ML20057G122
| ML20057G122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1993 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057G114 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-93-26, NUDOCS 9310200205 | |
| Download: ML20057G122 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1993026
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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Inspection Report:
50-482/93-26
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Operating License:
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)
P.O. Box 411
,
Burlington, Kansas 66839
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Facility Name:
Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)
Inspection At:
Burlington, Kansas
Inspection Conducted:
September 20-24, 1993
Inspectors:
D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Lead Inspector
J. Pellet, Chief, Operations Inspection Section
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Approved:
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Blaine Murray, Chlef, Radi
ogical Protection-
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and Emergency Preparedn s Section
Inspection Summary
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of
the emergency preparedness program, including changes to the emergency plan
and implementing procedures; emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies;
organization and management control; training; and internal reviews and
audits. A regional inspection initiative was performed in the area of
knowledge and performance of duties.
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Results:
Changes to the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures had been
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properly reviewed and approved and hac' '
submitted to NRC in a timely
manner (Section 2.1).
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Emergency facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of
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operational readiness (Section 3.1).
The Emergency Response Organization was well staffed with trained and
qualified individuals.
Recent organizational changes had improved the
staffing and management of emergency planning (Section 4.1).
Two concerns were identified concerning the training of certain
emergency response personnel.
In general, the licensee's emergency
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response training program, including exercises and drills, had been
conducted in accordance with the Emergency Plan and implementing
procedures (Secticn 5.1).
Two weaknesses were identified during walkthroughs conducted with
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operating crews.
One weakness involved a repeat weakness. This repeat
weakness was classified as a violation because of ineffective corrective
actions. A second weakness was identified for failure to follow
procedures in making notifications to the NRC Operations Center
(Sections 6.1 and 8.2).
Audits of the emergency preparedness program had been conducted in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(t) and were of good scope and depth.
Quality assurance surveillances of emergency preparedness capabilities
were very effective at evaluating the status of ongoing concerns in
emergency preparedness (Section 7.1).
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A violation was identified for failure to correct a previous weakness in
the area of emergency classification (Sections 6.1 and 8.2).
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Summary of Inspection Findings:
Violation 482/9326-01 was opened (Section 6.1).
Emergency Preparedness Weakness 482/9326-02 was opened (Section 6.1).
Exercise Weakness 482/9119-03 was closed (Section 8.1)..
Emergency Preparedness Weakness 482/9213-02 was closed (Section 8.3).
Emergency Preparedness Weakness 482/9213-03 was closed (Section 8.4).
Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01 was closed (Section 8.5).
Attachments:
Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
Attachment 2 - Operator Walkthrough Scenario Narrative Summary
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DETAILS
1 PLANT STATUS
During this inspection, the reactor operated at full power.
2 EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (82701-02.01)
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The inspector reviewed changes in the licensee's emergency plan and
implementing procedures to verify that these changes had not decreased the
effectiveness of emergency planning and that the changes had been reviewed
properly and submitted to NRC.
2.1
Discussion
The inspector reviewed correspondence related to the three Emergency Plan
revisions and the Emergency Plan implementing procedure changes implemented
since the previous inspection. The plan revisions had been reviewed and
approved as specified in procedure EPP 02-1.1, " Emergency Planning Program,"
and were determined not to have decreased the effectiveness of emergency
planning.
Emergency Plan revisions and changes to the implementing procedures
had been submitted to NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.V, and
The inspectors reviewed letters of agreemen~ with offsite
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response and support organizations and found that they had been maintained in
a current status.
2.2 Conclusions
Changes to the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures had been properly
reviewed and approved and had been submitted to NRC in a timely manner.
3 EMERGENCY FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, INSTRUMENTATION, AND SUPPLIES
(82701-02.02)
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The inspectors toured nearsite emergency response facilities and reviewed the
licensee's emergency equipment inventories and maintenance to determine
whether facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of operational
readiness.
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3.1 Discussion
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Emergency response facilities were observed to be orderly and operationally
ready.
No significant changes had been made since the previous inspection in
the facilities' functional layouts or emergency equipment and supplies
maintained.
Records showed that the emergency ventilation system and the
facility radiation monitoring systems in the Technical Support Center (TSC)
had been tested according to applicable procedures.
The inspectors ncted that
the iodine monitor in the TSC was in a room that was outside of the doars that
had been maintained as the TSC airlock.
Under accident conditions this could
create an exposure risk to those monitoring iodine levels in the TSC.
During
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the inspection, the licensee initiated a work order to correct this problem by
repairing and maintaining the seals on the outermost doors to the TSC.
The inspectors examined emergency equipment lockers in each response facility
and performed random checks of inventories.
The lockers had been inventoried
quarterly as specified in procedure EPP 02-1.5, " Maintenance of Emergency
Facilities and Equipment." The inspectors noted some inconsistencies in the
manner in which inventory records had been completed.
Specifically, several
inventory records indicated that certain equipment had exceeded calibration
due dates. The inspectors confirmed upon further review, that the equipment
had not, in fact, exceeded expiration dates.
For the supplies in question,
the inventory records had been completed by erroneously indicating the "date
of last calibration" under the " calibration due" column on the inventory form.
Licensee representatives produced documentation showing that the inventory
forms were in the prccess of revision to prevent such conflicts in the future.
The inspectors observed the performance of function tests on facility
radiation monitoring systems and emergency vehicles and found that they were
conducted in accordance with applicable procedures.
Documentation was
reviewed of routine tests of the emergency communication equipment, offsite
sirens, and the Emergency Response Data System.
This documentation showed
that these tests had been conducted as required.
3.2 Conclusions
Emergency facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of
operational readiness.
4 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL (82701-02.03)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response organization staffing levels to
determine whether sufficient personnel resources were available for emergency
response.
The emergency planning organization was reviewed to ensure that an
effective programmatic management system was in place.
4.1 Discussion
The inspectors determined that no Emergency Response Organization ~ positions
had been delated since the previous inspection.
Two positions acl been added,
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a position for Radiological Assessment Manager in the Emergency Operations
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Facility and a cierk position in the Technical Support Center.
Depth at each
staff position was excellent, with about 600 personnel trained to fill the
142 designated positions.
The criteria for assignment of personnel to the
Emergency Response Organization was found to be appropriately based on an
individual's qualifications and were generally aligned with their normal job
responsibilities.
The inspectors found that the methods for review and
updating of the Emergency Response Organization roster were sufficient to
ensure that it was staffed only with trained and qualified individuals.
The inspectors reviewed recent changes in the organization responsible for
emergency planning and noted improvements in this area. All emergency
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planning positions were staffed by experienced and qualified personnel.
An
additional Emergency Planning Specialist position had been added since the
previous inspection.
Another recent change involved the transfer of the
majority of the emergency preparedness training function from the training
department to the emergency planning organization. The licensee had developed
plans to move the offsite planning functions from the Wichita office to the
site within the coming year.
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4.2 Conclusions
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The Emergency Response Organization was well staffed with trained and
qualified individuals.
Recent organizational changes had improved the
staffing and management of emergency planning.
5 TRAINING (82701-02.04)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response training program and
interviewed selected individuals to determine whether emergency response
personnel were receiving the required training to be in compliance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.IV.F, and the
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5.1 Discussion
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Selected training records for Emergency Response Organization staff positions
and assigned individuals were current and up to date. The inspectors
determined that the licensee's emergency response training program had been
conducted in accordance with the Emergency Plan and procedure EPP 02-1.2,
" Training Program." Training lessons plans for initial training were reviewed
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and found to be appropriate. Most of the continuing training for emergency
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response personnel had been provided by self-study workbooks which contained
test questions.
Licensed personnel were provided emergency responder training
as part of their normal classroom requalification training.
Control room
personnel also implemented at least the classification process routinely in
simulator exercises during license requalification training.
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The inspectors identified two concerns in the emergency response training
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program.
First, it was noted that emergency response personnel outside of the
control room, including dose assessors and health physics personnel, did not
receive practice in performing their assigned response functions as frequently
as did control room personnel.
Second, the emergency response training
program did not have a mechanism to keep response personnel informed of
industry events applicable to emergency planning or to highlight emergency
plan changes which might affect their duties.
The results of exercises and drills were reviewed and it was determined that,
in general, these activities had been conducted in accordance with the
Emergency Plan and procedure EPP 02-1.3.
Licensee identified weaknesses were
well documented in drill and exercise critiques as required by 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E.IV.F.5.
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5.2 Conclusions
Two concerns were identified concerning the training of emergency response
personnel.
In general, the licensee's emergency response training program,
including exercises and drills, had been conducted in accordance with the
Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.
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6 KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
(82206)
The inspectors conducted a series of emergency response walkthroughs with
operating crews to evaluate the adequacy and retention of skills obtained from
the emergency response training program.
6.1 Discussion
A single walkthrough scenario was developed by the inspectors and administered
to the crews to determine whether control room personnel were proficient in
their duties and responsibilities during a simulated accident scenario.
Attachment 2 to this inspection report contains a narrative summary of the
walkthrough scenario.
The inspectors observed three crews during the walkthroughs using the control
room simulator in the dynamic mode.
Included among each crew was a shift
chemist and health physics technician.
The scenario consisted of a sequence
of events requiring an escalation of emergency classifications, culminating in
a general emergency. Each walkthrough lasted approximately 90 minutes.
Durino
the walkthroughs, the inspectors were able to observe the interaction of the
response crews to verify that duties and responsibilities were clearly defined
and understood.
The walkthroughs also allowed the evaluation of the crews'
abilities to assess and classify accident conditions, perform dose
assessments, develop protective action recommendations, and make timely and
complete notifications to offsite authorities.
During the scenarios, crew performance was strong in the areas of command,
control, and communications. The crews displayed strong communication
techniques by employing echo and confirmation before acting on directions.
Development of mitigation strategies and goals was effective. As in previous
walkthroughs and exercises, the inspectors noted that logs completed by the
control room crews during the simulated emergency would not have permitted
accurate and complete reconstruction of crew actions.
During the walkthroughs, two of three crews evaluated failed to accurately or
promptly classify plant conditions corresponding to a General Emergency as
follows:
One crew failed to classify plant conditions at the General Emergency
level as specified in procedure EPP 01-2.1, Rev.ll, " Emergency
Classification," Attachment 1.0.
This requires that a General Emergency
be declared when containment high range radiation monitor readings
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exceed the Emergency Action Level of 10,000 R/h.
For this crew, the
containment high range radiation monitors were announced to the Shift
Supervisor / Emergency Director as reading 1.0E5 R/h at 8:38 a.m.
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General Emergency was not declared until 31 minutes later, when at
9:09 a.m., plant conditions degraded further following a report of an
explosion and steam release from containment.
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A second crew was slow to classify the same conditions as a General
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Emergency.
This crew did not promptly recognize as a General Emergency
the report from the chemistry technician at 1:25 p.m. that containment
high range radiation monitors had exceeded 3.0E6 R/h.
This report was
part of the chemistry technician's explanation to the Shift
Supervisor / Emergency Director of tne basis for the dose assessments
completed. The chemistry technician also explained that his previous
dose projections had been based on the earlier containment high range
monitor readings of 1.0E6 R/h. .The Shift Supervisor / Emergency Director
classified these reported conditions as a General Emergency some
10 minutes later at 1:35 p.m.
The failure of crews to promptly and accurately classify plant conditions was
also identified as a weakness during the previous walkthroughs conducted in
July 1992.
In the August 21, 1992, response to Exercise Weakness
(482/9213-01), the licensee stated that Procedure EPP01-2.1, " Emergency
Classification" would be revised and that operators would be trained on proper
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classification procedures in order to correct the exercise weakness. The
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repeat weakness identified during this inspection indicates that the
licensee's corrective actions were ineffective to prevent recurrence of the
classification problem.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F.5, requires that
exercise veaknesses shall be corrected.
The failure to correct Exercise
Weakness 482/9213-01 is considered a violation (482/9326-01).
This violation is also discussed in Sections 7.1 and 8.2.
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Initial emergency notifications to the state and county were accurate and
timely.
Shift clerks were proficient in performing the notifications to the
response organizations identified on form EP 01-3.1-1.
The initial
notifications to the NRC Operations Center were made by Nuclear Station
Operators performing the task of shift communicator. Two of the crews made
these notifications without using Form NRC 361 " Event Notification Worksheet"
as required by procedure EPP 01-3.1, Rev. 15, "Immediate Notifications,"
Step 4.1.8.1, and procedure EPP 01-1,0, Rev. 9, " Control Room Organization,"
Attachment 2.1.
Instead, the NRC Operations Center was initially notified of
events in an unstructured, piecemeal manner despite there having been
sufficient time when the nntifications were made to have completed the NRC 361
forms.
Failure to make initial notifications to the NRC in accordance with
procedures was identified as a weakness (482/9326-02).
During the walkthroughs, dose assessments were performed using several models
which, at the time, best approximated the scenario plant conditions and the
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probable release pathways.
Shift chemists performed dose projections
expeditiously and used appropriate input parameters for the assessments.
Following the explosion which breached containment, the appropriate dose
projection model was based on a containment release which calculated a release
rate based on containment high range radiation monitor readings and the
containment pressure differential over time.
Because the explosion caused a
rapid containment depressurization, the dose rate projections derived from
this model yielded very high values which could not have been sustained. Two"
of the chemists performed very well to explain the bounding limitations of
these dose projections to the Shift Supervisor / Emergency Director.
Despite the overall excellent performance of the shift chemists in performing
dose assessments, one chemist incorrectly explained the units of a dose
projection table to the shift supervisor.
The inspectors noted that some of
the computer generated dose projection tables printed the units of the results
while others did not.
Protective action recommendations made during the walkthroughs were accurate
with the exception of one crew which failed to evacuate certain sectors at the
General Emergency classification level.
This crew, however, recognized its
error and promptly corrected it in a followup message.
The inspectors noted three minor simulation fidelity errors.
These included
plant computer radiation monitor indications that did not track with other
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indications, the plant unit vent radiation monitor that did not respond
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properly, and service water strainer differential pressure annunciators did
not alarm as the strainers clogged.
6.2 Conclusions
In walkthroughs conducted with operating crews, two weaknesses were
identified.
A repeat weakness was related to failures to accurately or
promptly classify pla:.' conditions corresponding to a General Emergency. The
second weakness was ioentified for failure to follow procedures in making
notifications to the NRC Operations Center.
7 INDEPENDENT AND INTERNAL REVIEWS AND AUDITS (82701-02.05)
The inspectors met with quality assurance personnel and reviewed independent
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and internal audits of the emergency preparedness program performed since the
last inspection to determine compliance with the requirements of
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7.1
Discussion
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The last two annual audits performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(t) were
reviewed.
The 1992 audit (TE: 50140-K367) identified no adverse findings and
three recommendations for improvement.
The 1993 audit (TE: 50140-K396)
identified one adverse finding resulting in the generation of a performance
improvement request.
The audit plans and procedures were reviewed by the
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inspectors who found the depth and scope of the audits to be appropriate.
Audit team leaders were certified as lead auditors according to
ANSI N45.2.231978, " Qualification of Quality Assurance Program Audit
Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants." The audit teams included a technical
specialist from another licensed facility.
The inspectors reviewed four quality assurance surveillances conducted in the ,
emergency preparedness area since the previous inspection.
The surveillances
were of good scope and well targeted.
One surveillance in particular,
provided excellent results in the area of emergency classification. This
surveillance (TE:53359 S-2059) was requested by the Manager of Technical
Services, a position which at the time had responsibility for the emergency
planning organization.
The surveillance was requested to evaluate the
effectiveness of corrective action implemented in response to the
classification and notification weaknesses (482/9213-01) identified by the NRC
during the 1992 walkthroughs.
The surveillance was conducted in July and
August 1993 and involved the evaluation of all individuals in the licensed
operator requalification program. The crews were evaluated in their response
to scenarios administered using the simulator.
Surveillance S-2059 found that the NRC identified classification weakness
still existed.
The evaluations resulted in "five of ten events being
misclassified for one emergency scenario and three of nine events were
classified identifying the wrong barriers for a second emergency scenario."
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's request for this surveillance was
proactive and the surveillance was objective and effective at evaluating the
status of ongoing weaknesses in emergency preparedness. This issue is also
discussed in Section 8.2 of this report.
The inspectors reviewed quality assurance procedure QAP 18.4," Issuance and
Tracking of Non-Hardware Problems." Since February 1993, all adverse quality
findings had been characterized as Performance Improvement Requests. The
inspectors reviewed the process for tracking, followup, and closecut of
adverse quality findings in the emergency preparedness area and found timely
and appropriate followup.
At the time of the inspection, there were no long
standing open quality assurance items in emergency preparedness.
7.2 Conclusion
Audits of the emergency preparedness program had been conducted in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.54(t) and were of good scope and depth. Quality assurance
surveillances of emergency preparedness capabilities were very effective at
evaluating the status of ongoing concerns in emergency preparedness.
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8 FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS
(92702)
8.1
(Closed) 482/9119-03: This item had remained open as a result of an
observation during the 1992 exercise that habitability of the TSC could
have been compromised by not keeping the front entrance to the TSC
completely closed.
The inspectors confirmed that the TSC activation checklist was revised to
assign responsibility to the TSC accountability clerk to keep the TSC door
closed.
In addition, a sign was posted on the door to keep it closed during
emergencies, and the floor catch on the door was removed so that it would
close automatically after a person entered the TSC.
8.2
(0 pen) 482/9213-01: Failure to declare a Site Area Emergency during
operator walkthroughs as a result of loss or challenge to 2 fission
product barriers.
In response to this item, the licensee issued Performance Improvement Request
92-0604 on August 27, 1992. A request for surveillance dated December 15,
1992, requested evaluation of the effectiveness of the corrective actions to
this weakness.
Surveillance S-2059 was conducted during the period July 14
through August 26, 1993, and found that the weakness still existed (See
Section 7.1).
Walkthroughs conducted during the current inspection identified
a repeat weakness for failure to accurately and promptly classify plant
conditions at the General Emergency level.
The failure to correct an
identified emergency preparedness weakness was identified as a violation of
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10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.F.5.
See Sections 6.1 and 7.1.
This weakness remains open pending resolution of Violation (482/9326-01).
8.3
(Closed) 482/9213-02: Errors and omissions in notification messages
issued to the state and county, and in formulation and issuance of
protective action recommendations.
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In response to this item, the licensee expanded simuiator scenarios to provide
more opportunities to practice the full notification process.
In walkthroughs
conducted during this inspection, offsite notification messages to the state
and county were timely and accurate.
8.4
(Closed) Weakness 482/9213-03: Failure of the dose assessment procedure
to provide guidance on obtaining accurate integrated dose projections
based on prior release conditions.
The inspectors verified that procedure EPP 01-7.2, " Computer Dose Calculation"
was revised to require that the maximum release rate be obtained for releases
in progress at time of the calculations.
Records indicated that dose
assessment personnel had been trained on the revised procedure.
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8.5
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01: Excessive delays experienced in
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making initial notifications and in activating the group paqers.
The inspectors verified that procedure MPE BA-006 was revised and retraining
conducted such that the communications group would be notified prior to work
on the batteries.
Procedures EPP 01-3.1, "Immediate Notifications,"
EPP 01-1.0, " Control Room Organization," and EPP 01-3.2, " Followup
Notifications" were revised to incorporate references on the notification
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forms to refer to the phone use instructions in the Emergency Telephone
Directory. The inspectors observed that the backup phone system phone had
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been replaced with a touchtone phone installed in the secondary alarm station.
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ATTACHMENT 1
1 PERSONS CONTACTED
1.1
Licensee Personnel
- N. Carns, President and Chief Executive Officer
K. Craighead, Emergency Planning Specialist
J. Dagenette, Emergency Planning Specialist
- T. East, Supervisory Instructor, Chemistry
- D. Fehr, Manager, Operations Training
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- R. Hammond, Health Physicist
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- R. Hagan, Vice President, Nuclear Assurance
- L. Herhold, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
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- W. Lindsay, Manager, Quality Assurance
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- R. Logsdon, Manager, Chemistry
- B. McKinney, Manager, Training
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- 0. Maynard, Vice President, Plant Operations
- K. Moles, Manager, Regulatory Services
- W. Norton, Manager, Technical Support
- F. Rhodes, Vice President, Engineering
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- T. Riley, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
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- M. Schreiber, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- C. Sprout, Manager, Systems Engineering
- J. Weeks, Manager, Operations
- S. Wideman, Supervisor, Licensing
- M. Williams, Manager, Plant Support
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1.2
NRC Personnel
- G. Pick, Senior Resident Inspector, Wolf Creek
The inspectors also held discussions with and observed the actions of other
station and corporate personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2 EXIT MEETING
The lead inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in
Section 1 of this attachment on September 24, 1993, and summarized the scope
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and findings of the inspection as presented in this report. The licensee did
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not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or reviewed by,
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the inspectors during the inspection.
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ATTACHMENT 2
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY
Simulation Facility:
Wolf Creek
Summary:
The scenario creates a sustained and total loss of Essential Service
Water (ESW), including service water backup, which leads to
equipment and reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal failures.
Events will
involve actual or imminent core degradation and a breach of
containment leading to General Emergency conditions with an
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unmonitored radiological release.
1/C:
It is 4:30 a.m. on Sunday. Winds are to the SSW at 10 miles per
hour.
The unit has been operating at 100 percent power for 300
days.
Fuel pin failures have been detected in the fuel elements
that were installed in the last refueling outage.
Dose Equivalent
I-131 (DEI) was 0.5 uCi/g.
and gross activity was 25 uCi/g from a
sample taken at 3:30 a.m.
Chemistry took another sample at
4:00 a.m.
Results are expected shortly.
Sequence of Events:
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Security reports that two unauthorized divers were recovered from the lake
near the normal intake structure. The divers were wearing scuba gear.
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Security is investigating the possibility of declaring a Security Alert.
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The CVCS letdown radiation monitor alarms, indicating 2.0 uCi.
Chemistry
reports that DEI has increased to 450 uCi/g ard 200 uti/g gross activity.
This represents an Alert based on loss of fuel clad due to increase in gross
activity > 63 uCi/g within 30 minutes with letdown monitor alarm, per
EPP 01-2.1, page 11.
Discharge pressure decreases for all operating SW pumps and the SW pumps trip.
Cause will be reported as clogged intake bays.
This will preclude recovery of
SW using any pumps until the bays are cleared.
At the same time, ESW pumps
trip on overload after low flow conditions are experienced when ESW is
started. This causes Component Cooling Water (CCW) and secondary systems'
temperatures to increase and equipment to trip or run back. The turbine
generator will run back which may result and will eventually require a manual
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However, the trip break.ers fail to open, and the reactor trip
has to be performed locally. This precipitates additional fuel failures. The
Shift Supervisor / Emergency Director may declare an Alert or Site Area
Emergency based on judgement as DED.
As CCW temperature increases, the crew will have to observe reactor coolant
pump and other major heat loads to determine how long operation is permitted.
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At some point, loads will need to be shed to reduce CCW heating and
temperature increase.
Temperatures on all four RCPs will increase due to elevated seal injection
temperature.
After the RCPs have been secured for about 5 minutes, the No. I
seal on a RCP will start to fail due to the absence of adequate thermal
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barrier cooling.
Ten minutes later, the other seals start to fail, and
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reactor coolant escapes into the containment (Site Area Emergency Action Level
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based on loss of two fission product barriers).
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Ten minutes later, control room instruments indicate decreasing containment
pressure.
Outside A0 or security reports a loud explosion and observed steam
from area of containment equipment hatch.
The Supervisor should declare a
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General Emergency based on status of fission product barriers.
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO EVENTS
Simulation Facility:
Wolf Creek
Initial Conditions:
The unit is operating at 100% power, late in core
life.
Fuel pin failures have been detected in the new
fuel elements that were installed in the last
refueling outage. Dose Equivalent I-131 (DEI) was
0.5 uCi/g.
and gross activity was 25 uti/g from a
sample taken at 3:30 a.m.
Chemistry took another
sample at 4:00 a.m.
It is 4:30 a.m. and sample
'
results are expected shortly.
Event
Time
Mal f.
Description
l
0
0
?
Failed fuel ramping up to max 2~5 percent over entire
scenario.
0
0
PCS-8
Automatic & manual RPS signals are failed.
Reactor
Both
trip requires locally opening trip breakers.
0
0
WAT-3
Both trains ESW pumps trip when started.
!
Both
1
5
-
Security reports two divers recovered from the iake
near the intake structure.
Classification is DED
,
'
judgement call.
2
10
-
Chemistry reports that DEI is 450 uti/g and 200 uCi/g
gross activity.
3
12
RMS-3,
CVCS letdown monitor alarms.
Ramp from initial value
SJ01
to 2.0 over 5 minutes.
This requires Alert declaration
'
Opt.#1 based on loss of fuel clad.
4
20
WAT-2
Running SW pumps trip on overcurrent. Any pumps
started will also trip on overcurrent without
delivering flow.
If simulator supports, ramp down flow
indications on SW for prior few minutes.
Five minutes
after dispatching outside A0 to SW intake, he will
report water in bays but intakes clogged with foam
plastic material, with more in bay.
6
40?
-
As ESW loss extends, CCW will heat up and various CCW
components will_ start tripping.
The ESW/SW loss will
result in a turbine run back requiring a manual or
automatic reactor trip.
At this point the ATWS will be
discovered.
About 5 minutes after RCPs are tripped,
RCP seal failures will begin.
7
40
RCS-6? RCP seal failures ramped to ~400 gpm over 5 minutes.
400g/
Failure of 2nd FPB, requiring Site Area Emergency.
300 s
8
60
?
Containment fails due to unknown reason at same time as
reflected by containment model.
Loss of 3 fpb=GE
declaration.
. . _ _ _ . _ ._
_
_-
- ._.
..