6 (Proposed Wording)

1 q

l J

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NOTES:

'l 10.6

1. RWST TEMPERATURE BETWEEN 45 'F AND 55 *F.

10.5

2. MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE CONTAINMENT 3"...

1 TEMPERATURE 105 'F.

J VACEMMMCN0 10.4

3. MINIMUM ALLOWABLE CONTAINMENT 4

LWITH'AVAILABLE RIVER 5 3.

AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE 8 9 PStA.

WATER' FLOW TO R.SS;-

=

10.3

4. MAxlMUM RNER WATER WEATsEXCHi a::80C0 GPI4i TEMERATURE oo F 10.2

i k 10.1

sw I i

\\

\\

i 10.0 CC NTAlyMENT a. :.,k<k:a O'S TE WPERATUR Ea76 'Fs i

N 4

UNACCEPTABLE gjj OPERATION ACCEPTABLE DPERATION 9.7 WITH3VADBLEF IVER WATER FLOW TO RSS 2

HEAT EXCH. m 6000 GPM jjj 9.5

\\

\\

s

=::

i 9.4 3

a 9.3 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATUREa:95'F %

5:1 M

pi 9.1 is:.x.

9.0 6.9 f

30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85-90 RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE ( *F)

FIGURE 3.61 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR PRESSURE VERSUS RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE

• The 6000 GPM is applicable until the eighth refueling outage (8R) only and then reverts to 8000 GPM following 8R.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-7 (Proposed Wording)

{-?

gONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) e.

At.least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

1.

Cycling each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

2.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuatea to its correct position on a test signal.

3.

Initiating flow through each River Water subsystem and i

its two associated recirculation spray heat gxchangers, and verifying a flow rate of at least 8000 gpm f.

At least once per 5 yeara by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed, a

The lvalue-of 8000 gpm may be lowered to 6000 gpm provided the additional operational restrictions imposed by Figure 3.6-1 of L. C. O. -

3.6.1.4 are applied.

This provision is only applicable until the eight (8th) refueling outage.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 n

(Proposed Wording) w