W3P90-1506, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-17. Corrective Actions:Computer Software Will Be Installed to Perform Offsite Dose Calculations W/Nomographs Remaining as Backup
| ML20059M738 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1990 |
| From: | Burski R ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| W3P90-1506, NUDOCS 9010050227 | |
| Download: ML20059M738 (3) | |
Text
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Ent:rgy oper;tlins, inn.
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Nea Oreav. LA 70112 :
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b 504-73M,774 Raymond F. Burski w a,v vaa. mpo, as W3P90-1506 A4.05 QA
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October 1, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 IJcense No. NPF-38 NRC Inspection Report 90-17
- Gentlemen:
Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits, as Attachment 1, our response to the weakness noted in the subject Insnection Report.
1
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If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact F.J. Englebracht, Emergency Planning & Administration Manager, at (504).739-6607.
Very truly yours,
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RFB /TWG'/ssf Attachment cc:
Messrs. R.D. Martin, NRC Region av l
N.M. Terc, NRC Region IV D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR E.L. Blake W.M. Stevenson R.B. McGehee i
NRC Resident Inspectors Office -
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9010050227 901001 ~f PDR ADOCK 05000382i G
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W3P90-1506 Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 ENTERGY OPERATIONS RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM WEAKNESS IDENTIFIED IN INSPECTION REPORT 90-17 WEAKNESS' NO. 9017-01:
The two groups tested with the simulator operating on an interactive modo performed their emergency response duties almost flawlessly.
In general, crew prioritization of response and mitigation actions and resource a!!ocation were good.
Teams properly classified, notified, protected the health and safety of injured plant personnel, conducted site evacuation announcements, and made adequate protective action recommendations.
Several areas for improvement were identified, as follows:'
1.
One of three teams failed to properly perform dose calculations.
2.
One team underestimated the magnitude of the release because they failed to interpret the exponent in the monitor readout.
3.
In addition, the inspectors found that in some areas, key decision makers had not received sufficient guidelines to effectively make decisions (e.g., habitability critoria, reasons to contact NRC, difference between delegating work and responsibilities, etc.).
4.
Finally, the information flow between the control room (CR) operators and the Shift Supervisor (SS) functioning as the Emergency Coordinator (EC) was less than optimal and sometimes tagged the actual change in plant status by 5 to 10 minutes.
In part, this may have been the result of the architectural design pertaining To the location of the SS space within the CR.
The EC tended to remain in the SS booth, which restricted his ability to hear the information exchanged between the CR operators.
Additionally, the activities of the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) were not uniform from crew to crew with respect to the method of supporting the EC concerning plant status.
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Attochment to W3P90-1506 -
Page 2 of 2
RESPONSE
Analysis of the Weakness / Schedule of' Corrective Action In light of the overall performance of the operations teams in handling.
the first phase of the emergency response, Entergy Operations, Inc.
l considers the various aspects of the identified weakness to be isolated i
occurances rather than indicative of a programmatic failure.'
The failure by one-of the three teams to properly perform dose calculations wss the-result of simply misreading the associated nomograph.
In this-particular instance, one individual on one crew briefly misread the.nemograph and then instantly-recognized his mistake when the error was pointed out-to him.
Entergy Operations will address this particular issue by installing computer software that will be used to perform off-site dose calculations with the nomographs-I remaining as a backup.
This system will be in place and fully.
operational by October 24, 1990; it will result in calculation of.
- accurate, reliable dose estimates more quickly than is possible with the nomograph method.
In addition, the importance of careful, deliberate use of the nomographs will be an element of the: training seminars-to be conducted with each shift crew during,the first quarter of 1991.
The faulty interpretation of the exponent in the monitor readout is, again, an isolated failure with one individual on' one_ team making an error. - This particular issue will be. addressed in terms of 'a " lesson
. learned" during the training seminars in the first quarter 'of 1991.
~
a The vwkness-also characterized key decision _ makers as not having 1
sufficient guidelines to make certain decisions. - Given the' teams' noteworthy performance in other aspects of the scenario, ~ Entergy.
1 Operations, Inc. intends to provide further guidance and address the philosophical aspects ol delegation during the first quarter 1991 training seminars.
Finally, the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan. dictates that the Control Room Supervisor is responsible for placing the plant in a safe condition in an emergency; the Shift Supervisor becomes 'the Emergency Coordinator with primary responsibility for implementing the l
Given the different responsibilities, in =a fast developing emergency situation it is not' necessarily unusual or unacceptable for some delay to exist before the EC becomes aware of changes in plant conditions.
In some cases, however, the STA could ease this lag time by assisting the EC in staying abreast of rapidly-changing plant status.
This topic wil; be examined during the first quarter 1991 training seminars.
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