ML20056G325
| ML20056G325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1993 |
| From: | Storz L CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309020411 | |
| Download: ML20056G325 (3) | |
Text
E Cu.t TERIOR ENERGY 300 Madison Avenue Louis F. Sforz To-eco. 0H 43652-0001 Vice President-Nxieof 419-249 2300 Deas Besse PRiD...
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Docket Number 50-346 DRA lEiC
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License Number NPF-3 94RiS Jj rr,
Of Serial Number 1-1024 DRSS'
'PA0 DRMAi August 23, 1993 l
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Mr. J. B. Martin Regional Administrator NRC Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
April 13, 1993 Unplanned Vater Transfer Between RCS and BVST Gentlemen:
The purpose of this letter is to provide an update of the management actions taken in response to the inadvertent transfer of water from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to the Berated Vater Storage Tank (BVST) which occurred at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) on April 13, 1993.
This event was initially discussed in a letter from Toledo Edison dated April 22, 1993, (Serial Number 1-1013). As discussed with the NRL staff at the June 3, 1993 management meeting, Toledo Edison is well aware of the implications of the April 13, 1993 event and is taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence of similar events.
These corrective actions vere documented in Toledo Edison's response to Inspection Report 93-011, dated June 14, 1993 (Serial Number 1-1015).
Although the unplanned water transfer occurred while the plant was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), Toledo Edison management considered this operational event to be serious. A Transient Assessment Program (TAP) team was assembled which commenced its investigation prior to shift i
turnover. tap teams are assembled to investigate any significant i
operational event. These teams examine an event in detail, determine contributing causes, and propose corrective actions. As discussed in the response to Inspection Report 93-011, Toledo Edison is implementing corrective actions and recommendations from the TAP team investigation.
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I Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1024 Page 2 Toledo Edison is implementing certain corrective actions to address the generic implications of the April 13, 1993 event.
These actions
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include:
The completion of INP0's Control Room Teamwork Development Course by available Operations Control Room personnel. This training has provided valuable insights into methods of enhancing crev dynamics and communications.
The strengthening of control room operating crews through assignment of recently licensed personnel. These individuals
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vere chosen for the Senior Reactor Operator Program because they I
had demonstrated excellent communication and command skills. As noted in Initial License Examination Report OL-93-01, dated June 14, 1993, during dynamic simulator scenarios, communications were formal and positive with ample feedback and crew input to ensure the crew members were kept appraised of all events / situations. It is expected that these individuals vill bring a better balance and a higher level of knowledge to the control room operating erevs.
Conducting a procedure adequacy review of existing outage related operations procedures.
The review included procedures having system interfaces t;ith the Reactor Coolant System, the Spent Fuel Pool, and the Decay Heat Removal System.
As a result of this review, twelve pr ocedures vill be revised to better identify the potential for inadvertent water transfers.
Initiating a reviev, by Nuclear Training and Independent Safety Engineering personnel, of several eighth refueling outage operational events.
This reviev vill include the April 13, 1993 event.
Lessons learned from this review will be incorporated into pre-outage operator requalification training. This training vill be provided to operating crews immediately prior to the ninth refueling outage.
Independent Safety Engineering personnel vere included in the outage review to enhance the ability to identify generic concerns.
These aggressive corrective actions, taken in response to the April 13, 1993 event, demonstrate that Toledo Eiison considers the event, as well l
as any event involving RCS inventory or decay heat removal capability, to be important.
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The April 13, 1993 event was not rt3ortable under the provisions of l
10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73. The intent of Toledo Edison's April 22, 1993 l
submittal (Serial 1-1013) vas to document the details of the event.
Toledo Edison understood the significance of the event and believed it was important to note that the consequences of the event did not seriously degrade plant safety systems nor was there a threat to the public health and safety. However, Toledo Edison did not wish to imply that the Company believed the event itself to be inconsequential.
1 Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1024 Page 3 l
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Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Villiam T. O'Connor, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (419) 249-2366.
Very truly yours,
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1 MAT /dle cc:
J. B. Hopkins, NRC Senior Project Manager S. Stasek, DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector USNRC Document Control Desk Utility Radiological Safety Board I
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