ML20058D585
| ML20058D585 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1982 |
| From: | Kadak A YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Lainas G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FYR-82-77, NUDOCS 8207270220 | |
| Download: ML20058D585 (5) | |
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e Telephone (617) 872-8100 TWX 710u380u7619 YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY 2.C.2.1 l },
FYR 82-77 h
1671 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 c
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July 22, 1982 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:
Mr. Cus C. Lainas, Assistant Director Safety Assessment Division of Licensing Ref erence :
(a) License No. DPR-3 (Docket No. 50-29)
Sutject:
Dispoeition of NRC Memorandum of July 12, 1982 (*)
Dear Sir:
==
Introduction:==
NEC's SEP Policy Feversal At the outset of this response to your July 12 letter, Yankee Aton:ic wishes to contest the inconsistent approach that is apparently being adopted by NRC, in its administration of tLe Systematic Evaluation Program'for Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS). We refer, of course, to the total and inexplicable reversal in SEP policy that has occurred between your letters of May 7,1981 and July 12, 1982.
Quoting from your previous letter (**):
" Topics in the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), Fhase II that are being implemented as... Unresolved Safety Issues..., are being deleted from SEP to minimize duplication."
"The NRC review of [the deleted SEP Topic issues] will be performed by the staff responsible for... the Unresolved Safety Issue. The review and implementation of... and USI's are being conducted for all operating reactors separate f rom the SEP program [ sic)." (May 7,1962)(emphasie supplied)
(*)
Attachment:
NRC to Yankee Atomic Electric Ccmpany, Cus C. Lainas to James A. Kay, fOF
Subject:
Unresolved Safety Issues Status for the Yankee Atomic Electric
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Power Station (Yankee).
(**) Letter from Gus C. Lainas to All SEP Licensees,
Subject:
Deletion of Systematic Evaluation Program Topics Covered by Three Mile Island NEC Action Plan, Unresolved Safety Issues, or Other SEP Topics, 7 May 1981.
8207270220 820722 PDR ADOCK 05000029 P
1 Mr. Cus C. Lainas July 22, 1982 Page 2 Quoting f rom your recent letter, to illustrate its diametric opposition:
"The staff's safety evaluation report regarding the SEP Integrated Assesscent Frograr (IAP) for Yankee cust address the status of unresolved safety issues...." (July 12, 1982)
While ref raining f rom speculating on the basis for this policy-shif t, our comments will focus on the contents of your July 12 letter.
In short, we unfeld our position telow:
(1) that the subject matter of NFC's letter is inappropriate grounds for an under-cath written reply, pursuant to Section 50.54(f) of 10CFR50; (2) that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Ecard decisions cited by NRC as its reason for the 50.54(f) request regarding the SEP Integrated Assessment FroE ra m, do not require the EEC Staff's safety evaluation report to address the status of unresolved safety issues; and, finally, (3) that, regardless of these procedural flaws in hRC's letter, no conclusive or factual response tu the technical questions posed by the NFC can te formulated for YNPS, by either Yankee Atomic or the NRC; and, moreover, no licensee of any nuclear power plant can claim
" full resolution" of an unresolved safety issue until regulatory requirements are defined.
NFC Irrroperly Posed Its Recuest Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Section 50.54(f) is a condition applicable to any licerse issued by the KRC for operation of a nuclear facility.
It provides that the NRC ray compel a written under-oath response frcm licensees, but is restricted by preceding Section 50.54(e) to NRC actions of revocation, suspension, or codification.
Section 50.54(e), however, provides that such actions must te based upon "cause as provided in the act and regulations."
We sutrit that KFC's July 12 request for information is not cause for revocation, suspension, or modification of the operating license for YNFS.
Any frp11 cation in KFC's July 12 Ictter that a revocation, suspension, or modification is being contemplated is unwarranted, if the letter's only purpose is to request inforration on unresolved safety issues.
Sufficient authorization already exists for NRC to request information concerning the Integrated Assessment Frogram, without improperly citing Section 50.54(f),
simply because Yankee Atomic owns a SEF plant.
Mo re ove r, previous SEP topic evaluations submitted by Yarkee Atomic vere never sutject to the strong arm language of Section 50.54(f).
Finally, we Felieve that such improper citations to Section 50.54(f) are unnecessarily harassing and accomplish nothing to improve working relationshirs letween URC and good-faith SEF-licensees.
Mr. Cus C. Lainas July 22, 19E2 Page 3 NFC'r Letter Cites ALAB-Decisions That Do Not Apply to SEP-Plants 23,(1977 decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal The Noverter Board, ALAE-444, I) was a narrow holding on the question whether a construction permit could be issued to an applicant pursuant to Section 50.35 of 10CFR50.
It was a decision, rendered on appeal, concerning a previous finding by a licensing board constituted specifically for the applicant.
Yankee Atomic was not the applicant. NFC Staff is not a licensing board.
YNPS was not the nuclear facility. And the issue in question did not concern an Integrated Assessrent Program for a fully-licensed SEP plant.
The author (s) of ALAB-444 make these important distinctions more than clear (emphasis supplied):
"To the contrary, prior to authorizing a construction permit the board must make a finding....."
"Of necessity, this 10 CFR 50.35(a) determination will entail an inquiry into whether... any unresolved generic safety problems which might have an irpact upon operation of the nuclear facility under question."
"Once again, this assessment might' well have direct bearing upon the ability of the If eensing board to make the safety findings required of it on the construction permit level even though generic answers to the questions remains in the offering."
Furthermore, ALAE-491,(2) shich was cited as related authority (4) in NFC's July 12 letter, and its companion opinions ALAE-538(3) and ALAE-551
, which were not cited, all deal with the question vFether, under proceedings for issuance of an operating license, the Appeals Board has jurisdiction to consider generic safety questions. Again, these opinions do not address the question of unresolved safety question in the context of an Integrated Safety Assessment for a fully-licensed SEP plant.
No ASLE is presently constituted for any proceedings concerning YKPS, and no question of Appeals Board jurisdiction arises as in ALAB-491.
NEC's 60-Day Pecuest on Fesolving Unresolved Safety Iseues Is Unrealistic Neither NUREC-0649(5) nor NUREG-0606(6) are regulatory requirements. They could be loosely characterized as a generis for future requirerents, but, are (1) Culf States Utilities Co.,' River Eend Stations, Units 1 and 2, 23 November 1977 (Paragraph 30,250 CCH NRR Rptr.)
(2) Virginia Electric and Fower Corpany, North Anna Units 1 and 2, j
25 August 1978 (Paragraph 30,321 CCH FRR Rptr.)
l (3) 12 April 1979 (Paragraph 30,37E CCH ?3R Rptr.)
' (4) 26 June 1979 (Paragraph 30,3f? CCH KRR Eptr.)
(5) Task Action Plans for Unresolved Safety Iseuce Eelated to Nuclear Power Plants; February,1980 (f) Aqua Book:
Unresolved Safety Issues Summary; Fevised May 21, 1982 (Vol. 4, No. 2) l a
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nevertheless only plans and summaries, respectively.
In NUEEC-0820, the Integrated Plant Safety Assessment for the Pa11 sides SEP-Plant, the NRC Staff deleted from consideration some nineteer SEP, Topics, because they were defined as unresolved safety issues.
In Appendix A to NUREC-0820, the staff did little nore than cite that the deleted topics sere unresolved safety issues, as its basis for their deletion.
Nowhere in NUREC-0820 did the NRC Staff address unresolved safety issues, for the Palisades-Plant, to the extent that its July 12 letter demands that Yankee Atomic address these issues, for YNPS.
Thus, it appearr that, when NUREC-0820 was ist,ted in draf t form in April, 1982, the NRC Staf f was continuing to impleme at your original position of May 7, 1981, that "USI's are beizg conducted'fc5 h11 opereting reactors separate from the SEP program."
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With few exceptions, ID any, regulatory recuirerents do not exist for the nineteen USI's listed in your July 12 letter. How could Yankee Arcaic furnish
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information, purhuant to ycur incuiry of "has the issue been resolved at Yankee," on the AT95 issuc (lask No. A-9), for example, when no final rulemaking on this issue has occurred? The answer to this question moots your second and third questions of July 12, 1982: Yankee Nuclear Power Station is fully licensed in corpliance with TPC regulations.
This disposes of your third query of "...what interim neasures have been taken to assure that continued operation would not pose an undue risk to the public."
t Resolution of an unresolved safety issue, for which no unique regulatory requirerents have ever been promulgated, simply means that, under the circumstances, the public's health and safety are assured in accord with existing regulations. This is not to say that public health and safety could not be in some way affected by unresolved safety issues.
It says simply that if unique and legitimate requirements exist for any unresolved safety issue, then a licensee's compliance constitutes resolution of that issue. We offer the perhaps trivial observation, that without possibility for regulatory compliance, there cannot be the " resolution" that NRC has requested Yankee Atomic to furnish.
Thus, the July 12 questions are unrealistic, since the only plausible resrgonse is whether or not an issue is defined to be an unresolved safety issue.
NUFEG-0606 represents just such a response to these f
questions.
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Concluding Ecc. ark: Unresolved Safety Issues Should R(main Separated frem SEP l
Enclosure I to your July 12 letter contains no justification for the cover
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letter's statement that "the staf f 's. safety evaluation report regarding the SEP Integrated Assessment Program (IAP) for Yankee must address the status of unresolved safety issues...."
Enclosure i does contain, however, an excerpt from ALAE-444, sore historical information, and a naked list of unresolved safety issues.
None of these items are 1ctitimate requirements we can respond l
to.
A proposed resolution for an unresolved safety issue cannot be regarded l
as a licensinfg requirecent for YNPS, even if it is erbodied in a NUREC report or in the Standqrd Review Plan.
The se informal guidance documents are not i
requirements,' for which compliance can be enforced. Yankee Atomic cannot l
corrit resources'to merely reconciling NRC's informal positions on technical issues.
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Mr. Cus C. Lainas July 22,^1982 p,g, 5
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j The NFC Staff's Integrated Safety Assessment for Palisades did not implement jinresolved safety issues. Rather, it used them as a basis for narrowing the
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scope of topics for SEP review. Similarly, your letter of May 7,1981 advocated this de-coupling of unresolved safety issues from SEP. We think
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.this is the appropriate policy, since public health and safety cannot be q
assessed in terms of task action plans, technical assistance contracts, staf f report s, or any other item that is not a legitimate regulatory requirement.
i In conclusion, therefore, Yankee Atomic submits that the foregoing comments constitute the only possille response to the flawed " request" that we perceive your' July 12 letter to be.
6 Very truly yours, I
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YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY C. [e h d A. C. Kadak, Project Manager Yankee Nuclear Power Station Operational Projects Department EEHelf rich: dad cc':
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief
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Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing W. T. Russell, Chief 7 Systematic Evaluation Branch
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'e July 12, 1982 Docket No. 50-29 ti r. James A. Kay Senior Engineer-Licensing Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701
Dear Mr. Kay:
SUBJECT:
UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES STATUS FOR THE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION (YANKEE)
The staff's safety evaluation report regarding the SEP In~tegisted Assessment Program (IAP) for Yankee must address the status of un-resolved safety issues (see discussion of ALAB-444 in Enclosure 1).
To enable the staff to expeditiously review and evaluate the status of these items at Yankee, we will need up-to-date information of the type described in the enclosure to this letter for the unresolved safety issues listed in Enclosure 1.
Accordingly, pursuant to liSO.54(f) of 10 CFR 50, you are requested to furnish the following information with regard to each of the identified unresolved safety issues within 60 days of the date of this letter:
(1) has the issue been resolved at Yankec; (2) if so, how has it been resolved; and (3) if full resolution has not occurred (including implementation of necessary hardware, procedures, etc.) what interim measures have been taken to assure that continued operation would not pose an undue risk to the public.
l The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely,
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,us C. Lainas, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment Division of Licensing ec See next page
' ' Duly 12 198'2 0
Mr. James A. Kay cc Mr. James E. Tribble, President Yankee Atomic Electric Company 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Chairman Board of Selectmen Town of Rowe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Facilities Siting Council 14th Floor One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108' U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities ATTN: Chairman Leverett Saltonstall Building Government Center 100 Cambridge Street Boston, Massachusetts 02202 Resident Inspector Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC P. O. Box 28 Monroe Bridge, Massachusetts 01350 Ronald C.. Haynes, Regional Administrator
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prpssia, Pennsylvania 19406
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STATUS OF UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES AT YANKEE The NRC s'aff evaluates the safety requirements used in its reviews against new information as it becomes available.
Information related to the saf.ety of nuclear rower plants ccmss frca a variety of scurces including. experience from cpera-ine reactors ; researcn resui.s; NRC staff and Adviscry Cc'mmittee on j
P.sactor Safeguards scfety reviews; and vender, archipct/ engineer, and utili.y design reviews.
Each time a new cencern or safety issu'e is identifi'ed from one or more of ttjese sources, the need for immediate action to ensure safe ope. ration is assessed.
This assessment includes consideration of the generic, implications of the is' sue.
In some cases, immediate action is taken to ensure safety.
In other cas'es, interim measures, such as modifications to operating.
procedur'es, may be sufficient to allow further study of the issue before licensing decisions are made.
In most cases, 'the initia1 as'sessment ' indicates that immediate licensing actions or changes' in licensing criteria are not necessary.
In any event, further study may be deemed appr'opriate to make judgments as to whether existing NRC staff' requirements shou'ld be' modifi'ed to address the issue for new'piants or if backfitting is approprihte 'for the l
long-term operation of plants alresdy under construction or in operation.
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These _.jssubs are sometimes called " generic safety issues" because they are l
related' to a particular class or type cf nuclear facility rather than to
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' specific plant".
These issues have also been referred tp as ".enr.esolved safety
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g, issues". -(NUREG-0410, "tjRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Iss'ves Related to Nuclear Power Plants," dated January 1, 1978).
However, as discusshd above, such issues are consicered on a generic basis only after the itaff has made an initial determination that the safety sicnificance of the issue does not
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prchibit continued opera 1;i.on or recuire licensing actions while the. longer-p.
term generic review is under way.
A Decisien by the Atomic Safety and Licansing Appeal Board of the Nuclear Regulat0ry Ccomission acdresses these' ionger-term generic stucies.
The Decisicn as issued on November 23, 1977 1
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(ALAB-u,4) in conn:ction-with th; Apptal Board's' considarati'on of the Gulf States Utility Company application for the River Bend Station, Units,1 and '2.
In the view of the Appeal Board (pp. 25-29),
The responsibilities of a '.icensing board in the radi.ological health 2..c safety spnere are not confined to the consiceration and dispo~-
sition of incse issues wnich ma have oeen presented to it by a party or En " Interested State" with the required degree of specificity.
To ine contrary, irrespec.ive of what ' matters may or..may not have been' I
properly piaced in centroversy, prior to authorizing the issuance of a construction permit the board must make the finding, inter alia, that there is " reasonable assurance" that ".the proposed f acility can be constructec and. operated at the proposed,iocation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public."
Of~ necessity, this 10 CFR 50.35.(a) determinatioh will Entail an inquiry into whether th'e
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staff revi'ew satisf actorily has come to grips with any unresolved
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. generic safety problems which might' have an impact'upon op'erati6n' of' the nuclear facility under consideratich.
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The SER is, of course, the principal document before the licensing board which reflects the content and outcome of the staff's safety review.
The board should therefore be able to look to that document to ascertain the extent to which generic unresolved safety problems which have been previously identified in an FSAR item, a Task Action Plan, an ACRS report or elsewhere have been factored into the' staff's' analysis for the particular reactor--and with what resuit.
To this end, in our view, each SER should contain a summary description of those generic' problems under continuing study which have both' rele-vance to facilities of the type.under review and potentially -signifi-cant public safety implications.
This summary description should include in; formation of the kind now
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contained in most Task Action Plans.
More specifically, there' should be 'an indication of the investigative program which has been or will c.
be undertaken witli regard to the problem, the program's anticipated time span, whether (and if so, what) interim measures have been devised for dealing with the problem pending the completion of the investigation, and what alternative course 'of action' mi~ ht' be~ avail-g able-should the program not produce the envisaged result.
In short, the board (and the public as well) should be in a positi'on to ascertain from the SER itself--without the need to resort to extrinsic documents--the staff's perception of the nature and extent of the relationship between each significant unresolved generic
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safety question and,,tbe, eventual cperation of the reactor under scrutiny.
Once again,' this assessment might well have a direct beEring upon the aciiity of the licensing bcara to make the safety findings required of it on the construction permit level even though
.ne ceneric answer to the question remains in the offing.
Among other things, the furnished information would likely shed light on such ilternatively important considerations as whether:
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(1) the problem has already been resolved for the reactor under study; (2) there is a reasonable basis.for, concluding that a
. satisfactory solution will be obtained before the reactor is put in operation; or (3) the problem.would have no safety implications until af ter several years of reactor operation and, should it not be resolved by then, alternative means will be availabTe to insure that cc :ir.ved eteraticr (if per-i-ed at all) culd.ct pese an undue
'i. tc tr.e puOliC.
This sectica is spec;fically included to respond to tbe decisicr. of the A Opic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boarc as enunciatec in ALAB-t'4, and as applied to an operating license proceeding Vircinia Electric and Power Comoany (North Anna Nuclear Power Station Unit Nos.1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 2.45 (1978).
In a. related matter, as a result of C-ongressional action on the Nuc-lear-Regulatory Commi'ssion budget for Fiscal Ye'ar,1978, the, Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 was amended (PL 95-209) on December 13, 1977 to include, among other things, a new Section 210 as follows:
UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES PLAN.
SEC. 210.
The Commission shall develop a' plan provid'ing for specifi-cation and analysis of unresolved safety issues relating to nuclear ~
reactors and shall take such actions as may*be necessary to implement corrective measures with respect to such-issues.
Such plan shall be submitted to th5 Congress on QT before January 1,1978, and progress reports shall be included, in the annual report of the. Commission thereafter.
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The Joint Explanatory statement of the House-senate conference Committee for the Fiscal Yeaf'1978 Appropriations Bill (Bill 5.1131) provided +he following
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additional information regarding the Cornittee's, deliberations on this portion of the bill:
SECTION 3 - UEESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES
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The House amencment requirec cevelcpment of a plan tc resolve generic safety issues.
Thi conferees agreed to a receirement that the plan be su:mitted to tne Congress on or before January 1, 1978.
The conferees also expressed the intent that this pian should identify anc describe those safety issues, relating to nuclear power reactors, l -
wnich are unresolved on the date of enactment.
It should set forth:
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(1) Commissiori actions taken directly or indirectly ts' develcp and.
implement corrective measures; (2) futher actions planned concerning such measures; and (3) timetables and cost. estimates of such actions.
The Commission should indicate the priority it has assigned to' each issue and the basis on which p.riorities have been assigned.
g In res:ense to tne reporting recuirements of the new Sedion 210, the NRC staff succittec to Congress en January 1,1575, a repcrt, NUREG-0410, entitled "NRC progra-for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related.to Nuclear-Power Pl' ants."
describing the NRC generic issues procram.
The NRC program was already in place when PL 95-209 was enacted and is of considerably broader scope than the "Unrescived Safety Issues Plan" required by Secyion 210.
In the letter trans.
mitting NUREG-0410 to the Cong'ress on December 30, 1977, NRC indicated' th~at '-
"the progress reports, which are reqEired by Section 210 to..be. included..in
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future NRC annual reports, may be more useful to Congress if,they focus on _the i
specific Section 210 safety items."
I~t is the NRC's view that the intent of Section 210 was to, ensure that plans were developed and implemented on issues with poten'tially significant public safety implicat ons.
In 1978, the NRC. undertook a yeview of more than 130 generic issues addressed in the'NRC prdgram to d'etermine which is' sues fit this description and qualify as unresolved safety issues for repoi-ting to the Congress.
The NRC review included the development of propo'sals' by the NRC staff and review and. final approval.by the NRC Commissioners.
This review is described in NUREG-0510, " Identification of Unresol'ved Safety e-Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants - A Report to Congress," January 1979.
The ' report provi' des the following definition of an unres,olved,sa Q ty issue.
f Isn Unresolved Safety Issue is a matter affecting a number of nuclear power plan.s that poses important questions concerning the adequacy of existing safety requirements for which a final resolution has not yet been ceveloped and that involves conditions not likely to be acceptable ever the lifetime of the plants it affects.
Further,- the repcrt inc.icates that in applying this cefinition, matters that pose "important cuestiens concerning the acequacy of existing safety require-ments were judged to be those for which resolution is necessary to (1) com-pensate for a possible major reduction in the degree of protection'of the
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- dri public health and safety or (2) provide a potentially significant decrease 'in L
p the risk to the oublic health and safety.
Quite simply, an unresolved safety issue is potentially significant from a public safety standpoint, and its resolu, tion.is likely to result in NRC action on the affected plants.
e - e issues addressed in the 'RC crc; ram < ere systematicilly evaluated agains- -his definition as described in NUREG-0EiC.
The issues are listed oeicw.
Fregress on :hese issues was first c'is cussed -tn the 7975 NRC Annual' Report.
The number (s) of the ceneric task (s) (e.c., A-1) in the NRC program addressing each issue 4's indicated in parentheses following the title.
UNRESOLVED SAFETY' IS' SUES [ APPLICABLE TAS'K N05.)
(1)
Waterhammer - ( A-1)
(2)
Asymmetric Slowdown Loads on the Reactor Cociant System (A-2)
(3)
Pressurized Water Reactor 5 team Generator Tube Integrity (A-3; A-4, A-5)
(a) Anticipated Transients Without Scram (A-9)
(5)
Reactor Vessel Materials Toughness (A-11)
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(6)
Fracture Toughness of Steam Generator and Reactor Coolant Pump Supports A'-12 )
(7) Systems. Interaction in Nuclear Power Plants (A-17)
(8)
Environmental Qualification of Safety-Relate'd Electrical Equipment (A-24)
(9)
Reactor Vessel P'ressure Transip.pt Protect. ion (A-26)
(10). Residual Heat Removal Requ.irements (A-31)'
(11)
Control of ' Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel (A-36)
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(12)
Seismic Design. Criteria (A-40)
(13)
Containment Emergency Sump Reliability (A-43)
(14)
Station Blackout (A-44)
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- '(15 ); Shutdown Decay Heat' Removal Recuirements (A-45)
(i S)
Seismic Qualification of Ecuipment in Operating Plants (A-45)
(17)
Safety Implications of Control Systems (A 47)
(18)
Hydrocen Control Measures and Effects cf Hydrogen Eurns on Safety Ec.ui pme nt ( A-4 8-)
(19)
Fre.s s urized Thermal. Shock (PTS) ( A-49)
The NRC staff has issued reports providing its proposed resolution of six. of these issues.
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NRC_ staff's proposcd resolution of s'ix. safety issurs -
Task number NUREG report number and title
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NUREG-0590, "As>= metric Blowdown Loads on PWR Primary A-2 Systems" A9 SUREG- 04 50, "ci 4, " Anticipated Transients Without Scram
- cr 'igh-Wate-Reactors" A-24 NUREG-0558, " interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Ecuipment"
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A-25 NUREG-0224, " Reactor Vessel; Pressu.re Transient Protection.
for Press.ur.ized Wa_ter Reactors".and NUREG-0800, STP. RSB 5-2 A-31 SRP 5.47 and BTP 5-1, " Residual Heat Removal Systems"
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incorporate requirements of USI A-31 A-35 NUREG-0512,, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants With the exception of Tasks A-9, A-43, A-44, A-47, A '48 and A-49, Task Action Plans
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for the generic tasks above are included in NUREG-0549, " Task Action Plans for,
Onresolved Safety Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants."
A' technical res.olutio,n,,_
-for Task ~ A-9 has been proposed.by the NRC staff in Volume 4 'of NUREG-0450, issued -
for comment.
This served as a basis for the, staff's proposal for rulemakinf o~n ~ ~~ '
this issue.
Th'e Task Action Plan for Task A-43 was issued in January.1981, and the Task Action Plan for A-44 was issued in July 1980.
Draft NUREG'-0577.which,..
represe' ts staff resolution of USI A-12 was issued for comment in November 1979.
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The' Draft NUREG contained the Task Action Plan for A-12.
The information provided in NUREG-0594 meets most of the informational requirements of ALAB-444.
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Each Task Action Plan provides a d es'cription of the problem; the staff's approaches to its resolution; a generai discussion of the bases on which continued piant licensing or operation can proceed pending completion e
the technical organi:a-ion involved in the task and estimates of the of the task; manpower recuired; a' des ~crihtfon of the interactions with other NRC offices, the
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Advisory
- Committee on Reactor Safeguards and outside organizations; es'timates. of funding required for contractor-supplied technical assistance; prospective dates for completing the task; and a description of potential problems that could alter the planne'd. approach on sched'ule.
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In addition to the T'sk Action ~ Plans, the staff issues the " Office of'Nucl' ear a
Reactor Regulation Unresolved Safety Issues Suninary, Aqua Book" (NUREG-0506) on a quarterly basis, which provides cc-rent schedule information for 'each.of the unresolved safety' issues.
It alle includes infor: nation relative to the sniple-
.s r.:s :i: r status of each unresolved :afety issue for which technical resolu:icn
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