ML20058E289
| ML20058E289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1993 |
| From: | Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058E276 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-93-27, NUDOCS 9312060239 | |
| Download: ML20058E289 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1993027
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APPENDIX B
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-482/93-27
License:
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas
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Facility Name:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Inspection At:
Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas
Inspection Conducted: Seitember 12 through October 23, 1993
Inspectors:
G. A. Pick, Senior Resident Inspector
J. F. Ringwald, Resident Inspector
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O .11 M93
Approved:
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A. Yandell, Chief, Project Section B
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Division of Reactor Projects
Inspection Summary
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant status, operational
safety verification, engineered safety features walkdown. maintenance
observations, surveillance observations, followup, followup on corrective
actions for violations, onsite review of licensee event reports (LERs) and
in-office review of LERs.
Results:
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The inspector identified a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a
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because personnel failed to properly implement a clearance order. The
inspector expressed concerns that clearance order problems continue to
he *dentified (Section 2.1).
ine inspector identified a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a
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because craft personnel began work in the field without obtaining the
shift supervisor's permission (Section 4.3).
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The inspector determined that inadequate corrective actions had been
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implemented to resolve the root cause identified in LER 482/93-003,
which resulted in a violation (Section 8.2).
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9312060239 931139
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The inspector identified a failure by the licensee to immobilize
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equipment as specified by plant procedures which resulted in a violation
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(Section 2.3).
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The inspector identified two examples of a failure to properly support
and evaluate scaffolding which resulted in a violation (Section 2.6).
The licensee implemented strong controls for testing reactor vessel head
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vent valves (Section 2.2).
The licensee established strong controls over switchyard maintenance
activities. The inspector found that-the licensee did not effectively
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incorporate switchyard work activities into the weekly and daily
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schedules until questioned by NRC (Section 2.4).
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The inspector found that the licensee had strong procedures-for
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responding to process radiation monitor alarms (Section 2.5).
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Yne licensee responded well to ventilation system testing issues
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(Section 2.7).
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The inspectors found the component cooling water system material
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condition to be good. The licensee maintained a low percentage of the
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plant area as contaminated (Section 3).
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The inspector determined that a mechanic responded in an outstanding
manner to problems encountered while performing preventive maintenance.
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The licensee implemented strong corrective actions in response to
inspector concerns (Section 4.1).
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The system engineer responsible for instrument air provided excellent
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response to air compressor trips and proactively recommended overhaul of
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an air compressor (Section 4.2).
The inspector identified minor human factor weaknesses with the format
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and coordination of test procedures (Sections 5.1 and 5.2).
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A licensed operator exhibited very good communication practices that
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ensured proper completion of a surveillance test and control of other
control room activities (Section 5.4).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
Violation 482/9327-01 was oper ed (Section 2.1).
Violation 482/9327-02 was opened (Section 2.3).
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Violation 482/9327-03 was opened (Section 2.6).
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Violation 482/9327-04 was opened (Section 4.3).
Violation 482/9327-05 was opened (Section 8.2)
Violation 482/9327-06 was opened and closed for tracking purposes
(Sections 6 and 7).
Unresolved Item 482/9228-02 was closed (Section 6).
Violations 482/9231-01, 482/9231-04, 482/9308-03, and 482/9314-02 were
closed (Section 7).
LERs 482/93-001, 482/93-003, 482/93-005, 482/93-007, and 482/93-011 were
closed (Sections 8 and 9).
Attacliment:
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Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS
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I PLANT STATUS (71707)
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The plant operated at 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
2 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
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The inspectors performed this inspection to ensure that the licensee operated
the facility safely and in conformance with license and regulatory
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requirements and that the licensee's management control systems effectively
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discharged the their responsibilities for safe operation.
The methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of
activities and equipment, observation of control room operations, tours of the
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facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent
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verification of safety system status and Technical Specifications limiting
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conditions for operation, verification of corrective actions, and review of
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facility records.
2.1 Boric Acid Filter Not Properly Bypassed
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On September 21, 1993, after an unanticipated-automatic makeup to the volume
control tank occurred, a nonlicensed operator determined that the boric acid
filter in the chemical and volume control system was not bypassed'and isolated
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as specified on Clearance Order 93-1825-BG. The licensee had initiated
Clearance Order 93-1825-BG in order to repair the boric acid filter drain
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valve reach rod. The licensee intended to isolate the filter so that a large
amount of water would not drain as personnel cycled the drain valve. The
licensee determined that Valves BG V149, boric acid filter inlet isolation,
and BG V152, boric acid filter outlet isolation, were not fully closed.
The licensee immediately initiated Performance Improvement
Request (PIR) OP 93-1056 to identify the root cause and appropriate corrective
actions. The inspector interviewed the individual who performed the
investigation and reviewed PIR OP 93-1056. The inspector considered the
investigation to be detailed and thorough. The licensee attributed the root
cause to the failure to properly implement Procedure ADM 02-100, " Clearance
Order Procedure," Revision 27, Step 6.14, that specified requirements for
valves with reach rods. The procedure required, for valves with reach rods,
that the valve position be checked to ensure that the reach rod reflects the
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desired valve position.
The f ailure to follow the requirements of Procedure ADM 02-100 is a violation
of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (482/9327-01).
Even though the. licensee
performed an effective root cause evaluation, the violation will be cited
because of previous instances where personnel failed to properly implement, in
part, the clearance order process (refer to NRC Inspection
Reports 50-482/93-19 and 50-482/93-03).
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2.2 Reactor Vessel Head Vent System
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On September 23, 1993, the inspector received information that the Wolf Creek
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reactor vessel head vent valves might be subject to spurious opening. Another
facility had a downstream reactor vessel head vent valve open inadvertently
when personnel stroked the upstream reactor vessel head vent valve with
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reactor coolant system pressure at 150 psi.
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Previously, the inspector reviewed this area in NRC Inspection
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Report 50-482/93-01, Section 7.4.
Letter WM 92-0115 dated July 14, 1992,
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specified that in Modes 5 and 6, a pressure transient severe enough to open
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the downstream reactor vessel head vent valves while performing valve
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operability testing could not occur. The inspector found that
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Procedure STS BB-205, "RCS Inservice Valve Test," Revision 8, Step 2.2.1.1,
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specified that, if pressure is above 50 psi, but no more than 60 psi, close an
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upstream valve then open the valve % turn to establish flow. This action
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would reduce the flow rate prior to opening the reactor vessel head vent
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valves. The inspector verified that the open-stroke time for each reactor
vessel head vent valve was 0.5 seconds; hence, at 50 to 60 psi the pressure
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transient should not exceed 120 psi /sec. Design information from Westinghouse
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indicated that the valves would open if a pressure transient greater than
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250 psi /sec occurred.
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The inspector concluded that the licensee's procedural controls should prevent
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spurious opening of the reactor vessel head vent valves.
In addition, if the
reactor vessel head vent valves spuriously open, as the pressures equalize,
the system flow would reseat the reactor vessel head vent valves.
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2.3 Temporar_y Ecuipment Control Issues
At the beginning of the inspection period, the inspector questioned licensee
personnel about the appropriateness of the exempt equipment list contained in
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Procedure ADM 01-201, " Control of Temporary Equipment," Revision 5.
The
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licensee controls temporary equipment in the plant to protect permanent plant
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equipment and to assure personnel safety. The inspector reviewed the safety
evaluations supporting procedure changes that added eyewash stations to the
exempt equipment list and speci9ed plant locations for liquid nitrogen
dewars. The inspector found the safety evaluations to be thorough.
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The inspector researched previous revisions of Procedure ADM 01-201 and
determined that licensee personnel had not conducted the same level of review
and evaluation for existing items on the exempt equipment list. The licensee
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decided to reevaluate the temporary equipment control program and issued
PIR TS 93-1003. The licensee scheduled the review to be completed by
November 12, 1993.
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On September 26, 1993, during a plant tour, the inspector observed numerous
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carts around the auxiliary building tool room that were not immobilized. One
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cart contained cast iron parts that exceeded the 50-pound limit specified in
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Procedure ADM 01-201.
Procedure ADM 01-201, Step 4.3.3, specified that
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equipment having rollers or wheels capable of moving during a seismic
condition shall be immobilized to restrict / limit movement. The failure of
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licensee personnel to immobilize the carts is a failure to follow procedures
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as required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (482/9327-02). The failure to
immobilize the equipment could have resulted in harm to personnel or damage. to
equipment, such as the residual heat removal room sump pump. The licensee
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issued PIR MA 93-1075 to ensure an investigation would be performed to
identify the root cause and implement corrective actions.
In addition, on two
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subsequent occasions, the inspector found other carts surrounding the tool
room that had not been properly immobilized.
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On October 8, 1993, licensee personnel met with the inspector and described
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the results of their investigations stemming from PIR MA 93-1075 and
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PIR TS 93-1003. The investigation for PIR MA 93-1075 found that craft
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personnel were unfamiliar with Procedure ADM 01-201 requirements and that
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craft personnel had the misconception that the area surrounding the tool room
was an approved storage area.
Presently, the licensee has no approved storage
areas in the auxiliary building.
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The corrective actions in response to PIR TS 93-1003 resulted in licensee
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personnel revising their methodology for control of temporary equipment. The
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licensee intended to limit control of temporary equipment in the facility to
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Seismic Category I structures, and the licensee initiated a revision to
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Procedure ADM 01-201 that described the new methodology. Preliminarily, the
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licensee defined equipment as stable, unstable, and mobile and specified
requirements within the Seismic Category I structures for controlling each
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type of equipment. The licensee will continue to require that mobile
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equipment be immobilized. The licensee will designate approved storage areas
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after they complete the appropriate evaluations. The licensee constructed a
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concrete pad adjacent to their radioactive waste building. After the licensee
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encloses the concrete pad, the licensee will begin storing materials and
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components in the building during the first quarter of 1994.
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2.4 Control of Switchyard Activities
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's controls for personnel performing work
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in the switchyard.
The inspector evaluated licensee controls for:
(1) Access to the switchyard,
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(2) Control of switchyard work activities,
(3) Training of nonplant personnel on the applicable plant procedures, and
(4) Conduct of quality assurance audit /surveillances.
The inspector found that Procedure KGP-1400, " Substation / Switchyard
Protection," Revision 2, provided guidance for coordination with Kansas Gas
and Electric for conduct of maintenance within the Wolf Creek
substation / switchyard fence and Panel MA 105, main transformer site relay
panel, located in the turbine building.
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Procedure KGP-1400 specifies responsibility for various onsite groups,
provides steps to be followed for planning and coordinating work activities,
and references WCGS Standing Order 23, " Control of Switchyard Maintenance,"
Revision 2, which provided additional information to the shift supervisor for
control of switchyard maintenance. The licensee utilized Form KGF-40,
" Substation Work Authorization," to control work activities in the switchyard.
Personnel identify the component (s) to be repaired, the number of vehicles and
personnel entering the switchyard, the planned work start and finish dates,
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and any required compensatory measures.
Designated personnel in
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instrumentation and control (I&C) and electrical maintenance provided
coordination of the switchyard activities.
System operations for Kansas Gas and Electric revised a company-wide
department instruction in December 1991 to specify requirements for Kansas Gas
and Electric personnel working in the Wolf Creek switchyard. The instruction
letter, "WCGS Substation / Switchyard Directive," reflected the same
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requirements as Procedure KGP-1400 and enclosed a copy of Form KGF-40.
Personnel had not received refresher training after the initial program
development in 1991.
From discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector found that personnel
entering the switchyard contact security personnel and the control room. The
security personnel request permission from the control room to allow personnel
entry into the switchyard. The personnel inform the control room of the
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substation work authorization number and inform the control room when work
commences. The inspector found that the control room did not always have a
substation work authorization on hand when the switchyard workers arrived.
The supervisor of operations informed the shift supervisors that if personnel
arrive without a prepared substation work authorization they should not be
admitted until receipt of a substation work authori::ation in the control room.
Further, the inspector found that the supervisor of operations recommended
that the 1&C and electrical maintenance coordinators maintain a list of
routine switchyard maintenance activities. The licensee obtained these
updated lists from Kansas Gas and Electric prior to the end of the inspection
period.
The inspector identified weaknesses in the planning and scheduling of
switchyard work activities.
Even though the licensee had requirements to
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schedule routine work 30 days in advance, the licensee did not place the work
activities on their weekly schedules. Also, on many occasions personnel
identified emergent switchyard work activities 2 days prior to commencing
work; however, the licensee did not include the emergent work on the daily
work schedule addendum. The licensee informed the inspector that switchyard
work activities would be added to both work schedules.
The quality assurance department performed two surveillances since June 1991,
which reviewed portions of the program for controlling switchyard activities.
In Surveillance 5-1888, " Control of Vital AC Power Sources During Maintenance
Activities or Refueling Outages," quality assurance determined that
Procedure KGP-1400 and WCGS Standing Order 23 established adequate
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programmatic controls to control switchyard work activit.ies. Also, shift
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supervisors demonstrated a good working knowledge of the procedures. The
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surveillance noted that the licensee had implemented actions in response to an
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NRC Information Notice; however, implementation of corrective actions was
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slow.
In Surveillance S-1991, " Control of Cranes and Heavy Loads," quality
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assurance determined that the program provided appropriate information for
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controlling switchyard maintenance activities.
2.5 Radiation Monitor Alarm Response Procedures
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On September 28, 1993, the inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures that
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describe actions to be taken in response to process radiation monitor alarms.
The inspector reviewed the procedures listed below:
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Number
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ALR 00-061A
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Process Rad Hi Hi
ALR 00-061B
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Process Radiation Hi
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ALR 00-0610
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Process Rad Mon Failure
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0FN 88-006
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High Reactor Coolant Activity
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OFN 00-010
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Accidental Radioactive Release
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The inspector verified that all process radiation monitors cause Alarm
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Windows 61A, -61B, or -61C to annunciate if the alarm setpoint, the alert
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setpoint, or a monitor failure occurs. The inspector determined that all
process radiation monitors had specific response actions described in the
offnormal procedures with the exceptien of Radiation Monitor GH RE022,
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radwaste building exhaust particulate detector. Radiation Monitor GH RE022
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will alarm on high particulate activity with the setpoint a factor of 10 lower
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than a nearby gaseous radiation monitor. The offnormal procedures contain
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guidance for responding to specific radiation monitor alarms.
In addition,
for any radiation monitor not listed, the offnormal procedures had guidance
for responding to Annunciator Windows 61A and 618. These entry conditions
together captured all process radiation monitor alarms. The licensee revised
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the affected procedure to include Radiation Monitor GH RE022.
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2.6 Improper Scaffolding Construction
On October 5, 1993, the inspector observed I&C technicians ascend scaffolding
erected over Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger A.
While the technicians
climbed onto the scaffolding, the inspector observed the scaffold move and
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then noticed that a vertical member of the scaffold touched Valve EG-V205,
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger A temperature bypass upstream
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isolation. The inspector noted that personnel had tied the scaffold to a
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component cooling water pump room cooler ventilation duct support and to a
component cooling water pipe support. The. inspector determined that
Procedure ADM 01-113 " Scaffold Construction," Revision 5, Step 5.2.d, stated
that a scaffold shall not be in contact with or secured to any safety-related
or special scope structure / equipment unless allowed by an evaluation. The
evaluation documented in Scaffold Request 93-S0836 did not authorize the
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scaffold to be in contact with safety-related equipment or secured to
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safety-related supports. This failure to construct the scaffold in accordance
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with the procedure is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a
(482/9327-03).
The licensee agreed that personnel constructed the scaffold contrary to
Procedure ADM 01-113 and initiated PIR MA 93-1111. The licensee removed the
scaffold, inspected Valve EG-V205 and found no damage, walked down scaffolding
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in areas containing safety-related equipment, and walked down the auxiliary
building looking for unapproved scaffolds. The licensee identified one other
scaffold tied to safety-related equipment and identified no undocumented
The licensee found no damage or other effects to safety-related
equipment.
The licensee determined that craft personnel attached the scaffold
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to safety-related equipment because of a misunderstanding between results
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engineering and the scaffold constructors.
The scaffold constructors
understood the phrase " permanent structures" on the scaffold request to
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include any permanent plant equipment.
The evaluator intended to include
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permanent steel structures only. The licensee planned to revise the procedure
to require that engineers go into the field to show the scaffold constructors
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where to tie-off scaffolding. The licensee also intends to add a minimum
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clearance requirement when constructing scaffolding next to safety-related
components. The inspector concluded that these immediate and planned
corrective actions appeared appropriate.
On October 22, 1993, the inspector identified a scaffold next to Spent Fuel
Pool Heat Exchanger B tied to a support for special scope equipment. The
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inspector noted that Scaffold Request 93-50850 did not have an evaluation that
allowed the scaffold to be secured in this manner as required by
Procedure ADM 01-113. This is a second example of failure to construct the
scaffold in accordance with the procedure and is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (482/9327-03).
The licensee agreed that personnel constructed the scaffold contrary to
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Procedure ADM 01-113 and initiated PIR MA 93-1197.
In response to this second
occurrence, the licensee stated 100 percent of scaffolding to be erected would
be reviewed in the field by engineers. The field reviews will continue until
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the licensee completes upgrades to the scaffold program. The licensee plans
to visit another utility that has a scaffold program recognized to be
effective. After this visit, the entire scaffolding program will be revised.
The inspector concluded that these corrective actions were appropriate.
The inspector also reviewed the PIR history for scaffolding concerns for the
past 2 years and noted that the licensee identified no conditions that
required PIRs for safety-related equipment.
Several PIRs identified
weaknesses in the scaffolding prigram, and three PIRs identified scaffold
construction deficiencies. The inspector concluded that the scaffold program
had weaknesses, but the licensee acknowledged and was addressing these
weaknesses.
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2.7 Control Room Filtration and Pressurization System Testing
The inspector monitored the licensee's responses to problems encountered
during control room ventilation tests and reviewed the results for both the
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Trains A and B.
The licensee performed the tests in accordance with
Procedure STS PE-009, " Control Room Filtration and Pressurization Systems Flow
Rate and Combined Pressure Drop Test," Revision 3.
The licensee tested
Train A on October 7, 1993, and tested Train B on October 14, 1993.
During the Train A test performance on October 7, 1993, personnel obtained
flow data that exceeded the test acceptance criteria and Technical
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Specifications limits.
The licensee stopped the test and initiated a work
request.
The licensee found that the flows upstream and downstream of the
specified measurement point indicated that the flows met the acceptance
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criteria. The licensee attributed the false high-flow readings to increased
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turbulence since personnel took measurement near a throttled damper.
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licensee changed the monitoring point to prevent flow fluctuations during
future tests.
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During the Train B test performance on October 14, 1993, all required data to
ensure operability met specifications. However, the licensee determined that
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the pressure drop across the prefilter exceeded the limits of 3.6 psid.
Consequently, the licensee exited from the test, cleaned the prefilter, and
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reinitiated the test. The licensee discovered that they had no instructions
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that required checking the prefilter differential pressure prior to performing
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the test. The licensee informed the inspector that a preventive maintenance
activity for inspecting the prefilter would be developed prior to the next
test performance.
Craft personnel initiated their cleanup act'vities on the prefilter prior to
control room personnel entering the limiting conditions for operation.
Quality assurance personnel initiated PIR OP 93-1141, as part of an equipment
control audit, because a limiting conditions for operation may not have been
properly entered. The licensee initiated Reportability Evaluation
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Request 93-044 to determine reportability and to cetermine whether the
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limiting conditions for operation should have been entered. The licensee
determined that the deficiency was not reportable because the other train
remained operable and Technical Specifications had a 7-day allowed outage time
before any required actions. Also, the licensee determined that, for work
activities of this nature, only control room log er,tries would be made.
2.8 Conclusions
The licensee performed a comprehensive, detailed evaluation into a clearance
order deficiency. The failure to properly implement the requirements of the
clearance order resulted in a violation because of recurring problems in this
area. The inspector found the licensee controls for testing of reactor vessel
head vent system valves to be excellent. The inspector identified a violation
of administrative procedure requirements because personnel failed to
immobilize equipment with rollers on several occasions. The inspector
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questioned the appropriateness of items placed on the exempt list in
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Procedure ADM 01-201.
The inspector determined that the licensee established
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strong controls over access to the switchyard by maintenance personnel. The
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licensee incorporated switchyard maintenance in the weekly and daily schedule
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after the inspector determined that the licensee did not use the scheduling
process for switchyard work activities. The inspector identified improper
scaffold construction on two occasions.
In response to the first occurrence,
the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions but not in time to
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prevent a second occurrence. After the inspector identified the second
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occurrence, the licensee stated that 100 percent of scaffolding, when erected,
would receive field review by engineers until improved program guidance is
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developed. The licensee responded well to problems identified during
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ventilation system testing.
3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES WALKDOWN (71710)
The inspectors reviewed the operational readiness and material condition of
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the component cooling water system. The inspectors verified system components
to be operable as required by Technical Specifications. The inspectors
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verified that Procedure CKL EG-120, " Component Cooling Water System Valve,
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Switch and Bretker Lineup," Revision 15, contained all valves listed on the
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system piping and instrumentation diagrams. Also, the inspectors walked down
the accessible portions of the component cooling water system in the
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auxiliary, radioactive waste, and fuel buildings. During the system walkdown,
the inspectors found housekeeping generally good and identified to the
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licensee the areas that had poor housekeeping. The inspectors noticed that
the licensee maintained a low amount of contaminated areas (approximately
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2.7 percent). The inspectors reviewed the maintenance history of the
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component cooling water system for the past 2 years and identified no
problems.
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4 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)
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The inspectors reviewed this area to ascertain that the licensee conducted
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maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components in accordance
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with approved procedures and Technical Specifications. Methods used in this
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inspection included direct observations of maintenance activities, interviews
with personnel, and review of records.
4.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Couplina Maintenance
On October 6, 1993, the inspector observed mechanics perform preventive
maintenance on the Auxiliary feedwater Pump B motor-to-pump coupling as
specified in Work Request 50994-93.
The work request specified changing the
grease and measuring the coupling gap. The inspector reviewed the work
instructions and found them to be very specific and easy to understand.
The
mechanics performed the measurements in accordance with the work instructions
and found that the coupling gap was too large. Consequently, the mechanics
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consulted with maintenance engineering and referred to the vendor manual for
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the pump. The second set of measurements still indicated the coupling gap was
too large.
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The mechanic again consulted with maintenance engineering and referred to the
vendor manual for the motor. The vendor manual for the motor specified
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aligning the motor coupling at magnetic center and described how to identify
the magnetic center. After consulting the vendor manual for the motor, the
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mechanics concluded that the second set of measurements had incorrectly been
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taken at the mechanical center of the motor shaft.
The licensee revised the
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work instructions to specify placing the motor shaft at magnetic center. The
mechanic documented the above evolutions on Work Request 50994-93. The
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coupling gap measurement met specifications with the motor placed at magnetic
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center. The inspector concluded that the mechanics demonstrated a strong
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awareness of problems and took appropriate corrective actions.
Maintenance personnel initiated PIR MA 93-1110 after the inspector expressed
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concern about the adequacy of the work instructions. Although the work
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instructions had specific, detailed steps, the instructions did not have
sufficient guidance about placing the motor at the magnetic center when taking
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the measurement.
Concurrently, the system engineer had contacted maintenance
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engineering about the work instructions. Maintenance engineering issued
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PIR MA 93-1112 that documented the conflict between the pump and motor vendor
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manuals and recommended reviewing other pump and motor vendor manuals for
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similar conflicts.
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The inspector expressed concerns regarding previous performances of the
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coupling preventive maintenance activities. The licensee demonstrated that
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following the coupling gap measurements taken for the turbine-driven auxiliary
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feedwater pump in 1986, they made the coupling gap measurement optional.
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However, in 1992 the licensee revised the preventive maintenance instructions
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to require inspection of the coupling, change out of the-coupling grease, and
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verificaticn of the coupling gap as part of their reliability centered
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maintenance program. The inspector found that this measurement of the
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coupling gap was the first measurement for either motor-driven auxiliary
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feedwater pump. Corrective actions specified on PIR MA 93-1110
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included eliminating the coupling gap measurement during preventive
maintenance, reviewing standard supplemental work instructions to determine
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whether instructional weaknesses exis6, and verifying that the rotating
equipment alignment procedure provides appropriate guidance. The inspector
considered the corrective actions to be effective. The inspector determined
that deleting the requirement to measure the coupling gap during preventive
maintenance would be prudent and noted that the relative positions of either
the driver or the pump on the pedestal are not altered when the' preventive
maintenance (i.e., grease changeout) is performed.
4.2 Air Compressor B Postmodification Testing
During this period, the licensee replaced the Train B piston-type instrument
air compressor with a screw-type air compressor.
The licensee installed the
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screw-type air compressor in accordance with Plant Modification Request 02980,
" Replace Instrument Air Compressor." In addition, the licensee installed
stainless steel internals into Valve EF V076, Air Compressor B essential
service water (ESW) return check valve, and installed a 1%-inch drain line
for testing Valve EF V076 because of problems experienced with the Train A
check valve (refer to NRC Inspection Report 50-482/93-24, Section 2.7).
The
licensee performed a preoperational readiness test of Air Compressor B in
accordance with Procedure TP TS-152, "New B Air Compressor Prep For
Preoperational Test," Revision 0.
The licensee performed the preoperational
test in accordance with Procedure TP TS-156, "New B Air Compressor
Preoperational Test," Revision 0.
During the preoperational test, no major problems occurred.
The licensee had
a vendor representative present during the testing.
Because high intercooler
temperatures occurred while the air compressor operated unloaded, the vendor
representative decreased the back pressure for the intercooler.
No
inadvertent shutdowns occurred during the acceptance testing.
Subsequently,
the air compressor tripped while running unloaded after operators completed
Procedure STS EF-210B, "ESW System Inservice Check Valve Test," Revision 4.
After operations accepted Air Compressor B, the system engineer issued a work
request to overhaul Air Compressor C since past experience demonstrated
numerous minor maintenance problems following long periods of operation.
Initially, the licensee did not identify the root cause for the high
intercooler temperature trip. Consequently, the licensee initiated a
procedure change to require operators to vent the system and verify that water
flowed from the vent valve. Also, the licensee initiated PIR NP Y3-ll47 to
ensure personnel investigated the inadvertent air compressor trip.
One week later, Air Compressor B tripped on high intercooler tempertture while
running loaded.
Review by the system engineer and I&C personnel identified an
intermittent resistance temperature detector (RTD).
Further evaluation
concluded the RTD caused the previous air compressor trip. At the end of the
inspection period, the licensee continued to review the failure mechanism of
the RID.
The licensee suspected the RTD required a different design
application.
Presently, the RTD is submerged in the air flow, but the
licensee has reviewed the possibility of using thermowells.
4.3 Work Performed Without Shift Supervisor Permission
On October 12, 1993, the inspector observed a machinist perform work required
by Work Request 02815-93. The licensee had experienced unacceptably high "as
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found" relief valve setpoints in Lonergan Engineering relief valves. Lonergan
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Engineering Bulletin 91-001 identified that certain valves will lift above the
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set pressure if the lifting lever is in contact with the valve stem. The
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engineering bulletin described the necessary measurements and adjustments to
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prevent this from occurring.
After observing the mechanics perform work on emergency diesel generator
starting air tank relief valves, the inspector observed the machinist present
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the work request to the shift supervisor asking for permission to begin work.
The shift supervisor performed a detailed review of the work request. After
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the shift supervisor asked the mechanics several questions, the maintenance
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engineer explained that personnel began work prior to obtaining permission
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from the shift supervisor. The inspector had not known that the personnel did
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not have permission to start until the maintenance engineer informed the shift
supervisor. The shift supervisor further questioned the machinist regarding
the specifics of the work performed to ensure that the work had no impact on
the operability of the diesel generators. The shift supervisor also prompted
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the machinist and maintenance engineer to write PIR MA 93-1135.
Procedure ADM 01-057, " Work Request," Revision 27, Step 7.24, requires that
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personnel obtain permission from the shift supervisor prior to beginning work
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activities. Also, Procedure ADM 01-057, Figure 6, " Work Request Flow Chart,"
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requires a worker to obtain the shift supervisor's permission prior to
starting work. The performance of this work without the shift supervisor's
permission is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (482/9327-04).
4.4
Safety-Related Pump Oil Change
On October 13, 1993, the inspector observed the oil sample collection and oil
change for the outboard motor bearing of Safety Injection Pump B in accordance
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with Work Request 51895-93. The inspector observed the mechanics use
appropriate mechanical and radiological work practices. The inspector
questioned the mechanic's use of the same funnel used in draining the old oil
to supply the new oil to the bearing, particularly after the mechanic noted
and wiped some foreign material from the funnel after flushing the funnel with
new oil. The mechanic replied that this was acceptable since he flushed the
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funnel prior to adding the new oil. The inspector found the mechanic's
conclusions to be appropriate and considered the sump operable.
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4.5 Planning and Scheduling of Maintenance Activities
The inspector attended the licensee's planning and scheduling meetings in
preparation for the Safety Injection Pump B train outage.
From discussions
with licensee personnel, the inspector found that the licensee implemented all
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packages ready for maintenance.
From review of the open outstanding work
requests, the irspector determined that a significant number related to repair
and/or refurbishment of motor-operated valves (MOVs) not installed in the
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plant.
Because the MOVs were not installed in the field, the inspector
concluded that the work requests did not affect plant safety and did not
contribute to the maintenance backlog.
4.6 Conclusior;s
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A mechanic responded in an outstanding manner to problems encountered during
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pump-to-motor coupling gap measurements. After the inspector expressed
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concern over adequacy of the work instructions and prior work performances,
the licensee parformed a detailed review that demonstrated this was the first
performarice of these work instructions.
The licensee implemented strong
corrective actions to reduce the potential for future confusion. The system
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engineer responsible for the instrument air system provided an excellent
response to an air compressor trip and proactively recommended overhaul of
another air compressor.
The inspector identified a violation of procedure
requirements when maintenance personnel performed work without the shift
supervisor's permission. The inspector noted that the shift supervisor
demonstrated a questioning attitude in reviewing the work request.
5 SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)
The inspectors reviewed this area to ascertain whether the licensee conducts
surveillance of safety-significant systems and components in accordance with
Technical Specifications and approved procedures.
5.1 ESW Inservice Pump and Valve Test
On October 6, 1993, the inspector observed a licensed operator perform the
quarterly inservice pump test for ESW Pump B.
The operator performed the test
in accordance with Procedure STS EF-1008, "ESW System Inservice Pump B Test
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and ESW B/ Service Water Cross Connect Valve Test," Revision 12. The inspector-
noted that test personnel performed a prejob brief that identified the test
sequence, responsibilities, and objectives. The inspector determined from
discussions with the operator that he was knowledgeable about the general test
sequence.
The inspector verified that test personnel utilized calibrated test
equipment and-observed clear, concise communications among personnel. All
test data met specifications.
The inspector found that recently revised Procedure STS EF-100B caused
unnecessary stroking of MOV EF HV024, ESW B/ service water cross connect valve,
and MOV EF HV026, ESW B/ service water cross connect valve. The unnecessary
stroking had no safety impact. The licensee performed the test to verify
compliance with Technical Specification 4.0.5.
The inspector considered the
failure of the procedure to provide sufficient guidance to prevent unnecessary
stroking of safety-related MOVs to be a minor human factor deficiency.
In
addition, quality assurance personnel initiated PIR OP 93-1115 because
operators deviated from their approved procedure by using the plant computer
data instead of the control panel gauge to determine whether system pressure
exceeded 113 psig. The licensee included the NRC identified procedure
weakness in PIR OP 93-1115. The procedure required that if the system
pressure exceeds 113 psig, the service water pumps should be secured.
The inspector questioned the basis for the maximum service water system
pressure limit of 113 psig. The licensee demonstrated that 113 psig reflects
an administrative limit prior to the low-flow condition for the service water
pumps. Further, the licensee demonstrated that the service water pumps should
not be operated with system pressure above 120 psig, the shut off head for the
service water pumps, aad stated that the service water system pressure always
exceeded 113 psig after starting the ESW pump and prior to closing
MOVs EF HV024 and -026.
The system pressure exceeds 113 psig with the service
water cross-connect valves open since the ESW pump discharge pressure is
150 psig. The inspector considered the licensee's failure to modify
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Procedure STS EF-100B to accurately reflect actual system operating conditions
to be a weakness. The procedure problems were minor and had minimal safety
significance. Operators did not secure the service water pumps because, by
the time the pumps were secured, the crossconnect valves would be closed. The
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licensee initiated action to correct the procedure.
5.2 Slave Relay Testina
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On October 6,1993, the inspector observed a licensed operator and I&C
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technicians perform Procedure STS IC-616A, " Slave Relay Test K616 Train A
Safety Injection," Revision 5.
The procedure verified that actuations
required for Slave Relay K616 occurred upon receipt of a safety injection
signal.
The inspector determined that the licensee poorly coordinated the initial
conditions and restoration sections of Procedure STS IC-616A with
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Procedure STS EF-100B.
Procedure STS IC-616A, Step 3.1, specified ensuring
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that ESW Pump B operated in accordance with Procedure STS EF-200, " Operation
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of the ESW System," Revision 14; however, the operator entered
Procedure STS IC-616A from Procedure STS EF-100B, Step 6.1.36.
Procedure
STS IC-616A, Step 6.11, specified that personnel restore ESW B in accordance
with SYS EF-202, " Transferring ESW Supply to Service Water System," Revision
12, and required a signoff and verification signoff that the personnel
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restored the system; however, the personnel returned to Procedure STS EF-1008,
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Step 6.1.37.
Subsequently, 'icensee personnel informed the inspector that
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they changed the procedure steps to refer to STS EF-100B because the slave
relay test is normally performed in conjunction with the pump inservice test.
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5.3 Valve Stroke Timing Surveillance
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On October 12, 1993, the inspector observed operators verify the valve stroke
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time for Valve EF HV044, ESW B to air compressor, in accordance with
Procedure STS EF-201, " Component Cooling Water System Inservice Valve Test,"
Revision 9.
The inspector noted that this test satisfied Technical
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Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.0.5.
The operators used effective
communication techniques. The inspector had one minor observation that the
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licensee immediately addressed.
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5.4 Rod Testing
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On October 13, 1993, the inspector observed operators verify proper rod
operation in accordance with Procedure STS SF-001, " Control and Shutdown Rod
Operability Verification," Revision 10. The inspector noted that this test
satisfied Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.1.2.
The
inspector found that operators used formal communications that clearly
apprised all control room personnel of the test activities. This
communication resulted in effective coordination of the test and permitted the
supervising operator to monitor and control plant activities. The inspector
concluded that the operators effectively performed the surveillance test.
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5.5 Conclusions
During an inservice test of ESW Pump B, the inspector noted that the newly
upgraded test procedure had minor human factor deficiencies. Ihr inspector
determined that a quality assurance auditor identified another longstanding
procedure weakness during an equipment control audit. The inspector
identified the poor coordination among licensee test procedures.
The
inspector observed very good communication, control and coordination of
control room activities during control rod testing.
6 FOLLOWUP (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 482/9228-02:
Licensee Reviews of Operator Logs
The inspector initiated this unresolved item because of log discrepancies
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identified by both NRC and the licensee in various building watchstander logs.
On October 15, 1993, the NRC issued a letter transmitting a Notice of
Violation of 10 CFR 50.9, " Completeness and Accuracy of Information," to Wolf
Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation. NRC was concerned with the conduct of
some licensee personnel who improperly maintained watchstander logs. However,
because of the corrective actions taken, the violation required no response
and had no severity level assigned. The failure to accurately document
information on watchstander logs is identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.9
(482/9327-06).
7 FOLLOWUP DN CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS (92702)
7.1
(Closed) Violation 482/9231-01:
Incdeauate Alarm Response Procedure
This violation was cited because the licensee failed to modify an alarm
response procedure. When the normal drain path from the refueling water--
storage tank became blocked, the licensee established an alternate drain path.
The licensee created an information tag that explained the alternate path and
posted the information tag on the control panel. However, the licensee failed
to modify the alarm response procedure.
Af ter the inspector identified this deficiency, the licensee issued a
temporary procedure change to the affected procedure. The licensee determined
this deficiency to be weaknesses between coordinating the information placed
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on information tags and implementing required procedure changes.
Subsequently, the licensee changed Procedure ADM 02-110, " Control of
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Information Tags," to provide guidance for implementing procedure changes in
place of or in conjunction with developing information tags.
The inspector verified that the licensee revised Procedure ADM 02-110 to
provide guidance for initiating procedure changes instead of or in conjunction
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with information tags. The licensee added a statement to the procedure
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precautions and limitations and in the body of the procedure that specified
information tags and operator aids should not be used in place of procedures.
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7.2 (Closed) Violation 482/9231-04:
Failure to Properly Implenent an
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Approved Procedure
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This violation occurred when an . operator failed.to perform-
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Procedure SYS BG-201, " Shifting Between Positive Displacement-and Centrifugal
Charging Pumps," Step 4.2.6, which required operators to close
Valve BG HV8106, positive displacement pump recirculation valve. The failure
to close Valve BG HV8109 resulted in a loss of charging and letdown flows for
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20 seconds.
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The licensee specified that they would employ " positive discipline" as
corrective actions to address the personnel error.
" Positive discipline"
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involved the responsible individual describing the event, the corrective
actions, the root cause, and the consequences to management and his peers.
The inspector monitored one of the presentation sessions. The individual who
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erred described his actions, described the event, and addressed the importance
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of self checking and following procedures.
In addition, the inspector found
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the engineering evaluation of the effects of the loss of letdown to be
thorough.
7.3
(Closed) Violation 4R2/9308-03:
Failure to Perform a Timely
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Surveillance
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During Refuel VI with water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel
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flange, the . licensee determined that the inservice test for Residual Heat
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Removal Pump B was not performed prior to the late date. The licensee
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declared the pump inoperable and determined that they violated Technical
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Specification 3.9.8.2.
The licensee found that miscommunications among
personnel in the operations department resulted in the missed surveillance.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions that the licensee implemented to
address the breakdown in coordination and communications. The licensee added
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a late surveillance notification form, which is provided to the control room
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2 days prior to the late date as specified in Procedure ADM 01-300,
Step 5.6.2.2.
Also, the licensee changed Procedure ADM 01-300 that required a
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PIR to be initiated whenever a late surveillance notification form is issued
because the licensee considered issuance of the late notification form to
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indicate weaknesses in surveillance scheduling.
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The integrated planning and scheduling group developed a rolling schedule that
includes surveillance tests.
Personnel use the rolling schedule to develop
the weekly work activities schedule.
For semi-annual, annual, and 18-month
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surveillance tests, the surveillance group provides the integrated planning
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and scheduling group with information 3 weeks in advance. The inspector
verified that the licensee utilized the weekly activities schedule to schedule
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surveillance tests that have a frequency of greater than 1 month through the
integrated planning and scheduling group planning process.
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7.4
(Closed) Violation 482/9314-02: Failure to Correctiv Transfer Desian
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Data into the Appropriate Documents and Computer Data Bases
This violation was cited for two examples of failing to properly control
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design information.
The first example occurred because personnel failed to
update the computer database to reflect revised axial flux difference limits
listed in the Core Operating Limits Report. The failure to update the limits
rendered the axial flux difference monitor inoperable since the outdated
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limits were nonconservative. With the monitor inoperable, operators failed to
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log the axial flux difference hourly, as required by Technical Specifications.
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Upon identification, the licensee immediately declared the axial flux
difference monitor inoperable and logged the axial flux difference hourly.
The licensee identified the root cause as an inadequate review of the Core
Operating Limits Report since personnel failed to recognize that the axial
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flux difference monitor constants required modification. The licensee issued
a computer software modification to correct the immediate problem with the
axial flux difference monitor and developed a procedure checklist to be used
when reactor engineers implement nonroutine design changes. The inspector
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verified that Procedure RXE 03-003, " Determination of Implementation
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Requirements for Nonroutine Design Changes," Revision 0, referenced the PIR
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that documented the investigation and listed items to be considered for
implementation of a design change.
Procedure RXE 03-003 specified that
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nonroutine design changes include Technical Specifications revisions, Core
Operating Limits Report revisions, fuel design changes, Updated Safety
Analysis Report revisions, and other modifications as selected by the reactor
engineering supervisor.
The second example occurred because the licensee failed to develop shutdown
margin tables based on the correct 100 percent rated thermal power value. The
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licensee used the uprated thermal power value of 3565 megawatts instead of the
current operating thermal power value of 3411 megawatts to develop the tables.
Reactor engineering personnel believed that Manual WCRX-12, " Control Room
Operating Curves and Tables Reference Manual Cycle 7," reflected
3411 megawatts rated thermal power for the first 200 effective full power days
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then reflected the rerated power of 3565 megawatts rated thermal power. The
licensee attributed the deficiency to weak communications. The licensee had
not used the affected tables in Manual WCRX-12 prior to discovering the error.
The licensee immediately added a correction factor to plant procedures that
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referenced appropriate WCRX-12 tables until the tables were updated. The
licensee addressed the communication problems by having the personnel involved
identify the root cause and develop procedure enhancements to address the
deficiency.
The licensee revised Procedure KP-C237, " Reload Design and Safety
Evaluation," to require formal transmittal of proposed core design changes to
reactor engineering prior to approval, as compared to previous transmittals or
telephone discussions. The licensee revised Procedure KP-1537, " Development
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and Control of Technical Guidelines / Topical Reports," to require assumptions
and conditions associated with data to be explicitly documented. The
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inspector verified that the licensee implemented the procedure changes and
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updated WCRX-12 to reflect the correct rated thermal power levels.
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7.5 (Closed) Violation 482/9327-06:
Falsification of Plant Records
As described in Section 6, this violation required no response because of the
corrective actions that the licensee implemented. The inspector formally
opened and closed the violation in this report for tracking purposes.
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7.6 Conclusions
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The licensee implemented strong corrective actions in response to NRC-
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findings. Personnel errors were addressed by implementing " positive
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discipline." The licensee implemented good corrective actions in' response to
a missed surveillance. The licensee implemented generic actions to address
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future design information transfer between onsite and offsite reactor
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engineering groups.
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8 ONSITE REVIEW OF LERs (92700)
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8.1
(Closed) LER 482/93-001:
Inadeauate Technical Specifications Developed
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by Westinghouse Results in a Failure to Include All Time Delays in
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Technical Specifications Response Time Testina
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The licensee determined, while reviewing concerns related to.a Westinghouse
technical bulletin, that they had potentially operated the facility in a
condition outside the design basis. The reactor coolant pump undervoltage
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trip circuit did not include time delays created by reverse electromotive
force as a factor in the actual circuit-response time. The licensee performed
a safety evaluation and concluded that the plant had not operated outside of
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the design basis. The licensee attributed the root cause.to inadequate
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Technical Specifications developed by Westinghouse because they failed to
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include the reactor coolant pump reverse electromotive force effects created
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by the pump coast down. Also, the licensee determined that they should have
included the coni.rol rod gripper finger release times as part of the
respunse-time tests.
The licensee reviewed historical rod-drop time tests to identify the
appropriate gripper finger release time.
The licensee verified that the added
time caused by reverse electromotive force only affected the reactor coolant
pump undervoltage trip. However, all reactor protection system response times
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were affected by the added control rod gripper finger release time. The
licensee stated that they would alter the response-time test procedures to
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account for the control rod gripper finger release time and that they would
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change Procedure STS RE-007, " Rod Drop Time Measurement," to require
determining the control rod gripper finger release time. Additional actions
included providing the information to the Westinghouse Owners Group so that
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other plants would be made aware of the problems.
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The inspector verified that the licensee changed the affected procedures. The
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licensee presented the information to the Westinghouse Owners Group Licensing
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Subcommittee in April 1993. The inspector verified that Wolf Creek placed the
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information onto the nuclear network as suggested by the subcommittee.
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8.2
(Clostd) LER 482/93-003:
Personnel Error by Licensed Operators Resulted
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in a Di ect Flow Path Between the Containment-Atmosphere and the
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Auxiliar> Building Durina Fuel Movement
While draining ESW B in accordance with Procedure SYS EF-420, "ESW A(B) Train
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Drain," Revisicn 0, in Mode 6, the licensee created a direct path between the
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auxiliary and c)ntainment buildings. The licansee discovered the flow path
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while restoring from a local leak rate test on ESW valves. The licensee
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developed Procedure SYS EF-420 to be performed in modes that did not require
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containment closure. When the licensee altered Procedure SYS EF-420,
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personnel only considered the requirement to have one train of ESW operable.
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Personnel failed to consider the requirements of maintaining containment
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closure during fuel movement even though Procedure SYS EF-420 had a precaution
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about containment closure. This event was documented in NRC Inspection
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Report 50-482/93-03, Section 2.8, as a violation of Technical Specification 3.9.4 and was not cited because the licensee satisfied the
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criteria specified in paragraph VII.B.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. As a
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corrective action to prevent recurrence, the licensee committed to review all
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operating procedures for systems penetrating containment for similar
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deficiencies.
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The licensee immediately established containment closure. The licensee
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attributed the root cause to personnel error.
Licensee personnel addressed
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how using their self-checking program could have prevented this violation of
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containment integrity. As committed, the licensee reviewed other systems with
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existing procedures for draining the part of the system that penetrates
containment and identified a total of three procedures that were affected.
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The inspector verified that the licensee revised Procedure SYS EF-420. The
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inspector found that the licensee also corrected Procedure SYS EM-420, " Safety
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Injection System Drain," Revision 1, to provide explicit guidance immediately
before the applicable steps cor.cerning containment closure requirements
whenever systems inside containment were drained.
The third procedure identified, Procedure SYS EG-401, " Component Cooling Water
System Drain Procedure," Revision 0, was not modified in like manner.
The
inspector considered the failure to provide explicit guidance in
Procedure SYS EG-401, as specified in LER 482/93-003, to be a violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (482/9327-05). The licensee changed
Procedure SYS EG-401 to provide explicit guidance prior to the appropriate
steps that addressed requirements for containment closure after the inspector
identified the deficiency.
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8.3
(Closed) LER 482/93-005:
Failure to Perform "As Found" Local Leak
Rate Test
On March 22, 1993, an electrician removed the actuator for Valve BG HV8105,
centrifugal charging pumps to regenerative heat exchanger containment
isolation, before personnel performed the "as found" Type C local leak rate
test, as specified in the supplemental work instructions. The licensee
determined that the electricians had inadvertently skipped the required step.
Immediately, the electrical maintenance supervisor discussed this event with
electrical maintenance personnel. The licensee identified this occurrence as
cognitive personnel error and initiated " positive discipline" for the
individual.
The inspector reviewed the memorandum that documented the individuals
" positive discipline" discussion. The electrician described the various
changes to the work activities he was to perform, described some schedule
pressures (outage), and admitted that he missed the step. The electrician
described the importance (missed Technical Specification requirement), the
consequences (personnel injury / equipment damage), and preventive actions (self
checking) related to this deficiency.
8.4 Conclusions
The inspector found that the licensee completed their commitment to review
other draindown procedures that have the potential to violate containment
integrity. However, after review of the affected procedures, the inspector
identified a violation because the licensee failed to effectively implement
corrective actions. One of the affected procedures was not modified to
provide explicit guidance that would eliminate the potential for a similar
situation to exist. The inspector found that the licensee implemented strong
corrective actions in response to the other events.
9 IN-OFFICE REVIEW 0F LERs
(90712)
The inspector reviewed the following LERs and determined that personnel
completed the corrective actions discussed in the report.
9.1
(Closed) LER 482/93-007:
Late Surveillance Test Performance Caused By
Lack of Oversight of the Surveillance Program Results in a Technical
Specification Violation
9.2 (Closed) LER 482/93-011:
Nuclear Plant Information System Axial Flux
Dif ference Limits Were Not Updated With Technical Specifications
Revision
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ATTACHMENT
1 PERSONS CONTACTED
N. S. Carns, President and Chief Executive Officer
K. B. Clair, Supervisor, Maintenance Planning
A. B. Clason, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering
H. E. Dingler, Manager, Hot License Training
D. L. Fehr, Manager, Operations Training
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C. W. Fowler, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications
R. B. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering
D. E. Gerrelts, Manager, Instrumentation and Control
R. C. Hagan, Vice President Nuclear Assurance
K. M. Harvey, Manager, Document Services
S. F. Hatch, Specialist, Quality Assurance
W. M. Lindsay, Manager, Quality Assurance
R. L. Logsdon, Manager, Chemistry
A. S. Mah, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety Engineering
0. L. Maynard, Vice President Plant Operations
B. T. McKinney, Manager, Operations
T. S. Morrill, Manager, Radiation Protection
W. B. Norton, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
J. D. Pappan, Specialist III, Quality Assurance,
C. E. Parry, Director Performance Enhancement
J. M. Pippin, Manager, Integrated Plant Scheduling
C. E. Rich, Jr., Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance
T. L. Riley, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
R. L. Sims, Supervisor, Results Engineering
B. B. Smith, Manager, Modifications
C. M. Sprout, Manager, System Engineering
J. D. Stamm, Manager, Support Engineering
S. G. Wideman, Supervisor, licensing
M. G. Williams, Manager, Plant Support
D. P. Wiltse, Shift Supervisor
The above licensee personnel attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the
personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this
inspection period.
2 EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting was conducted on October 27, 1993. During this meeting, the
inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the
inspectors.
The licensee stated, as an interim measure, that engineers would review
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100 percent of erected scaffolding for compliance with program requirements
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until more specific program guidance is developed. The licenNe took no
exception to any of the findings.
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