ML20055A371
| ML20055A371 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1982 |
| From: | Caruso R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kay J YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-15-14, TASK-RR LSO5-82-07-029, LSO5-82-7-29, NUDOCS 8207160219 | |
| Download: ML20055A371 (6) | |
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July 14, 1982 Docket l'o. 50-29 LS05-82-07-029 T'r. James A. Kay Senior Engineer - Licensing Yankee Abonic Electric Company 1G71 Ucrcester Road Franinghan,!!assachusetts 01701
Dear I:
- r. Kay:
SUBJECT:
YANKEE - SEP TOPIC XV-14, "If!ADVERTEilT OPERATIQ!1 0F ECCS A::D CIIEMICAL AfiD VOLU :E C0ilTRDL SYSTEi! f'.ALFUflCTIO:1 TIIAT IfiCREASES REACTOR C00LAflT IllVEflTORY By letter dated June 30, 1981, you submitted a safety assessoent report for the above topic. The staff has reviewed this assess-cent and our conclusions are presented in the enclosed Safety Evaluation Report, which completes this topic for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated assessment for your facility. The evaluation may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if flRC criteria relating to this topic is codified before the integrated assessment is conpleted.
Sincerely,
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Operating Reactors Branch e5 psu @ g (p)
Ralph Caruso, Project !;anager Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
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Mr. James A. Kay CC Mr. James E. Tribble, President Yankee Atomic Electric Co.'pany 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Chairman Board of Selectmen Town of Rowe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Facilities Siting Council 14th Floor One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Resident Inspector Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC Post Office Box 28 Monroe Bridge,' Massachusetts 01350 Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 m..... - - -..
YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SEP Topic XV-14 INADVERTENT OPERATION OF ECCS AND CVCS MALFUNCTION THAT INCREASES REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY I.
INTRODUCTION An inadvertent safety injection or a malfunction in the pressurizer level controls can cause an increase in primary coolant inventory. The incraase in inventory may result in power level increase and lead to fuel damage or overpressurization of the primary system'.'
If the transient is severe enough the reactor will trip from high pressurizer water level or high pre;surizer a
pressure.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA Section 50.34 of 10CFR Part 50 requires that each applicant for a construction permit or operating license provide an analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components of the facility with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility, including determination of the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the facility.
Section 50.36 of 10CFR Part 50 requires the Technical Specifications to include safety limits which protect the integrity of the physical barriers which guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity.
i The General Design Criteria (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50) establish minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled reactors.
GDC 10 " Reactor Design" requires that the core and associated coolant, control and protection systems be designed with appropriate margin to assure that
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specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational occurrences.
GDC 15 " Reactor Coolant System Design" requires that the reactor coolant and associated protection systems be designed with sufficient margin to assure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded during normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational occurrences.
GDC 26 " Reactivity Control System Redundancy and Capability" requires that the reactivity control systems be capable of reliably controlling reactivity changes to assure that under conditions of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, and with appropriate margin for malfunctions such as stuck rods, specified acceptable fuel design ' imits are not exceeded.
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RELATED SAFETY TOPICS Inadvertent boron dilution is discussed in Topic XV.10.
Various other SEP topics evaluate such items as the reactor protection system.
The effects of single failures on safe shutdown capability are considered under Topic VII-3.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review is conducted in accordance with SRP 15.5.1, 15.5.2.
The evaluation includes review of the analysis for the event and identification of the features in the' plant that mitigate the consequences of the event as well as the ability of these systems to function as required. The extent to which operator action is required is also evaluated. Deviations from the criteria specified in the Standard Review Plan are identified.
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. V.
EVALUATION The licensee has evaluated the effects of an inadvertent safety injection during power operation (Ref.1).
It has been determined that since the primary coolant pressure (2000 psig) exceeds the shutoff head of the safety infection pamps (1560 psig) no safety injection will take p, lace during power operation.
The licensee has also evaluated malfunctions of the pressurizer level control system.
This could result in starting of the 3 charging pumps and closing the 3 letdown orifice valves.
At this rate, the pressurizer level will increase at approximately 17 inches per minute from its normal level of 120 inches (1/3 full).
A high pressurizer level alarm will occur at 150 inches. A high' pressurizer water level trip will scram the reactor at 200 inches, at about 4.7 minutes after initiation of the transient.
A high main coolant pressure trip scrams the reactor at a pressure of 2200 psig.
The licensee indicates that the high pressure trip would occur prior to the pressurizer high level trip. Thus, pressure in the reactor coolant system is maintained below 110% of the design value of 2485 psig.
Because this is a pressurization i
transient, fuel cladding damage is not a concern.
VI. CONCLUSION As part of the SEP review for the Yankee Nuclear Station we have concluded that the licensee byaluation of inadvertent operation of ECCS & CVCS malfunctions confirms that the acceptance criteria of SRP 15.5.1& 2 are met with regard to maintaining system pressure and fuel cladding DNBR within acceptable limits, and therefore no adverse consequences will result from this event.
O REFERENCES 1.
Letter from J. A. Kay, YAEC, to D. M. Crutchfield, NRC,
Subject:
Systematic.
Evaluation Program Topic Assessments, dated June 30, 1981.
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