ML20056E894
| ML20056E894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056E889 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-93-26, 50-325-93-26, NUDOCS 9308250272 | |
| Download: ML20056E894 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1993026
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UldlTED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANT A. GEORGI A 30323
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JUN 16 ]gg3
Report Nos.:
50-325/93-26 and 50-324/93-29
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
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P. O. Box 1551
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Raleigh, NC 27602
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Docket Nos.:
5' -325 and 50-324
License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62
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Facility Name: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant-
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Inspection Con ucted: May 24-28, 1993
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Inspe tor:
/
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L---) Sartor, Jr.
Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
G. Bethke, Comex Corp.
J. Kreh, NRC Region II
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D.
oberts, NRC Resident Inspector (Harris)
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Approvejby(
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4.~ P. Barr, Chief
Date Signed
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Emergency Preparedness Section
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Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
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This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
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' the annual emergency preparedness exercise. The limited participation-
exercise was conducted on May 25, 1993, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and
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3:15 p.m.
Selected areas of the licensee's emergency response facilities and
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organization were observed to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's
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implementation of the Radiological Emergency Plan and procedures during a
simulated emergency. The inspection also included a review of the exercise
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scenario and observation of the licensee's critique.
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Results:
In the area inspected,-no violations or deviations were ihntified.
The emergency response organization's performance was satisfactory to mitigate
the accident postulated by the scenario. The licensee's first use of the
simulator for the graded exercise was considered a strength. Areas noted for
improvement included exercise control and notifications.
9308250272 930616
ADOCK 05000324
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
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- R. Anderson, Vice. President, Brunswick Plant
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- R. Baldwin, Senior Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
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- C. Blackman, Assistant Plant Manager
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- J. Brown, Plant Manager, Unit 1
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- G. Hicks, Manager, Training
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- C. Hinnant, Director, Site Operations
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- B. Houston, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
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- R. Indelicato, Manager, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- J. Leviner, Manager, Nuclear Systems Engineer
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- B. Levis, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
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- G. Miller, Manager, Technical Support
- B. Pergerson, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
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- C. Robertson, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- R. Smith, Manager, Radiation Control
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- R. Tart, Manager, Radwaste/ Fire Protection
- J. Terry, Manager, Environment and Chemistry
- J. Titrington, Manager, Unit 2 Operations
- C. Warren, Manager, Unit 2 Operations
- G. Warriner, Manager, Control and Administration
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
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craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
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technicians, and administrative personnel.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- P. Byron, Resident Inspector
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R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit interview
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine
whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency
response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the
licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and
Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The scenario for this daytime, limited participation exercise (State and
local governments participating only for receipt of notification
messages) was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was found to be
adequate for the objectives. This was the licensee's first use of the
simulator for a graded exercise at this site. The use of the simulator
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was considered a strength as it enhanced the realism of the operating
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shift's participation. However, the use of the simulator resulted in a
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licensee-identified deficiency addressing improper contingencies in
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place for scenario data when simulator /ERFIS [ Emergency Response
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Facility Information System] data was different from the time line
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anticipated. Because of the difference in the radiological data in the
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scenario and that on the ERFIS computers, the licensee's corrective
action for this item will be tracked as an Inspector Follow-up Item
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(IFI).
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IFI 50-325, 324/93-26-01: Review licensee's corrective actions for
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exercise control to improve continuity of data between scenario timeline
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and ERFIS data.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to
determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E
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to 10 CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan) were implemented
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with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignments of the
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onsite emergency response organization.
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The inspector determined that the initial onsite emergency organization
was adequately defined and that primary and alternate assignments for
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the positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly
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designated. During the exercise the inspector observed that staff was
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available to fill key functional positions within the initial onsite
emergency organization.
Following the decision to r. tivate the
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Technical Support Center (TSC), designated individuals were notified and
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responded to the TSC to assume the duties of assigned emergency
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positions. Likewise, following the Site Emergency Coordinator's
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decision to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the
designated personnel responded and staffed the EOF in accordance with
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their preassigned responsibilities.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting
and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether
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arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel at the E0F were
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adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the
planned response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
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Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated
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in Section II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision I).
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An inspector noted that the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures
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identified other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
response. The scope of this exercise did not include any support from
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offsite resources other than the Southport Rescue Squad and the State
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and county communicators who received notification messages.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
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This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to
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10 CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately
implemented.
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The licensee's emergency procedures were used to identify and classify
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each emergency condition and to escalate to more severe classifications
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as the simulated accident progressed. The licensee's classifications
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and emergency declarations were appropriate throughout the exercise.
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The Notification of Unusual Event was declared by the Shift Supervisor
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at 9:20 a.m. based on the loss of the audible function of all alarms or
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annunciators for greater than 15 minutes. The Alert was declared by the
Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) in the Control Room / Simulator at
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10:14 a.m. based on the loss of audible and visual alarms for greater
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than 15 minutes. A second Alert was declared by the SEC in the
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Technical Support Center (TSC) at 11:08 a.m. based on anticipated
transient without a scram. A Site Area Emergency was declared at
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11:41 a.m. based upon failure of the Standby Liquid Control System to
fully shutdown the reactor. The General Emergency was declared at
2:38 p.m. based on the loss of two of three fission product barriers
with a potential for the loss of the third barrier.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been
established for notification by the licensee of State and local response
organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and
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follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and a
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means to provide early notification to the population within the plume
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exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and the specific criteria in
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for providing emergency
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information to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and for
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alerting and mobilizing the licensee's augmented emergency response
organization. The inspector noted that implementing procedures for
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notifications had been established and were adequate to provide guidance
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to personnel for initial notification to the State and local
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authorities. The notifications made during the exercise were timely and
provided the appropriate information to offsite authorities with one
exception. The exception was notification message number 3 transmitted
at 10:40 a.m. notifying the offsite agencies of a Notification of
Unusual Event (NOUE) classification based on a potentially contaminated
injured person taken offsite for medical assistance. The site was
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actually in an Alert status when this message was transmitted. Because
the offsite agencies were only receiving messages and not actually
participating, the confusion this message could have created was
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unknown. A correction was made to the emergency classification at a
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later time. The licensee identified this issue as a deficiency in their
critique. The inspector informed the licensee that the corrective
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action to this licensee-identified deficiency would be followed as an
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IFI.
IFI 50-325, 324/93-26-02:
Review corrective action to communication
problems identified during exercise when an event of lesser
classification occurred during a higher classified event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
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This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
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personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications capability existed
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among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's
emergency response organizations and offsite authorities.
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communication hardware problems were observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency
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facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided
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and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50,
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Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.H.
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The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
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emergency response facilities to include the TSC and the EOF.
In these
cases, the facility and its dedicated equipment facilitated the
emergency response.
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a.
Simulator Control Room
The Simulator Control Room was used in lieu of the actual Control
Room for the exercise.
Emergency communications equipment that
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had been installed in the simulator functioned effectively to
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fully support the initial emergency response prior to the turnover
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of communications to the TSC.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was not within the protected area during normal
conditions, but was incorporated into the protected area by the
security force following the NOUE declaration.
There were no
major facility or equipment problems identified during the
exercise.
c.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The inspector noted that the EOF facility and equipment appeared
adequate to support the emergency response throughout the
exercise.
d.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
There were no major facility or equipment problems noted with the
OSC.
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Emergency News Center (ENC)
The ENC was not staffed and activated for this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that methods, systems, and equipment
for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of
a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and the
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program reviewed by the inspector included an
engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological
hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the
simulated accident.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Protective Responses (82301)
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This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions
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during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed
and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including
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evacuation of nonessential personnel were implemented promptly as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and the specific criteria in.
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The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for
formulating protective action recommendations' (PARS) for the offsite
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populace within the 10-mile emergency planning zone.
Protective actions
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were quickly formulated and transmitted to the State and local
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authorities within 15 minutes of the declaration of the General
Emergency. Onsite protective actions such as accountability and
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evacuation were simulated.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed'to
determine the deficiencies identified as a result.of the. exercise, and
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weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were
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formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F,
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The licensee conducted evaluator / controller critiques. prior to the
formal presentation to facility management on May 27,-1993. The
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critique as presented to licensee management was comprehensive and
addressed deficiencies and comments,
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No violations or deviations were. identified.
12.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 27, 1993, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The Exercise Team 1.eader
described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results
listed below. No proprietary information is contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
Descriotion and Reference
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50-325,324/93-26-01
IFI - Review corrective action for exercise
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control to improve consistency of scenario
data (Paragraph 2).
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50-325,324/93-26-02
IFI - Review corrective action for
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confusion surrounding emergency
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classification level (Paragraph 6).
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Attachments (5 pages):
Exercise Objectives and
Narrative Summary
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
PIJN FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT EMERGENCY EIERCISE
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MAY 25, 1993
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of
emergency response capabilities and other elements of the CP&L Brunswick
Steam Electric Plant Plan, associated implementing procedures, and the CP&L
Corporate Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) Regulation lOCFR50.47(b).
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2.0 OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELIhTS
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2.1 GENERAL INFORMATION
1.
Scope
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A simulated accident at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) which
could escalate to a general emergency and will involve planned response
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and recovery actions to includes emergency classification; notification
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of off-site oryanizations and plant personnel; actions to correct the
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emergency conditions;
and initiation of accident assessment and
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protective actions as necessary to cope with the accident. The exercise
will simulate an emergency that does not result in off-site radiological
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releases and which will not require responses by state and local
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government personnel (state and county participation will be simulated) .
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2.
Obiectives
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The 1993 Brunswick Emergency Preparedness Exercise will provide an
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cpportunity for emergency response personnel to:
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Demonstrate the use of the Emergency Action Level Classification
procedure for emergency class declarations.
b.
Demonstrate notification and deployment of the Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) as required by the scenario.
c.
Demonstrate emergency notification of the appropriate state and
county amergency management contacts within 15 minutes of a declared
emergency class.
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d.
Demonstrate the adequacy and timeliness of follow-up emergency
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notifications to appropriate federal, state, and county agencies.
Demonstrate adequacy and timeliness of emergency notifications to
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the NRC (may simulate if NRC chooses not to participate in the
exercise).
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f.
Demonstrate the Technical Support Center (TSC) can be activated in
accordance with the Emergency Plan and implementing procedure
following declaration of an Alert or higher emergency class.
g.
Demonstrate the operations support Center (OSC) can be activated in
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accordance with the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures
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following declaration of an Alert or higher emergency class.
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h.
Demonstrate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) can be activated
in accordance with the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures
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following declaration of a Site Area or General Emergency.
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1.
Demonstrate adequacy of communication between the Control Room,
Technical Support Center, Operation Support Center, Emergency
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Operations Facility,
NRC,
and state / county emergency response
officials.
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Demonstrate adequate information flow from within and between each
Emergency Response Facility.
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Demonstrate an effective team work response within and between the
Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operation Support Center,
and Emergency Operations Facility throughout the exercise.
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Demonstrate the transfer of direction and control responsibilities
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(and maintain continuity) from the initial to the fully augmented
Emergency Response Organization.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of the TSC in providing accident assessment
and mitigation.
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Demonstrate proper selection of Protective Action Recommendations
(PARS) and timely delivery of PARS to the state and county
officials.
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Demonstrate the assessment of radiological accident consequences and
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any releases of radioactive materials to the environment.
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Demonstrate tia adequacy of the Emergency Response Team's response
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to simulated ev nts,
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Demonctrate the ability to assess radiological conditions inside the
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plant environs.
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Demonstrate radiation / contamination monitoring in Emergency Response
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Facilities.
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Demonstrate the ability to provide security for the Emergency
Operations Facility.
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Demonstrate timely formation and dispatching of Damage control Teams
by the OSC for initial recovery and reentry actions.
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Demonstrate the ability to control access to the Exclusion Area and
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establishment of road blocks.
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Demonstrate the ability to transition to the Recovery Plan,
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Demonstrate that previously identified NRC open items resulting from
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the prior year's exercise have been resolved.
3.
Exercise Dates
a.
Pre-Exercise Evaluator Meeting: May 24, 1993
TSC/ EOF Training Building, Room No. 143
b.
Exercises May 25, 1993
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c.
Evaluator Group Meeting: May 25, 1993
d.
Lead Evaluator Meeting: May 26, 1993, 9 a.m., Room 143
e.
Post Exercise Critique Report to Players: May 28, 1993, 9 a.m.
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NARRATIVE SUMMARY
The initial conditions for the drill are Unit 1 at 100% power
with no equipment out of service.
Unit 2 is at 100% power and
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has been running 140 days.
HPCI is out of service for
maintenance.
The site is under a severe thunderstorm warning and
the modem link to the met tower is inoperable.
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The drill will be initiated by a loss of the audible functions on
all annunciators.
This will require the declaration of an
Unusual Event.
I&C Technicians will respond to the control room
but the problem degrades until the visual function of the
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annunciators are lost one hour into the drill.
This requires the
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declaration of an Alert.
During this time, plant personnel are
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responding to an accident in the hot machine shop that has
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injured two people.
Two hours into the drill Unit 2 loses one
incoming 230KV line.
A generator load reject occurs and a
reactor scram signal occurs.
All rods do not go in at this time.
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Manual attempts to scram the reactor are not successful, and SLC
pumps are started.
The
"A" SLC pamp loses power and the coupling
for the
"P"
SLC pump will break.
All indications in the control
room will indicate it is running.
Operators will continue to
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keep the reactor stable while attempting to get rods inserted.
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Control rods will not be inserted during this scenario.
The
first chemistry sample following ATWS will show indications of
minor fuel damage.
Three hours into the exercise, a loss of all
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offsite power for Unit 2 will occur.
Diesel #3 fails to start.
. - - .
.-
,
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~ ...
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Diesel #4 will start
and load as required.
Fifteen minutes
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after the loss of offsite power the operators should determine
that SLC is not injecting. This will require the declaration of a
Site Area Emergency based on the ATWS and SLC failure.
This
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declaration may occur earlier based on operator recognition.
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Five hours into the scenario a steam line break will occur in -
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17' SRHR on the RCIC steam supply line.
The inboard and outboard
valves fail to isolate at the time of the break.
A release into
secondary containment will occur and a General Emergency will be
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declared.
The steam leak can be isolated by cross tying power to
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operate the inboard valve or by manually closing the outboard
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valve.
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The drill will be terminated upon the successful isolation of the
steam leak and restoration of offsite power.
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