ML20054H777

Initial Decision LBP-82-48 Specifying License Conditions for Authorization of 5% Power Operation.Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Listed.Jurisdiction Retained to Rule on Miami Valley Power Project Motion to Admit New Contentions

ML20054H777
Person / Time
Site:	Zimmer
Issue date:	06/21/1982
From:	Frye J, Hooper F, Livingston M Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
LBP-82-48, NUDOCS 8206240420
Download: ML20054H777 (178)

Text

-

,, , LBP-82-48 a

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,E Before Administrative Judges:

John H Frye, III, Esq., Chairman

[#M Dr. M. Stanley Livingston Dr. Frank F. Hooper . , ,,

MD JUN 221982 In the Matter of )

\

The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Docket No. 50-358 Company, et al.

(Wm. H. Zimer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ) June 21, 1982 Appearances Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq., and Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.,

of Conner & Wetterhahn, Washington, D.C., and William J. Moran, Esq., General Counsel, and Jerome A.

Vennemann, Esq., Counsel far The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, et al .

l l

l ,

John D. Woliver, Esq., for Dr. David B. Fankhauser l James H. Feldman, Jr., Esq., for the Miami Valley Power Project Andrew B. Dennison, Esq., for Zimmer Area Citizens and Zimmer Area Citizens of Kentucky David K. Martin, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for the Comonwealth of Kentucky William Peter Heile, Esq., Assistant City Solicitor for the City of Cincinnati Deborah Faber Webb, Esq., Mrs. Mary Reder and Mr. Donald Reder, for the City of Mentor, Kentucky I

George E. Pattison, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney, and Lawrence R.

! Fisse, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for i

C1ermont County, Ohio l

8206240420 820621 gDRADOCK 05000358 PDR DS O2

.- 7

i George Jett, Esq., General Counsel, and .

Brian P. Cassidy, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, '

Washington, D.C.

Charles A. Barth, Esq., Myron Karman, Esq.,

Lawrence Brenner, Esq., and Janice E. Moore, Esq.,

Office of the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for the NRC Staff i

7 f

e 9

)

1 I 3

~

}.

' l' s

>! / -.

s ,

7 f

/

ii

t INITIAL DECISION (OPERATING LICENSE PROCEEDING)

I. INTRODUCTION This Initial Decision concerns the application filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, for itself and as agent for Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company and The Dayton Power & Light Company, (hereinafter collectively "Appli-cants") for a facility operating license which wcald authorize the operation of the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter "Zimmer Station," " Station," or " facility"). The Cincinnati Gas &

Electric Company is responsible for operation of the facility, a boil-ing water reactor designed to operate at a core power level up to 2436 thermal megawatts 'with a net electrical output of approximately 800

! megawatts. The facility is located on Applicants' site on the eastern shore of the Ohio River, one-half mile north of Moscow and about 24 miles southeast of Cincinnati, in Washington Township, Clermont County, 1

Ohio. Commercial operation of the facility is projected for December, 1982.

On October 27, 1972, following technical reviews by its Staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and hearings and a favorable Initial Decision (LBP-72-27, 5 AEC 133 [1972]) by an Atomic I

i l

i I *a =

l l

Safety and Licensing Board, the Atomic Energy Comission issued a construction permit for the Zimer Station.

Following docketir.g of the application for an operating license, on September 28, 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (successor to the Atomic Energy Commission) published a notice entitled

" Receipt of Application for Facility Operating License; Availability of Applicants' Environmental Report; and Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License and Opportunity for Hearing" (40 Fed. Reg. 43959). In response to the notice, petitions for leave to intervene were filed by the Miami Valley Power Project ("MVPP"), Dr. David B.

Fankhauser, Mrs. Marie 8. Leigh and the City of Cincinnati. Following a prehearing. conference the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board established to rule on the petitions admitted all of the petitioners as parties to the proceeding and specified the contentions at issue. It also issued a Notice of Hearing comencing this proceeding on March 19, 1976.

By letter of September 9, 1977, the Staff informed the Board that Mrs. Leigh had died. Her contentions are therefore moot.

In Memoranda and Orders of April 22,1980(LBP-80-14, 11 NRC 570) and July 2,1980 (LBP-80-19,12 NRC 67), Zimer Area Citizens and Zimer Area Citizens of Kentucky ("ZAC-ZACK" or "ZAC")

were admitted as intervenors. Their contentions, all related to emergency planning and monitoring, were conditionally admitted subject reconsideration and modification pending adoption of the final NRC rules on this subject.

In a Memorandum and Order of January 29, 1980 (LBP-80-6, 11 NRC 148), the City of Mentor, Kentucky, was admitted under the provisions of 10 CFR 2.715(c). Pursuant to the same provision, the Commonwealth of Kentucky was admitted on April 23, 1980, and Clermont County, Ohio, on June 11, 1980.

In a motion of May 18, 1982, MVPP seeks admission of eight new contentions concerning quality assurance and corporate character and competence. We have elected to issue this Initial Decision in advance of our ruling on this motion. While we intend to rule on this motion promptly, we do not wish to delay the commencement of the addi-tional proceedings which may be necessary as a result of this Initial Decision pending that ruling. This Initial Decision rules on all presently outstanding contentions; our rulings herein and MVPP's motion may necessitte further proceedings and decisions in the future.

Consequently we are retaining jurisdiction to deal with these matters.

The decisional record in this proceeding consists of the following:

a. The material pleadings filed herein, includ-ing the petitions and other pleadings filed by the parties, and the orders issued by the Board during the course of this proceeding;

b. The transcripts of the prehearing conferences on January 23, 1976 (Tr. 1-120), May 21-23, 1979-(Tr. 121-532), and October 29 and 30, 1981 (Tr. 4644-4865), and the transcript of testimony of the evidentiary. hearings with pagination from 533 to 7979 (pages 3600-3900 were skipped by the reporter). Limited appear-ance statements, not part of the decisional record, were heard as follows:

May 22, 1979 --

Tr. 221 - 360 May 23, 1979 --

Tr. 365 - 531 June 20, 1979 --

Tr. 889 975 June 26, 1979 --

Tr. 1533 - 1605 November 14, 1979 --

Tr. 3150 - 3223 January 25, 1982 --

Tr. 4872 - 4883 Tr. 4899 - 4902

- Tr. 4938 - 4935;

c. All of the exhibits received into evidence which are identified in Appendix A to this Initial Decision.

A chronology of this proceeding is attached as Appendix B.

4

BOARD RAISED ISSUES

, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, Cost Benefit On June 20, 1979, the Board, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.760a and 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix A 1 VIII(b), raised sua sponte the question whether the operation of Zimmer would comply with Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 (Tr. 781). The facility will comply with l

Appendix I dose levels (Tr. 2937,2967,2938,2947,2969,2971). The Board has reviewed 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I and the Connission's underlying decision (CLI-75-5, 1 NRC 277 [1975]) and concludes that the Commission's intent is to afford plants in the category of Zimmer more latitude than newer plants in meeting the "as-low-as-reasonably-achievable" standard. Plants such as Zimmer, i.e.,those for which an application was filed prior to January 2,1971, are not bound by the guides on design objectives contained in Section II.D. However, if the plant can voluntarily meet the design objectives which are intended for newer plants, i.e.,Section II.A-C, and demonstr e compliance with the Annex to Appendix I which is a more stringent demonstration than would otherwise be required, the Board sees no reason why such standards e

should not be applicable. The Applicants have so committed themselves Tr.(783,786-88).

On June 26, 1979, the Board sua sponte raised questions related to whether scheduling of certain operations could result in a favorable cost-benefit ratio:

a. With respect to the cost-benefit balance con-templated by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Sec-tion II.D., the Board wishes to be advised whether scheduling of releases from non-continuous sources (i.e., the mechanical vacuum pump and the dry well purge) could effect reductions in man-rem and/or man-thyroid-rem dose to the population reason-ably expected to be within 50 miles of the reactor. In this context population includes but is not limited to school children; tran-sients should be included. By scheduling of releases, the Board has in mind:

1. time: day / night for the dry well purge and variation of days (e.g.,

weekends / weekdays / seasons) for both the dry well purge and the operation of the mechanical vacuum pump. In other words, in this analysis the parties should take into account the l

number of people at various direc-tions and distances from the plant site at night versus the day and on weekends versus week days.

I

2. If a reduction in population dose may be achieved by one or more of the .

scheduling methods referenced above, either alone or in combination, the Board wishes to be further apprised of the cost thereof; in doing an esti-mate with respect to dry well purge, the parties may wish to segregate purges which may be rescheduled with little or no difficulty or expense from those where greater difficulty or expense is entailed. (Tr. 1428-29.)

4

-r--- . - _ -

Applicants' response to these questions follows Tr. 2937, Staff's Tr. 2967. Based on these responses, the Board concludes that

~

scheduling releases from the dry well and mechanical vacuum pump would make an insignificant contribution to reduction of radiation doses expected to be received by the population in the area of the Zimmer facility. Scheduling of releases according to time and wind direction is not beneficial because of the infrequent occurrence of very favor-able wind conditions and the small magnitude of the reduction of the population dose to be achieved by such scheduling. Considering these facts and recognizing the flexibility of operation contemplated by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, the Board concludes that no limitation in operation beyond that presently contemplated by Appendix I for inclu-sion in the Technical Specifications is appropriate.

Pressure Testing of Doors During the May 1979 prehearing conference, an affidavit executed by Robert Anderson, an ironworker who was employed to install and pressure check watertight doors at the Zimer site, was submitted to the Board. The affidavit stated that during pressure testing -

10 watertight doors leaked between the concrete and the door frame imbedded into the concrete. (Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel Regarding the Pressure Testing of Doors, following Tr.1643).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.760a this Board raised as a poten-tially serious safety matter the allegations contained in Mr. Ander-son's affidavit and requested the Staff to present evidence upon this matter. The Staff did so (Id., Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel Regarding Pressure Testing of Doors . . ., following Tr. 3140). The

v .

=

Board concludes that the Staff's investigation was adequate and that no further action is called for.

Nuts and Bolts for the Traveling Screen During the June, 1979, hearings, an affidavit was submitted to the Licensing Board alleging that stainless steel nuts and bolts were not used in the installation of the " drag line" as was required.

The Board raised- this issue pursuant to 10 CFR 2.760a. Staff reviewed the matter on a site visit. Staff determined that the term

" drag line" refers to the set of traveling screens installed in the water intake structure, non-safety related equipment. The Board concludes that the Staff's investigation of this matter was adequate cnd that no further action is called for (Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel Regarding . . . Use of Improper Bolts for the Travelling Screen, following Tr. 3140). ,

~

Alleged Electrical Deficiencies 4 4 On June 29, 2979, MVPP submitted an affidavit of an elec-trician alleging that electrical problems and/or possible problems existed in seven areas. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.760a we raised this matter as a Board issue. Staff investigated and testified that while some of the allegations related to safety components, these had been previously identified and analyzed by the NRC or the Applicants, or both (Direct Testimony of Jack Hughes and Thomas E. Vandel Regarding Electrical Deficiencies, Tr. 3116). The Board concludes that the Staff investigation was adequate and that no further action is called for.

i l

=

w Unresolved Safety Issues The board has reviewed the staff's analysis of unresolved safety issues in the Safety Evaluation Report (Staff's Exh. 9 at Appendix C.)

Although none of these issues are in controversy they must be examined by the board. (Virginia Electric & Power Company [ North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1&2], ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 [1978]).

We believe that these generic issues can be resolved and that the Zinner facility can operate safely pending final resolution of all of these issues.

We find that the staff's analysis reflects current views and is a suitable foundation for our conclusion that they can be resolved without risk to safety.

OPINION In the following opinion, the Board will discuss each of the contentions heard, explain to the extent necessary why the facts with respect to each contention have been found as they have, and rule on each contention.

Contention 1 (alleging failure to meet the design objectives of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 because of the storage of spent fuel on site), those portions of Contention 2 which were not withdrawn (alleging that Applicants' radiological monitoring program is inadequate),

and Contention 5 (asserting a lack of plans to train the local populace J

9

cy -

4-with respect to transportation accidents of shipments of radioactive materials), all sponsored by Dr. Faukhauser, were summarily disposed of favorably to Applicants.

Contention 11 (alleging a lack of a need for the facility) and Contention 12 (alleging a lack of sufficient fuel supply), both sponsored by MVPP, were also sunnarily disposed of favor-ably to Applicants. (See unpublished Prehearing Conference Order of June 4, 1979, unpublished Memorandum and Order of February 4, 1982, and L8P-81-2, 13 NRC 36 [1981].)

Contention 2(a) (alleging a lack of provisions for radio-logical monitoring at the Moscow School, adjacent to the site) was withdrawn by Dr. Fankhauser in light of the fact that the school had been closed. Similarly, Dr. Fankhauser also withdrew Contentions 2(d) and 3 (relating to radiological monitoring petaining to the City of Cincinnati's drinking water supply) in light of the settlement agree-ment between Applicant and the City. Dr. Fankhauser also withdrew Contention 4(a) (relating to emergency notification) because it was no longer relevant. (See Settlement Agreement of' October 30,1981, and unpublished Prehearing Conference Order of November 5, 1981.) Dr.

Fankhauser was permitted to revise the remainder of Contention 4 in light of extensive developments with respect to offsite emergency planning since it was filed. Revised Contention 4 was denied admission in our unpublished Prehearing Conference Order of December 3, 1981, except for Contention 4(12), (relating to the document " Circle of Safety") which was consolidated with ZAC-ZACK Contention 23(3).

Dr. Fankhauser's Contention 6 (alleging that the doses received by the school children attending the Moscow Elementary School would exceed those permissible under Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50) j was heard. Subsequent to that hearing, this school was closed (Tr. )

i 4246-47,4663). The contention is moot and accordingly we have not ,

l made findings on it.

Contentions 7 through 10 and 18 and 19 (pertaining to the City of Cincinnati's water supply) were withdrawn pursuant to settle-ment between the City and Applicants (settlement agreement of Octo-ber 30, 1981; unpublished Prehearing Conference Order of November 5, 1981). ,

Contention 13 (relating to Applicants' financial qualifica-tions) advanced by MVPP, was heard, together with certain Board questions based on it. Subsequently, on March 24, 1982 (47 Fed. Reg. 13750, March 31, 1982) the Comission amended its ,

regulations to eliminate the issue of an electric utility's financial qualifications from consideration in licensing proceedings such as this.

The Statement of Considerations for this final rule clearly states the Commission's intention tht this rule be applied to pending proceedings.

Applicants pointed this out in their proposed findings and subsequently joined in an unopposed Staff motion to dismiss this contention for this reason. We concur with Applicants and Staff. The Commission has l'

clearly indicated that no consideration is to be given to the financial qualifications of an electric utility applicant. Consequently we have made no findings on Contention 13 and hereby grant Staff's motion to dismiss.

i

MVPP CONTENTION 14 (Adequacy of Welds on Cable Tray Transition Fittings)

This controversy stems from a letter written by Mr. Edwin Hofstadter, a former employee of Burndy-Husky (manufacturer of the cable trays) and Miami Valley Power Project's witness, of August 1978, to the Public Interest Research Group. This letter, which prompted NRC's Region III to initiate an investigation, raised concerns about the strength of the materials used to fabricate the cable trays and the competency of the welders who assembled and welded the trays.

In the course of the investigation, Region III inspectors interviewed Mr. Hofstedter in person and by telephone on several occasions. These interviews are detailed in Report No. 50-358/78-21 -

which is attached to the Staff's testimony on this contention following Tr. 1643.

Contention 14 did not challenge the strength of the materials used to fabricate the cable trays and fittings. Instead, it focused on the qualifications of the welders and the quality of the welds they produced, particularly as they might have been affected by the incen-tive system employed by Husky. Mr. Hofstadter was Miami Valley's principal witness, although they. also offered another witness, Mr. Spievack, who had visited the Husky plant shortly before the manual welding was begun on the fittings.

Consideration of this contention must focus principally on Mr. Hofstadter's testimony, and some background with regard to his

relationship with Husky is therefore appropriate. Mr. Hofstadter was employed by Husky frcm rebruary 1973 until August 1978 when he was let go apparently as the result of a general directive to Husky from its parent corporation to reduce costs. According to Mr. Hofstadter, his responsibilities generally included performing estimates with regard to new orders, acquiring the necessary tooling and equipment to carry them out, and specifying the processes to be used. As a part of these responsibilities, Mr. Hofstadter was required to obtain the necessary

' welding procedure qualification records and to ensure that the welders who would weld to these procedures were properly qualified and certified.

Also by way of background, Husky received the order to produce the Zimmer cable trays and fittings in late 1973 or 1974, and the manual welding of the fittings (which is in issue) began in November 1974.

With regard to the qualification and certification of the welders, Mr. Hofstadter's con.cerns, as amplified on cross-examination, center on two areas: first, that certain welders were tested and certified prior to the qualification of the procedure, and second, that certain welder qualification tests had not been properly witnessed.

The record indicates that standards of American Society of Mechanical Engineers adopted by Husky for the qualification of welding procedures and certification of welders are:

l l .. .

(1) The welding procedure must be qualified. Qualification is deter-mined on the basis of a procedure qualification test, which is per-formed by a welder; (2) A new welder must pass a performance test following the approved welding procedure.

A welder who performs the procedure qualification test, which is approved, also passes his performance qualification test. No work may be done by a welder until both the procedure qualification test and the performance qualification tests have been passed. All parties accept this interpretation.

There is disagreement on whether a welder may take a test to demonstrate his qualification in a new procedure prior to receipt of the results of the procedure test. Applicants and Staff assert that he may, and that he may then be certified on receipt of favorable results from both tests. MVPP maintains favorable results of the procedure test must be received prior to any test of a welder's qualifications, although this point is not clearly made in its proposed findin,)s.

The Staff's testimony, as well as Mr. Spievack's testimony makes it clear that the welding procedure qualification test need not be completed and approved prior to the testing of the welders who will use that procedure. If the procedure qualification test is satisfac-torily completed, welders tested prior to receipt of those results can be certified, assuming their satisfactory completion of their test.

Two welders and the tungsten inert gas (TIG) procedure had not been qualified prior to work on the cable trays as they should have been. However, in light of the routine inspections given the trays, the subsequent qualification of the welders, and the fact that these

requirements were imposed by Husky rather 'han NRC and are not safety related, we do not believe this oversight is significant.

None of the parties addressed Mr. Hofstadter's second l concern, the witnessing of qualification tests, in their proposed findings. Examination of the record on this contention indicates that it is not cause for concern.

We have found that the record does not support the allegation that Hui 97~s incentive system promoted bad welding practices. While MVPP's proposed findings 'on this subject may generally reflect the testimony with respect to the problems which may be posed by attempting I

to weld at a high rate of speed, particularly if one is not a profi-

/

cient welder, the record does not support the allegation that these

( problems in fact occurred with respect to the cable tray transition f .

! fittings.

A good deal of testimony was devoted to the safety signific-ance of the cable trays. Mr. Hofstadter's concern stems from his belief that the trays were overloaded. His concern arose from a visit to the station when he observed that the tray's were. filled, some to the point that they required the addition of side pieces to prevent the cables from spilling out. Mr. Hofstadter was also concerned about the transition fittings which direct the cables from horizontal to verti-cal. These fittings were the only ones manually welded and hence the ones in issue at the hearing.

We have not made findings with rr. gard to these concerns because we have found that the record does not support the allegation 9

that-the cable tray transition fittings were improperly welded. We also note here our conclusion that these concerns are ill-founded.

First, the evidence reflects that the loading of trays is determined by weight, not volume, that the degree of loading is monitored by computer, and that the trays are not overloaded.

Second, the weight of the cables at the point of their transition from horizontal to vertical is not borne by the transition fittings. Rather, it is borne by the building structure itself. This is accomplished by the use of so-called "Kellum Grips" which attach to the cable on one end and the building on the other. These grips are connonly used by electric utilities. Thus, if the cable trays and transition fittings were to disappear, the cables would remain in place to perform their intended function.

Third, testimony addressed the effect of the breaking of a weld. It was assumed that the weld, when broken, would present a jaggcd edge which could conceivably cut a cable, particularly if the cable were to jump when energized. However, the testimony established that the cables, being three-phase and bound in the same sheath, will not jump whan energized. Similarly, the evidence established that the

-possibility that a weld might break and cut a cable in the course of l

some other event, such as a fire or earthquake, was not a hazard. In such an event, the circuit breakers installed on the cables would trip, cutting off the electrical current and preventing a fire.

We hold that the record amply supports a finding in Appli-c' ants' favor on this contention.

l

MVPP CONTENTION 15 (Dimensions of Control Rod Blades)

The issues identified in this Contention as well as Conten-tion 16 come from the testimony of Mr. Thomas Dean Martin, a mill-wright temporarily employed by Reactor Controls, Inc. (RCI), a firm engaged by the Applicants to conduct on-site inspections of control rods and other safety-related equipment. Mr. Martin tarked for RCI from May, 1978 until September, 1978. He was assigned the task of uncrating, handling and inspecting control rods after they a'rrived at the plant. During his inspections he was required to make a number of thickness measurements of the control rod blades and found what he believed to be a failure of the manufacturer to meet design specifications.

The control rods are cruciform in cross-section, formed of four blades at right angles, each nominally 0.280-inch thick. Each blade is a flat package with an outer stainless steel sheath filled with boron carbide (an efficient neutron absorber). Each control rod unit of four blades slides up and down within the water-filled spaces between four control rods; hence the crucifonn shape. The rods are supported so they can be inserted freely if desired to create a " scram" or rapid shut-down. Blade thickness is critical only if it exceeds 0.320-inch over a length of one foot. During inspection a clamp is used on oversized rods, to see if they can be reduced to 0.280-inch thickness with a pressure less than 40 pounds per square inch. Such rods will perform properly in service and are acceptable.

About 75% of the control rods Mr. Martin measured exceeded a thickness of 0.280 inches. Later they were reneasured after a clamp was installed at points which exceeded the 0.280 inch thickness. The clamps imposed a 40-pound pressure upon the blade and in most cases brought the thickness below the 0.280 inch limit. Martin may have believed that the procedure of clamping during measurement violated specifications because the blades returned to their original thickness when the clamps were removed. Martin also believed that a second pro-cedure used to test for bowing, which enployed a gauge that measured 1-foot long segments of the rods and which permitted a thickness of no more than 0.320 of an inch, was inadequate.

He observed foreign particles on the rods which he felt were not removed by cleaning procedures. He was concerned that these would obstruct free movement of the rods when they were inserted into the core.

Martin beliaved that all these supposed defects constituted a safety hazard and could prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. He test-ified that he reported all of these defects to a QA/QC inspector but that corrective action was not taken before rods were installed in the reactor. He also believes that his complaints regarding these defects led to premature termination of his employment with RCI.

In tha Board's considertion of Mr. Martin's testimony, we determined that his complaints were ill-founded because (1) he did not understand the basis for the specifications and requirements which must be met by inspections, and (2) he could not correctly appraise the effects of the supposed defects upon the operation of the reactor.

The allegedly improper measurement of high spots with a 40-lb. clamp in place was shown to be a procedure designed to see if the blades had sufficient elasticity to be compressed to the desired 0.280 inch thickness under the pressure they would experience during actual operation and do so without creating undue friction.

There was a basis for some confusion regarding these tests because Mr. Martin was first told to crate rods having a thickness greater than 0.280 inches for return to the manufacturer and later told to unpack the rods and reneasure them with the clamps installed. He may have interpreted this as failure to meet specifications. Staff testimony revealed that clamping was in accord with G.E. procedures.

The 0.280 dimension does not represent a maximum design requirement for blade thickness, but rather a checkpoint at which the design engineer wished to be consulted.

Martin's concerns regarding the validity of the testing procedure for bowing using the one-foot long 0.320 envelope gauge were also poorly founded. He apparently did not understand how measurements within the limits of this gauge permitted only an amount of misalignment less than the water, gap (the space between the rod and its containment).

Martin's observation of foreign particles on the control rods was confirmed by the Staff; however, he apparently misunderstood their operational significance. Staff inspectors identified these flecks as mater.ial from spot welding. Even if clean-up procedures undertaken l after the particles were discovered failed to remove them, there was no basis for Martin's belief that these particles might impede insertion

I of the control rods. The Staff's opinion, after analysis, was that these flecks posed no operational safety problem even if they were not removed. We find their opinion persua'sive.

At the Board's suggestion, the Staff also investigated the possibility that the chamfering of the ledge in the corner of the control rod blades at the top of the velocity limiter might have resulted in metal chips being left inside the control rod blades (Direct Testimony of Federico A. Maura Regarding Metal Chips in Control Rods, folowing Tr. 3497). The Board concurs in the Staff's opinion that any chips which conceivably were left in the control rod blades do not present a safety concern.

The central issue in this Contention was the on-site clarifi-cation of inspection procedures which gave the appearance of a compro-mise on safety and quality. The Board notes that control rods which deviated from the norm were accepted only after consultation with manu-facturers had established that these deviations posed no threat to operations or safety. In the case of six rods which failed to pass the 0.280-inch gauge with the clamp attached, the procedure was clarified to permit the clamp to be placed directly on the high spot. These six rods were then found acceptable. They were later inspected by NRC inspectors on the basis of tne c'arified procedure and approved. Additionally, functional testing of rod operation will occur during pre-operational testing of the reactor. This should identify any defects impacting safety.

The Board finds that the defects noted by Martin have no operational or safety significance. Contention 15 is without merit.

l i

l MVPP CONTENTION 16 (Smoothness of Control Rod Seals)

The issue of Contention 16, like Contention 15, arose from concerns of Mr. Martin during his employment as a millwright at the Station. Martin's complaint in this Contention is with the quality of i inspection for smoothness of a section of control rods identified as a seal, but also referred to as a machined surface on the control rod bottom casting velocity limiter. This machined surface is designed to make a metal.-to-metal seal between the rod and its guide tube when the control rod drive unit is removed for repair. At this time, and only at this time, it serves to prevent leakage of radioactive water from the reactor.

Martin testified that he was required to inspect this surface of some of the seals for roughness. He alleges that a smoothness com-parator was not used in inspecting about half of the seals; thus they were not properly inspected. He found that the seals he inspected with a comparator did not meet the required, standard of smoothness. Thus he concluded the seals did not meet technical specifications and consti-tuted a threat to safety.

The record fails to substantiate Mr. Martin's testimony.

Mr. Kananen, a quality control inspector for RCI denied that mill-wrights played a part in the inspection of these seals. He also testified that he and an associate, Mr. Parla, had inspected all the seals using the comparator and found that all except one, which was scratched, met the required standard.

When questioned about his role in inspection, Mr. Martin's answers left some doubt whether he fully understood (1) the location of these seals on the control rods, (2) the inspection requirements, and (3) the function of the seals in the reactor.

A Staff inspector who had inspected some of these seals testified that use of a comparator was not required in the inspection at the site. 'The site inspection is designed to reveal possible shipping damage. The seals were inspected for smoothness and correct dimensions prior to shipment. These scals are not designed to be water tight but may allow a small amount of leakage.

As in Contention 15, the Board finds Mr. Martin's claims ill-founded and can see no basis for questioning either the quality of the control rods or their ability to function properly in the reactor.

The Board finds Contention 16 to be without merit.

MVPP CONTENTION 17 l

( Adequacy of Fire Insulation Materials for Electrical Cables) t i This contention concerns the adequacy of the insulation material used to protect electrical cables in the plant in case of fire. These cables are conveyed in trays and the trays are wrapped in insulation material to protect the cables so that they will continue to carry their electrical load in the event of fire. This insulation material is only one of a number of fire protection devices in the

plant. Many other protection, prevention and suppression devices and procedures are utilized to lessen the fire hazard to cables.

The insulating material used is a ceramic fiber material manufactured by Babcock and Wilcox under the trade name "Kaowool". l Blankets of the material are wrapped around the cable trays in such a way as to protect the trays from heat for a period of 90 minutes. This time period is considered adequte since the Staff has concluded that most fires could be extinguished within 15 minutes.

The Intervenor, MVPP, did not present evidence on this contention. The tests which provided.the basis for the Applicant's claim that this material will provide adequate protection for cables l

were carried out by Portland Cement Association Construction Technology l

Laboratory in 1979. These tests utilized cable and cable trays similar in quality and in configuration to those employed at Zimmer. Tests were in accord with ASTM standards and were believed to represent conditions more severe than postulated at Zimmer. The cables with '

stood the imposed heat without failure of electrical circuits for 90 minutes.

I The testing satisfied Staff requirements for protection and qualified the material as a thermal barrier for cable trays. Nothing developed in the record casts doubt upon the adequacy of these tests.

The heat generated by the electrical load within the trays and the degree to which the trays were to be filled were taken into considera-tion but were found to be negligible factors.

We find that Contention 17 is without merit. '

_ 24 Offsite Emergency Planning General Considerations Orfsite emergency planning considerations potentially present situations which may not be well suited to NRC adjudications. It became clear in this case that certain traditional ways of proceeding -

simply were not applicable because of the differing roles of the Appli-cants and NRC Staff, the appearance as at least a dji facto party of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA"), and the real if not actively represented interests of the state and local governments.

Offsite emergency planning issues are crucial to the granting of this operating license. Yet they are issues over which these Applicants have little, if any, direct control. Only with respect to the Evacuation Time Study prepared under Applicants' direction and certain communications issues about which Applicants' witness had direct personal knowledge did Applicants' testimony amount to more than a restatement of information already contained in the emergency plans or otherwise readily available. Applicants' witnesses simply did not have knowledge regarding the details and problems of plan -

implementation raised by most of the contentions.

l 1

l l

l

\

We mean no criticism of Applicants' witnesses on this score.

We fully recognize that while they have a very real interest in these issues, they have no direct control over them and consequently were not in a position to address the issues in the detail in which they were presented. The following exchange indicates the problem:

Q [DR. HOOPER] You first made the decision that you were going to have these relocation centers and then decided what the evacuation routes would be, is that your testimony?

A [ WITNESS FICKE] The County selected the relocation centers, yes.

Q Then you were sort of locked in, so to speak, by the County on your evacuation routes, were you not?

A Well, they are the county's evacuation routes.

A [ WITNESS 80RGMANN] Or. Hooper, may I make a coment here? Maybe I can shed some light on this. I think maybe there is some misunderstanding as to the util-ity's role in these plans. We were the catalyst to get the people together, but under this 0654 it's the off-site planner's responsibility -- in this case the County of Clermont and the State of Ohio. We were not ,

involved in the selection of evacuation routes or centers or anything else.

Q Well, I'm just trying to get some information here. I'm not arguing the matter of responsibility. I want to find i out some information on how the thing got generated.

l A Okay, I was just trying to explain we were not really involved other than in a coordinating role to see that something was being done which met 0654.

Tr. 5865-66.

Similarly, the NRC Staff, although aggressively represented by counsel, had very little testimony to contribute. Staff offered a

transportation expert who testified on his conclusions with respect to Applicants' evacuation time study. Another Staff member addressed the appropriateness of the boundaries of the plume exposure EPZ,and the Director of the Division of Emergency Preparedness, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, testified generally without specifically addressing any of the contentions.

The role usually taken by the Staff was assumed by FEMA.

FEMA furnished witnesses who addressed the contentions in prefiled testimony, attended all the hearing sessions, and testified at length.

FEMA's review of the offsite plans was far from complete at the time of the hearing. Its witnesses were no more able to address the contentions than were Applicants' witnesses. Except for a few areas, such as gene.ral considerations governing evacuation during floods and similar natural disasters where at least one witness had had extensive prior non-government experience, these witnesses lacked the knowledge and involvement with the plans which would enable them to address the details and problems of plan implementation raised by the contentions.

Counsel for ZAC-ZACK, in his argument in support of a motion to strike the FEMA testimony, accurately summed up the problem as follows:

Whether we are considering it from the standpoint of the obligations, the duty, the responsibilities, what you will, that [are] imposed upon FEMA by law and their agreement with the NRC Regulatory Commis-

, sion or we view it from the standpoint of 0654 or what I would suggest would be a combination of them all, these witnes'ses laid no foundation [for] an opinion and it's to that extent the probative value issue is raised.

Their opinion obviously has probative value if there is some foundation actually for the opinion, not a guess, not a hunch or when I glanced at it and compared it with the guideline, the check list and'0654, everything seemed to be all right.

I don't think we're here for that kind of determination.

Following or flowing from that is if we have no factual basis for the quasi-opinion or the opinion, as you will, for which I deem these individuals to be obligated, then we have no probative value what-soever to that opinion. We can simply stretch out a number of opinions that look fine to me, it's adequate, it presents. reasonable assurance.

Ne spent a number of days trying to find out how they came to those [ opinions] and of tentimes felt we were going in gigantic circles, only to come back to the point of beginning and to constantly engender a constant theme of oh, yes, there is assurance; yes, these are adequate; yes, these are capable of being implemented, but never a single, solitary factor to support that was ever presented.

Tr. 7923-24.

We denied the motion to strike the FEMA testimony on the ground that the objection went more to weight than aamissibility. In making our findings of fact, we relied on the FEMA testimony only on the following points: school bus drivers are considered emergency response personnel; volunteers generally tend to respond in emergencies; people generally tend to follow instructions in

- 28 emergencies; and certain facts regarding water monitoring. Similably, we note that Staff seemed to avoid relying on FEMA testimony in its proposed findings.

This leaves the testimony of the state and local officials and the Intervenors. The former group of witnesses, although we had requested sponsorship by Applicants and 2.715(c) participants,were presented as Board witnesses, and the emergency plans are Board exhibits.

We found both groups of witnesses to be knowledgeable and forthright, although the breadth of subjects which Intervenors' witnesses could address was necessarily more limited. In making our findings, we have relied primarily on these two groups of witnesses.

The findings address only those contentions on which intervenors submitted proposed findings. Consistent with 10 CFR 2.754(b), we treat those contentions for which ZAC-ZACK has not submitted findings as having been abandoned. This is consistent with ZAC-ZACX's practice in the course of prehearing procedures and the hearing of abandoning contentions which it apparently felt it could not support. There is one exception to this: when a contention was abandoned after Applicants' response indicated that appropriate action would be taken to alleviate the problems identified in the contention, we have included a finding in order to support a license condition.

4 - n n n e - --

CONTENTION 20 X (Portions of Brown County, Ohio, Should be Included in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ.)

The Commission's regulations provide that: '

[t]he exact ~ size and configuration of the EPZ sur-rounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.

10 CFR 50.47(c)(2).

The eastern boundary of the plume exposure EPZ in Ohio is the boundary of Clermont and Brown Counties. At its closest point, this boundary is slightly in excess of ten miles from the station. The record is devoid of any evidence that conditions exist, such as those enumerated in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), whici. would dictate the inclusion of portions of Brown County in the plume exposure EPZ. The Staff's evidentiary presentation on this topic is persuasive (Tr. 6872-76.)

A substantial amount of ZAC-ZACK's efforts with respect to this contention were devoted to showing that the evacuation routes and relocation centers selected by Clemont County to serve the eastern portion of the plume exposure EPZ wre inappropriate. As presented at the hearing, the County's evacuation routes were entirely confined to Clermont County, thus ignoring superior routes which lead into Brown County. The selected routes, if followed, bring one to relocation centers in Northern Clermont County, although potential relocation centers exist in Brown County.

ZAC-ZACK was successful with respect to the evacuation routes. As a result of its efforts, the county and state planners adopted additional routes leading through Brown County to the reloca-tion centers in Northern Clermont. These additional routes provide for evacuation radially from the plume exposure EPZ; the original routes provided for evacuation only in a northerly direction. We have adopted a license condition reflecting these additional routes.

ZAC-ZACK was unable to convince these planners of the desir-ability of establishing relocation centers in Brown County. Although they reconsidered the matter, the state planners did not choose to seriously explore the possibility of using certain identified school facilities in Brown County as relocation centers. The principle advan-tage of the Brown County facilities is their proximity to Eastern Clermont County; their disadvantages are their increased distance from the source of supply for relocation centers, and the lack of a formal county emergency response organ'ization in Brown County.

While on balance the establishment of relocation centers in t Brown County to serve the Eastern Clermont population might be prefer-able to the existing plan, that plan clearly is not inadequate or incapable of implementation on that score. Consequently we deny Con-l tention 20 X. The contentions originally advanced by ZAC-ZACK which focused on Brown County (which were denied without prejudice to resub-mittal in the event ZAC-ZACK was successful on Contention 20 X) are therefore unconditionally denied. ,

l

Nonetheless we urge the Ohio planners to again consider the establishment of relocation centers in Brown County if and when Brown County establishes a formal emergency response organization.

Problems Associated with the Evacuation of Schools in Clermont and Campbell Counties (Contentions 20(b)(5) & (6); 21(c)(1) A (3), (4);

21(d)(1) - (4); 21(e)(1) - (3); and 36E)

With regard to the affected Clermont and Campbell County schools, these contentions challenge the adequacy of telephone communications, the adequacy of the number of school buses, and the ability to communicate with the school bus drivers while enroute, and during.the period between morning and afternoon routes in order to promptly assemble the buses for evacuation.

The parties and planners all recognize that notification of the affected schools and mobilization of buses to be used to evacuate those schools, should that be necessary, is at present dependent principally on the commercial telephone system. They further recognize that that system, during an emergency, may not be reliable because of extensive use generally in the affected area and heavy parental calling to the schools. To avoid these problems, those opposing Intervenors' position indicate that: first, notice will be given to the schools prior to no'tification of the public in order to permit the schools to implement evacuation procedures while telephone service is available; and second, that in the event telephone service is not available, the

. schools will be notified through NOAA radios and the emergency broadcast system.

The record makes it clear that, once the public is notified of the existence of an emergency, the telephone systems will be overloaded and simultaneously the volume of calls into the schools will increase, further complicating the problem. The emergency plans, in accord with regulatory guidance, all require prompt public notification. All of the population within five miles of the station is to be notified within 15 minutes of the declaration of a site emergency. This leaves too little time to accomplish more than initial notification to the schools prior to public notification, even assuming that no " unusual event" or " alert" had earlier occurred which could lead to extensive telephone use by the public.

Once affected schools have been notified and a decision to evacuate these schools has been made, transportation for the students must be provided. This requires mobilization of school buses and drivers. When not actually transporting students, the buses and drivers are at scattered locations during the day. Plans have not been developed to mobilize the drivers and buses if telephone service is

curtailed or eliminated. Nor have plans been developed to deal with l the problems presented if buses are in the process of transporting students when the decision to evacuate is made.

Campbell County has two schools within four and one-half miles of the Station. Sufficient buses are available at the bus garage to transport the students at these schools, although sufficient bus l .

drivers are not. The next closest schools in Campbell County are nine miles distant.

In Clermont County, sufficient buses are not available to evacuate all the students in the New Richmond school district within the EPZ simultaneously. Inadequate consideration has been given to this problem.

We cannot find that the Clermont and Campbell County plans are adequate or capable of implementation with respect to evacuation of the affected schools. While the problems outlined above and set forth in detail in the findings are soluble, the solutions must be presented on the record prior to full-power operation of the Station.

Volunteer Services (Contentions 20(e)(3) - (4), (7) - (8); 36H)

The contribution of volunteers to a number of essential s

. emergency services was the central issue of these contentions.

Emergency plans of Clermont County and Campbell County require that volunteers perform a variety of services such as fire fighting, door-to-door verification of notification, access control, medical support, and rescue -- these services must be performed.in the EPZ after notification of an emergency thus there may be some risk to personal safety associated with these activities.

The plans do not (1) assess the availability of volunteers during hours in which many are employed outside the EPZ, (2) take into consideration possible personal conflicts in the responses of volunteers who have families within the EPZ, and (3) give consideration to the

. possibility that some volunteers who may perform well in the case of non-nuclear disasters may refuse to participate in a nuclear disaster at Zimmer.

The record is inadequate on the subject of the availability of volunteer personnel. Although a large number of volunteers work outside the EPZ, there are no data on job locations and the time required to travel from their work to join their emergency unit. Some may be close at hand, but others work in Cincinnati and adjoining areas requiring a long travel time. The Board considers this to be a serious but correctable defect.

The record contains a substantial dispute between actual volunteers and their supervisors on one hand and witnesses presented by Ohio, Kentucky, and FEMA on the other as to the performance of volunteers during the stress of an emergency at Zimmer.

Some life squad members testified that they would not participate in a Zimmer emergency. Others testified that they would consider performing an emergency role at Zimmer only after they were certain of the safety of their families. On the other hand, witnesses for Ohio, Kentucky and FEMA who claimed substantial experience in non-nuclear emergencies believed that volunteers respond well during disasters despite risks to themselves.

There is little in the record to give guidance on whether the behavior of volunteers would be different in non-nuclear versus nuclear emergencies. We find the testimony of General Buntin and others who have extensive experience in non-nuclear emergencies to be impressive.

However, we are also mindful of a substantial amount of direct testimony from actual volunteers which indicated that nuclear events regarded differently and they might not respond at all or would do so only after their family's security had been established, in the absence of evidence on this matter the Board takes the view that this controversy can be resolved at least in part simply by establishing some guidelines for the screening of volunteers. Data must be assembled on (1) the work location of volunteers and time needed for response, (2) the number of volunteers with families in the EPZ, and (3) the number who would not respond at all to nuclear emergencies. These data would indicate the need to recruit additional personnel to provide adequate response on a 24-hour basis and give some assurances that assigned volunteers can and will in fact respond when needed.

Some' of the testimony of volunteers indicated that their training for.; nuclear disasters had been incomplete or entirely lacking.

This must be corrected since most volunteers badly need an understanding of radiation effects and protective actions. An adequate training program might in fact alleviate one of the problems cited above; namely volunteers who refuse to serve in nuclear emergencies.

With a better understanding of nuclear events and their associated hazards, they may choose to participate.

4 Ability of Clermont Population to Follow Instructions (Contention 23(1) and (2))

Here as in the preceding contention the central question is whether the public will react in a responsible manner during a nuclear emergency. Testimony from peace officers and officials within Clermont County indicated that the public often does not take proper protective action even though instructed to do so. They often use poor judgment in emergencies. FEMA witnesses, on the other hand, contend that people generally follow directions well during emergencies.

We conclude that some members of the public may not follow instructions. We also conclude that the knowledge of the local law enforcement officers could be valuable to planners in estimating the amount of time (and hence personnel) needed to perform door-to-door verification of notification. This information should be utilized in connection with the information gained in the survey we require with respect to volunteers.

Transportation Dependent Disabled Individuals - Clermont County (Contention 24(10))

Individuals falling within this category are those who are both disabled and require transportation assistance. They are to be identified through the means of a postcard survey. Several agencies were identified as having responsibility to maintain lists of these individuals. Clermont Association for the Physically

)

9

Handicapped / Developmentally Disabled (CAPH/DD) has responsibility for providing transportation with assistance from Clermont Authority for Rural Transportation and possibly the Life Squads and National Guard.

Clear responsibility should be assigned for periodically surveying and maintaining of lists of these individuals. Updated lists should be periodically furnished CAPH/DD so that transportation needs

! can be reassessed from time to time.

Based on the total number of these individuals statistically present in the EPZ (976), CAPH/DD's transportation resources (two buses and one driver) are clearly inadequate. Assistance will be necessary, but the extent of that assistance cannct be predicted in advance of completion of the postcard survey.

We conclude that, once responsibility for surveying and maintaining lists of these individuals is clearly assigned, and transportation needs assessed, that the' plan will adequately provide for the protection of this segment of.;the public.

Monitoring of Farm Products in Clermont County (Contentions 25(3) & (4))

ZAK-ZACK confined its proposed findings on this topic to the problems posed by the necessity for radiological monitoring of goats' milk production in Clermont~ County. However, for the sake of completeness, we have made findings with respect to monitoring of both goats' and cows' milk, l

l

While we have adopted the proposed finding submitted by ZAK-ZACK with some changes, we do not conclude that problems associated with monitoring of goats' milk during an emergency rise to the level of an inadequacy in the plan or its implementation. We do not mean to belittle this serious problem; we note that the State of Ohio has taken notice of it. However, we conclude that provision for a simple warning to the citizens not to drink their goats' milk will adequately protect the public pending the State's evaluation of the problem. Consequently we find the plans adequate on this point.

Inadequacies in Radio Communication in Clermont County (Contention 20(b)(4))

In their prepared testimony, Applicants indicate that they will provide certain radio equipment which will alleviate problems of

" dead spots" in radio communications along U. S. 52. ZAK-ZACK, apparently satisfied with this solution, did not submit a proposed -

finding on this subject. Because we are incorporating Applicants' undertaking as a license condition, we have made an appropriate finding.

" Circle of Safety"

(Contentions 4(12) & 23(3))

" Circle of Safety," is a pamphlet designed to advise the public with respect to radiological and other emergencies and appropriate protective actions.

1 I , '

In their prepared testimony, Applicants agreed with ZAC-ZACK and Dr. Fankhauser that the publication " Circle of Safety" was too difficult to read. They submitted a revised version with their testimony whose readability had been reduced to the seventh-grade level. ZAK-ZACK then dropped its contention, although Dr. Fankhauser pursued his.

Dr. Fankhauser's witness on this subject, an English Professor from a local college, did not quarrel with the level of readability of this publication. Rather, he took the position that i

additional information on the nature of radioactivity and the hazards it poses should be made available to those who seek it. Similarly, additional information should be offered with respect to the services available at relocation centers. This witness testified that information such as the availability of sleeping accommodations and decontanination facilities at relocation centers should be included.

We agree that the availability of more information on radiation hazards would be helpful. However, we do not impose a license condition with respect to this matter.

We conclude that the services available at relocation centers need to be better set out in " Circle of Safety". Readers should be

F informed with respect to the availability of such necessities as food and sleeping accommodations. In particular, readers should be informed with respect to the availability of checks for contamination and decontamination services. We impose an appropriate license condition.

Evacuation Time Study (Contentions 20(c)(1) - (3), (5) - (9),

(10) - (14); 36B, 36C, 360)

At the hearing much evidence was adduced which goes to the question of whether the Evacuation Time Study had correctly calculated the capacities of the identified evacuation routes. This evidence focused on the attributes of those routes which are relevant to their traffic capacity. Applicants' witness Weiss, who supervised the preparation of the Evacuation Time Study, pointed out that in his opinion, route capacity was not a critical factor in the Study because of the low volume of traffic which the routes would have to carry during an evacuation. We conclude that this opinion is correct. While we have adopted some of ZAC-ZACK's proposed findings because they accurately reflect the record, these findings do not call this opinion into question.

Standard Operating Procedures (Contention 34) lhe City of Mentor's Contention 34 asserts that the radiological emergency response plans for both the Commonwealth of

Kentucky and Campbell County are invalid because both of these plans state: "During an emergency, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS),

developed from the plan, will be employed to respond to the emergency rather than this planning document" (Boar,d Ex. 3, Plan Organization, at vi; Board Ex. 5, Basic Plan, Appendix 8, at VII-8-1). Although the Board chose to accept testimony on this contention at the hearing, we have determined that Mentor's challenge to the validity of the Kentucky and Campbell County plans should be addressed as a question of law.

The Staff proposes that we dismiss Mentor's Contention 34 as an impermissible challenge to the validity of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and 10 CFR 50.47. However, Section 50.47 makes no mention of implementing procedures or S0Ps. The Staff's argument is that "10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V specifically requires implementing procedures (SOPS) for onsite emergency plans and, by analogy, for all emergency plans."

We view this section as merely a filing requirement which specifies the dates by which an Applicant must file three copies of any implementing procedures for its on-site emergency plans. Hence we do not agree with the Staff's assertion that we can utilize these requirements regarding on-site planning in interpreting the requirements of Section 50.47 as they relate to off-site plans developed by States and counties. We find Staff's argument that NRC regulations require the use of SOPS to lack merit.

e We similarly find Mentor's argument that the Kentucky and Campbell County plans are invalid because of their utilization of SOPS lacks merit. NUREG-0654 provides, at 29:

The guidance does not specify a single format for emergency response plans but it is important that the means by which all criteria are met be clearly set forth in the plans. . . . Applicable supporting and reference documents and tables may be incorporated by reference, and appendices should be used whenever necessary. The plans should be kept as concise as possible. The average plan should consist of perhaps hundreds of pages, not thousands.

The plans should make clear what is to be done in an emergency, how it is to be done and by whom.

As stated by the Kentucky planners, their purpose in choosing to use SOPS was as a means of providing " additional guidance or specialized functions which have markedly differed from those which are normally conducted" (Tr. 6134; cf. NUREG-0654, s II p.7, P.79). This appears to be in accordance with NUREG-0654's guidance that plans are to be kept as concise as possible and that documents may be incorporated by reference. Contention 34 is therefore dismissed.

Plan for Indiana Ingestion Exposure EPZ (Contention 35)

Contention 35 asserted that there is no Indiana radiological emergency response plan for the portions of the Zimmer Station ingestion exposure pathway located in that state. This contention alleged that the absence of such a plan endangered the health and

-- r -

.c -

safety of the citizens of Mentor. Testimony at the hearing indicated that such a plan existed.

Early in the hearing, the Board had occasion to note that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.33(g), Applicants are obliged to file the ,

Indiana plan. They did so after the close of the record. Later in the hearing, in response to Mentor's frustration at the fact that the FEMA witnesses had no knowledge of the plan, the Board indicated that Mentor might file an appropriate motion or a proposed finding. The Board expected that, at some point after testimony on the first hearing day indicated the existence of the Indiana Plan, a motion would be forthcoming seeking to pursue its adequacy. However, none was filed and we are left with the situation that that point was never placed in issue. Consequently, faced with a contention which asserts the absence of a plan and uncontroverted testimony to the contrary, we must deny the contention.

Public Notification System (Contention 361)

The record indicat's that the prompt notification system will comoly with the applicable regulatory requirements. We do not agree with Mentor that it is significant that testing of the system is to occur after the close of this record. In nuclear licensing cases, it frequently happens that the adequacy of certain systems is litigated in j advance of operational testing; this particular system has not been l

shown to warrant different treatment. Any deficiencies revealed by the operational tests will be corrected prior to operation.

l l

44 -

While we recognize that the Mayor of Mentor has the option of joining the EOC organization and has the authority to order an evacuation of Mentor, we hold that the absence of a means of notifying the Mayor, in addition to the commercial telephone and prompt notification system, does not result in any inadequacy in the Campbell County plan.

Monitoring Kentucky Water Supplies ,

(Contention 36K)

The citizens of Mentor contend that the Campbell County plan does not adequately address the problem of monitoring water supplies in the case of an emergency at Zimmer. Responsibility for monitoring and regulating water supplies lies with the Kentucky Department of Natural ~ Resources and Environmental Protection and this agency has developed procedures for collecting and analysis of water samples in the event of an emergency. These procedures are adequate.

Municipalities whose water supplies come from the Ohio river downstream of the Station are a sufficient distance away from the Station so that ample advance notification of river contamination identified by monitors at the Zimmer site can be given. Intakes from the river can be closed thereby protecting stored supplies of water from contaminated river water. Plans also call for monitoring of contaminated ground water, cisterns and other surface supplies.

In general the procedures that have been e,stablished for monitoring seem to be both timely and adequate for protection of the

public. There are adequate procedures for notification of the public and state agencies of contamination. The record fails to identify any serious deficiencies in the Campbell County plans .'or water monitoring.

We conclude that the plans are adequate.

Relief As set out above and in the findings of fact, the record in this case reveals a number of deficiencies in offsite emergency planning which must be corrected. We conclude that they must be corrected prior to operation of the Station at power levels in excess of 5% of rated power. The applicable regulation does not specifically address this point; it requires that no operating license is to be issued unless a finding is made that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency (10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)) . The regulation goes on to provide, in subsection (c)(1), flexibility to permit operation even though all of the requirements of the regulation have not been met.

In subsection (c)(1), the Commission's clearly stated intent is to permit operation whenever identified deficiencies are not significant. We hold that the deficiencies identified in this record are not significant in the context of low power operation at levels not in excess of 5% of rated power. We base this holding on the fact that, in pursuing their contentions, Intervenors consistently followed the

" worst case" scenario put forwrd by NUREG-0654. This scenario is not a possible occurrence at power levels of less than 5%, a fact recognized by the Commission in promulgating a proposed rule which would formally

eliminate low power licenses from the planning requirements of Section 50.47.

A more difficult question is whether the deficiencies are amenable to correction through a license condition, or whether further on the record proceedings are necessary. The Staff presented the Director of the Division of Emergency Preparedness, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on this point. His constantly recurring theme with respect to this question was sumed up as follows:

The deficiencies identified in the plan, which are related to the contentions, should have clear courses of action identified to remedy those deficiencies. These courses of action should be fairly straightforward in nature and likely to result in correcting the deficiencies.

With this kind of corrective action plan in place, a finding of reasonable assurance on the state of emergency preparedness can be made with respect to those areas in contention, conditioned on the deficiencies being fixed before operation, or before full power is permitted by the Staff.

Tr. 7394.

l We agree with this statement to the extent that, when clear i

courses of corrective action are present, deficiencies may be corrected t

by means of a license condition. The statement does not address the situation when clear courses of action are not present. In that situation, further proceedings are necessary with respect to the l

identified deficiencies. This is consistent with Commission precedent.

The Commission has stated in a similar context:

Our review of the plant security and freezer-dryer issues leads us to discuss the procedure whereby licenses issue

= + ~

after adversary proceedings, while certain issues are left for the staff to resolve following the hearings. As a general propositivn, issues should be dealt with in the hearings and not left over for later (and possibly more informal) resolution. See this Comission's decision in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Unit 2), RAI-73-1,

p. 6. In some instances, however, the unresolved matter is suchthatBoardsareneverthelessablg/omakethefindings t

requisite to issuance of the license._ But the mechanism of post-hearing resolution must not be employed to obviate the basic findings prerequisite to an operating license--including a reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public. 10 CFR 50.57. In short, the " post-hearing" approach should be employed sparingly and only in clear cases. In doubtful cases, the matter should be resolved in an adversary framework prior to issuance of licenses, reopening hearings if necessary.

8] For example, a Board might, after hearing, find an applicant's security plan adequate, except for minor procedural deficiencies. In such a case, the Board could choose to authorize issuance of a license--with the deficiencies to be subsequently cured under the scrutiny of the Director of Regulation.

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2) CLI-74-23, 7 AF.C 947 at 951-2 (1974); cf. Public u Service -

Company of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313 at 318 (1978); Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), Docket No, 50-289, unpublished order dated March 23, 1981, at 6-7. Applying the above precedent to the facts of this case, we hold that the deficiencies identified with respect to the availability and responsibility of volunteers, the transport of disabled individuals, inadequacies in radio comunications, and in the publication " Circle of

Safety" all have clear courses of corrective action. We have therefore adopted license conditions to deal with these deficiencies.

Two problems remain. The first of these pertains to evacuation of the Clermont and Campbell County Schools. Our findings reflect the complexity of this problem. Were we to adopt a license condition to deal with this deficiency, we would be forced to dictate a solution to the problem. This is wholly inappropriate. We are charged with making findings with respect to the adequacy of plans, not writing plans. Nor could we effectively discharge the responsibility of writing plans. This must be accomplished by the state and local officials who are intimately famil,iar with the situation. While we are confident that solutions to this problem are available, these officials are aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the various solutions and hence able to arrive at .the optimum solution. Further proceedings are necessary on this issue before we will authorize the issuance of an operating license.

The second problem involves the so-called final FEMA finding.

l This case proceeded to hearing in advance of this finding in order to accommodate Applicants' projected fuel loading date of July, 1982. ,

Immediately following the hearing, the Applicants advised that their projection had slipped to December, 1982.

In order to accommodate Applicants' fuel load date, ZAC-ZACK and the City of Mentor complied with rigorous schedules without complaint, and proceeded to hearing only to find that FEMA was unprepared to address their specific contentions.

These contentions (ZAC-ZACK's were conditionally admitted in July 1980) were specified in voluminous detail on November 12 and 13, 1991 and formally admitted on November 25, 1981, two months prior to hearing. These intervenors did not follow the pattern often followed by intervenors opposing the licensing of a plant. Delay clearly was not an objective. The contentions themselves represent the sincere concerns of the community, concerns which we have found in many instances to be well founded. Throughout this proceeding many points raised in the contentions were found to require some action or further consideration by the Applicants and the state and local planners. For example, Applicants' response to contentions on the publication " Circle -

of Safety" and inadequate radio communicaions has been detailed. The State of Ohio has agreed to review certain questions of state law raised by ZAC-ZACK. It has also indicated that certain testimony filed by ZAC-ZACK has exposed problems which, if cleared up, will immensely benefit the entire state (Tr. 5141). And it has revised the Clermont County evacuation routes.

Given this situation, this Board is appalled by the inability of FEMA to respond to the contentions. These citizens deserve far better from the government agency with responsibility to protect them than they have received. -

In considering appropriate relief, we are reminded of the basis upon which Applicants urged hearing the contentions in advance of the final FEMA finding:

Certainly, as we have emphasized both prior to this hearing and, I believe, last week and perhaps even this week, that if there are significant new developments, first the Applicants or the Staff or FEMA, as appr.opriate, would have to bring that to the attention of the Licensing Board and the parties, and that Mr. Dennison and his clients and Mrs. Webb and her client would be given the opportunity to make appropriate motions with regard to the resumption of these hearings as these significant changes might affect their contentions in this proceeding.

Tr. 7050-51.

We will not authorize an operating license for this facility until at least so much of the final FEMA findings that relate to the contentions admitted on November 25, 1981, and the Staff's supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report related to those findings, have been filed and served on the parties and the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to assess their impact on the admitted contentions and this Initial Decision. ,

In making the findings of fact and conclusions of law which follow, the Board considered the entire record of the proceeding and all of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties. Each of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which is not incorporated directly or inferentially in this Initial Decision is rejected as being unsupported in law or fact or as being unnecessary to the rendering of this decision.

l l

1 FINDINGS OF FACT

, Contention 14 MVPP Cable trays containing electrical wires have been inade-quately welded by improperly qualified welders, contrary to NRC regulations. More specifically, three piece verticals and two piece channels.were welded by people not fully ASME certified. These welders were not consistently able to produce a quality weld with good fusion, a situation aggravated by Husky Product's incentive system which induced quick blasting techniques to be employed. Further disregarding standard procedures production welding techniques and test welding techniques were not identical. Any meaningful inspection.of the crucial three piece vertical welds is impossible because the trays have been galvanized. Therefore, the existing system of cable trays must be dismantled and a new set, welded by fully certified welders, installed.

1. At the Zimmer Station, cable trays are utilized to separate and direct the routing of electrical. cables (necessary to the proper functioning of the station). Support for both the electrical cables and the cable trays is provided by seismically designed hangars, attached to the structure. The trays, therefore, are not essential to support the electrical cables. (Vandel and Wescott-Cable Tray Welding fol. Tr.1643 at 8 [ hereinafter Staff Cable Tray Testimony].)

2. Cable trays used in the Zimer facility were manufactured by Burndy-Husky Incorporated of Florence, Kentucky, and consist of three types of trays. First, a three piece straight tray usbd horizontally, having two side channels welded to a corrugated bottom plant. Second, a three piece vertical tray utilized in straight vertical runs having two side channels welded to a flat plate for the back of the tray.

These trays are welded by an automatic resistance spot-welding machine.

Third, fittings to provide transition of cable routing from horizontal to verticle, known as T-sections. These transition trays may have either single piece side channels or three separate pieces joined by manual welding, utilizing the tungsten inert gas (TIG) process. The 4

fillet welds are approximately one-inch long and are spaced every two to three inches along the welded joint. These side channels are then spot welded to a corrugated solid bottom plate. This welding is done by either a resistance spot welding machine or by semiautomatic metal inert gas (MIG) process as necessary (Staff Cable Tray Testimony at 7-8).

3. Cable trays for the Zimmer Station were manufactured in accordance with a quality assurance (QA) program approved by the Applicants (Tr. 990,1104-05). Cable trays at Zimmer are not required .

to be ASME Class 1 (Tr. 1097), and there is consequently no ,

requirement for " certification" of welders. Nonetheless, each Husky welder was required by the QA program to have a qualification test to .

establish his competence for the type of welds made on Zimmer cable

! trays (Banta, Borgmann & Schwiers - Cable Tray Testimony fol. Tr. 985 at 1 [ hereinafter Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony];'Tr. 987). As a separate matter, the welding procedure used on the cable trays also had to be qualified (Tr. 1759-61).

4. Each welding procedure and each welder therefore should have undergone a prior qualification test required for each position and process involved in the production of the cable tray transition l

l fittings. An internal audit by Burndy-Husky revealed that the TIG l

procedure and two welders had not been so qualified. These welders were qualified in August 1975 and March 1976. They had welded transition fittings sometime during 1974. (Tr. 1044-45; Staff Cable Tray Test. at 11; Tr. 1767.) Their welds were subjected to Husky quality control (QC) procedures (Tr. 1091-92).

5. The evidence does not support the allegations that the welders were not consistently able to produce a quality weld with good fusion.

a. NRC's Chicago Office of Inspection and Enforcement investigated these allegations (Staff Cable Tray Test., Region Report No.50-358[78-21]).

b. Staff destructively tested some MIG spot welds on randomly selected fittings. All were found to be acceptable (Id. at 11-12).

c. Staff did not knowingly destructively test TIG welds (Tr. 1703), although some TIG welds may have inadvertently .been subjected to the same destructive test as the MIG welds. In this test only MIG welds failed (Tr. 1749,1762-63,1774). Staff visvilly inspected TIG welds on fittings installed at the site and found that they appeared sound and suitable for their function (Staff Cable Tray Test. at 12). This inspection was carried out after the fittings had been galvanized (Applicants' Cable Tray Test.; Tr. 1106), so that this inspection would probably spot gross defects, but not lesser faults such as pin holes, porosity, and hairline cracks (Staff Cable Tray Test.; Tr. 1745)

d. TIG and MIG welds were inspected at Husky prior to shipment. pursuant to Husky's inspection program ( Applicants' Cable Tray Test., Tr. 1032-33,1070,1085-86,1092,1814). Welds were subjected to another inspection on arrival at the Zimmer site to assure that there was no damage in shipment and that the welds were acceptable.

Upon installation of the trays and fittings, welds were again inspected. Inspections at the site occurred after galvanization (Applicants' Cable Tray Test.; Tr. 1099,1102).

6. The allegation that Husky's incentive system led to improper welding practices is not supported. The incentive system rewards a wel' der for increased acceptable production; he benefits by decreasing the time it takes to gather and assemble the parts for welding as well as,by decreasing welding time. However, production of bad welds results in a deduction from a welder's incentive earnings. Continued unacceptable production can result in reprimands and eventually disqualification (Tr. 1081-86). There has been no showing of bad welds on the Zimmer cable trays and fittings (Tr. 1224,1416).

CONTENTION 15 MVPP Control rods which must be easily inserted into and removed from the reactor core have been inadequately manufactured so that they do not meet the site specifications for such control rods.

7. The control rods perform the dual function of power shaping and reactivity control in the reactor core. Power distribution in the core is controlled during operation of the reactor by manipulating selected

patterns of control rods. In the event it is necessary to quickly shut down the reactor (scram), withdrawn control rods must be quickly inserted into the core.

8. The control rod consists of a sheathed cruciform array of stainless steel tubes filled with baron-carbide powder. The main structural member of a control rod is made of Type 304 stainless steel a consists of a top handle, a bottom casting with a velocity limiter and control rod drive coupling, a vertical cruciform center post, and four U-shaped absorber tube sheaths, known as blades, which give the rod its distinctive cruciform configuration. The top handle, bottom casting, and center post are welded into a single skeletal structure.

The U-shaped sheaths are resistance-welded to the center post, handle, and castings form a housing to contain the boron-carbide-filled absorber rods. Rollers at the top and bottom guide the control rod as it is inserted and withdrawn from the core. When in the core, each control rod is surround by four fuel assemblies. The control rods are 5 cooled by the core bypass flow. The blades are perforated to allow the coolant to circulate freely about the absorber tubes ( Appl . Exh.

1, Final Safety Analysis Report [ hereinafter "FSAR"] at 4.2).

9. The control rods were manufactured at General Electric Company's plant in Wilmington, North Carolina. Before shipment, control rods were inspected pursuant to General Electric's quality assurance procedures to assure that design specifications were met (Pence Testimony on Manufacture of Control Rods, following Tr. 2209

[ hereinafter " Applicants' Control Rod Testimony"] at 1).

10. Procedures to determine whether to accept control rods are set by the manufacturer. These include use of a 0.280-inch envelope gauge to determine if the control rod blade thickness at any one point exceeds 0.280-inches. Also, a one foot long 0.320-inch envelope gauge is used to- determine if bowing exists over a wider area (Maura Testimony on Control Rod Thickness and Seals fol. Tr. 1643 [ hereinafter Staff Control Rod Testimony] at 3-4). The 0.280 dimension did not represent any maximum design requirement for sheath thickness, but a checkpoint at which the design engineer wished to be consulted (Staff l Control Rod Testimony at 7; Tr. 2651-53). / l

11. In accordance with the GE inspection procedure, a 40-pound i per- square-inch pressure clamp is placed adjacent to any high spet's identified by the 0.280-inch envelope gauge (Tr. 2409-10). The purpose of the clamp is to determine if the high spot is flexible, and to ensure the absence of foreign matter between the sheath and the poison ,

. rods which form the blade (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 4). ,

12. While certain damage such as significant dents or bent rods -

could be a reason for rejection, normal waviness which is overcome by . -

~

the clamp is acceptable (Tr. 2253-54; 2416-17). j

13. During the initial site inspection of the 137 control rods, 86 did not pass the 0.280-inch envelope gauge (Staff Control Rod V

Testimony.at 4; Tr. 2247). Of those 86 that did not pass, 4 also did not pass the 0.320-inch gauge and these four control rods were rejected (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 4). Additionally, one of the remaining 82 rods was rejecte because it obviously had been hit with something (Tr.2279,2286-7). Seventy-five of the remaining 81 rods were found i

acceptable after clamping; six were not (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 4). These six were ultimately accepted after the GE procedure was clarified to indicate that the clamp could be placed directly over the high spot and the surface area of interest on the blade was redefined; such modification resulted in readings of 0.280 inches or less.

Because it had questions concerning this modification, Staff requested a reinspection of these six rods which Staff witnessed. Reinspection disclosed no problems (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 4; Tr. 2285-6).

14. The control rod is designed to operate with rubbing friction between the control rod and the fuel bundles which is substantially in excess of forty pounds. Therefore, the fact that a forty pound ,

inspection clamp load was necessary in order for 81 rods to pass the -

0.280-inch gauge has no implications for operation (Applicants' Control Rod Testimony at 2; Tr. 2324). Because of elasticity of the control rod blade and fuel channels, the blade thickness could be increased above 0.280 inches without encountering operational difficulty. (Staff l Control Rod Testimony a 7; Tr. 2385-87, 2436-37). In any event, any i abnormal friction would be found during preopertional and operational testing of the control rods and control rod drives (FSAR 4.2.3.2.4.3, 4.2.3.2.4.4, 4.2.3.2.4.5 at 4.2-59 through 61; Staff  ;

Control Rod Testimony at 7; Tr. 2645-49).

15. During the course of handling the control rods, particles of material were discovered in the connection between the sheath and the center structural member of the control rod (Martin Testimony fol. Tr.

., 2449 at 3; Tr. 2296-7, 2308-09, 2312-13, 2419). A cleaning process was initiated utilizing compressed air, vacuum cleaners, probes and other i

4

methods to dislodge the particles. The rods were wiped down with a degreasing agent (Tr. 2296-7,2308-9). The particles, which had a maximum size of 1/16 inch by 1/8 inch and which were extremely thin, were determined to be the result of a spot welding process (Tr. 2309-12, 2438). If some particles were not removed and escaped during operation, filters on individual pieces of equipment and the cleanup system would remove them (Tr. 2358-59,2420). These particles pose no safety problem.

16. In January 1979, during initial fuel loading at the Fukushima 6. reactor (Japan) it was noticed that several fuel channels hit the small ledge that exists in the corner of the control rod blades at the top of the velocity limiter just before the fuel bundle seated on the orificed fuel support. Under certain circumstances, this ledge could nick the corner of a fuel channel. Nicking would not affect fuel channel, control rod life, or reactor safety. Nonetheless, this ledge on certain of the control rods in question was chamfered to eliminate the possibility of nicking (Tr. 2315-16,2318). The chamfering was done with a handheld .high speed air motor driving a small milling tool (burr). Control rods were selected for chamfering by utilizing a gauge which duplicated the fuel channel corner. All corners of all control rods ultimately passed the gauge (Applicants' Control Rod Testimony at l 2-3). The chamfering procedure used assured that particles could not i

j get into the control rod as happened in connection with spot welding l (Tr.2421). At that time the rods were again visually inspected and randomly checked with micromet'er and gauge (Tr. 2658,2676). This disclosed no rejectable control rod blades (Tr. 2658-59).

l l

Contention 16 MVPP Almost all of the seals on the control rods, which when properly set prevent radioactive water from leaking out when the reactor is shut down for maintenance, do not meet minimum specifications for smoothness. Rough seals cannot set properly, making servicing more difficult and unnecessarily endangering workers and the general public by causing leakage of radioactive water.

17. During operation, the primary seal which retains water in the reactor is that created by the mating surfaces of the control rod drive and control rod drive housing flanges. Contention 16 is concerned with the velocity limiter to guide tube backseat seals which

~

serve to limit the leakage of water from the reactor vessel during the time when the control rod drive mechanism is disassem' bled for maintenance and the reactor is shut down (Pence Control Rod Seals Testimony, following Tr. 2209 [ hereinafter " Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony"] at 1; Staff Control Rod Testimony at 8; Tr. 2745-46, 2766-67).

18. The specifications' for the seals, which are AISI Type 304 stainless steel, call for a 63 RMS finish and dimensional constraints in size and shape (Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 1).

19. These are not perfect metal-to-metal seals and a small amount of leakage is to be expected. Once the drive is removed, if necessary, a blind flange can be installed on the control rod drive housing to deal with leakage. This small leakage in no case creates an operational or personnel radiological safety problem (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 8-9; Tr. 2746, 2763-64, 2765-66).

20. To determine that the specifications were met, all control rod seals were subjected to visual inspection with a comparator and a

dimensional check in a special inspection fixture. These inspections were performed at Wilmington as part of General Electric's Quality Assurance Program (Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 1-2).

. 21. The seals were again visually inspected with a comparator at the Zinner site for possible damage in shipment (Tr. 2742). One control rod was rejected because of a scratch across the seal surface

( Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 2; Staff Control Red Testimony at 8).

Contention 17 MVPP Fire insulation material which is being used to protect the cables in the cable trays from fire is inadequate to protect the cables in light of the cable tray installa-tion design and cable tray load. The tests of the fire insulation material were improperly performed in that conditions which will exist during operation were not adequately simulated.

22. The Applicants proposed to use a ceramic fiber blanket thermal insulation material manufactured by the Babcock and Wilcox Ccmpany under the trademark name "Kaowool" as a protective insulation material to be wrapped around selected cable trays which the Staff has concluded need additional fire protection (Harrison, Cohn, & Barnes -

Kaowool as a Fire Barrier for Cable Trays fol. Tr. 3244 [ hereinafter Staff Fire Protection Testimony] at 8; Tr. 3245-46; Appl . Ex. 7A at 4 and Appendix A.2). Applicants will cocoon all cable trays requiring l additional protection with three one-inch layers of Kaowool, giving each tray a 90 minute fire rating (Cotta Affidavit following Tr. 3414 at 2; Tr. 3245-46, 3377-78, 3425). The 90 minute fire rating provides for extreme conservatism inasmuch as the Staff has concluded that it i

would not take more than 15 minutes to detect and extinguish a fire at Zimmer(Tr. 3278,3378).

23. To qualify Kaowool as a thermal insulation material, the Applicants rely on a test conducted by the Portland Cement Association ,

at Construction Technology Laboratories' ("CTL") on June 6,1979. Four 16 foot cable tray sections were used in the test. Seventy EPR insulated, seven conductor Hypalon jacketed IEEE 383 Grade control cables were placed randomly in each tray, constituting a 40% fill (Applicants' Exh. 7A at 5-6; Tr. 3420-22; Cotta Affidavit at 2). These cables were chosen because they are the most susceptible to an outside fire (Tr. 3421). These cable trays were insulated with a three-inch -

Kaowool blanket (App. Ex. 7A at 8).

24. The trays were then placed horizontally in the CTL beam furnace (Applicants' Exh. 7A at 13). Furnace atmospheric temperatures were programmed to follow time-temperature relationships specified in

. ASTM E119 (Applicants' Exh. 7A at 13). Eight shielded thermocouples protected in accordance with the requirements of ASTM were used to msasure and control furnace atmospheric tempertures (Id,. at 13).

Average furnace atmosphere temperature was controlled with a 1.5%

variation from the standard time-temperature curve throughout the test (H.at14).

25. Electrical continuity of 15 cables at the bottom, sides, top and middle of each tray position, known to fail first, was monitored by observing lamps in a panel that were wired to conductors in each cable.

Short circuits from the outer conductors to the center conductor within

each cable were monitored ( App.Exh. 7A at 1, 8,12; Tr. 3301-04). The first short-circuit occurred at 94 minutes (Id.at 15).

26. The Applicants have imposed a heat genertion limitation on all Kaowool-wrapped cable trays of 13 watts per foot (Tr. 3422-25, 3560-62,3599). This internal heat could hasten cable failure by about 1 minute 20 seconds (Tr. 3422-23).

27. The ASTM test is an extremely severe fire test (Tr. 3280-81, 3301), more severe than any potential spot fire at Zimmer because it involved complete engulfment of the bottom two trays in a flame atmosphere (Tr. 3316, 3451-52). The trays were wrapped in the.same manner as those installed at the Zimmer station (App. Exh. 7A at 8, Appendix A and Figures 1-14; Tr. 3316; Cotta Affidavit at 2). The trays were positioned in the furnace to simulate to the extent possible the configuration of trays at Zimmer (Tr. 3451-57). A change in the positioning or number of the trays in the furnace would not have any significant effect on the test results (Tr. 3449-51,3456). The testing of trays in the horizontal position is sufficient also to qualify similarly insulated vertical cable trays installed at the plant (Tr. 3314-16).

~

Brown County, Ohio, Should Be Included in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ (Contention 20X)*

28. Brown County does not have an emergency response plan. It plans to establish a County Disaster Service Agency and retain a director, who may be a volunteer. At present, the Brown County Sheriff's office is responsible for relaying information concerning a Zimmer emergency to a commercial radio station located near Georgetown, Ohio, for broadcast to the County population. (Tr.4979,7899-7907.)

29. The western boundary of Brown County is 10.04 to 10.6 air miles from the Zimmer Station; the closest point is 10 miles, 762 feet (Tr.4972-73,5832-33). This boundary constitutes the eastern boundary of the plume EPZ extending from the Ohio River to S.R.125 (Staff Ex.

11). .

30. The population of the eastern half of the plume exposure EPZ in Clermont County (Sectors NNE, NE, ENE, E, ESE; 1980 census data) is 13727 (Staff Ex. A, Att'achment to Feb. 12, 1982, letter from Borgmann to Denton, Fig 2, p. 16-17). The Brown County population within 15 miles of the Zimmer Station is 3587 people, including two incorporated villages: Higginsport, approximately 343; and Hamersville, approximately 688 (Applicants' Ex. 15 [ hereinafter App. Test.] at 2; Tr. 5831). The topography of the adjacent areas of Brown County and Clermont Counties is similar, rising from approximately 520 MSL (at the Zimmer Station) to 800-900 MSL within one to three miles. Within 15

• /

Because of their length, the offsite emergency planning planning contentions are not set out with these findings; rather they are attached as Appendix C.

miles of the Station the terrain is hilly, fluctuating between about 550 and 950 ft. MSL. (App. Test. at 3; Tr. 6872-6875.)

31. The Clermont County Radiological Emergency Response Plan provides evacuation routes for the eastern portion of Clermont County which proceed from Zimmer Station on U.S. 52 to its junction with S.R.

133, then on S.R.133 to S.R.125, with alternate routing from S.R.133 via S.R.'s 222 and 232 to S.R. 125. This routing is entirely within Clermont County. (Board Ex. 2, p. II-I-18). During the course of the hearing, this routing was altered by the State of Ohio and Clermont County to~ provide additional evacuation routes from Clermont County through Brown County to relocation centers in northern Clermont County utilizing U.S. 52 to U.S. 68 and U.S. 62 to S.R.'s 32 and 125, S.R.'s 756 and portions of S.R. 505, and S.R. 747 to S.R. 125 (Williams Test.

fol. Tr. 7766 at 2; Tr. 7769-71, 7785-6).

~

32. The most direct evacuation routes out of the EPZ for Clermont County residents situated east of the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station are U.S. 52, S.R.'s 756, 774, and Sodom Road (Wesseler Test.

fol. Tr. 5256 at 3; Tr. 7769).

33. U.S. 52 is a superior roadway to S.R.'s 133, 222 and 232.

S.R. 133 is steep, winding, hilly and narrow roadway. U.S. 52 is ,

generally flat and straight, and about twice the capacity of S.R.133 (Wesseler Test. fol. Tr. 5256 at 2; Tr. 5288-89.)

34. The Ohio State Patrol Post in Georgetown, Ohio, and the Brown County Sheriff will provide access control points and traffic control on roads and highways in Brown County. The record does not reflect the details of this commitment nor whether state patrolmen

assigned to the Georgetown Post are committed under the existing plan for deployment in Clermont County or retention in Brown County, or both. (Wesseler Test. fol. Tr. 5256 at 3;_ Williams Test. fol. Tr. 7766 at 2; Tr. 7902-3; Board Ex. 1, V-7.)

35. The distance required to be traveled by Clermont County evacuees from the Clermont-Brown County boundary through Brown County to arrive at a relocation center in Williamsburg, Clermont County, Ohio, is from 37 to 50 miles (Tr. 7788).

36. Individuals leaving the plume exposure zone may in many cases go to friends' homes or some other location and not to a relocation center. Approximmately 20% of an evacuating population will proceed to a relocation center. Contaminated individuals departing the EPZ may contaminate other persons in other areas. If the possibility of cont /.iination exists, individuals would be advised to report to a relocation center through the media. (Tr. 4991-2, 5202-03, 7791-93.)

37. The Villages of Higginsport and Ripley in Brown County are approximately seven and 12-14 miles, respectively, from the Clermont-Brown boundary on U.S. 52 and each have school facilities.

Western Brown High School facility is located in the Village of Mt.

Orab and Hamersville School is located on S.R.125. Respective'ly, these facilities are approximately 10-12 miles and approximately three miles from the Brown County line. (Wesseler Test. fol . Tr. 5256 at 2; Tr. 5276.) Each has a cafeteria and capability for providing shelter and sleeping facilities (Tr. 5269-70,5279-80). All presently designated relocation centers are school buildings (Tr. 4992). There is no evidence that Brown County school facilities could not serve as l

. relocation centers (Tr. 7781-83). However, substituting these facilities for existing centers would entail longer supply routes because supplies (furnished by the Red Cross) originate in Cincinnati (Tr.7795). One relocation center is located in Hamilton County .

(Tr. 4992-3), and is located on superior roadways leading to that center (Tr. 5871-72).

38. After its initial testimony, the~ State of Ohio again reviewed its decision not to establish relocation centers in Brown County and adhered to it (Williams Test. fol. Tr. 7766 at 1; Tr. 7784-85, 7795). It is the state's position to permit the county government to determine how to care for its citizens (Tr. 4973,4993).

If the county government cannot provide adequately for the relocation of its citizens, the state policy is that the county immediately adjacent to the involved county shall plan to provide for relocation centers for individuals coming from the county in which the plant is located (Tr. 4973) . Brawn County may choose to establish such centers (Tr.4994). In that event the state government would act to insure that efforts of the individual county disaster service agencies and respective county governments are well coordinated (Williams Test. fol.

Tr. 7766 at 1; Tr. 4973). >

1 l

a y . -

Problems Associated with the Evacuation of Schools in Clermont and Campbell Counties (Contentions 20(b)(5) & (6);

21(c)(1)&(3), (4); 21(d)(1)-(4);

21(e)(1)-(3); and 36E)

A. Notification and Comunications Generally

39. Two-way communications among school officials and personnel during a Zimer emerg.ency are presently limited to the use of comercial telephones (Tr. 5378,5901-02).

40. The use of telephones by 10% of the telephone subscribers within exchange is sufficient to overload that system, e.g., an exchange possessing 3000 subscribers will be overloaded if 300 subscribers use a telephone at one time (Tr. 6542-3). When an exchange is overloaded, no calls can be completed (Tr. 6522).

41. During emergencies, the New Richmond area (Clermont County).

telephone exchanges (prefixes 553 and 557) are frequently overloaded (Kennedy Testimony fol. Tr. 5752 at 3; Tr. 5784-85). Similarly, the .

635 telephone exchange which serves the Campbell County plume exposure EPZ historically has been subject to overloading (Tr. 7965). -

42. A second problem affecting school comunications is posed by -

parents calling the schools in sufficient volume to tie-up the school telephones (Direct Test. Sell, Voelker, Reinhardt fol. Tr. 6371 at 6-7; Tr.5639-40).

43. Applicants' witness Badger has a system for dealing with the second problem which will provide for one or more lines remaining free for outgoing calls where two or more lines are present. This system is known as Mr. Badger's Secret System (Tr. 6526-27,.6536-40).

4 yn.-, y _

44. Mr. Badger's Secret System cannot alleviate the problem caused by an overloaded telephone exchange. This problem removes the telephone system from use; thus communication must be by some other means. In addition to Mr. Badger's Secret System, Applicants indicate three ways to overcome both problems (Applicants' Test. at 9, 11-12; Tr. 5882-85):

1. Provide notification and instructions to the affected schools by telephone prior to notifying the public whenever possible. However, the County plans provide for notification of 100%

of the populatifon within five miles of the plant within 15 minutes of the declaration of a site or more severe emergency (Board Ex. 2, II-0, p. 11-0-2; Board Ex. 4, 5 & 6, Annex C, pp. C-3&4*)

11. Provide NOAA radios to the schools. However, NOAA and similar radios provide for communications to the schools only; they do not provide the schools the capability to transmit messages (Tr.

5651-52,6399-400).

iii. Provide volunteer amateur radio operators with radios to establish communications. The Clermont Plan provides, in toto, "[t]he Milford Amateur Radio Club (MARC) and Bethel Amateur Radio Klub (BARK) will assist CCDSA with emergency communications as necessary" (Board Ex. 2, II-E, p. II-E-2). The Campbell, Bracken

• / The Kentucky Plans do not specify what type of emergency; however, NUREG-0654 provides for two emergency classifications: site and general, so that it is reasonable to presume that notification of a site emergency will be given. Further, public notification at the onset of a site emergency could not be totally restricted to Ohio.

and Pendleton County Plans contain comparable provisions (Board Ex. 4, 5 & 6, Annex B, p. B-1-2) . The record does not reflect whether these resources could in fact provide effective and timely communications to the school systems if telephone communication is unavailable.

B. Notification and Communications Specifically Clermont County

45. In Clermont County, District School Superintendents have authority to institute protective action for their schools (App. Test.

at 8). The Clermont County Emergency Plan provides for primary communications among public school emergency resource response agencies by commercial telephone with NOAA weather radio and the emergency broadcast system as backups. The latter do not provide for two-way communication (Tr. 5879-80, 5882; Board Ex. 2, II-E, Table E-1, pp.

II-E-3 and 5; s III-A, p. III-A-2; III-C, pp. III-C-1 through 3). No school within the plume EPZ in Ohio has more than four telephone lines and some have only one or two lines (Tr. 5038).

46. The Felicity-Franklin School District must utilize long distance trunk lines for communications with the county EOC, the Applicants' EOF and the county school superintendent (Tr. 5038-39, 7024-5).

47. At the New Richmond School Site, the Superintendent of the New Richmond School District has four, the High School and Middle School have three each, and the Elementary School has two telephone trunk lines. These lines have been subject to overload in the past, particularly during inclement weather, by parental calls, although it l is usually possible to obtain an open line in the superintendent's

e

• l l

office (Tr. 5638-40,5640,5692-93). Planners have made no inquiry regarding past overloading of school telephones during emergencies (Tr. 5039-40, 5042) . Applicants may provide a two-way radio communications link between the Superintendent of the New Richmond School District and the Station (Tr. 5883,5905).

Campbell County

48. The Campbell County Emergency Plan provides for communications among its public school emergency resource agencies by non-dedicated telephone lines (Plan, Basic Plan, pp. V-5, 6; Annex 8, p . B-3; Annex C, p. C-4). Notification to the schools in the event of a Zimmer emergency can also be provided by monitor radio activated from the E0C, NOAA radio, and, in some cases, the siren system (App.

Test at 11).

49. The County School Superintendent relies on four non-dedicated telephone trunk lines (Sell, Voelker, Reinhardt Test.

fol. Tr. 6371 at 6-7). .;

50. County Superintendent's notification to four ele.nentary and one middle school, including A. J. Jolly Elementary School 3.5 miles from the Zimmer Station, is hindered by the fact that these schools have single non-dedicated telephone lines which are subject to overload (Id.).

51. The County Superintendent's four non-dedicated trunk lines i are the means of telephone connunications with 54 regular bus drivers (ld at 4, 7).

52. The telephone trunk lines for each of the affected schools, the Superintendent and the bus garage are of ten overloaded during inclement weather because of parental telephoning (Id. at 7).

53. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has indicated that two-way radios will be provided to the Campbell County Superintendent of Schools, A. J. Jolly Elementary School, and St. Peter and Paul Elementary School (Tr. 6069-70,6522). The Superintendent is unaware of any such arrangements (Tr. 6373-74). Applicants may provide a two-way radio cmnnunications link.

School Bus Drivers, Clermont and Campbell Counties

54. The Plans make no provision for communication with school bus drivers and other school personnel in the event telephones cannot be used (Finding 44, supra, Tr. 6071-72). -

55. The schools involved in the New Richmond and Bethel-Tate School Districts of Clermont County and the Campbell County School District have no reliable means of communication with bus drivers while the driver is enroute (Tr. 5058, 5632-34, 5659-61, Sell, Voelker, Reinhardt Test. fol. Tr. 6371 at 5; Tr. 6375). The best available means of canmunication is to telephone a resident located on the route and have a message delivered to the driver (Tr. 6158-59,6400-01).

56. During the school day when not transporting students, the buses of the New Richmond and Bethel-Tate School Districts of Clermont County and the Campbell County School District are parked at the driver's residence or other parking area (Sell, Voelker & Reinhardt Test. fol. Tr. 6371 at 4-5; Tr. 5646-48, 5058). The only means for school districts to summon the drivers to mobilize buses at the school

sites is by telephone and broadcast media (Tr. 5667, 89, 93-94, 5903-04,6525). School bus drivers are energency response personnel (Tr. 7035, 57). School bus drivers during non-driving school hours are involved in other modes of employment, including farming, or in leisure pursuits, during which time they may not be accessible (Tr. 5661-63, 5058,5652-53). The Campbell County School Superintendent's t understanding of the requirements of Kentucky law is that children may only be transported in the school district's buses (Tr. 6375-77).

There is no provision in any plan that addresses this problem (Tr. 5909-11).

C. School Location, Population, and Bus Resources Clermont County

57. The New Richmond Exempted School District operates schools at two different sites within the plume EPZ (New Richmond-1503 students and Monroe-549 students); one site is outside the EPZ (Tr. 5'048, 5636, 5645-46). The New Richmond and Monroe sites are located 6.8 and 5 miles from Zimmer, respectively ( Applicants' Test, at 78). Both sites are north of the Zimmer Station (Board Ex. 2, II-I, p. II-I-21).

l

58. The New Richmond Exempted School District has 20 school buses each with a maximum capacity of 71 (Tr. 5641, 5645, 5688). Roughly 99 percent of the district's children are transported to school via bus (Tr. 5690). Each bus travels three routes in the morning and evening (Tr.5643-44).

59. The New Richmond School District does not possess a sufficient number of buses to simultneously evacuate all students' at the New Richmond and Monroe sites (Tr. 5050,5645,5688). All its buses would be able to evacuate less than three-quarters of the district's students in the EPZ at one time (cf. Tr. 5047). Arrangements have been made for the West Clermont School District (approximately 10-15 miles distant) to provide some additional buses, if needed, to aid in student

• evacuation, although the number of buses and specific arrangements with West Clermont are unclear ( App. Test. at 89, Tr. 5690') . Applicants testified that 17 buses are available from West Clermont ( App. Test. at 85); the New Richmond school officials had no direct knowledge of the number available (Tr. 5690). Applicants concede that these buses could not be of assistance during normal busing periods (Applicants' Test, at 95-96).

60. The record fails to indicate whether appropriate consideration has been given to whether buses sent from other districts can timely evacuate the children at the New Richmond district because of the time required for those buses to reach the plume EPZ school sites (Tr. 5047, 5050, 5064-66, 6803-06). While there is testimony that at least some consideration has been given to this problem, there is no plan provision or letter of agreement dealing with it.

Campbell County

61. The Campbell County School District has nine schools at various sites within the EPZ. These schools, the enrollment, and distances from the Zimmer Station are as follows:

School Enrollment Miles from Zimmer A. J. Jolly Elementary 221 3.5 Alexandria Elementary 617 10.5 Grants Lick Elementary 271 9.0 Southern Campbell Middle School 582 9.0 Campbell County High School 1580 10.5 Campbell County Vocational School 362 10.5 St. Peter & Paul Elementary School 62 4.5 St. Mary Elementary School 410 10.5 Bishop Brossart High School 242 10.5 Total Enrollment 4347 (Direct Testimony of Sell, Voelker and Reinhardt fol. Tr. 6371 at 3; App. Testitmony at 78-79.) Although Standard Operating Procedures are contemplated to cover emergency response in the Campbell County Schools, at the time of the hearing they had not been developed (Tr. 6043-44, 6135). It is contemplated that the closest schools would be evacuated j first (Tr. 6388-90,6394,6105-C).

62. This District has 60 buses to accomplish evacuation, 25 of which are 8 years or older. These buses experienced 78 out-of-service days during the 1980-81 scholastic year. (Direct Testimony of Sell, Voelker & Reinhardt fol. Tr. 6371 at 3-4).

63. Five to six buses to evacuate the St. Peter and Paul and A.

J. Jolly students would be dispatched from the bus garage, a distance of 11-12 miles (Tr. 6394,6409). Four qualified bus drivers would be available at the bus garage (Tr. 6429). Teachers cannot be assigned

responsibility to drive school buses because they must be accountable for the students in their charge (Tr. 6396-97,6405,6412-13). Under optimum conditions, it will take one hour from initial notification to evacuate until the boarding of the Jolly students on the buses (Tr.

6076,6411-12,6418,6422-25).

D. Other Considerations

64. School officials in the Ohio districts of the plume exposure area of the EPZ have not kept parents advised of their planning for a Zimmer emergency. There is testimony that this has resulted in a lack of parental confidence that school children will be adequately protected.

Communications to parents are planned in the future (M. Erbe Test. at 3-4; Tr. 5544-45).

65. Parents of New Richmond School District students, although advised not to go to the school, may proceed to the school in the event of a Zimmer emergency to transport their children (Kennedy Test. fol.

Tr. 5752 at 4). This may block traffic and create congestion. There are insufficient police officers to direct or control such traffi.c (Kennedy Test. fol. Tr. 5752 at 4). The New Richmond site (Bethel-New Richmond Road) is particularly susceptible to traffic congestion (Kennedy Test. fol. Tr. 5752 at 4). The record does not reflect whether the fact that Route 52 in New Richmond is the only identified evacuation route " bottleneck" (Staff Ex. A, Attachment to Feb. 12, 1982, letter from Borgmann to Denton, pp. 13-14) would compound this situation at the school site or on Route 52 in New Richmond.

I

=

66. There is testimony that parents in Kentucky may also respond to the schools in the event of an emergency, although there is no evidence that this would create traffic problems to the extent possible at the New Richmond School site (Sell, Reinhardt, Voelker Test. fol. Tr.

6371 at 8-9; Tr.6411-12, 6418, 6422-25).

Volunteer Fire and Life Squad Personnel (Contentions 20(e)(3)-(4), (7)-(8), 36(H))

A. Clermont County

67. Clermont County has only volunteer fire squads within the plume exposure EPZ. Two units outside the plume EPZ are staffed by full-time personnel (Tr. 5119-20,5123-26). The Plan provides that the fire squads' primary responsibility is to fight fires. Secondarily, fire personnel, as available, are assigned to provide door-to-door verification of population notification and to support access control.

(Board Ex. 2 III-B, p. III-B-2, 3.) They may be required to use personal vehicles to accomplish verification (App. Test. at 51). The record indicates that the units staffed by full-time personnel will respond to relocation centers (Tr. 5119-20; Board Ex. 2, III-8, Table III-B-1, p. III-B-5).

68. In Clermont County, all but three life squads are composed of volunteers (Tr. 5125); all five responding in the plume EPZ are composed of volunteers (Board Ex. 2, III-8, Table III-B-4, p. III-B-9). Each of the five has one emergncy vehicle equipped with a radio (App.

Testimony at 57). Standard emergency medical support is the function assigned the Life Squads (Board Ex. 2 III-8, p. III-B-4).

69. The record reveals the following with respect to the Monroe Life Squad and New Richmond Fire and Life Squad in Clermont County.

70. During normal working hours, from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., relatively few of the 42 volunteer New Richmond life squad and fire personnel are available. There is testimony that approximately 95% of the New Richmond life squad personnel and 25% of the fire personnel have indicated that they will not respond to the Zimmer Station in the event of a nuclear emergency. It is unclear whether these individuals would *espond within the EPZ in a nuclear emergency.

The leader of the New Richmond life squad would first attend to the needs of his family and then determine whether he would undertake his emergency response role. (Feldkamp Test. fol. Tr. 5467 p. 1-3; Tr.

5475-6,5489-91.) There is evidence that many volunteers would similarly attend to the needs of their f amilies prior to responding and that representations may have been made to them that they would have time to do so. (Tr. 5461, 5769-73, McMillian Testimony fol. Tr. 5567 at 4).

71. The Chief of the Monroe Township Life Squad has elected not to participate in any Zimmer Emergency and this has resulted in halting radiological training for this life squad (Tr. 5458-9,5462).

72. To qualify as an emergency medical technician one must successfully complete a 70-hour course in which less than 30 minutes is devoted to radiological training (Tr. '5445, 5456-57). Some additional

training apparen::ly has been offered, but the extent of that training and the extent of the participation in it is unclear. Twelve (three life squad and nine fire personnel) of the 42 New Richmond Fire and Life Squad personnel received it (Tr. 5130-31,5464-66,5471-72)'. Applicants indicate that two of the three life squads designated to respond to the Zimmer site have been trained in the transportation of contaminated individuals. A third is to be trained prior to operation. (App. Test.

at 115.)

B. Campbell County

73. In Campbell County, fire and rescue units are combined (Board Ex. 5 Annex H, II-C, p. H-2). Within the C&mpbell EPZ the personnel are all volunteer (Tr. 6107-09). The fire personnel in Campbell County are assigned the task of fire response and assisting other emergency response functions. Responsibilities of fire units in Campbell County, in order of priority, are:

1) Rescuing survivors of fires and other emergencies;

2) Extinguishing fires;

3) Assist in protective actions such as confirmation of evacuation, access control, or inplace protection /

sheltering as needed; and l

4) Assist in other emergency response functions if capable.

! These priorities may be changed upon recommendations from the County DES l

Director (Board Ex. 5, Annex I, IV-A, p. I-2; Tr. 6108). SOPS for the fire departments are being developed (Tr. 6135).

9 l

l

74. The Eastern Campbell County Volunteer Fire Department is located on Smith Road outside Mentor and serves Mentor as well as an area in the plume exposure EPZ (Board Ex. 5, Annex I. pp. I-1-I-2 Appendix I-1; McCormick and Smith Test. fol. Tr. 6440 at 1; Tr. 6455).

It has three to five personnel available during working hours. There is testimony that its members will assist their families before responding (McCormack & Smith Test. fol. Tr. 6440 1-4; Tr. 6479-82.) This fire department has not been briefed with regard to its specific responsibilities, about which there appears to be some confusion, and does not have an S0P (McCormack & Smith Test. fol. Tr. 6440 1-4; Tr.

6446-48, 6483-88, 6773-75; cf. Board Ex. 5, Annex F, C, p. F-9-3; Tr.

6443-44). It has had some radiological monitoring training, and has radiological monitoring equipment (Tr. 6443-44,6469-70). Personal

. dosimetry will be provided its members; special protective gear is not required (Board Ex. 5, Annex E, p. E-3; App. Test. at 66). It has adequate radio comunications with other state and local response agencies (Tr. 6457-58).

75. The Campbell County Plan specifies that rescue squads are to transport contaminated individuals to a hospital as well as to perform their normal duties. The Plan provides for assistance from the Commonwealth on request (Board Ex. 5, Annex H, IV C, p. H-2). The record indicates that at present emergency medical technicians are only prepared to provide first aid and hospital transportation and are not trained in the proper transportation procedures for contaminated individuals, or to decontaminate themselves or their vehicles (McCormack

and Smith Test. fol. Tr. 6440, p. 2-3; Board Ex. 5, Annex H, Medical &

Public Health, p. H-2). The EMT training includes instruction on dealing with radiation burns resulting from nuclear weapons, but specifically disclaims any relationship to injuries resulting from fixed nuclear f acilities (McCormack and Smith Test. fol. Tr. 6440, p. 2). It appears that, other than some monitoring training, no training has been given with respect to injuries resulting from nuclear power plant accidents.

C. Availability of Volunteers

76. Kentucky state and local planners have no knowledge of where volunteer response personnel are employed and no inquiry has been made -

of fire chiefs to determine if firemen could respond during daylight hours in the event of a Zimmer emergency (Tr. 6129-30).

77. The plan and the record f ail to indicate that consideration has been given to the number of Clermont County volunteer fire and lifesquad personnel that could .be available at the time.of an emergency and whether that number could adequately perform the responsibilities given them by the Plan.

78. While many witnesses expressed doubts about whether l volunteers would respond to a Zininer emergency, some also testified that l

volunteers had always responded to calls to duty in the past (Tr.

5451-53,5477-79,5767-68,5473-76). This is consistent with ths testimony of Applicants, FEMA, Kentucky and Ohio that, as a general proposition, volunteers readily respond during emergencies (App. Test.

at 114-15; FEMA Test. fol. Tr. 6982 at 43; Tr. 5197-5200, 6111), as well as the testimony of some of the volunteers themselves (Tr. 6483-91).

Ability of Clermont Population to Follow Instructions (Contention 23(1) & (2))

79. It is possible that a large number of Monroe Township residents will not utilize cards or towels indicating notification and will not follow evacuation or take shelter directions disseminated to them. The Chief of the Monroe Township Police estimates the period involved for door-to-door verification of Monroe residences would require three and one-half to four hours because of the number and nature of the roadways and the f act that many residences are serviced by 200-foot and longer driveways. (McMillian Test. fol. Tr. 5567 at 1-4).

80. The residents of New Richmond, during tornado and flood ,

emergencies, have failed to implement protective actions upon notification despite previous distribution of information concerning protective actions. These residents often request information from the police department and, although they generally follow police instruction, they often exercise poor judgment (Kennedy Test. fol. Tr.

5752 at 2-4; Tr. 5763-4, 5494).

81. Approximately 50 to 90 percent of these residents may not display a notification symbol, and may overreact and panic. (Feldkamp

Test. fol. Tr. 5467 at 3-4; Kennedy Test. fol. Tr. 5752 at 3-4; Tr.

5430,5494,5497,5579-80,5783).

82. A portion of the population (those served by the Clermont Metropolitan Housing Authority) involved in the plume exposure area of the EPZ do not follow direction or respond to written or verbal communications absent the opportunity to make inquiry concerning the instruction to be followed. This portion of the population has a severe inability to follow simple directions (Slemmer Test. fol. Tr.

5426 at 3-5).

83. FEMA testified that, based on its broad exposure to disasters, people in emergencies generally follow directions (FEMA Test.

fol. Tr. 6982 at 69). This should be contrasted with the contrary testimony of Sheriff Wesseler of Brown County who has had extensive law enforcement experience (Tr. 5290).

Transportation Dependent Disabled _ Individuals ,

Clermont County (Contention 24(10))

84. In Clermont County, lists of disabled, handicapped and senior citizens requiring special transportation are to be compiled from postage paid postcards designed to identify these individuals. The cards are to be distributed with the publication " Circle of Safety."

(App. Testimony at 45-46; " Circle of Safety" at 13,15.) According to Applicants, Clermont Association for the Physically Handicapped /

Developmentally Disabled (CAPH/DD), Clermont Senior Services, and the County Disaster Services Administration all have responsibility for l

maintaining lists; hence it is unclear to whom the cards are to be returned (App. Testimony at 46). The Plan itself does not mention DSA, but does identify the County Welfare Department, CAPH/DD, and County Senior Services (Plan, II-8, p. II-B-1; II-1, p. II-I-5; III-A, p. III-A-16). If a card has not been previously returned, absence of an "I have been notified" signal should summon help.

85. In Clermont County, CAPH/DD apparently has primary responsibility for evacuating these individuals (Board Ex. 2, II-B, p.

II-B-1; Tr. 5501-12). CAPH/DD has identified 153 mentally and approximately the same number of physically disabled individuals within the plume exposure EPZ. Of these, 20 to 30 are confined to wheelchairs, four or five of whom could not be transported in a supine position.

(Tr. 5509-11.) The expected total number in the plume exposure EPZ requiring assistance, based on population figures and state statistics, is approximately 976. Temporarily disabled individuals may not identify themselves prior to a Zimmer accident. (Goode Testimony fol. Tr. 5499 at 3-4.)

86. The actual number requiring outside assistance, i.e., those who could not rely on family or friends, will vary with the time of day, i

l A method of identifying those who will not require outside assistance has not yet been developed. (Tr.5523-24).

l j 87. CAPH/DD will coordinate transportation (Board Ex. 2 II-8,

p. II-B-1) with assistance from Clermont Authority for Rural l Transportation (CART) (Id.,

III-I, p. III-I-5), which has a superior i

l I ^

1 i s

capability to furnish transportation (Finding 88). The Life Squads and ' <

National Guard may ass;st (M. TR. 5172-73). ,

88. CAPH/DD has two buses. One is a converted maxi van with two wheelchair tiedowns and six seats. The other, the, size of a 52 passenger school bus, has eight wheelchair tiedowns and 11 seats. This vehicle may not be able to negotiate some of the country lanes in the plume exposure EPZ. CAPH/DD has one driver who has no telephone and must be contacted through a relative eight miles distant. (Goode Testimony fol. Tr. 5499 at 2-3.) CART has seven radio equipped Ians anb one radio equipped bus equipped with wheelchair lif ts (Board Ex. 2, III-A, p. III-A-1). CART has a total of 22 radio-equipped " buses" i J (App. Test. at 5).

of Farm Products in Clermont County ,

Monitoring (Contentions 25(3) & (4)) ,, ,

89. The Clermont County Board of Health and the Clermont County,

- Cooperative Extension Service provide support to the state which is '

j responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the impact of radiation 1

l release upon county farm products and livestock. Based upon such monitoring and assessment the state will institute protective actions ,

pertaining to milk and livestock feed control. (Board Ex.1, IV, pp. e IV IV-8, V, p. V V-5; Board Ex. 2, II-I-4-e, p. II-I ,6; Tr.

5561-62).

I

! 90. Monitoring will be performed on products intended for human $

l l consumption at various stages of production (App. Test. at 118-20).

3 l

i

1

/

91. According to the Plan, contaminated foodstuffs are to be kept from consumers (Board Exh. I at IV-8 and V-5; Tr. 5566, 6851).

92. The state maintains a list of all Grade A milk producers in Clermont County and a list identifying shipping locations for each producer (App. Test at 120). The state has helicopters and laboratory facilities available to assure the timely transportation and analysis of milk samples (Tr. 5562-63,6836-38). The state may quarantine milk and forbid the sale of milk (Board Exh I at IV-2; Tr. 5560).

93. . There are several goats present in Clermont County which produce milk for human consumption. The farms in which goats are maintained have inadequate storage capacity to keep feed covered and it would be difficult to maintain roughage under cover. It is unknown whether goats' milk is transported within or without the county for retail sales and subsequent consumption. There are only two goats' . milk producers in the county which are tested. The remaining goats' milk is consumed or sold at the farm of its source (Sutton Test. fol. Tr. 5556 at 2, 4).

94. There is no specific provision in the state and local Ohio plans for the monitoring of goats' milk and that question is apparently being considered by the State of Ohio ( Tr. 5140-2).

Inadequacies in Radio Communication in Clermont County (Contention 20(b)(4))

95. An area presently exists along U.S. Highway 52 in the vicinity of the Zimmer facility where there are " dead spots" in radio

communications (Kennedy Test fol. Tr. 5753). To eliminate these problems, Applicants will provide a repeater station (Applicants' Test, at 5; Tr. 5875), and three 100W radio base stations with antennas at its communications facilities located on a hilltop near Zimer Station to serve Clermont County police, fire, and local government services, and will provide space for a life squad radio system (Applicants' Test at 5;Tr.5874-75).

96. The Applicants are continuing to work with New Richmond and Moscow officials to provide additional communications equipment which would improve communications in the vicinity of Neville and points further along the river (Applicants' Test. at 6; Tr. 5875-76).

" Circle of Safety" (Contentions 4(12) & 23(3))

97. The " Circle of Safety" is intended to be the primary means for dissemination of general radiological emergency information to members of the public who reside within the plume EPZ (App. Test. at 101).

98. Subsequent to the filing of Intervenors' testimony relating to these Contentions the applicants rewrote the " Circle of Safety" essentially by simplifying the language and reducing the readability level to a seventh grade level on the Fry Readability Graph (Tr. 5818).

Further reductions might affect the message content (App. Test. at 105). Insufficient information on the services available at relocation centers is given in the rewritten version (Tr. 5718-20,5735).

l

+ ..

Evacuation Time Study (Contentions 20(c)(1)(3), (5)-(9), (10)-(14),36(B), 36(C), 36(D))

99. The roadways situated in the involved counties within the plume exposure EPZ are steep, hilly, narrow and winding, subject to snow and ice accumulation, and to impassability resulting from flooding. These factors retard evacuation of the population involved in those areas. (Tr.5303-15,5323-51; E. Erbe Test. fol. Tr. 5303 at 3-6; 5364-5421; McMillian Test. fol. Tr. 5567 at 2; 5629, 5643-4, 5654-5, 5683-4; Sell, Voelker, Reinhardt Test. fol. Tr. 6371 at 5-6; Brown, Nelson, Betting Test. fol. Tr. 6492 'at 1-2; Tr. 6495-6515; Reder Test.

fol. Tr. 6515 at 3-5.)

100. The Ohio state and county planners have no knowledge of and apparently have not given consideration to roadways in Clermont County which do not have berm or shoulders, to the residents served by 200 ft.

lanes, to the time required to clear roads of snow or ice accumulation, and to the manner and means by which the county engineer will maintain roads in the event of snow (Tr. 5010, 5013-4, 5026, 5035, 5099, 5117-8).

101. The Kentucky state and local planners acknowledge that Campbell County is hilly, has crooked and narrow roads that are, to a certain extent, steep and curving. Normal speeds on these roads are about 35 m.p.h. They also acknowledge that there is insufficient equipment for snow removal, that ice accumulation and severe weather conditions will render most routes impassable, that Ky 8 is impassable at 58 ft. flood stage of the Ohio River, and the Gubser Mill area is l

l 3

subject to flash floods rendering the roads there impassable. (Tr.

6045-6,6053-4,6056,6058,6064-5).

102. Only in the sector of the ten-mile radius EPZ in which New Richmond is located do evacuation route capacities present a potential limit on the time in which a sector can be evacuated. In the other sectors, the number of residents' vehicles is below reasonable evacuation route capacities of 1000 vehicles per hour. The evacuation time estimates for these other sectors are unaffected by a reduction of roadway capacities by 25% to 750 vehicles per hour. ( App. Test. at 36; Staff Ex. A, Attachment to February 12, 1982, letter from Borgmann to Denton, pp. 12, 15; Tr. 6596-97, 6698, 6737-38, 6752-53.)

Standard Operating Procedures (Contention 34) 103. The Connonwealth of Kentucky and Campbell County plans provide that "During an emergency, Standard ' Operating Procedures (50Ps),

developed from the plan, will be employed to respond to the emergency rather than this document" (Board Ex. 3, Plan Organization, at vi; Board Ex. 5, Basic Plan, Appendix 8, at VII-8-1). Commonwealth witnesses testified that this quoted language will be rewritten to state:

In an emergency standard operating procedures, or S0Ps, developed from the plan will be employed to provide additional guidance or specialized functions which are markedly different from those which are normally conducted.

Tr. 6134.

104. SOPS will not be written for every emergency function which would have to be carried out, but only for specialized functions (Tr.6136). A person performing a specialized function would rely on an 50P for guidance, while other emergency workers would rely on the terms oftheplanitself(M.). The S0Ps will furnish more detailed instructions than will the plans (Id.).

105. The Campbell County plan contains a list of SOPS required to implement the plan (Board Ex. 5, Basic Plan, Appendix 8, at VII-8-1). A comparable list appears in the Kentucky plan (Board Ex. 3, Basic Plan, Appendix 5, at 5-1). Additional SOPS may be required with respect to the evacuation of people without transportation (Tr. 6102) and the distribution of potassium iodide (Tr. 6180). There are no completed SOPS (Tr. 6140). While there was testimony to the effect that the Kentucky plan, as it now stands, would be adequate to protect the public (Tr. 6141), it was stipulated that the plan cannot be implemented withoutSOPs(Tr. 7953-54).

Plan for Indiana Ingestion Exposure EPZ (Contention 35) 106. The 50-mile ingestion pathway for the Zimmer Station EPZ includes a portion of southeast Indiana. After the record was closed, ,

by letter of April 19, 1982, Applicants submitted a radiological emergency plan for the State of Indiana to the Staff pursuant to 10 CFR 50.33(g). The testimony at the hearing had indicated the existence of such a plan. (App. Testimony at 124; Tr. 4976-77, 5150-59, 6174-75).

Public Notification System (Contention 36(I))

107. Within 5 miles of the station, the recommended alerting system includes 8 sirens covering approximately 40 percent of the population (App. Test. at 125). In addition to the sirens, in-home NOAA weather radios will be made available to all households within five miles of the station (Ibid.). In the 5-10 mile range, the population will be covered by either sirens or in-home NOAA weather radios (App.

Test. at 125; Board Ex. I at II-0-3; Board Ex. 2 at II-D-2; Board Ex. 3 and 4 at C-4; Board Ex. 5 and 6 at C-3, 4).

108. The Prompt Notification System was designed with consideration of a wide range of weather conditions (App. Test at 125).

The Prompt Notification System as designed meets the design objective of direct coverage of essentially 100 percent of the population within five miles of the site. ,

109. An integrated test of the Prompt Notification System prior to' its approval will determine the acceptability of the system as installed. If necessary, corrective actions to assure meeting regulatory requirements will be taken based on the results of the integrated test (App. Test. at 125-26; Tr. 6163, 6855).

110. Special arrangements will be made to assure that those with t

hearing or sight impairments will be notified by the Prompt Notification System (App. Test. at 126).

111. Although not an NRC or FEMA requirement, both the in-home NOAA weather radios and the sirens are battery equipped; hence, they are i

capable of functioning during electrical power outages (App. Test. at 126).

Monitorirg of Water Supplies (Contention 36(K))

112. The Campbell County and Commonwealth of Kentucky Radiological Emergency Plans for the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station both recognize that in the event of a radiological emergency at the Zimmer plant, domestic water supplies could be contaminated either by the accidental discharge of contaminated water from the station or by deposition from an atmospheric release (Bd. Ex. 3, Annex F, p. F-7; Bd.

Ex. 5, Annex F, p. F-8; Tr. 6170.) These plans contemplate the possibility of the contamination of domestic cisterns, as well as surf ace and groundwater supplies (Id.).

113. The Commonwealth has the responsibility of providing safe drinking water to the citizens of Kentucky (Tr. 6170). The Campbell County Plan provides that the Kentucky Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection is responsible for developing and regulating the public water supplies in the Commonwealth. The Bureau for Health Services is responsible for regulating private water supplies. The Radiation Control Branch will perform tests for radiological contamination in the plume exposure and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The Radiation Control Branch will coordinate with the Division of Water, the Division of Natural Resources, Environmental Pro:ction for collection and delivery of water samples for analysis.

(Bd. Ex. 5, Annex F, Appeno1x F-12-1; Tr. 6173.) The Northern Kentucky District Health Department will assist in collecting environmental samples, including water samples, and the County Disaster and Emergency Services Director will arrange for the samples to be transported to the proper laboratories for analysis. (Bd. Ex. 5, Annex H, p. H-2).

114. The Kentucky Plan contains a list of public water supplies within a 50-mile radius of the Zinmer power plant. (Bd. Ex. 3, Annex F, Table F-4.) The Campbell County plan states that lists of public water supply sources within the ZPS-1 ingestion pathway are maintained in the State E0C for prompt emergency use. (Bd. Ex. 5, Annex F, Appendix F-12,

p. F-12-1.) The record is silent as to any listing of private water supplies which may exist.

115. In the event of contamination of the Ohio River during a Zimner emergency, this will be detected by a monitoring station located at the Zimmer Station itself. (App. Test. at 128; Tr. 6170). This fact will be conmunicated directly;to the Kentucky E0C by the Zimmer Station, who will contact state monitoring teams in Frankfort, Kentucky. (Tr.

6171). These teams will be responsible for telephoning nearby waterworks to inform them that water intake valves should be closed (Id.). Additionally, two-way radio communications will be established between the Zimmer Station and the three nearest water intake and treatment facilities located downstream from the Zimmer Station on the Ohio River: the City of Cincinnati, Kenton County and Newport Water Works (App. Ex. 13 at 5.4.9 and Appendix D, Letter of February 9,1981;

App. Test. at 127, Tr. 6170-71.) This will provide for a redundant notification procedure for those waterworks involved. (Tr. 6171.)

116. The Frankfort-based monitoring teams will be mobilized and in the field within 3-1/2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of notification (Tr. 7846). After the samples are taken, they are transported to Falmouth, Kentucky for testing (Tr. 7849). Travel time between Falmouth and Mentor is one hour (Tr. 7849). Falmouth is an hour and one-half away from Newport Water Works (Tr. 7850), which was stated to serve Mentor (App. Test. at 128). Therefore, it was estimated that it could take between five and a half to seven hours to get a particular water sample analyzed (Tr. 7850).

117. Based on the average speed of the Ohio River, there would be a period of about ten hours from the time of any liquid release from Zimmer Station to the time it reached the nearest waterworks intake on the Ohio River (App. Testimony at 127-128).

118. If a potential for contamination of water supplies, including wells and cisterns, existed, the public would be instructed not to utilize these supplies until tests had demonstrated them to be safe (Tr. 6173-74). If water sources are found to be unsafe, the state can isolate them from the public water supply or store the water until short lived radionuclides have decayed to safe levels. (Bd. Ex. 5, Annex F, Appendix F-12, p. F-12-1.) Wells will be pumped, if necessary (Tr. 6174).

119. Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services will provide water in the interim (Tr. 6173). Supplies of uncontaminated water will

probably not be immediately necessary if water intakes on the Ohio River are closed because water works have some reserve storage capacity and can continue to supply water, usually for one to two days (App. Test. at 128; Tr. 6170-72). Nonetheless, Kentucky organizations have gained extensive experience in supplying water from alternate sources in other instances, such as floods, where water supplies have been rendered unusable (App. Test. at 128, Tr. 6169-70).

LICENSE CONDITIONS Prior to authorizing operation of the Station at power levels in excess of 5% of rated power, Applicants shall demonstrate to the satisf action of NRC Staff that:

1. A survey of volunteer personnel assigned on emergency response role inside the plume exposure EPZ has been made to determine:

a) the availability of such personnel by time of day; b) the existence of f amily connitments of such. personnel which could interfere with their ability or willingness to respond in a radiological emergency; and c) the willingness of such personnel to respond in a radiological emergency to i) the Zimmer Station and 11) within the EPZ.

In making this survey, account shall be taken of the portions of any community which may not follow instructions to signify notification in determining how many volunteer personnel may be necessary to accomplish door-to-door verification of notification.

Applicants shall demonstrate to the satisf action of the Staff that

sufficient volunteer personnel are available to discharge their assigned responsibilities or that steps are in progress to obtain sufficient personnel.

2.- Clear authority for the maintenance of lists and conducting of surveys of transportation dependent disabled individuals in Clermont County has been established, such a survey has been conducted, the list compiled, and transportation needs assessed.

3. A repeater station and three 100 watt radio base stations have been installed to eliminate " dead spots" in radio transmissions along U.S. 52 for use by Clermont County police, fire, and local government services. Space shall be provided for a lifesquad radio system.

4. The publication " Circle of Safety" is issued as revised (Applicants' Testimony fol. p.106) and as further revised to detail the services available at relocation centers.

5. All evacuation route maps available to the public reflect the additional evacuation routes adopted by the State of Ohio and Clermont County.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW l

In an operating license proceeding, the Board is called upon to decide only issues in controversy among the parties (10 CFR 2.760a and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 2, Section VIII). In this case, the l

contentions and evidence have placed in issue the general subjects of compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, cable tray manuf acture, .

l l .__

f control rod design and manuf acture, fire protection of cable trays, financial qualifications, and offsite emergency planning. Contentions related to radiological monitoring, training of the local populace to deal with transportation accidents of shipments of radioactive material, an alleged lack of a need for the facility, and an alleged lack of a sufficient fuel supply for the facility were disposed of summarily.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact which are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's Rules of Practice, and upon consideration of the entire evidentiary record in this proceeding, the Board makes the following Conclusions of Law:

(1) The requirements of 10 CFR Part 51 have been met; (2) The requirements of Section 102(2)(A), (C) and (E) of the National Environmental Policy Act have been met; (3) Control rods as manufactured and installed are capable of adequately performing their intended function; (4) Cable trays as manuf actured and installed are capable of adequately performing their intended function; (5) Cable trays for which additional fire' protection is required have been wrapped in a material which was qualified to perform its intended function; (6) The state of offsite emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency; (7) Offsite emergency response plans are not invalid by virtue of this incorporation by reference of Standard Operating Procedures.

IV. ORDER WHEREFORE, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.718, 2.760, 2.761a, and 2.762, IT IS ORDERED that

4 This Board retains jurisdiction of this matter to rule on the motion of !1VPP to admit new contentions and conduct any further proceedings which may become necessary as a result of that motion and the Board's rulings set forth herein.

This decision will constitute the final action of the Commission thirty (30) days after its date unless exceptions are taken.

Exceptions to this Initial Decision may be filed within ten (10) days after service of this Initial Decision. A brief in support of the exceptions shall be filed within thirty (30) days thereafter [ forty (40) days in the case of the NP,C Staff]. Within thirty (30) days of the filing and service of the brief of the Appellant [ forty (40) days in the case of the Staff] any other party may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, the exceptions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

- b l Frank F. Hooper '

ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

/. ty 1#f M. 5tanley,ltivingston o ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE b

r N , Chairman John 3 rye, II MINIYATIV JUDGE Bethesda,liaryland June 21, 1982

U~ APPENDIX A Exhibits Applicants' Exhibits No. Identified Received Description 1 597 605 Application, including FSAR, ER and FPER (with amendments)

(Supp.) 4907 4907 2 1123 1125 Letter to R.F. Heishman from Earl Borgmann re IE Inspection Report 50-358/78-21 3A-3L 1532 Welding Procedure and Performance Qualifications Test Sheets 4 2007 Page 9-1, Husky Products, Inc., Quality Control Manual 5 2559 . List of Individuals Receiving Quality Assurance Training from RCI dated June 27, 1978 6 2559 List of Individuals Receiving Quality Assurance Training fro ~m RCI dated July 26,. 1978 7A* 3411 3417 Rev. 13 to Fire Protection Evaluation Report 8A* 3411 3419 Rev. 14 to Fire Protection Evaluation Report 7 3618 3652 Additional Financial Information and Page Changes to the Formal Application submitted November 14, 1981 8 3618 3652 Letter to Harold Denton from Earl Borgmann Responding to Three Staff Financial Questions

• / Inasmuch as exhibit numbers 7 an'd 8 were used twice, the first exhibits so numbered have been designated 7A and 8A and have been referred to as such in this Initial Decision.

~

No. Identified Received Descriction 9 4483 4483 Chapter 20 - Staff Safety Evaluation Report -

Financial Qualifications 10A-10C 4498 4609 Summary of Rate, Increases for Applicants 11A-11D 4570 Decommissiching Costs for Zimmer Unit 1 - Four Tables Prepared at the Request of the Licensing Board 12 4572 Decommissioning Fund Balances for Various Earned Investment Rates 13 4908 4908 Emergency Plan for the Wm.

H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station 14 5302 Deposition of Charles Jackson 15* 5796 5816 Applicants' Testimony Relating to Emergency Planning Contentions 15A* 7891 Emergency Preparedness Completion Schedule for the Wm. H. Zi=mer Nuclear Power

. Station Staff's Exhibits 1 745 745 Professional Qualifications of Richard S. Cleveland 2 754 754 Final Environmental Statement 3 754 754 Staff Supplement to Final Environmental Statement Regarding Radon 4 754 754 NUREG-0332, Health Effects Attributable to Coal and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Alternatives

• Inasmuch as exhibit number 15 was used twice, the second

_/

exhibit so numbered has been designated 15A and has been referred to as such in this Initial Decision.

No. Identified Received Description 5 754 754 Revised Tables, Summary and Conclusion to Draft NUREG-0332 6 754 754 Update of NUREG-0332 762 762 Letter to Earl Borgmann from 7

Ronald Ballard enclosing revised draft Environmental Technical Soecifications 8 4911 4913 Safety Evaluation Report -

NUREG-0528 9 4912 4913 Safety Evaluation Report -

NUREG-0528, Supp. No. 1 10 4912 4913 Safety Evaluation Report -

NUREG-0528, Suppl No. 2 11 7146 Map - Evacuation Road Network 12 7146 Louisville, Kentucky District - Flooded Areas -

Ohio River, Clermont County

- Plate 5 13 7146 Louisville, Kentucky

- District - Flooded Areas -

Ohio River, Clermont County

- Plate 6 14 7146 Louisville, Kentucky District - Flooded Areas -

Ohio River, Clerment County

- Plate 7 15 7146 Louisville, Kentucky District - Flooded Areas -

Ohio River, Clermont County

- Plate 8 16 7146 Louisville, Kentucky District - Flooded Areas -

Ohio River, Clermont County Dr. Fankhauser's Exhibits 1 854 862 Enrollment Figures for Moscow Elementary School

---

_-_______-_________-___-_____J

Miami Valley Power Project's Exhibits No. Identified Received Description 1 1057 1119 List of Certified Welders Employed by Husky Products 2 1842 1849 Welder Qualification Program 3 1947 1950 Memo to E. McClung from Randy Pratt re Welding Qualification for J. Allen and M. Brock 4 1956 1970 Field Complaint of Crater Cracks in TIG Welding 5 2043 Affidavit of Donald Blanch ZAC/ZACK's Exhibits 1 5208 Direct Testimony of Charles Jackson addressing ZAC/ZACK Contentions 20c(5) and 20 (e) (6)

2. 5234 5234 Memo from Health Planning and Resource Development Association of CORVA re Material on Activities of Radiation Safety Task Force 3 5309 5324 ' Photographs 15 5334 5351 Photographs 16-18 5367 5367 Photographs County of Mentor's Exhibits

{ ___ _ _

1 6434 6438 A. J. Jolly Elementary School Radiological Emergency Protective Action Procedures (Draft) 2 6435 6438 Zimmer Evacuation Plan Meeting - September 29, 1981 1

Board Exhibits No. Identified Received Descriction 1 4935 4961 State .of Ohio Nuclear Pcwer Plant Emergency Response Plan 2 4935 4961 Clermont County Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station 3 6030 6034 Kentucky Radiological Emergency Plan 4 6030 6036 Bracken County Radiological Emergency Plan 5 6030 6038 Campbell County Radiological Emergency Plan 6 6030 6040 Pendleton County Radiological Emergency Plan I

i O O

APPENDIX B ,

Chronology of Zimer Station Operating License Proceeding October 27, 1972 Construction Permit issued.

September 28, 1975 Operating License Opportunity for Hearing noticed. (40 Fed. Reg. 43959).

January 23, 1976 Prehearing Conference.

tiarch 19, 1976 Intervention Granted; Notice of Hearing issued. Initial intervenors were: Miami Valley Power Project, Dr. David B. Fankhauser Mrs. Marie B. Leigh,* and the City of Cin-cinnati.

November 2, 1977 Board reconstituted: Frank F. Hooper,vice John R. Lyman, who was ill.

October 2,1978 Board reconstituted: Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman, vice Samuel Jensch, Chairman, who

' retired.

tiay 21-23,1979 Prehearing Conference.

June 19-22, 26-29, Evidentiary hearings.

August 7-10, November 14-15, 1979.

January 19, 1980 City of Mentor, Kentucky, admitted. LBP-80-6,11 NRC 148.

April 22, 1980 ZAC-ZACK admitted. '

LBP-80-14,11 NRC 570 LBP-80-19, 12 NRC 67.

April 23, 1980 Commonwealth of Kentucky admitted.

l June 11, 1980 Clermont County, Ohio admitted.

March 2-4, 1981 Evidentiary hearings.

March 5, 1981 Board reconstituted: M. Stanley Livingston vice Glenn Bright, because of schedule conflict.

April 24 - July 2, 1981 Proposed findings submitted.

• Mrs. Leigh subsequently passed away.

l

. September 10, 1981 Board reconstituted: John H Frye, Chairman, vice Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman, because of schedule conflict.

October,1981 Offsite Emergency Plans filed.

October 29-30, 1981 Prehearing Conference. ,

November 12-13, 1981 Emergency Planning and Monitoring Contentions Revised and Specified.

November 20, 1981 Applicants & Staff Responses to Contentions.

November 25, 1981 Oral Board Ruling on Contentions.

November 30, 1981 Formal Discovery Cut-Off Date.

December 3, 1981 Prehearing Conference Order Ruling on Revised Contentions.

December 11, 1981 Board issues compilation of admitted Con-tentions. (Appendix C.)

January 25-29, and Evidentiary hearings.

February 2-5, 1982 February 4, 1982 Applicants' and Staff's Motions for Summary Disposition of Contention 2 granted.

March 1-4,1982 Evidentiary hearings.

April 2-30, 1982 Proposed Findings submitted.

June 21, 1982 Initial Decision issued.

l

. APPENDIX C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

John H Frye, III, Chairman M. Stanley Livingston Frank F. Hooper In the Matter of Docket No. 50-358-OL CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.

(Zimer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) December 11, 1981 LIST OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND MONITORING CONTENTIONS INDICATING DISPOSITION Conten- Number in ,

tion 11/13/81 Subject Status Number Filing Fankhauser's Contentions 2-4 N/A Monitoring -

Moscow School

• 2(a) Withdrawn.

2(b) Involved Citizenry Motion for Sumary Disposition Pending.

2(c) Isotopes Monitored Motion for Sumary Disposition Pending.

2(d) Readouts at Withdrawn.

City Water Works 2(e) Scope vague. Motion for Sumary Disposition Pending.

2(f) Monthly Assays of Motion for Sumary Isotopes in Foodstuffs Disposition Pending.

2(g) Ring of Stations Motion for Sumary Disposition Pending.

3 N/A Monitoring ' Withdrawn.

- - - - ____.__________________J

Page 2 of 7 pages.

Conten- Number in tion " ' l ' ' 11/13/81

~ ' "

S~ubject Status" Number Filing Fankhauser's Contentions (continued) 4 Emergency Planning --

Clermont County 4(a) -

' Withdrawn.

4(1) 1 Expand EPZ Admission denied.

~

4(2) 2 Fiscal Resources Admission denied.

4(3) 3 Sheriff's Training Admission denied.

& Equipment 4(4) 4 CCDSA Training & Equipment Admission denied.

4(5) 5 Agency Responsibility Admission denied.

Matrix 4(6) 6 Ingestion Exposure Pathway Admission denied.

4(7) 7 Evacuation . Adm'ission denied.

4(8) 8 ,

Clermont County Hospital . Admission denied.

4(9) 9 Department of Energy Admission denied.

4(10) 10 Emergency Classification Admission denied.

System 4(11) 11 Public Notification System Admission denied.

4(12) 12 " Circle of Safety" Admitted to the extent it directly attacks the document: " Circle

of Safety"; Consolida-ted witn 23 (3).

4(13) 13 Public Disobedience Admission denied.

4(14) 14 Volunteers Admission denied.

4(15) 15 School Evacuation Admission denied.

1 4(16) 16 Evacuation Routes Admission denied.

.. /

Page 3 of 7 pages.

. . Conten- . Number in tion 11/13/81 Subject Status Number Filing City of Cincinnati Contentions 7 - 10 Emergency Planning Withdrawn Pursuant

& Monitoring to Settlement.

18 - 19 Monitoring Withdrawn Pursuant to Settlement.

ZAC-ZACK Contentions 20 - 32 Emergency Planning -

. & Monitoring 20X Include Portions of Admitted.

Brown County in Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ 20(a)(1)-(3) Lack of Brown County E0C Denied without Prej-udice to later sub-mittal if 20 X Deter-mined Favorably to .;

ZAC-ZACK. *

(b)(1)-(3) Brown County Denied without Prej-Connunications udice to later sub-mittal if 20 X Deter-mined Favorably to ZAC-ZACK.

l (b)(4) Certain Radio Communica- Admitted.

tion Problems (b)(5)-(8) Communications with Admitted.

Schools (c)(1)-(3) Adequacy of Roads Admitted.

(c)(4) Adequacy of Denied without Prej-Brown County Roads udice to later sub-mittal if 20 X Deter-mined Favorably to ZAC-ZACK.

Page 4 of 7 pages.

Conten- Number in '

tion 11/13/81 Subject' " Status '

Number Filing ZAC-ZACK Contentions (continued) 20(c)(5)-(14) Adequacy of Roads Admitted.

(Two contentions are numbered "(9)"

-- the second is renumbered "(9A)".)

20(d) Adequacy of Roads Withdrawn.

20(e)(1)-(2) Brown County Police Denied without Prej-and Fire Personnel udice to later sub-mittal if 20 X Deter-mined Favorably to ZAC-ZACK.

20(e)(3)-(15) Police and Fire Personnel Admitted.

20(f)(1) __Floo. ding of the. 0hio _ _ Admitted. __ _

20(g)(1) 20(h)(1) Inclement Weather Admitted.

21(a) School Personnel Withdrawn.

(b)(1) Psychological Stress in Denied.

• Schools (b)(2) Potassium Iodide Admitted, for Children (c)(1)-(4) School Buses Admitted.

(d)(1)-(4) Evacuation of Schools Admitted.

during Busing Periods (e)(1)-(3) Availability of Admitted.

School Bus Drivers 22 Warning System Withdrawn.

23(1)-(5) Education of Public Admitted.

., l Page 5 of 7 pages.

Conten- Number in

~ tion 11/13/81 Suoject Status Number Filing ZAC-ZACK Contentions (continued) 24(1)-(10) Medical Facilities Admitted.

and Treatment 25(1) Disclosure to ' Denied.

Clermont County of Information Furnished Cincinnati

~

(2) Collection of Baseline Denied.

Kealth Data by Clermont County (3) Monitoring of Effect of Admitted to Extent Releases on Agriculture 50.47(b)(9) Matters are Raised.

(4) Monitoring of Milk Admitted to Extent 50.47(b)(9) Matters are Raised.

26(1) Independent Monitoring Denied.

by Local Government 27(1) Independent it nitoring Denied.

by Local Government 28(1) Independent .t nitoring Denied.

29(1) Meteorological Withdrawn.

Monitoring 30(1) Protective Gea- for Denied.

the Public 31(1) Local Governments Lack Denied.

Financial Resources 32(1) Public Participation Denied.

in Drill

Page 6 of 7 pages.

Conten- Number in tfon 11/13/81 -

Sabject' Siatus -

Number Filing City of Mentor 33 - 36M 1 - 4M Emergency Planning -

33 1 Mentor Not Included in Denied.

Plan Formulation 34 2 Use of Standard Operating Admitted.

Procedures 35 3 Indiana Not Included in Admitted.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway Planning 36 4 Defects in Kentucky and - -

Campbell County Plans 36A 4A Cross-Ref'erence to Denied.

NUREG-0654 368 4B Ten Defects (subsections Admitted; Consolidated 1 - x) in Stone & Webster with 20 (c) (10).

Evacuation Time Studies 36C 4C Alternate Evacuation Admitted; Consolidated Routes with 20 (c) (7).

36D 40 Unsuitability of Admitted; Consolidated Ky. Route 8 for with 20 (c) (8).

Evacuation t

l 36E 4E Evacuation of Schools Admitted; Consolidated with 21.

36F 4F Storage and Distribution Admitted; Consolidated of Potasium Iodide with 24 (8).

36G 4G Evacuation of Those Admitted; Consolidated in Need of Assistance with 20 (c) (9).

l 36H 4H Capabilities of Eastern Admitted; Consolidated l Campbell Volunteer with 20 (e) (7).

Fire Department

. Page 7 of 7 pages.

Conten- Number in l

tion 11/13/81 Subject Status ** '

Number Filing City of Mentor (continued) 361 41 Public Notification Admitted; With System a Deletion.

36J 4J Storage of Animal Feed Denied.

36K 4K Monitorized Control of Admitted.

Public Water Supplies 36L 4L Communications Between Denied.

Zimer Station and Mentor 36M 4M Role for Mentor in Drill Denied.

\

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

John H Frye, III, Chairman M Stanley Livingston '

Frank F. Hooper '

In the Matter of Docket No. 50-358-OL ,

CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.

(Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) December 11, 1981 REVISED CONTENTIONS -- EMERGENCY PLANNING AND MONITORING (Approved November 25,1981) 20 X] Authority for the requirement that Brown County, Ohio, be included into the emergency planning response of the lume exposure zone is as follows: Brown County is situated approximately 10 and 1/8th miles generally east from the Zimmer Station; the current plume exposure zone depicted on emergency planning zone maps presented in the local plans ter-minates the plume exposure EPZ at the Brown and Clermont Counties border; the conditions of the topography and land characteristics placing the involved areas of Brown County in an elevation plane ,in exceis of 400 feet above the Zimmer Station; access routes for the affected Brown County popu-lation are in part common for certain affected population in Clermont

County (particularly U.S. 52 and the population of Clermont County involved

( ,

in Designated Sector SE(G), ESE(F) and E(E) involving an approximate i

Clermont population of 2,518 [Clermont Plan, II-I, at pp. II-1-17 and

II-I-22] in which that affected population is routed from U.S. 52 to S.R.

133 and subsequently alternate S.R. 222 and 232 [Clermont Plan II-I, at

p. II-I-18] requiring a greater distance and travel time within the plume exposed area); the condition that in Brown County there are no response needs, capabilities or implementation of emergency resource personnel for an emergency response to a Zimmer accident or event; and 10 C.F.R. 50.47 (c)(2), which provides, inter alia:

[g]enerally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles [16 km] in radius * * *

• The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emer-gency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." TEmphasis supplied by writer.).

See also 10 C.F.R. 50.33(g) to the same effect. ,

20. The evacuation plans and the emergency response capabilities for the plume exposure pathway of the Emergency Planning Zone consisting of, i

and involving, parts of Clermont County, Ohio, and Campbell County, Pendleton County and Bracken County, Kentucky, including the municipal and village political subdivisions therein, are inadequate in their respective failures to timely and promptly evacuate the population within that zone to appropriately reduce, or minimize, radiation exposure for the protection of

(

l the safety and health of the public, due to:

h -

(20 a 1] ~--3] denied without prejudice to later submittal if 20 X]

determined favorably to ZAC-ZACK.)

20 b]. The absence of adequate connunication system, or systems, both telephone and radio, for the coordination and direction of evacuation and receipt and dissemination of data and information within any involved county, f.or communications between the respective county EOC and the emer-gency response support groups and between personnel of the emergency response support groups.

Specifically.

(20 b 1] - 3] denied without prejudice to later submittal of 20 K]

determined favorably to IAC-ZACK.)

20 b 4]. Radio connunications between base and mobile radios utilized by Clermont County emergency response support groups within an approximate area of four miles of the Zimmer Station in the near environs of U.S. 52 paraleling the Ohio River of incapable of radio transmission due to topo-graphical and land characteristics of that area creating blank, or void, radio transmission whereby radio signals meet natural terrain barriers.

[No plan provision].

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l

20 b 5]. The Clermont County Emergency Plan provides for communica-tions among some of its emergency resource agencies by non-dedicated telephone line only, involving limited trunk service to certain agencies (one to four telephone lines), utilization of long distance telephone lines involving General Bell telephone systems, and as such this. portion of the communications plan does not provide a reasonable assurance that communica-tions necessary to a timely and prompt evacuation can be implemented, especially where limited trunk lines for telephone usage are subject to overload, e.g.,

20 b 5 1] Communications between the Superintendent of the Clermont County Board of Education-County E0C and the Superintendent. of the Felicit . _

Franklin School District requires 'use of limited long distance trunk line, subject to overload, between Bell and General telephone systems: Felicity-Franklin Superintendent has three trunk lines for use in communications

• between the County Superintendent and to summon school bus drivers (approx-imately 18) to the school site for student evacuation; 20 b 5 11]. The Superintendent of Bethel-Tate School District has two telephone trunk lines, subject to overload, for use in connunications between the County Superintendent and to summon school bus drivers (approx-imately 15) to the school site for student evacuation;

20 b 5 111]. The Superintendent of the New Richmond School District has four telephone trunk lines, subject to overload, for use in communica-tions between the County Superintendent and to sumon school bus drivers (approximately 17) to the school site for student evacuation and for tele-phone communications to the Monroe and Pierce Elementary Schools within the District, each school has two telephone trunk lines; 20 b 5 iv]. The telephone trunk lines for each of the affected school districts will be overloaded during emergency situations due to parental telephoning into the schools; 20 b 5 v]. All notifications to the County Superintendent, affected school districts, reception school districts, school district transporation supervisors, and school district bus drivers is by non-dedicated, existing telephone trunk lines. [ Plan, II-E, Table E-1, pp. II-E-3 and 5; III-A, .

p. III-A-2; %III-C, pp. III-C-1 through 3].

j 20 b 6]. The Campbell County Emergency Plan provides for communica-tions among some of its emergency resource agencies by monitor radio and non-dedicated telephone lines, involving limited trunk service to certain agencies (one to four telephone lines), subject to overload, and as such l

l

~

this portion of the communications plan does not provide a reascnable assurance that communications necessary to a timely and prompt evacuation can be implemented, e.g., -

4 20 b 6 i]. Communications to County School Superintendent by monitor radio and subsequent non-dedicated telephone use (four trunk lines to Superintendent);

20 b 6 11]. County Superintendent's notification to five elementary and one middle school, including A. J. Jolly Elementary School within two miles of the Zimmer Station, is by a single non-dedicated telephone line into each of the six schools, each trunk line into each school is subject to overload; 20 b 6 111]. The County Superintendent's notification to the Alexan-

• dria Elementary School and the bus garage is by two non-dedicated telephone lines into each facility, both of which are subject to overload; I

20 b 6 iv]. The County Superintendent's four non-dedicated truhk lines are the means of communications to 54 regular and seven substitute bus drivers to summon school buses to nine school sites for student l

l evacuation; l

20 b 6 v]. The telephone trunk lines for each of the affected schools, the Superintendent and the bus garage will be overloaded during emergency situations due to parental telephoning into the schools; 20 b 6 vi]. All notification (except initial notification to Super-intendent by monitor radio) and communications between schools, bus drivers and transportation supervisor is by non-dedicated, existing telephone trunk lines. [ Plan, Basic Plan, pp. V-5,6; Annex B, Communications, p. B-3; Annex C, Notification & Warning, p. C-4].

20 b 7]. The Pendleton County Emergency Plan provides for notifica-tion and communications of and between emergency resource personnel by monitor radio and in most instances by pager or non-dedicated telephone absent reasonable assurance that contact can be made by pager (distance limitation in transmission) or by telephone, and as such this portion of

• the connunications plan does not provide a reasonable assurance that com-munications necessary to a timely and prompt evacuation can be implemented, e.g.,

20 b 7 i]. Judge / Executive notified from DES Director by pager or telephone; DES Director notified from Communications Coordinator by pager or telephone; County E0C personnel to be notified by telephone, pager, or radio;

20 b 711]. DES Director contact, communication and notification with Fire and Rescue Coordinator by means of telephoning an answering service and thereafter the answering service " contacting" (assumption is by telephone) that coordinator who will in turn communicate with the DES Director by telephone; 20 b 7111]. Connunications to fire departments will be by telephone, whether between fire company members or between fire chief and Fire and Rescue Coordinator (only the Falmouth Fire Departnent has radio c~ontact with the EOC);

20 b 7 iv]. Notification to the Law Enforcement Coordinator from the DES Director by pager or telephone; 20 b 7 v]. Notification to key emergency response personnel by pager, .

telephone, or answering service, and communications with certain emergency l

response personnel is inadequate to present reasonable assurance that notification and subsequent communications can be made and sustained where ifmited to non-dedicated commercial telephone line providing for single telephone trunk. [ Plan, Annex A, Direction and Control, pp. A-5 through 7 and 9; Annex C, Notification & Warning, p. C-2-1].

1 l

l 1

j l

(

20 b 7 vi]. Notification of special concerns by monitor radio (except l Butler and Grant's Lick Nursing Homes and Black River Mining Company which is silent as to notification) is Northern Elementary School, other communi-cations by commercial radio. [ Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, pp. F-9-1 and 2].

20 b 8]. The Bracken County Emergency Plan provides for notification and communications of and between emergency resource personnel by monitor radio and in most instances by pager or non-dedicated telephone absent reasonable assurance that contact can be made by pager (distance limitation in transmission) or by telephone, and as such this portion of the communi-cations plan does not provide a reasonable assurance that communications '

necessary to a timely and prompt evacuation can be implemented, e.g.,

P 20 b 8 i]. Judge / Executive and DES Director notified from Communica- . -

tions and Warning Coordinator by pager or telephone; County E0C personnel to be notified by telephone, pager or radio; l

20 b 8 11] . Fire and policy emergency response personnel to be noti-

! fled by pager; field fire resonse personnel will communicate with the

, County EOC by telephone; l

l l

l l

l

20 b 8 111]. Law Ent urcement' Coordinator wil's be notiffed by pager or telephone; 20 b 8 iv]. Notification to key emergency response personnel by pager and communications by telephone; 20 b 8 v]. Notification to School Preparedness Coordinator and to Western Hills Elementary School by monitor radio, other communications by telephone, including summoning of school buses for evacuation of students.

[ Plan, Annex A, Direction & Control, pp. A-6,13, Annex C, Notification &

Warning, C-2-1; Annex F, Protective Actions, pp. F-9-1 and 2].

20c]. The public roadways, as access roads for the evacuation of the EPZ populate of Clermont County, Ohio, and Campb' ell, Pendleton and Bracken Counties, Kentucky, are inadequate to promptlyjand timely evacuate the involved population.

Specifically.

l 20 c 1]. The Clermont population in Designated Sectors SSE(H) and SE(G), a permanent population of approximately 800, proceed in an easterly direction from the Zimmer Station on the major evacuation route of U.S. 52, l

l l

I through Washington and into Franklin Townshlis i to S.R. 133, the junctio'n of which is not an access control site and then proceed in a northerly direction on S.R. 133, a distance in excess of 10 miles to S.R. 125 at Bethel, Ohio, at which point they are emerging from the plume exposure area (an approximate distance of ll-mile exposure of the plume on U.S. 52 and an approximate distance of 13-mile exposure of plume on S.R.133, for a total approximate distance of plume exposure of 24 miles): or alternatively the evacuees may proceed northerly on S.R.133 to the Village of Felicity and then proceed on S.R. 222 to S.R. 232 to S.R.125 at Bethel (an approximate distance of ll-mile exposure of plume on U.S. 52 and an approximate dis-tance of 20-mile plc.ae exposure on S.R.s 133, 222 and 232, for a total approximate distance of plume exposure of 31 miles); or alternatively after traveling on S.R. 222 to remain on that route to its intersection with S.R.

125 near Bethel (for a total approximate distance of plume exposure of 29 miles). From entry onto S.R.s 133, 222 and 232 there are no control access contro'1 point until the evacuees reach S.R.125. At 0.25 miles east of the intersection of U.S. 52 and S.R.133, on U.S. 52, there is a manned access control to direct traffic flow return to S.R. 133. The population east of the stated access control point (on U.S. 52 0.25 mile east of S.R. 133) involving the populations situated east of S.R. 133 and the Village of Utopia and approximately 40 roads servicing residents in the previously stated Designated Secotrs and the additional Designated Sectors of E(E),

~

ENE(0) and NE(C), are not within the evacuation route designated and must either proceed into the plume area by proceeding by roadways intersecting S.R. 133 or by following county and township roads to S.R. 125 west of Bethel, or proceeding directly into Brown County. The aforestated desig-nated evacuation route fails in its implementation to timely and promptly evacuate this portion of the Clermont population from the plume exposure zone. [Clermont Plan, II-I, Protective Response, pp. II-I-17, 18, 22 and 23].

20 c 2]. The Clermont population in Designated Sectors (portions)

E(E), ENE(0), NE(C), NNE(B) and N(A), constituting the populations of Monroe and Washington Townships, approximately 1,639 permanent population, , _ . _ _

are to proceed by alternative routes: one, a southerly direction to U.S.

~~

52 toward the Zimer Station and thence west on U.S. 52; two, proceed in a northwesterly direction to S.R.132, th5nce north on S.R.132 to S.R.125;'

cr, three, a northeasterly direction to S.R. 222, thence northerly on S.R.

222 to S.R. 125; in which the roadways servicing that population for travel for travel to an evacuation route consists of two state roadways and approximately 38 county and township roadways. Manned access control points are located on S.R. 756, o.25 miles south of Brown Road, on Laurel-Point Isabel Road 0.1 miles west of S.R. 222, and on S.R. 743, 0.5 miles west of S.R. 222 in Washington Township to direct traffic flow, and at the

junctidn of 5.R.s '232 and 756 S R. 232' O.$ miles north of Ireton Trees' "'

Road and at the juncture of Franklin-Laurel and Carnes Roads in Monroe Township. The county, township and two state roadways for travel to an evacuation route situated in the aforestated sectors are narrow, winding, hilly and hazardous roadways unsupervised for traffic flow and control, except limitedly manned as noted, for prompt, safe and timely evacuation of the permanent population within the area. The road configurations will not afford directions by radio to that population of the numerous roadways that the population must follow to correct evacuation routes and a safe evacua-tion in a prompt manner in the appropriate direction of travel cannot be implemented. [Clermont P1'an, II-I, Protective Responses, pp. II-I-17, 18, 22 and 23.]

20c3]. Clermont population in Designated Sectors N(A), NNW(R) and NNE(B), consisting of a portion of Monroe Township, Ohio Township and a portion of Pierce Township (a permanent population of 10,596), are to proceed either to U.S. 52, thence in a westerly direction and out of the plume area; or, to proceed to S.R.132, thence in a northerly direction to S.R.125, in which the roadways for travel to an evacuation route servicing that population consists of one state roadway and 27 county and township roadways. There are two access control points on the perimeter of the

plume zone at the junction of S.R. 749 and Cole Road and on Jenny Lind Road, 0.25 miles south of Cole Road, but no access control points within the affected township areas. The roadways for travel to an evacuation route in the aforestated sector are narrow, winding, hilly and hazardous roadways unsupervised for traffic flow and control, except limitedly manned as noted, for prompt, safe and timely evacuation of the permanent popula-tion within the area and a safe evacuation in a prompt manner in the appro-priate direction of travel cannot be implemented. [Clermont Plan, II-I, Protective Response p. II-I-17, 18, 22 and 23.]

(20 c 4] denied without prejudice to later submittal if 20 X] deter-mined favorably to ZAC-ZACK.)

20 c 5]. The Clermont permanent population with the plume area is rural, generally serviced by narrow and winding township roads without center line and involving country lanes approximately eight feet in width and ranging from 200 to 700-foot depth from the township roadway. The use of CART buses, "as available", cannot reasonably assure prompt transporta-tion for evacuees without vehicles assembled at pickup sites. School buses cannot be used for public transportation; 3313.172 and 3327.14, Revised Code of Ohio, preclude use of school buses for public transportation,

except transportation of senior citizens and adult education groups, rendering the use of school buses for public transportation unlawful.

Vehicles used to afford transportation of handicapped and individuals without vehicles must be capable of driving country lanes, removing the ability of buses, CART or otherwise, from traveling such lanes or nego-tiating turnaround at residences. The timely and safe evacuation of the population without vehicles cannot be implemented. [Clermont Plan, II-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-5; @III-A, County Agencies (Gen), pp. III-A-1 and 2; III-C, County School Districts, pp. III-C-1 and 2].

20c 6]. The evacuation time estimates for evacuation of the Clermont population, ranging from 1.0 to 3.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />, do not recognize the roadway circumstances of Clermont County and evacuation routing, the location of residences from public roadways, fails to take into account roadway block-age due to vehicular mishap, weather circumstances of the area as reflected, by the Clermont DSA time study estimating evacuation times within a range of 2.5 and 77.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, fails to consider the character of the population (unprepared as to provisions to be transported, inadequate fuel in evacua-tion vehicle, single vehicle families in which vehicle is at work site, attempts to make telephone contact with police agency to determine if emer-gency is a test or actual, detouring from evacuation routes to gather fam-ily members not at home, family returning to home from off-home site, panic reaction, vehicular mishap, impassable roadways due to flooding, ice or

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ~

i snow and inadequate roadways leading to evacuation routes), paragraphs 1]

through 3] and 5], supra, and as such the time estimates are grossly under-estimated and the population cannot be evacuated within the mandatory time limitations. [Clermont Plan, II-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-15; Table 3-2, p.3-7 of Attachment I-2, Stone & Webster Time Study].

20 c 7]. The evacuation of the . Campbell County population directed in a generally north direction of Persimmon Grove Road to proceed in a gen-erally northwesterly direction on evacuation routes Ky 10 and Ky 8 are inadequate where the plume pathway of radiation rlease from the Zimmer Station is generally northwesterly proceeding in the same path as the evac-uation routing, and is inadequate in the failure to evacuate that portion of the population away from the plume pathway; and the evacuation of the Campbell County population directed in a generally south directi.on of Persimmon Grove Road to proceed in a generally westerly direction on evac- .

uation routes 1121,1280 and U.S. 27 are inadequate where the plume pathway of radiation release from the Zimmer Station is generally westerly proceed-ing in the same path as the evacuation routing, and is inadequate in the failure to evacuate that portion of the population away from the plume pathway.

Implementation of the evacuation under the stated circumstances provides no reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the affected population is protected. [ Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions,

p. F-14-1.]

__ ~ . _ _ .

36 C] There are no provisions for alternate evacuation routes or for evacuation in opposite directions on the provided routes in consideration of different radioactive plume directions, traffic congestions, or impass-able roadways. Maps in Annex F of both plans have arrowheads pointed inexorably in fixed directions and the Kentucky Division of Disaster and Emergency Services has publicly stated that no consideration whatsoever will be given to changing the plans in this respect. Since Appendix 2 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 is devoted entirely to meteorlogical measurements and predictions of atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion and criterion J-2 provides alternate evacuation routes for onsite individuals, the regu-lations clearly imply, and common sense dictates, that the general public should be able to flee away from a radioactive plume rather than be forced to pass through' it.

20 c 8]. Campbell evacuation routes 1121, California Cross Road and .

Persimmon Grove Pike are narrow, winding and hilly with steep inclines; Lickert Road has four 90* turns and a narrow bridge impeding evacuation and where it intersects U.S. 27 there is no access point control to direct traffic flow resulting in traffic blockage or accident; Ky 8 is narrow without road berm, or shoulder, and approximately one-half mile southeast of Oneota for an approximately distance of one-fourth of a mile the road has eroded and been without repair for a substantial period; Wesley Chapel

_-______m_.._..______ ____. . _ _ _ _ _ _ .

Road and 1197 are narrow, hilly ridge roads; Ky 10 is a narrow winding ridge road and parallels 12-Mile Creek and during flooding this portion of Ky 10 is impassable; and the approximate 50 rural service roads that the population must travel to evacuation routes are approximately 12 feet wide without centerline, some gravel roadways leading to evacuation routes, due to topog- raphy and land characteristics, are not capable of affording prompt and timely evacuation of the population. [No plan provision].

36'0] A designated major evacuation route, Kentucky Route 8, is dangerous in places for ordinary use and obviously unfit for emergency evacuation purposes. In particular, south of Twelve Mile Creek the road is built into the side of a steep hill and is frequently subject to slippages, some of them so severe that the north bound lane has been practically unusable for weeks at a time. Piles have been driven recently in an effort to support the roadway, but the road surface is dangerously irregular and

• i convoluted and would be particularly hazardous during emergency evacuction conditions.

20 e 9]. There is an inadequate number of school buses to timely

• l and promptly evacuate students of the nine schools within Campbell County subject to plume exposure, and during school session evacuation the use of school buses as vehicles for evacuation of the general public without

transportation is incapable of affording timely and prompt evacuation of that segment of the population; there are no posted school bus stops or routes and there is no plan provision to educate the public where they are to assemble for school bus transportation to afford timely and prompt evac-uation of that segment of the population; the roadways within approximately eight miles of the Zimer Station are inadequate for TANK bus travel and maneuverability. The plan is not capable of being implemented in a timely and safe manner to evacuate that portion of the population without personal vehicles. [ Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, pp. 5 and 6; Annex, Protective Actions, p. F-9-1].

36 G) Plans for the safe and timely evacuation of people without personal vehicles and for those who are elderly, handicapped, confined ,

or otherwise incapable.of evacuating themselves are rudimentary, inade-quate, undeveloped ~, and unworkable. The proposed Campbell County plan -

for such people calls for their evacuation by school buses and through the assistance by the Eastern Campbell County Volunteer Fire Department

( Annex F, Appendix F-9, II, p. F-9-1 and III-C, p. F-9-3). The schools

' lack sufficient buses to evacuate school children (see Contention 36 E, consolidated with Contention 21]) and can not provide buses for this purpose; the fire department is not capable of providing this assistance (see Contention 36 H, consolidated with Contention 20 e 7].)

-- __. =-

20c 9A]. Acgess control points are,inadequ. ate in number and placement.

to direct and control traffic during evacuation and the plan does not pro-vide any reasonable assurance that an adequate number of police and other support groups are available to discharge the responsiblity and police and support groups are insufficient in number to be timely deployed to control evacuation traffic. [ Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, p. V-7; . Annex F, Protec-tive Actions, pp. F-10-1 and 2; Annex G, Law Enforcement, p. G-1-1: other than a statement of the identity of police units, no information is pro-vided as to number of personnel, vehicles and equipment to provide reason-able assurance that the plan is capable of being implemented].

20 c 10]. The evacuation time estimates for the evacuation of the Campbell population, ranging from 1.0 to 2.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />, as performed by Stone &

Webster, and ranging from 1.25 to 11.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, estimated by Kentucky DES, do not recognize the roadway characteristics of Campbell County, the location of. residences from public roadways, and fail to consider the

( character of the population (unprepared as to provisions to be transported, i

l inadequate fuel in evacuation vehicles, single vehicle families in which the vehicle is at the work site, attempts to make telephone contact with a p611cy agency to determine if emergency is a test or actual, detouring from evacuation routes to gather f amily members not at home, f amily returning to home from off-home site, panic reaction, vehicular mishap, impassable roadways due to flooding, ice or snow, inadequate roadways leading to

evacuation routes, and th~e character of evacuation roadway's as to ~

topography and land characteristics), and as such the time estimates are grossly underestimated and the population cannot be evacuated with the mandatory time limitations. [ Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, Appendix F-18, pp. 3-6 and 3-7.]

36B] The Stone and Webster evacuation time study (Kentucky plan:

Annex F, Appendix F-5 and Campbell County plan: Annex F, Appendix F-18) is deficient in several respects and gives a falsely optimistic impression of the ability of the people to evacuate in a safe and timely mann'er during a radiological emergency. [In the following recitation the parenthetical citings after sub-parts 1, viii, and x refer to clarifying addenda that follow this contention; all others' refer to requirements in Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 by section, part, and page number.]

4 The study:

i) grossly underestimates evacuation times and the conclusions

,are not supported by the assumptions (Addendum 1).

ii) does not give estimates of evacuation times for the segment of the non-car-owning population dependent upon public transport (IV-8, p.4-9).

1 ,

a

, e iii) does not indicate the critic' al' assumptions which underlie the time estimates (e.g., day versus night, workday versus weekend, peak transient versus off-peak transient. and evacuation on adjacent sectors versus nonevacuation) (IV-A, p. 4-7).

iv) does not address the relative significance of alternative assumptions (IV-A, p. 4-7).

v) does not make evacuation time estimates for each special facility on an individual basis (II-C, p. 4-3; IV-8, p. 4-10).

vi) does not consider the impact of peak populations including behavioral aspects (IV-8, p. 4-10).

• l vii) does not make specific recommendations for actions that could -

be taken to significantly improve evacuation time (V, p. 4-10).

viii) contains errors in measurements of road widths that could i,nfluence calculations of road capabilities and result in additional under-estimations of evacuation times (Addendum 2) ix) does not contain comments by the principal organizations re-sulting from their review of a draft submittal of the s'tudy (V, p. 4-10).

l l

l x) contains unresolved conflicts of great proportions between evacuation time estimates by Stone and Webster and those by the Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services, the Ohio Disaster Services Agency, and the Clermont County Disaster Services Agency ( Addendum 3)

Clarifying Addenda To Contention 36 8

1) At the prehearing conference Mentor used the following example.

The best estimate evacuation time with prompt notification time for the 0-2 miles zone in Sector II is given as 1.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (Table 3-1). An evacuation time is the sum of the notification, preparation, and travel times (p. 4-1) for the 0-2 miles zone in Sector II; notification time is .25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> (Table 3-1) and preparation time is .50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> (p. 5-7), whose sum is .75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />.

This leaves a travel time (not given) of .25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> evacuation time minue .75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> preparation and mobilization). Assuming an evacuee must

• travel 8 miles to get outside the plume exposure EPZ, he must travel at 32 miles per hour (8 miles in .25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />). The study, however, assumes a rate of only 25 miles per hour (p. 5-7). The study further assumes a distance of twice the radial distance to the edge of the evacuation zone (p. 4-1).

t l

i The evacuee, then must travel at 64 miles per hour rather than 25 miles per hour to reach to edge of the plume exposure pathway. -

The applicant has since then interpreted " edge of the evacuation zone" to mean " edge of the 0-2 miles zone" rather than " edge of the 10 miles evacuation zone" which Mentor had assumed. Under this interpretation the above calculations are obviously not correct. However, because the City has not had time to study the rest of Table 3-1 with this interpretation in mind and because this interpretation raises new problems about warning times, plume speeds, road capacities, etc., that influence evacuation times, the City is not ready to withdraw this part of this contention.

2) Table 5-1 (pp. 5-9 to 5-11) names evacuation routes and gives the number of lanes, width of lanes, and the average capacity in vehicles per hour of each road. A spot check of road widths in Campbell County (SR 8, .

SR 10, US 27, and CR1121) revealed t' hat not one of them is as wide as the table indicates.

Evacuation Width Implied Actual Width Route _by Table 5-1 by Spot Check (ft.) (ft.)

SR 8 24 20 SR 10 20 17.25

, US 27 24 22 CR 1121 20 15.5 Table 5-1 gives the average capacity as 1000 vehicles per hour

, for each. of these roads, but does not indicate whether this figure is for ,

l . '

volume in one direction or both di.rections, and cites Transportation and I

.T -

. ,. a. . . .

Traffic Engineering Handbook as an authority. If 1000 vehicles per hour average capacity is for travel in one direction (a reasonable assumption, since the discussion is about evacuation in one direction), cursory look at the reference shows that this figure is pure fantasy. Table 8.9 p. 331) gives the maximum service volume in both directions under. ideal conditions on two-lane rural highways as 2000 vehicles per hour. Short passing sight distances, low average highway design speeds, narrow lane widths and small lateral clearances, the combination of low performance vehicles and grades, as well as. driver psychology are among the factors that reduce service volumes considerably. If the 1000 vehicles per hour average capacity is for travel in both directions, then that qualification is inapplicable and inappropriate in the context of one-way evacuation and the figure is still inflated and subject to modifying factors.

3) Table 3-2 (p. 3-7) compares Stone and Webster evacuation time estimates and those of KyDES, 00SA, and CCDSA. With two exceptions the Stone and Webster times are invariably lower than the others. Differences between Stone and Webster and KyDES with prompt notification considered range from .25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> to 7.85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br />. Differences between Stone and Webster and ODSA and CCDSA without prompt notification range from .7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> to 60.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. In a "run for your life" situation when minutes count, these dif-ferences between planners raise the question of the veracity of radiolog-ical emergency response plans written by the same people.

20 c 11]. Pendlet n County evacuatien routes Corntown Road, Ky 10, Flour Creek Road,159, Concord Caddo Road and Falmouth Lenexburg Road are ridge roads, steep, narrow, winding and in areas limited to maximum speeds of 25 mph; and the approximate 20 rural service roads that the population must travel to evacuation routes are approximately 12 feet wide without centerline, several gravel roads, winding and hilly; the evacuation routes and access roadways leading to evacuation routes, due to topography and land characteristics, are not capable of affording prompt and timely evacuation of the population. [No plan provision].

20 c 12]. Evacuation time estimates are inadequate for the reasons presented in paragraphs 6] and 10] supra and this plan again sets forth the Stone & Webster study.

20 c 13]. Bracken County evacuation routes Ky 10, 1109 and Ky 8 are -

ridge roads, steep, hilly, narrow and winding and the approximate 10 rural service roads that the population must travel to the evacuation routes are approximately 12-foot in width without centerline, winding and hilly and incapable of affording prompt and timely evacuation of the population. [No planprovision].

20c 14]. Evacuation time estimates are inadequate for the reasons presented in paragraphs 6] and 10] supra and this plan again sets forth .the Stone & Webster study.

20d]. Withdrawn. .

20 e]. The involved counties of Ohio and Kentucky possess no profes-sional, full-time fire and life squads. relying totally upon volunteer, part-time personnel whose primary concern and responsibility is to other endeavors and who have limited training; and the involved counties rely in many respects upon volunteer, auxiliary policemen to supplement inade-quately staffed local police units and the total full-time and auxiliary police personnel, by number, are inadequate to provide immediate and neces-5.ary police control in an emergency situation and the emergency resource personnel of police, fire and para-medic are inadequate for utilization during initial emergency and evacuation.

• \.

Specifically.

(20 e 1] and 2] denied without prejudice to later submittal if 20 X]

determined favorably to ZAC-ZACK.)

20e 3]. Clermont County has only volunteer fire squads. Fire per-sonnel are assigned supporting access control action as available and no dependable count is furnished by the plan. Fire personnel within the plume area will provide door-to-door verification of population notification consisting of 113 volunteer personnel and 28 vehicles with an additional

.o

combined fire and life squad group of 134 (fire personnel numbers not stated in plan) to perform tasks in either the plume or relocation area and equipped with 18 vehicles. The plan f ails to indicate the number of volunteer fire personnel that would or could be available at the time of I emergency. The approximate number of fire personnel available on shift at notification for initial service would be 38. The miles of roadway within the plume area. together with the miles of country lanes involved, remove any reasonable assurance that fire personnel of 38 to 267 (assuming all volunteers could and would immediately respond) to facilitate door-to-door verification of notification within the plume area and the miles of roadway present. The plan presents nasonable assurance or upon implementation that any one, more or all < 6ne volunteer fire personnel would or could be -

present to assume the responsibilities assigned, or that such personnel would or could leave their regular employment and family responsibilities during evacuation. [Clermont Plan, II-I, Protective Response. p. II- I-6; III-B, Emergency Services, pp. III-B-2, 5 and 7.]

20 e 4]. Clermont County has only volunteer fire squads in which only Goshen and Miamiville have trained para-medics. The 119 life squad person-nel within the plume area possess four mobile and no portable radios and no information is provided as to vehicles or equipment possessed by the plume area life squads. The plan f ails to establish how many, if any, of the staffs. The plan fails to indicate, with any reasonable assurance, or upon

\

~

implementation, that any one, more or all of the velur.teer life sq:ad -

personnel would or could be present to assume any responsibility in the plume area during evacuation or that such personnel would or could leave their :agular employment and family responsibilities during evacuation.

[Clermont Plan, III-B, Emergency Services, pp. III-B-4 5 and 9.]

20 e 5]. The County Sheriff has 12 road patrol deputies, the local police have 14 full-time officers, with support from Pierce Township p'olice in the plume area providing an additional nine full-time police officers.

The Ohio State Patrol has approximately 25 patrolmen at the Batavia Post.

In addition to the foregoing, there are 16 volunteer police officers asso-ciated with the local police departments. At the time of notification of an emergency mandating evacuation there would be approximately four deputy i sheriffs, seven local policemen and eight State Patrolmen on duty, for a total of 19 local police officers available to provide emergency response on duty, for a total of 19 local police officers available to provide emer-gency response resources to man access control points and direct traffic and maintain order within the plume evacuation area. The Clermont Plan as drawn and to be implemented provides no reasonable assurance that local police are capable of performing the response responsibility assigned, especially with the necessity to timely and safely direct and control evac-uation traffic. Off-duty local police would be available on the ability to summon such officers to duty based upon the location of such officers

and the presence.pf a point of notification contact. The plan presents no

reasonable assurance (nor can it be reasonably implemented) that there is an ability to contact and sumon off-duty local policy officers to respond within the time restrictions present to promptly and safely direct the evacuation of the population. The time restrictions necessary to activate and deploy National Guardsmen or to s minon police officers from continguous counties provides no reasonable assurance in the plan or upon implementa-tion, that such police and guard units can respond within time to support evacuation of the population. The number of police officers and the limi-tation of police vehicles fails to provide any reasonable asurance that local police are capable of discharging the assigned responsibility. The number of access control points for the direction of evacuation traffic is inadequate to properly, safely and time,1y direct the evacuating population,

.together with the absence of any access control points manned by police or other support emergency response personnel in the intersecting roads for 3

• travel by evacuees to evacuation routes. [Clermont Plan, sII-I, Protective Response, pp. II- I-6, 15, 18, 23 and 24; III-B, Emergency Services pp.

III- B-1, 5 and 6].

'20 e 6]. The Clermont County Sheriff is assigned the primary comand authority of all county activities in response to an emergency, including evacuation, and shall direct all primary and support agencies. The Sheriff i

shall direct all personnel involved in access control, inc.luding local

[

police, local fire and State Pctrol. A county sheriff is empowered. and thereby limited, by 311.07, Revised Code of Ohio, to call upon the sheriff of any adjoining county and municipal and township officials in his or adjoining counties, to furnish law enforcement and fire protection, together with appropriate equipment, as necessary, to preserve the public peace and protect persons and property only in the event of riot, insur-rection, or invasion. The provisions of the plan providing command authority for emergency response to a Zimmer Station event or accident is not within the provisions of 311.07(B), Revised Code of Ohio, as the same does not consist of riot, insurrection, or invasion, and the plan as draf ted and to be implemented provides a power to the Sheriff of Clermont County to control local police, fire and State Patrol contrary to the laws of the State of Ohio and the provisions of the plan are unlawful. Based upon the legal status of the plan, it cannot provide either reasonable assurance of implementation, or implementation, by its assignment of command responsibility cor.trary to state law. [Clermont Plan, II-A, Command & Coordination, p. II-A-1, Protective Response, p. II-I-6; {III-A, County Agencies (Gen), p. III- A-12.]

l -

20 e 7]. The fire personnel, in part volunteer, in Campbell County i

are assigned the task of fire response and, "if capable," to assist other emergency response functions without clarification. The plan provides no information as to either number of personnel and vehicles or support 1

emergency functions. The,,pla,n f ails to .provid.e reasonable assurance that fire personnel are capable of discharging emergency response roles other than fire related activity. [ Campbell Plan, Annex I, pp. I-1 and 2, 1-1-2].

36 H] The Eastern Campbell County Volunteer Fire Department is located about one-fourth mile outside Mentor and serves Mentor as well as an area in the southeast portion of Campbell County. The proposed Campbell County plans call for its participation in an emergency response (Annex F, Appendix F-6, p. F-6-1, Appendix F-9, III-C, p. F-9-3. Appendix F-10, III,

p. F-10-1, Appendix F-11, II, p. F-11-1; Annex I, pp. I-1-I-2 Appendix I-1: and Annex M, I-B-2, p. M-1, and possibly IV-C, p. M-2, which refers to an Appendix I-2 which does not exist). This fire department has no plans for a radiological emergency response, has not participated in any state or local planning effort, has had no training for fixed nuclear facilities radiological emergencies and does not anticipate such training, has inadequate or inappropriate radiological monitoring equipment, has no radiological protective gear, and has no radio comunications with the Zimmer plant and inadequate radio comunications with other state and local response agencies; and there is no evidence that the other fire departments within the 10-mile EPZ in Kentucky have adequate plans, training, and equipment to respond to a radiological emergency.

20 e 8]. Campbell County has i.0 provision or information pertaining i.

to rescue squads, except that rescue squads are present in the county fire departments and possess ambulances. No information is provided pertaining to training and to treat radiological injury. The plan fails to provide reasonable assurances that emergency medical technicians are prepared to provide services other than first aid and hospital transportation and are not trained for the identification and segregation of radiation injury.

[ Campbell Plan. Annex H, Medical & Public Health, p. H-2.]

20 e 9]. The number of State and local police present and available to provide access control point manning and other traffic control direction to provide a reasonable assurance of a safe and timely evacuation of the population are inadequate in number, as well as an inadequate number of j police to reasonably assure the safe and timely evacuation of A. J. Jolly

!- State Park and Camp Sunshine. The plan fails to present any information

(

pertaining to the number of police to be punctually available at the time of an evacuation, support police to be summoned and the times required to afford supported police assuming duty stations, or the number of police vehicles present and to be utilized in controlling evacuation. [ Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-9-2 and 3, F-1-1 and 2: Annex G, Law Enforcement. pp. G-12 and G-1-1, Annex K, Military Support, pp. K-1 and 2.]

.,c_,,, , - - , - _ . _ ~ - - -

~

~

20 e 10].

The Fire Departments in Pendleton County are volunteer ~ and are assigned only the duty of fire emergency. All contact with county fire units is by telephone and fire companies will be activated for fire; other functions to be coordinated at the time. The plan and its implementation >

f ails to provide any reasonable assurance that the fire companies will provide emergency response to protect the public in an evacuation. The plan presents no nunber of personnel or equipment available. [Pendleton Plan, Annex A, Direction & Control p. A-9; Annex I, Fire Protection / Rescue, pp. Il and 2, I-1-1].

20 e 11]. Pendleton has no provision or information pertaining to rescue squads except that such squads are present in the three volunteer fire departments.and that they are _ trained in rescuing fire survivors. The plan as drafted and to be implemented provides no reasonable assurance that ,

rescue personnel can determine and segregate radiological injured persons or to provide any emergency services. [Pendleton Plan, Annex H, Health /

Medical Services, pp. H-1 and 2; Annex I, Fire Protection / Rescue, pp.1-1 and 2, I-1-1].

20 e 12]. The number of State and local police and other resource support. groups available to provide and man access control points and to provide traffice, together with providing traffic control and evacuation of Kincaid Lake State Park, is inadequate to present reasonable assurance

by the plan or in its implementation that the population affected will be timely and safely evacuated from the exposed area. [Pendleton Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions,pp. F-9-2, F-10-1: Annex G, Law Enforcement, pp. G-1 and 2 G-1-1].

20 e 13]. Bracken County has four volunteer fire departments, trained in fire and rescue only. Departments have standby and call up procedures and other than fire related activity, the personnel are assigned access control functions during an evacuation. The plan and its implementation fails to provide any reasonable assurance that the personnel will provide emergency response for the protection of the public durina emergency.

The plan presents no number of personnel or equipment available. [ Bracken Plan, Annex F, Protection Actions, p. ,F-10-1; Annex I, Fire / Rescue Service, pp. I-1 and 2, I-1-1].

20 e 14]'. Bracken County has no provision or information pertaining to rescue squads. The squads will provide ambulance service only. The plan as drafted and to be implemented provides no reasonable assurance that rescue personnel can determine and segregate radiological injuries or to provide any emergency service. [ Bracken Plan, Annex H, Medical & Public Health, p. H-2; Annex I, Fire / Rescue Service, pp. I-1 and 2.1-1-1].

20 e 15]. The number of local police and other resource support groups present to provide and man access control points and to provide

'l

. , traffic control is . inadequate to, present reasonable.. assurance by the plar ,

or in its implementation that the population affected will be timely and safety evacuated. [ Bracken Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-10-1; Annex G, Security and Law Enforcement, pp. G-1 and 2, G-1-1].

20 f]. During flood conditions of the Ohio River and its tributaries, access roadways to the Zimer Power Station and access roadways for evacua-tion, situated in Ohio, are impassable, and in certain flooding conditions the Zimmer Station site is isolated and inaccessible to emergency vehicles and in such circumstances both population evacuation and offsite assistance to the Zimer Station are impossible.

Specifically. .

20 f 1]. At flood stage, Ohio River crest of 53 feet, U.S. 52, approximately 1/4th of a mile north of the Village of Neville is under water and impassable as to U.S. 52, Neville Spur and Maple Creek Road for an approximate distance of 1/2 mile and including Maple Creek. Near the Village of Moscow, just south of S.R. 743 by several feet, U.S. 52 is under l water and impassable for an approximate distance of 1/2 mile and including i Ray Run. On either side of U.S. 52 at the intersection of Laurel-Moscow Road for a distance of approximate 1/2 mile, U.S. 52 is under water and l impassable and at a 64-foot Ohio River crest the bridge over Little Indian l

,,, ,, , - . . - - , - - - - . . , - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ - - - - - - - - - - * - ~ - ~ * ~ ' - - ~ ~ " " ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' " ' ' ~~'

4 Creek near L:urel-Mosc:w Road-U.S. 52 intersection, on U S 52- is under water and impassable. U.S. 52 at the Village of Point Pleasant, including the intersection of U.S. 52-Indian Road, intersection of U.S. 52 and S.R.

232, for an approximate distance of 1/2 mile is under water and impassable.

From, and including, Clermontville Road, and its intersection of U.S. 52, portions of Clermontville Road and approximately 1/2 mile to the north, U.S. 52 is under water and impassable. From a distance of approximately 1/4 mile south of the Village of New Richmond to approximately 1/4 mile south of the intersection of Bethel-New Richmond Road and U.S. 52, U.S. 52 is under water and impassable. Within two hundred yards of U.S. 52 and to the west of U.S. 52, the streets of the Village of New Richmond are under water and impassable. The bridge located on Fagins Run Roa within 50 feet of S.R.132 is under water and impassable due to the flooding of Twelve Mile Creek and that evacuation route entry into S.R.132 for the population northeast of the location is closed. Flooding of the Ohio River at a crest

~

e of 80 feet (1937 flood) U.S. 52 is under water and impassable from approxi-mately 1 mile east of the Village of Neville to the west and north to with-in approximately 200 feet of the entrance to the Ziamer Station and within 200 feet to the north of the entrance of the Zimmer Station and continuing through the Villages of Point Pleasant and New Richmond and to the north-west of New Richmond, U.S. 52 is under water and impassable. Maple Creek Road, S.R 743, Laurel-Moscoe Road, Indian Road, S.R. 232 Clermontville Altman Road, and Frank Willis Memorial Road are all under water and impass-able at their respective intersections with U.S. 52, totally precluding

1 1

vehicular travel to the Zimmer Station.

0uring flood crests o,f the' Ohio River from 53 feet to 80 feet a range from a substantial portion of an evacuation route is impassable and vehicular travel to the Zimmer Station is limited to S.R. 743 to U.S. 52 to Zimmer to the exclusion of U.S. 52 as an evacuation route from New Richmond to beyond Neville and the isola-tion of the Zimmer Station. Under those circumstances, including flood-ing of the Zimmer EOF site, evacuation and emergency plans cannot be imple-mented. [No plan provision].

(Note: "20 g]" was denomina'ted "20 h]" in ZAC-ZACK's November 12, 1981, submission.] .

20 g.--During inclement winte,r weather conditions, roadways in the involved counties of Ohio and Kentucky are impassable due to accumulations of ice and snow, rendering evacuation of the respective populations and response of offsite emergency units to the Zimmer Station impossible for substantial time periods, and the majority of access roadways for evacua-tion purposes remain impassable for prolonged periods of times, measured in weeks,.thereby prohibiting large segments of the Emergency Planning Zone populations of the involved counties from being evacuated promptly and timely by other means; and a large segment of the Emergency Planning Zone populations of the involved counties are unable to reach access roadways from their residences for extended time periods during the presence and

continuation of large accumulations of snow, thereby precluding eith.ei- , ,

their evacuation by motor vehicle or the timely and prompt evacuation by other means.

I Specifically.

20 g 1]. The Ohio roadways set forth in Contention 20 c) 1), 2) and

3) and the Kentucky roadways set forth in Contention 20 c) 7), 8),11), and

13) are rendered impassable due to ice and snow accumulatins during the period December 1 to March 31 annually. The roadway crews available in each of the respective counties are not equipped to rapidly remove snow and to sand and salt to render the roadways passable. The federal and state highways in the respectively counties remain impassable for periods of approximately three hours to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. County and township roadways cannot.

be made passable from periods ranging for two to 14 days. The topography  ;

and land characteristics, together with the roadways t'eing hilly, narrow, steep and winding, precludes any vehicle travel, other than four wheel drive vehicles. Police vehicles were rendered useless during the winters of 1977 and 1978 and police activity was limited to one four-wheel vehicle in Clermont County and volunteer four-wheel drive operators to transport necessities to families that could not leave their residences. A majority of the population of the involved counties maintain their residences approximately 100 to 700 feet from the public roadway and vehicles at the

-- ,-r -

e. - - - , , . , . . , , , , , _

home are inoperative and transportation by vehicle is capable. only. at the intersection of the residence lane wi';h the pLblic roadway. An evacuation during snow or ice accumulation, rendering a portion or all of the evacua-tion routes impassable and rendering the service roadways of township and county roadways for travel to evacuation routes impassable would result in the inability to evacuate the affected population due to impassable road-ways and the absence of sufficient support vehicles present to evacuate.

No county possesses sufficient snow moving, salting and sanding equipment and personnel to maintain roadways passable during snow and ice accumula-tion to present reasonable assurance that the population can evacuate during this seasonable condition. [No plan provision].

21. The evacuation plans for the plume exposure pathway of the Emer-gency Planning Zone includes 18 elementary and secondary schools situated in Clermont County, Ohio and Bracken County, Pendleton County and Campbell County, Kentucky. Evacuation plans for these schools are inadequate to evacuate the populations of such schools in a time period required to reduce, or minimize, exposure and protect the safety and health of the children.

36 E] The several schools, public and private, located within the 10-mile EPZ in Kentucky lack sufficient buses and drivers to evacuate the school children in a fast, safe and orderly manner; the buses do not have

... ..c:r-unications equipment for use during an evacuation or for notification - -

and instructions to drivers in the event of a radiological emergency during the picking up or delivering of school children to and from schools or dur-ing the use of buses in school activities; there is no radio communica-tions system for warning (first alert) or for use during an evacuation between the schools and the Zimmer plant, and the various local, state and federal response agencies; there is no internal telephone system of dedicated lines between the central office and several schools; and there is no agreement between the local boards of education and the state and local radiological response planners and agencies that the schools or the response agencies have the procedures. equipment or manpower to ensure a f ast, safe and orderly evacuation of school children.

The Kentucky Division of Di.saster and Emergency Services has publicly stated that neither it nor its Campbell County counter- part has written or will write SOPS for the schools, but that it is the schools' responsibility to write them. There is no evidence that SOPS for schools have been writ-ten or will be written in the foreseeable future.

Despite the fact that the Campbell County school system does not have enough buses to evacuate schoolchildren simultaneously (it daily uses 54 buses to accomodate 5800 children and about half of the buses are involved in shuttle, double, or triple runs), the proposed Campbell County plan says i

. that the schpol system is .the " primary agency for transportation during an evacuation ( Annex M, IV-A, p. M-2) and assigns the system the additional duty of patroling the 10-mile EPZ and providing evacuation transportation for people without personal vehicles (Campbell County plan: Annex C, IV-0-1, p. C-4: Appendix F-6; Appendix F-9, II, p. F-9-1; Appendix F-9, III-A, p. F-9-2; Appendix F-18, p. 3-4, p. 3-2, pp. 4-1 and 4-2, p. 5-6) .

21 a]. Withdrawn.

21 b]. The school personnel at each of the subject schools lack the training and qualifications to supervise and administer aid and comfort to school children, especially school children in the elementary schools, during evacuation and housing in reception sites during the emotional trauma occasioned by the emergency and evacuation, or to possess, control, supervise,and administer ~ the thrcid blocking agent, potassium iodi,de, as

=

required, to such children.

Specifically.

21 b 1]. Denied.

21b2]. Ohio has employed the policy that it will administer potassium iodide to emergency workers only and not to the general public.

Ohio has made no provision whatsoever to administer potassium iodide to the

~

sensitive,and vulnerable group. the child. 0hio will.not monitor children or adult for a maximum period of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> at reception site to determine whether such individuals have been contaminated a period too long to protect the health and safety of the public, especially the child, and at that delayed period (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) the administration of potassium iodide would be of little effect. Kentucky will administer potassium iodide to emer-gency workers and to the general public, including children. Thekentucky plan has no provision for the implementation of the administration of potassium iodide and unless administered early its effect is diminished.

No plan provides for the timely administration of potassium iodide to school children. The plan as drafted and to be implemented provides no reasonable assurance for the timely administration of potassium iodide to school children by school personnel or other emergency resource workers and as such there is no reasonable assurance that the safety and health

. of children will be protected in the event of contamination. [0hio Plan, III, Letters of Agreement, letter 14; Clermont Plan, II-8, Emergency Response Support, p. II-B-1 (no plan provision); Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, V-8; Annex F, Protective Actions, p. 7, F-11-1; Pendleton and Bracken Plans comparable to Campbell Plan.]

21 c]. The respective school districts do not possess a sufficient number of buses for a timely and orderly transportation from the school to l a receiving site during evacuation.

i l

e

~ . .-

Specifically. ,, . , , ,

21 c 1]. The New Richmond School District has 17 buses and a student population of 2,562 students. The schools located in this district are at three different sites. The current fleet of buses requires that the student population being bused to or from school by each bus traveling three routes for each transportation of students, requiring that the bus be in transit for one hour each morning and evening routes. Monroe and Pierce Elementary students would be evacuated to the receiving site first and then return of buses for evacuation of the student population at the New Richmond site. From boarding of buses to the receiving site at Glen Este and return' would consume approximately one hour before commencement-of the boarding of the New Richmond. school population, total evacuation

' time for the last students to be evacuated and out of the 10-mile zone would be approximately four hours. The number of buses necessary to timely and ,:romptly evacuate the New Richmond District school population would be

! 43 buses. New Richmond is 26 buses short of the required number to effec-tively evacuate the school children of this district. The plan as imple-

,me,nted has no assurance, reasonable or otherwise, that school children can be effectively evacuated in a safe and timely manner.

I 21 c 2]. Bethel-Tate School District has 12 buses and a student population of 1900. The schools within the district are located at one

, site,.. _The, current fleet of buses requires that each bus transport students on two trips, morning and af ternoon. Approximatiely one-half of the student population would be evacuated to Goshen schools and bus return before the remaining population could be bused. The total time for evacuation would be approximately,three hours. 'The number of buses necessary to evacuate the student population of this district would be 31 buses. Bethel-Tate is 19 buses short of the required number to effectively evacuate the school children of this district. The plan as implemented has no assurance, rea-sonable or otherwise, that school children can be effectively evacuated in a safe and timely manner.

21 c 3]. Buses sent from other districts can not timely evacuate the children at the two involved Ohio school districts because of the time requirements for transportation of those buses from original site to the plume school site and the circumstances of the necessity to utilize those buses for the evacuation of the students located at the receiving sites to -

afford reception of the evacuees, adult and school child. [No plan l

provision, Ohio or Clermont Plans; see limited discussion, Clermont Plan II-I, Protective Response, p. II-I-5; III-A, County Agencies (Gen), p.

III-A-2, III-C, County School Districts, pp. III-C-1 through 3 and 5].

21 c 4]. The Campbell County School District has nine schools at various sites, including A. J. Jolly Elementary approximately 2 miles from

i .

the Zimmer Sta, tion, it has,60 buses, 25 of whi,ch tre 8 yeart.or older and . ,. .

subject to mechanical failure, and a student population of 6,111 students.

Students are transported to and from school in morning and evening double and triple routing. More than half of the student population would be required to remain at school while the first evacuees would be transported to a reception site and the buses returned to the schools .to continue evac-uation. Sixty-two additional buses would be required to provide timely and '

safe evacuation of the students in the affected area. In addition to the aforestated buses, the district is required to utilize two lift buses for handicapped children, each bus required to make two trips. No other buses would be available of any type to accommodate the evacuation of the handi-capped children in a timely and safe manner. The time required to evacuate

- the student population-would be approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The plan as imple-mented has no assurance, reasonable or otherwise, that school children can I

be effectively evacuated in a safe and timely manner. [ Campbell Plan, Basic Plan, pp. II-4, 7 and 8, V-5,6 and 11; Annex C, Notification and Warning p. C-4: Annex F, Protective Actions p. F-9-2.]

21 d]. The respective school districts do not possess either the capability or the number of buses necessary to afford transportation for the evacuation of school children where the emergency evacuation arises durinp bus transportation of children for the commencement or termination of the school day, because of the bus routing, multiple routes and trips, y-. , - - - - - - - - -

--Q - , , , . , -

and a portion of the children being located at the school site,and the remaining children being transported in the available buses.

Specifically.

21 d 1]. The schools involved in the New Richmond and Bethel-Tate School Districts of- Ohio and the-Campbell County School District of Ken-tucky have no means of comunication to bus drivers while the driver is enrodte. No present state or county plan presents a reasonable assurance or could be capable of implementation where students have been received at each school site following the first route trip and while the buses and drivers are in the course of picking up students preparatory to transpor-ting them to school and evacuation i.s ordered and there is no present abil-ity to contact the drivers and to direct them to transport the students currently on the buses to a receiving or other site during which time the I driver would continue on his normal route and there would be no provision for the summoning of those buses to transport the students required to be evacuated to a receiving site.

21 d 2]. No other school district contiguous to the involved school districts could dispatch buses to.the three affected districts because of l utilization of their respective fleet of buses and the inability to communicate with their drivers to advise discharge of their passengers.

l a

21 d 3]. The converse of 1] and 2]. would apply during the afternoon-initial routings where a portion of the student population would be on buses and the remaining student population at school without bus facility.

21 d 4]. Tho evacuation times set forth in the specified paragraphs of Contention 21 c] would be substantially increased and-for which there is no plan or its implementation capable of presenting an assurance. reason-able or otherwise, that the affected school children could be timely and safely evacuated frc.1 the affected schools. [No plan provision].

21e]. The inability of the respective school districts to summon buses to school sites in a prompt and timely manner, or provide standby

~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~

buses where , school evacuation is required during the course of the school day, the ' buses being located and stationed at various sites, unattended by drivers.;and the inadequate and ineffective means, or no means, of comuni ,

l cation to drivers to advise of the emergency and to require bus response to the subject school to comence evacuation.

Specifically. ..

21 e 1]. The buses utilized for student transportation of pupils in the New Richmond and Bethel-Tate School Districts of Ohio and the Campbell County School District of Kentucky are maintained by their drivers at the

driver's residence or other parkir.g area. in which the buses are parked -

during the school day offsite of the affected schools within the respective districts. Upon notification that it is necessary to conduct an evacuation of school children there are no reens to assure the contact of all drivers to summon the buses to the school sites, except as such drivers could be reached by telephone at their homes or other normal place during the non-driving period of the school day. Where the driver could not be contacted and instructed to drive the bus to the school site, that bus would be removed from the transportation means of evacuation. School bus drivers during non-driving school hours are involved in other modes of employment, including f arming, and in leisure pursuits, during which time they may not be accessible by telephone contact. The use of pagers to summon drivers are inadequate for transmission and notification over a distance of 12 miles and shopping areas and other areas for indulging in leisure pursuits, and areas in which one might be conducting business are beyond the 12-mile

=

i range for paging. There is no provision in any plan that provides for notification to drivers and as such there is no plan provision presenting reasonable assurance that buses can be summoned to the school site during l

. an emergency.

21 e 2]. The location of school buses during the school day ranges from 5 to 15 miles from the school site and upon notification to the driver an approximate hour is consumed from the point of advising that evacuation -

i l

o .-

l

.is. beinp ordered to the point, that the . notified driver arrives at the school site to connence transportation of evacuating children.

21 e 3]. None of the three school districts have the facility or the relationship with their respective drivers to park and maintain school buses at each respective school site. This circumstance removes any rea-sonable assurance that students can be timely and safety evacuated from school sites during a radiological emergency. [No plan provision.]

22. Withdrawn. ,

23. The characteristics of the Emergency Planning Zone portions of Clermont County, Ohio and Bracken, Pendleton and Campbell Counties, Ken-tucky is such that no adequate, effective. and positive education, training and advice to the public 'can be presented for the public's responsive, orderly and timely evacuation in the event of accident.

Specifically.

23 1]. The affected population of the involved counties ranges in education from elementary education to University trained and within the five-mile radius of the Zimmer Station is rural, f arming and factory employed populace. Flooding circumstances and being within the tornado

. is beino ordered to the- point that the notified driver arrives at the school site to comence transportation of evacuating children.

21 e 3]. None of the three school districts have the facility or the relationship with their respective drivers to park and maintain school buses at each respective school site. This circumstance removes any rea-sonable assurance that students can be timely and safety evacuated from school sites during a radiological emergency. [No plan provision.]

22. Withdrawn.

23. The characteristics of the Emergency Planning Zone portions of

~ ~

Clermont County, Ohio and Bracken, Pendleton and Campbell Counties, Ken-tucky is such that no adequate, effective and positive education, training and advice to .the public 'can be presented for the public's responsive, orderly and timely evacuation in the event of accident.

Specifically.

23 1]. The affected population of the involved counties ranges in education from elementary education to University trained and within the five-mile radius of the Zimmer Station is rural, f arming and factory employed populace. Flooding circumstances and being within the tornado

~

belt the population has been instructed by various mean: as to protective -

actions to be taken in the event of flood and in the event of tornado, as well as the use of sirens and other types of warning device including door-to-door notification. In each situation there has been a large seg-ment of the population who telephone local police agencies to inquire if the siren is actual or for drill, notwithstanding the educational measures taken; and who upon being advised by door-to-door notification nonetheless neglect to take protective action until forced to do so by policy author-ity; Inquiry to police agencies have overloaded the trunk lines within the community serviced by an assigned number of telephone trunk line. [NoPlan provision.]

23 2]. Times necessary to takb protective action during flood and tornado have been greatly in excess of estimated times because of the reactions of a large segment of the population. [No plan provision].

23 3]. The " Circle of Safety" as the mode of educating the affected population as to the nature of nuclear power, radiation, protective action, preparation is beyond the capabilities of the majority of the population .

within the affected area. Based on the average number of sentences per 100 words and the average number of syllables per 100 words the publication, in accord with Fry's Readability Graph, is within college level readability.

The publ'ication is too involved, too long and too sophisticated in its

writing. style to be either-read or understood by c large segmer.t of the involved population. The publication's style is comparable to text-book industry publications which do not interest the average reader and due to length frustrate the average reader and deters complete reading. Further, the publication in preliminary sentences attempting to minimize the poten-tial hazards directs the average reader to stop reading those portions because the reader is initially informed that the matter will probably not occur and thus is extraneous information. The publication has no reason-able asurance of being read, understood or educating the population within the EPZ and thus has no educational value of informing the affected public of the matters necessary to be known by that public to properly respond to an emergency at the Zimmer Station. [Clermont Plan, II-F, Public Informa-tion, Attachment F-1, pp. II-F-3, et seq.; each of the Kentucky counties have the same publication present in their plans].

4 12]. The document known as the " Circle of Safety" is written in vague language and language not calculated to insure that the populace will take the appropriate protective measures in the event of a general emergency.

23 4]. The plans provide no reasonable assurance of the information to be disseminated to the public, permanent and transient, (to be mailed to all permanent population, placement in local telephone books, or the

-53 installation of signs) will be :ufficient to inferm .cr in ':ts n4hi' o' '

dissemination (style), will not minimize the hazards and deter the educa-tional value of the mater.ial, or being written in such a manner that it is not readily understood by the public, e.g., " Circle of Safety." [Clermont Plan, II-F, Public Information pp. F-1 and 2; Campbell Plan, Basic Plan,

p. V-2; Annex J, Public Information, pp. J-5 and 6; same- information con-tained in Pendleton and Bracken Plans].

23 5]. There is no plan provision, or adequate assurance presented, as to the method, manner and text of the publications to be posted for the information of the transient population, particularly those visiting parks, historical sites and engaged in recreation pursuits on and near the Ohio River, all of which are within the affected area. [No plan provision].

24. Within the EPIs of the Zimmer Station, inclusive of a 50-mile radius, there are inadequate medical facilities to afford the required bed space, medical and para-medical personnel, requisite medication, screening,

, treatment and isolation of persons sustaining radiological injury; and the

, absence of adequate emergency materials, supplies, equipment and vehicles l necessary for the transportation of injured persons, injured onsite and offsite, during a radiological accident.

l l

Specifically.

l I

l e

241].- Clermont Countj and Cincinnati Genar al Hospitals 'are the two

• Ohio hospitals which would provide inpatient treatment to radiologically injured individuals The Central Ohio River Valley Association (CORVA) will provide guidance to those hospitals for development of disaster plans to include radiological emergency patient hand 11ng. Clermont County Hospital claims that it will treat radiological casualties and will institute pro-cedures for radiation exposure treatment. Clermont County Hospital has 109 beds, but of that number would provide 45 beds by discharging ambula-tory patients and transfer of others. Clermont County Hospital would transfer overage patients to Cincinnati General Hospital. Clermont County Hospital has not sought guidance frorii CORVA to the date of the filing of these revised contentions. Clermont County Hospital has not revealed its hospital plan for radiological treatinent. CORVA will be disbanded April 1, 1982. Clermont County Hospital has two full-time radiologists and one radiotherapist, as a consultant, and two radiation monitors and sufficient '

decontamination equipment for minor radiation accidents. There is nothing to indicate that Clermont County Hospital has separate, segregated emer-gency facilities so that other patients are not contaminated. The plan as drawn and as to be implemented does not provide reasonable assurances that Clermont County Hospital can provide adequate facilities and personnel to treat ~ radiologically injuried individuals. [Clermont Plan, II-K, Med &

Pub Health Sup p. II-K-1: IV, Letters of Agreement, Clermont County Hospital to Conover, January 21,1981.]

6

6 24 2]. 0ther than noted in paragraph 1] above. no.other information . .. .

^

is presented by the Clermont Plan pertaining to Cincinnati General Hos-pital . [No plan provision].

1 24 3]. Campbell represents that three hospitals have the capabil-ities to treat radiological injuries: St. Luke Hospital:. Cincinnati Gen-eral and the University of Kentucky Medical Center (Lexington, Kentucky, approximately one hour travel time from Campbell County): in which each has submitted a letter agreement. Only the letter from St. Luke Hospital is pres nted in the plan. St. Luke Hospital does not indicate its bed capa- -

city or how many beds would be available to hospitalize radiologeally injured patients. This hospital has two radiology technicians and some monitoring equipment. Isolation of contaminated patients is not indicated, nor is the presence of separate, segregated emergency facility. The plan

. as drawn and as to be implemented does not provide reasonable, assurances that St. Luke Hospital can provide adequate facilities and personnel to treat radiologically injured individuals. [ Campbell Plan, Annex H, Medical

& Public Health p. H-2; Annex P, Inter-Government & Private Relations, letter, St. Luke Hospital to Flynn].

24 4]. Other than noted in paragraph 3] above, no other information is presented by the Campbell Plan pertaining to Cincinnati General Hospital or University of Kentucky Medical Center. [No plan provision].

J

_ . . - - - _, .m. -_-y..__ _ . _ , _ - -

~

24 5]. Ohio"sppli'es the policy that' it will not administer pota'ssium iodide to the general public. including children. This position taken by the State of Ohio and its political subdivision of Clermont County, removes any consideration of a reasonable assurance being presented by state and county plans and the. failure to implement any procedure for the prompt

~

administration of potassium iodide to block radioactive iodine intake to the thyroid gland, presents a substantial departure from required protec-tive action to safeguard the health and safety of the exposed population.

[0hio Plan, sIII, Letters of Agreement, letter 14; Clermont Plan, II-B, Emergency Response Support, p. II-8-1 (no plan provision)].

24 6]. The life squads present in Clermont County, Ohio have no training fcr the examination and determination of persons contaminated and to take required safeguards to exclude such individuals from non-contaminated members of the public; and the members of the respective life squads in the plume area of Clermont have no training or qualifications in rendering aid to individuals contaminated and individuals sustaining radio-logical injury. The members of the plume area life squads in Clermont Cou,nty may or may not respond as emergency resource personnel based upon priority commitments to one's vocation and the need to assist one's family during the evacuation process. The Clermont Plan in its implementation of providing volunteer life squads to assist and render aid to radiological injured and etstaminated individuals provides no reasonable assurance that

s such volunteer wil! in fact volunteer one's services during an emergency.

[No plan provision.]

24 7]. The monitoring of evacuees by local police and fire personnel at relocation centers within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of the evacuees arrival is inadequate to screen, separate and isolate contaminated individuals, providing expo-sure by the contaminated person to the population at the relocation center.

There are no provisions set forth and no implementation of training to police and fire personnel to properly monitor evacuees at relocation cen-ters, to screen evacuees and isolate those contaminated or to decontaminate such individuals or the facilities for decontamination. There is no provi-sion for monitoring of persons present at relocation centers before such persons exit the premises. [Clermont Plan, II-I, Protective Response,

p. II-I-4; otherwise no plan p'rovision.]

l 24 8]. Campbell County provides no plan or its implementation for the timely administration of potassium iodide as to the manner, place, administration and timely presentation of such blocking agent to the gen-

.eral public, and as such there is no reasonable assurance that the blocking agent can be systematically and timely administered to the public. [ Camp-be11 ' Plan, Basic Plan, p. V-2,; otherwise no plan provision.]

i

.. 36 F] Although the p1ans acknowled5 4 that, it .is imputant that potassium iodide (KI) be administered as early as possible after a radioactive release and that it loses effectiveness quickly over a short period of time, there are no plans for the storage or distribution in Mentor or in the imediate vicinity of Mentor or within the 10-mile EPZ of KI for use by the general public. [ Campbell County plan:- Annex F, IV-A-3,

p. F-4, IV-F. p. F-7: Appendix F-11.]

24 9]. Campbell County does not provide for any monitoring of plume exposed persons, except that persons transported by school buses who do not wish to go to a reception center will be decontaminated at Northern Ken-tucky University. The absence of any reasonable assurance that contamina-ted persons will be monitored and decontaminated, as necessary, fails to provide reasonable assurance that monitoring of persons and decontamina-tion procedures will be implemented. [ Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-9-1.]

24 10]. The procedures in Clermont and Campbell Counties to acquire lists of disabled, handicapped and senior citizens requiring special trans-portation fails to provide reasonable assurance by the plan or in its implementation that all such individuals are identified and that adequate vehicles and personnel are available and dependable to enter tu plume l

. . exposed area to evacuate such individuals. [Clermont Plan II-B. Emerr gency Response Support, p. II-B-1; @II-I, Protective Response, p. II- I-5; Campbell Plan, Annex F, Protective Actions, p. F-9-1.]

25. The monitoring devices selected and their placement offsite for the monitoring of releases, anticipated and accidental, of radioactive materials, including plume exposure in the event of accident, as to the location are inadequate to protect the health and safety of the population of Clermont County, Ohio, and as the same applies to the monitoring of releases into the Ohio River, and other sources of water for human consump-tion, as the same affects drinking water, plant and animal life of that waterway and area within .the plume exposure which are subsequently consumed

^

by the population of the county; and the inability of such monitoring to adequately and timely inform the applicant and local and state agencies and related dissemination ,of such information to and for the protection of the ,

i public's health and safety. -

Specifically.

25 1]. Denied.

25 2]. Denied.

e .

(Note: 25 3] and 4] are admitted only to the extent that they raise matters within the purview of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9).)

25 3]. The Clermont County Board of Health and the Clermont County Cooperative Extension Service are jointly responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the impact of radiation release upon county farm products and livestock and based upon such monitoring and assessment wi11' institute protective actions pertaining to milk and livestock feed control. The plan provides no procedure and no procedure can be implemented with reasonable assurance for the protection of the public that livestock and dairy cattle within the monitoring range can be provided stored, closed fded. removed from pasturing, that facilities exist at the respective farm to remove livestock from field and house them and to store in sufficient quanity feed in closed containers, and to monitor that such protective agricultural practices are followed at the f arm level. [Clermont Plan, III-A, County Agencies (Gen), pp. III-A-3 and 10; otherwise no plan provision.]

25 4]. There is no provision for the monitoring of milk produced in the. EPZs and transported in bulk to a processing and bottling facility for distribution to retain groceries and subsequent human consumption. -[No planprovision.]

26. Denied.

27. Denied. - -

28. Denied.

29. Withdrawn.

30. Denied.

31. Denied.

32. Denied.

33 Denied.

34. The proposed Kentucky and Campbell County radiological response plans invalidate themselves as responses to the requirements for plans in 10 C.F.R. 50.33(g),10C.F.R. 50.47 (a), (b),10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appen-dix E, and NUREG-0654 because they repudiate their own use during an emer-gency. The Campbell County plan (p. V, Plan Organization) contains the following statement: "

During an emergency, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS), developed from the plan, will be employed to respond to the emer-gency rather than this planning document". This statement is essentially repeated in the Campbell County Basic Plan, Appendix '8, p. VII-8-1, and r - w yw , c -

y_ .--- ,, .- -y. _ _ ..

= .

a and twice ..in the Kentucky plan: Plan Organization p. VI and Basic Plar.,

Appendix 5, p. 5. SOPS are not included in the plans and have not been submitted separately.

Since the plans disavow themselves and establish SOPS as the sine ouo non of emergency planning during an emergency. and since no SOPS are con-tained in the proposed plans or have been otherwise submitted, the people of Mentor of Campbell County, and of Kentucky have no plan to protect their health, safety, and interests during a radiological emergency at the Zim er plant. As they stand, the so-called plans are, by self-description and by objective inspection, simply statements of intentions or, at best, I plans for plans. To consider them in any other light would deny Mentor its right to make a timely evaluation of plans that would actually be used dur-ing an emergency. those that, if they exist, are hidden in the undisclosed SOPS.

35. Although the 50-mile ingestion pathway for the Zimmer Station EPZ includes about 700 square miles of southeast Indiana there are no radio-1ogical emergency plans by or on behalf of the State of Indiana or the affected local Indiana governments. This omission endangers the health, safety, and interests, not only of the people of Indiana, but also of the people of Mentor, Campbell County, Kentucky, and Ohio, and is in violation of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,10 C.F.R. 50.33(g), 10 C.F.R. 50.47,

~ .c

-MUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, II-J-ll p 75-(and all other criteria for state plans which are related to ingestion pathway planning).

The people of Mentor. of Campbell County, and of Kentucky (and of Indiana and Ohio) do not live in a vacuum; political boundaries are of no significance here. Parts of Kentucky (including Mentor). Indiana and Ohio form a tri-state area within which there is production, distribution and consumption of milk and other foodstuffs with little or no regard to point of o,rigin. The people of Mentor buy their food in this tri-state market and must not be exposed to the hazards of contaminated food from the unpro-tected Indiana part of the 50-mile EPZ. Simple humanitarianism extends this concern to all people who might be similarly exposed.

36A]. Denied. .

36B]. Consolidated with 20 c 10].

36C]. Consolidated with 20 c 7].

36 0]. Consolidated with 20 e 8].

36E]. Censoiidated with 21].

36 F]. Consolidated with 24 8].

, -_ , . , - , _ - _ _ _ _ . - . . _ _ . . _ , _ . . , - _, . . _ . _ ~ _ . _ . _ - , . _ _ _ . . _ _ . . , - . _ _ _ . - . - . . , . , , , , _ ,

4 D. p O

l

\

. . , . 4 -

' 36']'

G' Consolidated with 20 c 9].

36 H]. Consolidated with 20 e 7].

36I]. The proposed system for prompt notification of the public (Campbell County plan: Annex C, I-A-1, p. C-1, IV-C, p. C-3, Appendix C-5) is inadequate and a burden to the people in that the siren system is designed to warn only 40% of the people within the 10-mile EPZ and has not been tested to ensure that it kill achieve that design objective in any or all weather conditions for people outside or inside their homes during all -

their various activities; the radio system will not serve people who are outside their homes, farmers in the field, or people in their automobiles and the integrated siren and radio system is not adequate to protect those with hearing or sight impairments or those who operate or are near loud or noisy equipment and, being dependent upon electricity,'will not function during periods of electric power outage.

36 J]. Denied.

36 K]. Provisions for the monitoring, control and regulation of public water supplies, or for the availability of uncontaminated water to the public, before and during a radiological emergency (Campbell County plan: Annex D. Appendix D-3; Annex F, G, p. F-8, pp. F-11, F-12, and

)

y-F-13, Appendix F-12, IV p F-12-1 Annex H IV-B, p. H-2 Annex P, Appendix F) are not adequate to protect the health and safety of the people of Mentor or for a large population within the 10 and 50-mile EPIs in Kentucky because there is no radio communications system between the Zimmer plant or state or local response agencies and the water treatment and supply facilities; the water treatment and supply facilities do not have the equipment or trained personnel fer continuous monitoring of water before and during a radiological emergency; the present plans are too undeveloped and too clumsy and time-consuming to ensure that prompt and appropriate protective action can be taken; and, further, the people of the City of Mentor and a'large population within the 10 and 50-mile EPZs, who receive their water from treatment and supply facilities that are situated near and are not unlike those of the City of Cincinnati, have not received consideration and potential protection similar or equal to that given the

/-

people of Cincinnati as evidenced by the recent settlement between the ,/

/

applicant and Cincinnati in a matter of radiological protection. '

36L]. Denied.

36 M]. Denied.

pf .

,: 1s>' -

.