ML20057E421
| ML20057E421 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057E237 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9310120122 | |
| Download: ML20057E421 (2) | |
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l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B,ASES l
3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the reactor building spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on Na0H volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and i
11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume limit includes an allowance for solution not usable l
because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
l These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.
3/4.6.2.3 REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the reactor building cooling system ensures that 1) l the reactor building air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the reactor building spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.
The reactor building cooling system and the reactor building spray j
system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the reactor building atmosphere. As a result of this redundance in cooling capability, the allowable out of service time requirements for the reactor building cooling system have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out of service time requirements for the reactor building spray system have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the reactor building spray system also provides a f
mechanism for removing iodine from the reactor building atmosphere.
The accident analysis requires the service water booster pump to be passing 4,000 gpm to both RBCU's within 86.5 seconds. This time encompasses the driving of all necessary service water valves to the correct positions, i.e., fully opened or fully closed. Reference Technical Specification Bases B 3/4.3.1 and B 3/4.3.2 for additional details.
3/4.6.3 PARTICULATE IODINE CLEANUP SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment filter trains ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The i
reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses.
9310120122 931004 PDR ADOCK 05000395 P
pon SUMMER - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. R 67 Corrected by letter dated 10/4/9.
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS j
J BASES I
ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued) i The limits on contained water volume and baron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated l
within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of l
iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
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SUPMER UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 61 Corrected by letter dated 10/4/93
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