ML20057B968

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Amends 182 & 159 to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,respectively, Providing Changes & Clarifications Which Separate Requirements for Borated Water Sources & Flow Paths Needed in Mode 1 Above 80% of Rated Thermal Power
ML20057B968
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  
(DPR-53-A-182, DPR-69-A-159)
Issue date: 09/20/1993
From: Capra R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20057B969 List:
References
NUDOCS 9309240218
Download: ML20057B968 (22)


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UNITED STATES 5'

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-(-

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY j

DOCKET NO. 50-317 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.182 License No. DPR-53 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for. amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated April 1, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; j

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission-i C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

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E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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9309240218 930920 PDR-ADOCK 05000317 P

PDR_

  • (2) Technical Snecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.182, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment' is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3Da. Cp Robert A. Capra, Director Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 20, 1993 O

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UNITED STATES i(I

'f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g; 1 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-318 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.159 License No. DPR-69 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application fdr amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated April 1,1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.159, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ToLJ a. Cp Robert A. Capra, Director Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 20, 1993 O

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO.182 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-53 AMENDMENT NO.159 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69 DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Paaes Insert Paaes l

Table of Contents III Table of Contents III l

Table of Contents IV*

Table of Contents IV*

3/4 1-17 3/4 1-17 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-21 3/4 1-21 3/4 1-22 3/4 1-22 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-4**

B 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 1-5**

B 3/4 1-5 i

Table of Contents changes inadvertently left out from previous Amendment No. 158 for Unit 2 only.

Rollover pages with no changes to the text. These pages are for Unit 1 i

only.

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE J

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY....................

3/4 0-1 i

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T., > 200 F............

3/4 1-1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T, 5 200 F............

3/4 1-4 Baron Dilution 3/4 1-6 1

Moderator Temperature Coefficient..........

3/4 1-7 Minimum Temperature for Criticality.........

3/4 1-10 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Flow Paths - Shutdown................

3/4 1-11 Flow Paths - Operating 3/4 1-12 Charging Pump - Shutdown 3/4 1-14 Charging Pumps - Operating 3/4 1-15 Boric Acid Pumps - Shutdown.............

3/4 1-16 Boric Acid Pumps - Operating 3/4 1-17 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown 3/4 1-18 Charging Pumps ECCS - Subsystem...........

3/4 1-20 l

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Full Length CEA Position 3/4 1-24 Position Indicator Channels.............

3/4 1-29 CEA Drop Time....................

3/4 1-32 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limit 3/4 1-33 Regulating CEA Insertion Limits...........

3/4 1-34 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR - EL.......

3/4 2-6 3/4.2.3 TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR - FJ.....

3/4 2-11 3/4.2.4 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T,..............

3/4 2-15 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS 3/4 2-16 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 III Amendment No. 182 I

.3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS I

Boric Acid Pumps - Operatina j

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

.l 3.1.2.6 a.

The boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow l

path (s) required to be OPERABLE pursuant to

~l Specification 3.1.2.2.a shall be OPERABLE.and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

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AND, When in MODE 1 > 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER b.

The boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required to be OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.8.a shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: With one boric acid pump required for the boron injection flow l

path (s) pursuant to either Specification 3.1.2.2.a or 3.1.2.8.a inoperable, I

restore the boric acid pump to OPERABLE status.within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least NOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTD0WN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% Ak/k at 200 F; restore the above required boric acid pump (s) to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specifications 4.0.5 and 4.1.2.2.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-17 Amendment No. 182 i

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEM Charging Pump Et,JS Subsystem l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 As a minimum, the following equipment shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Boric Acid Storage Tank 12 and its assor:iated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.9.a and the boron injection flow path via Boric Acid Pump 12 from Boric Acid Storage Tank 12 shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.2.a and Specification 3.1.2.6.

AND, One of the following:

b.

The boron injection flow path from Boric Acid Storage Tank 12 via a gravity feed connection shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.2.a. or, Boric Acid Storage Tank 11 and its associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.9.a and the boron injection flow path from Boric Acid Storage Tank 11 via a gravity feed connection shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.2.a.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 > 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION: With only one of the required combinations of borated water sources and flow paths OPD.ABLE, restore two required combinations of borated water sources and flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or reduce power to less than 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and comply with Specifications 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.6, and 3.1.2.9 as applicable.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-20 Amendment No. 182

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.1.2.8 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required oy Specifications 4.0.5,'4.1.2.2, and 4.1.2.9 i

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i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-21 Amendment No. 182 l

d 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2-BORATION SYSTEMS Borated Water Sources - Operatino LIMITING CONDITIeX FOR GrERATION I

3.1.2.9 At least two of the following three borated water sources shall be j

OPERABLE:

i a.

Two boric acid storage tank (s) and one associated heat tracing I

circuit per tank with the contents of the tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1.2-1 and the boron concentration limited to 5 8%,.

and b.

The refueling water tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallons, j

2.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm, 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40 F, and 4.

A maximum solution temperature of 100 F in MODE 1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

l' ACTION: With only one borated water source OPERABLE, restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within.72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least NOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to e SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% Ak/k at 200 F; restore at least two borated water sources to 0PERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within tha next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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a CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-22 Amendment No. 182

A 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 9,601 cubic feet in approximately 24 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration reductions will therefore be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle.

The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confim the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confimation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

3/4.1.1.5 Minimum Temperat p For Criticality This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 515 F.

This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RTm temperature.

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The Boration System is a subset of the Chemical Volume and Control System.

The Boration System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each MODE of facility operation. The system also provides coolant flow following a SIAS (e.g., during a Small Break LOCA) to supplement flow from the Safety Injection System. Above 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the Small Break LOCA analyses assume flow from a single charging pump, accounting for measurement uncertainties and flow mal-distribution effects in calculating a conservative value of charging flow actually delivered to l

the RCS. Credit is only taken for the water inventory, no credit is taken for the injected boron. Above 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, two independent, redundant, and automatic boration systens are provided to ensure functional

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capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable.

l The components required to perform this function include:

1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric a.;id pumps,
5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency powe; supply from OPERABLE diesel generators. At or below 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is a corresponding decrease in decay heat which compensates for the loss of injection from one charging pump assumed in the Small Break LOCA analyses.

i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 182 l

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two in3cpendent and redundant boration systems are provided to ensure single funcdonal capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 3.0% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F.

The maximum boration capabili;y requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks, the concentration and volume of which are met by the range of values given in Specifications 3.1.2.8 and 3.1.2.9, or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a minimum contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentration of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core during long tem ECCS cooling.

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one boration system is acceptable l

without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200 F is based upon providing a 34 Ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN after xenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.

This condition requires either boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks, the requirements of which are met by Specification 3.1.2.7, or 9,844 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank.

The OPERABILITY of one boration system during REFUELING ensures that this l

system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which pemit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met. A regulating or shutdown CEA is considered to be misaligned if it is more than 7.5 inches from any other CEA in its group, however, a shutdown CEA is also considered to be misaligned if it is CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 182

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES withdrawn to less than 129 inches even if it is within 7.5 inches of all other CEAs in its group.

For the purposes of the Technical Specifications, a dual assembly, connected to a single CEA drive mechanism, is considered to be a single CEA (e.g., dual shutdown CEAs connected to a single drive mechanism).

The ACTION statements applicable to an untrippable CEA and to a large l

misalignment (> 15 inches) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of an untrippable CEA, the loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN. A CEA is considered untrippable when it is known that the CEA would not be insertable in response to a Reactor Protection System signal or is known to be immovable due to excessive friction or mechanical interference.

For small misalignments (< 15 inches) of the CEAs, there is 1) a small degradation in the peaking factors relative to those assumed in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 2) a small effect on the time dependent long term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 3) a small effect on the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and 4) a small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the small misalignment of a CEA permits a one hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA(s) to within their alignment requirements prior to initiating a reduction in THERMAL POWER. The one hour time limit is sufficient to (1) identify causes of a misaligned CEA, (2) take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs and (3) minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

Overpower margin is provided to protect the core in the event of a large misalignment (> 15 inches) of a single regulating or shutdown CEA.

l However, this misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. The Reactor Protective System would not detect the degradation in radial peaking factors and since variations in other system parameters (e.g., pressure and coolant temperature) may not be sufficient to cause trips, it is possible that the reactor could be operating with process variables less conservative than those assumed in generating LCO and LSSS setpoints. The ACTION statement associated with a large CEA misalignment requires prompt action to realign the CEA to avoid excessive margin degradation.

If the CEA is not realigned within the given time constraints ACTION is specified which will preserve margin, including reductions in THERMAL POWER.

For a single CEA misalignment, the time allowance to realign the CEA (Figure 3.1.3-1 or as detemined by BASSS) is pemitted for the following reasons:

1.

The margin calculations which support the power distribution LCOs for DNBR are based on a steady-state F, as specified in Technical Specification 3.2.3.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 174

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 2.

When the actual P, is less than the Technical Specification value, additional margin exists.

3.

This additional margin can be credited to offset the increase in P, with time that will occur following a CEA misalignment due to xenon redistribution.

4.

If an F, measurement has not been taken recently (within 5 days),

a pre-misaligned value of 1.70 is assumed and no time for realignment is permitted.

The requirement to reduce power level after the time limit of Figure 3.1.3-1 or after the time limit determined by BASSS is reached offsets the continuing increase in F, that can occur due to xenon redistribution. A power reduction is not required below 50% power. Below 50% power there is sufficient conservatism in the DNB power distribution LCOs to completely offset any, or any additional, xenon redistribution effects.

The ACTION statements applicable to misaligned or inoperable CEAs include requirements to align the OPERABLE CEAs in a given group with the inoperable CEA. Confomance with these alignment requirements brings the core, within a short period of time, to a configuration consistent with that assumed in generating LCO and LSSS setpoints. However, extended operation with CEAs significantly inserted in the core may lead to perturbations in 1) local burnup, 2) peaking factors, and 3) available SHUTDOWN MARGIN which are more adverse than the conditions assumed to exist in the safety analyses and LCO and LSSS setpoints determination.

Therefore, time limits have been imposed on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing.

There are five different operating modes for control of CEAs; Off, Manual Individual, Manual Group, Maual Sequential and Automatic. The Manual Sequential mode is applicable to only the regulating CEAs and the Automatic mode is disabled and not used for both regulating and shutdown CEAs.

1 OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators is required to determine CEA positions and thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits and ensures proper operation of the rod block circuit.

The CEA " Full In" and " Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for detemining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. Therefore, the OPERABILITY and the ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA position indicators permit continued operations when positions of CEAs with inoperable indicators can be verified by the " Full In" or " Full Out" limits.

CEA positions and OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.

These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-5 Amendment No. 174

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TABLE OF CONTENTS LINITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY...................

3/4 0-1 i

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T., > 200 F...........

3/4 1-1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T,,, 5 200 F...........

3/4 1-4 Boron Dilution

.3/4 1-6 Moderator Temperature Coefficient.........

3/4 1-7 Minimum Temperature for Criticality........

3/4 1-10:

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS l

Fl ow Paths - Shutdown...............

3/4 1-11 Flow Paths - Operating 3/4 1-12 Charging Pump - Shutdown 3/4 1-14 Charging Pumps - Operating 3/4 1-IS' Boric Acid Pumps - Shutdown............

3/4 1-16 Boric Acid Pumps - Operating 3/4 1-17.

Borated Water Sources - Shutdown 3/4 1-18 Charging Pump ECCS Subsystem 3/4 1-20 l

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Full Length CEA Position 3/4 1-24 Position Indicator Channels............

3/4 1-29 CEA Drop Time...................

3/4 1-32 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limit 3/4 1-33 Regulating CEA Insertion Limits..........

3/4 1-34 l

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR - P,,.

3/4 2-6 3/4.2.3 TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR - F,....

3/4 2-11 3/4.2.4 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T,.............

3/4 2-15 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETER 3 3/4 2-16 i

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 III Amendment No. 159 i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDIENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-1 i

3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUPENTATION..................

3/4 3-11 3/4.3.3 MONIT0 aNG INSTRUMENTATION Radiat)on Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-27 Incore Detectors 3/4 3-31 Seismic Instrumentation..............

3/4 3-34 Meteorological Instrumentation 3/4 3-37 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation..........

3/4 3-40 Post-Accident Instrumentation...........

3/4 3-43 Fire Detection Instrumentation 3/4 3-47 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring I

Instrumentation..................

3/4 3-51 l

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation..................

3/4 3-56 l

3/4.4 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION l

STARTUP and POWER OPERATION............

3/4 4-1 H0T STANDBY....................

3/4 4-2 Shutdown 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES...................

3/4 4-6 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES...................

3/4 4-7 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER....................

3/4 4-8 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS 3/4 4-9 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems.............

3/4 4-16 Reactor Coolant System Leakage 3/4 4-18 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY.....................

3/4 4-20 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.................

3/4 4-23 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 IV Amendment No. 158 I

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4 3/4.1 KEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Boric Acid Pumps - Operating LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 a.

The boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required to be OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2.a shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

AND, When in MODE 1 > 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER b.

The boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required to be OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.8.a shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: With one boric acid pump required for the boron injection flow path (s) pursuant to either Specification 3.1.2.2.a or 3.1.2.8.a inoperable.

l restore the boric acid pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% Ak/k at 200'F; restore the above required boric acid pump (s) to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specifications 4.0.5 and 4.1.2.2.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-17 Amendment No. 159

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Chargina Pump ECCS Subsystem l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 As a minimum, the following equipment shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Boric Acid Storage Tank 22 and its associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.9.a and the boron injection flow path via Boric Acid Pump 22 from Boric Acid Storage Tank 22 shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.2.a and Specification 3.1.2.6.

AND, One of the following:

b.

The boron injection flow path from Boric Acid Storage Tank 22 via a gravity feed connection shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.2.a. or, Boric Acid Storage Tank 21 and its associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.9.a and the boron injection flow path from Boric Acid Storage Tank 21 via a gravity feed connection shall be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.2.a.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 > 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION: With only one of the required combinations of borated water sources and flow paths OPERABLE, restore two required combinations of borated water sources and flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or reduce power to less than 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and comply with Specifications 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.6, and 3.1.2.9 as applicable.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-20 Amendment No. 159

P 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILUUICE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 No additional-Surveillance Requirements other than those required l

by. Speci fications 4.0.5, 4.1.2.2, and 4.1.2.9.

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s CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-21 Amendment No. 159

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS Borated Water Sources - Operatino LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.9 At least two of the following three borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two boric acid storage tank (s) and one associated heat tracing circuit per tank with the contents of the tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1.2-1 and the boron concentration limited to < 8%,

and b.

The refueling water tank with:

1 1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallons.

l 2.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm, 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40 F, and 4.

A maximum solution temperature of 100 F in MODE 1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

l ACTION: With only one borated water source OPERABLE, restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least i

H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% Ak/k at 200 F; restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD-SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-22 Amendment No. 159

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1.3 Boron Dilution A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 9,601 cubic feet in approximately 24 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration reductions will therefore be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

The limitation on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle.

The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confinnation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

3/4.1.1.5 Minimum Temperature for Criticality This specification ensures that the reacter will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 515 F.

This limitation is required to ~ ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RTm temperature.

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The Boration System is a subset of the Chemical Volume and Control System.

The Boration System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each MODE of facility operation. The system also provides coolant flow following a SIAS (e.g., during a Small Break LOCA) to supplement flow from the Safety Injection System. Above 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the Small Break LOCA analyses assume flow from a single charging pump, accounting for measurement uncertainties and flow mal-distribution effects in calculating a conservative value of charging flow actually delivered to the RCS. Credit is only taken for the water inventory, no credit is taken for the injected boron. Above 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, two independent, redundant, and automatic boration systems are provided to ensure functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 159

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES The components required to perfom this function include:

1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from 0PERABLE diesel generators. At or below 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is a corresponding decrease in decay heat which compensates for the loss of injection from one charging pump assumed in the Small Break LOCA Analyses.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two independent and redundant boration systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a '

l SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 3.0% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F.

The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks, the concentration and volume of which are met by the range of values given in Specifications 3.1.2.8 and 3.1.2.9, or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a minimum contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentration of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core during long tem ECCS cooling.

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one boration system is acceptable l

without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200 F is based upon providing a 3%

Ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN after xenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.

This condition requires either boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks, the requirements of which are met by Specification 3.1.2.7, or 9,844 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank.

The OPERABILITY of one boration system during REFUELING ensures that this j

system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 159