ML20054M059
| ML20054M059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8207090204 | |
| Download: ML20054M059 (2) | |
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.4,. ;,o TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A, TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II June 29, 1982 BLRD-50-438/81-38 M
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N U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 o
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
,3-BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - STEAM PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION - BLRD-50-438/81-38, BLRD-50-439/81 FIFTH INTERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on May 19, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8105. This was followed by our interim reports dated June 18, September 30, and December 17, 1981 and April 2, 1982.
Enclosed is our fifth interim report. We expect to submit our next report by July 30, 1982. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable to this deficiency.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY e
. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 l
Mr. James McFarland (Enclosure)
Senior Project Manager
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Babcock & Wilcox Company P.O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 l
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ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 STEAM PRESSURE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION NCR BLN NEB 8105 BLRD-50-438/81-38, BLRD-50-439/81-41 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIFTH INTERIM REPORT Description of Deficiency During a May 6, 1981, telecon between TVA and B&W,- B&W was not s Sle to specify the minimum departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) which would result should a steam pressure regulator malfunction occur.
Therefore, TVA is unable to verify the extent of damage which would result from a steam pressure regulator malfunction. This is unacceptable since the Chapter 15 FSAR analysis states that the steam pressure regulator malfunction is bounded by the steam line break event. Also, the steam pressure regulator malfunction is a condition II event and, as such, must have a minimum DNBR greater than 1.24, per section 4.2.3.3.5 of the FSAR. As stated above, B&W is unable to verify this.
This failure mode is being analyzed as a postulated design basis event. There is no evidence to believe that any deficiency exists which could result in a steam pressure regulator malfunction.
This condition may be applicable to other B&W-supplied NSSS; however, it affects no other TVA plants since BLN represents TVA's only B&W-supplied NSSS.
Interim Progress B&W has submitted a revised analysis of the cited steam pressure regulator malfunction. The failure analyzed was a spurious opening of 28-percent turbine bypass. The analysis indicates that the minimum DNBR limits are not violated as a result of this malfunction.
Therefore, B&W concluded that there are no adverse safety implications inherent in the cited deficiency.
TVA is reviewing the B&W analysis to determine if we concur with their finding. TVA will supply further information upon the completion of this review.
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