ML20054F876
| ML20054F876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1982 |
| From: | Sinclair J VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| To: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FVY-82-72, NUDOCS 8206180075 | |
| Download: ML20054F876 (13) | |
Text
VERMONT Y AN KEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION SEVENTY SEVEN GROVE STREET 2.C.2.1 RUTLAND, VERMONT 05701 FVY 82-72 June 16, 1982
. E,cy,0, ENGINEERING OFFICE United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1671 WORCESTER ROAD Washington, D. C. 20555 FRAuiNos Au. u Ass AcH usETTs oi7oi TELEPHONE 617-872 6100 Attention:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing
References:
(a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
(b) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, dated May 10, 1982 (c) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 82-52, dated May 10, 1982 (d) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 81-109, dated July 31, 1981 (c) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, dated February 20, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-12)
Subject:
Alternate Shutdown System
Dear Sir:
to Reference (b) requested Vermont Yankee to submit additional information regarding our proposed alternate shutdown system. The purpose of this letter is to forward the attached information in response to l
that request.
It should be noted that the enclosed information supplements information previously submitted to you via Reference (d). This Reference submitted our proposed alternate shutdown system design and was intended to respond to the request for information in Reference (e). During a subsequent telecon in November of 1981, between NFC Staf f, Vermont Yankee, and the NRC's consultants (Brookhaven), Reference (d) was discussed. Questions were presented by the NRC's consultant and answered to his satisfaction. Vermont Yankee was informed at that time that these questions would be formally transmitted to us for formal resolution. The questions were subsequently forwarded as Enclosure 4 to Reference (b).
To the best of our knowledge, these questions represent the only outstanding information necessary for your staff to complete their review of our submittal. Certain information, such as detailed drawings, is not provided because it has not yet been developed at this stage of the design.
However, this information can be made available to you at our engineering offices located in Framingham, MA, as it is developed.
We trust that this information is acceptable; however, should you deem additional information is necessary, please inform us as soon as possible.
Very truly yours, VERMONT YANKEE liUCLEAR POWER CORR 0 RATION
[J.B.Sinclair0. [7,,4W hooI 8206180075 820616 Licensing Engineer PDR ADOCK 05000271 PDR p
ENCLOSURE 1 VERMONT YANKEE ANSWERS TO NRC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION BACKCROUND:
Vermont Yankee submitted its detailed concept for an Alternate Shutdown System July 31, 1981.
Information about equipment details was not supplied at that time because these details were still under development. Although the NRC has not approved this design concept, engineering has gone ahead. Some equipment has been ordered, and specifications for the balance are being completed.
Since the 1981 submittal, engineering and purchase has proceeded, assuming installation at the next outage af ter the fall of 1981, which is Spring,1983.
It is intended to furnish as much information as is available now.
For anything not yet purchased, details will be supplied when available.
NRC REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI):
1.
Confirm that the capability will be provided to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as required by Appendix R of 10CFR Part 50.
RES PONSE:
Vermont Yankee's design will be able to achieve cold shutdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The RCIC steam turbine-driven pump supplies reactor makeup and removes heat via the steam consumed. Once reactor vessel Icvel is maintained, af ter an initial drop, pump flow will be split. Flow not needed for reactor makeup will return to the condensate storage tank via the full flow test line. Thus, vessel cooldown will be controlled by turbine steam flow, which is regulated by setting the pump to full flow on the controller or governor. Vessel level will be controlled by full flow test line throttling. When cooled sufficiently, RHR will be placed in service for vessel cooldown, as designed. Previously, it will have been on torus cooling.
2.
Please commit and provide a schedule for developing and implementing the procedures for shutdown operation. These procedures should address manpower requirement and manual actions to accomplish shutdown.
RES PONSE:
Procedures will be developed on a schedule consistent with the installation of system modifications. This is targeted for the 1983 refueling outage. Based on Fire Brigade requirements, there will be three people availabic to operate the Alternate Shutdown System, but only two people are needed. The design concept specified certain manual operations. Procedures will specif y whether operations are manual or via control device.
3.
Identify the type of isolation proposed for the RCIC control and instrumentation circuits, the diesel generator 125 volt de loads, the RHR loads, the service water load and the uninterruptable power supply loads.
Details and schematics should be provided for the above.
RESPONSE
Isolation will be provided by local transfer / isolation switches located outside the fire areas.
These transfer switches will be Class 1E devices similar to Electroswitch Corporation Series 24 switches.
They will isolate all control circuits which could affect operation of the required equipment due to a fire in the control room, cable vault or either of the switchgear rooms. Once the circuits are isolated by the isolation switches, the cables routed through the fire area will have no effect on the equipment.
Details and schematics for the circuits are presently in the design phase. A typical control wiring diagram for the RHR System has been marked up for preliminary use to indicate the design philosophy for these isolation switches. Similar design is used for the isolation of control and instrumentation circuits of other applicable systems such as RCIC, Service Water, Diesel Generator, etc.
4.
Provide a point-by point response with respect to interactions of associated circuits as outlined in Enclosure 2 of the February 20, 1981 letter (including all requested tables).
RES PONSE :
To determine the interaction of associated circuits with shutdown systems outlined in the February 20, 1981 letter, Vermont Yankee has taken a systems approach as clarified on Page 8 of Attachment 2 of the May 10, 1982 letter. NRC concerns are listed below, followed by Vermont Yankee's response:
Concern a:
Describe the methodology used to assess the potential of associated circuit adversely affecting the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability. The description of the methodology should include the methods used to identify the circuits which share a common power supply or a common enclosure with the alternative or dedicated shutdown system and the circuits whose spurious operation would affect shutdown.
Additionally, the description should include the methods used to identify if these circuits are associated circuits of concern due to their location in the fire area.
RES PONSE:
Control and power circuits required for the shutdown systems listed in our February 21, 1981 letter have been identified. Manual isolation will be provided for those circuits routed through the fire area. These switches will be located outside the fire area as described in the answer to RAI 3.
Local control stations will provide any required control. Associated circuits with a common power supply to those of shutdown system have beer. identified.
Although not of concern, these included those routed totally outside the fire area as well as those routed through the fire area.
Current interrupting devices, mainly circuit breakers and in a few instances fuses, are provided to electrically isolate these associated circuits from their power supply in the event of a fault
cn tha ac:ociot:d circuit. Th2 cc:rdincticn b;twezn tha lead-interrupting device and that of the bus supply feeder was done by the architect engineer of Vermont Yankee as part of the original design.
This meets NRC guidelines.
Next, circuits were identified in the fire area whose spurious operation could affect the operation of the shutdown systems, or cause a LOCA. Hot shorts, cold shorts and open circuits as a result of a fire were considered.
In the event of a fire, the,e circuits will be manually isolated outside the fire area. Local control stations will provide the isolation and control where required.
This isolation method precludes any interaction of associated circuits in the fire area which could cause spurious movement.
A few circuits identified as either being required by, or associated to, the safe shutdown systems could not be isolated from the fire area without loss of the desired function. These cables will be protected by a one-hour fire barrier. This barrier, in conjunction with the existing fixed detection and suppression system, will provide adequate protection in conformance with NRC guidelines.
Concern b:
Provide a table that lists all associated circuits of concern located in the fire area.
RESPONSE
Associated circuits with a common power supply to those of shutdown systems are listed in Table I.
Although not of concern, those circuits routed totally outside the fire area are included. All these circuits are protected by interrupting devices as indicated.
j Associated circuits in the fire area whose spurious operation could affect the capability to safely shutdown, affect the operation of the shutdown, or cause a LOCA are listed in Table II.
These circuits will be manually isolatable outside the fire area.
The few circuits which cannot be isolated will be protected by a one-hour barrier.
These are listed in Table III along with the location of the fire barrier and the rethod of suppression.
. Concern c
Show that firs-inducsd failurac (hst eh:rto, cp;n circuita cr shorts to ground) of each of the cables listed in (b) will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method.
RESPONSE
These associated circuits will be isolated as described in (a) above. Where necessary, local control will be provided for repositioning should this equipment spuriously operate before the cables in the fire area can be isolated.
In other cases, isolating the circuit results in a fail safe position for the equipment.
Concern d:
For each cable listed in (b) where new electrical isolation has been provided, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that show how each cable is isolated from the fire area.
RESPONSE
Details and schematics for the circuits are presently in the design phase. A preliminary control wiring diagram is provided in our response to RAI 3.
Concern e:
Provide a location at the site or other offices where all the tables and drawings generated by this methodology approach for the associated circuits review may be audited to verify the information provided above.
RES PONSE:
The tables generated by this methodology are included in the response to RAI 4 (b) above. Further details will be included in the Engineering Design Change Requests (EDCRs) used for the implementation of the alternate shutdown system. These are currently in the design phase and should be completed by the end of 1982. When the implementation is completed, these EDCRs and supporting documentation will be located at Vermont Yankee for your verification.
5.
In your submittal dated July 31, 1981, the high-low pressure interface was identified as two valves in the RRR system and two valves for the reactor head vents.
However, you did not respond to the request to list the cables involved and to identify cables separation in accordance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
Please provide the information requested in Enclosure 2, Question 2 of the February 20, 1981 letter.
RESPONSE
The circuits, cables, and schematics for these valves are presently in the design phase.
A preliminary list of the cables to be isolated for these valves is shown below.
I.
s_
q Valva 07b12 Nu-be r Purptsa V10-17 C-11308B Cont rol ' Circuit '
C-11308C Control Circuit C-Il308D Instrumentation Circuit V10-18 C-11309B Control Circuit C-11309C Control Circuit C-11309D Instrumentation Circuit FCV 2-17 C-1833A Control Circuit FCV 2-18 C-18833B Control Circuit Rather than attempt to provide separation as described in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, the cables to these valves will be isolated from outside the fire areas. This method has been described in answers to RAIs 3 and 4.
This isolation method precludes any interaction of associated circuits in these fire areas.
Once the circuits are isolated by the isolation switches, the cables routed through the fire area will have no effect on the valves.
If the fire causes the reactor head vent valves (FCV 2-17, FCV 2-18) to spuriously open before isolation can be activated, isolating the control circuits will force these valves to move to their fail safe, closed ponition.
However, the likelihood of a high-low interface valve spuriously moving because of hot shorts in the time it takes the operator to go from the control room to the isolation switches in the reactor building is extremely remote and is, therefore, dis rega rded.
In addition, procedures will require that isolation of these valves have priority.
1 r
-TABLE I CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED BY POWER SUPPLY Bus f Voltage Circuit Interrupting Device 4
4160 V Tie to 4160 V Bus 2 Air Circuit Breaker Core Spray Pump P46-1A Air Circuit Breaker Tie to Vernon Station Air Circuit Breaker Bus 9, 480 V Auxiliary Meters Fuse Reactor Bldg. Cooling Water Pump P-59-1A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic CRD Water Pump P-38-1A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Fire Pump P-40-1B Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Tie to 480 V Bus 8 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic MCC 9A 480 V SGT Heater EUH-2 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic SGT Exhaust Fan Ref-2A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Battery Charger BC-1-1B Circuit Breaker, Thermal
>kgnetic RPS M/G Set M3-5-1B Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Lighting Transformer LP-lK Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Lighting Transformer LP-1SH Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Distribution Transformer Circuit Breaker, Thermal DT-1 Magnetic Distribution Itansformer Circuit Breaker, Thermal DT-3 Magnetic Distribution Transformer Circuit Breaker, Thermal DT-6 Magnetic 1
Security System Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Switchgear Room Exhaust Circuit Breaker, Thermal Fan Magnetic Condensate Vacuum V65-13 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic MCC 9B 480 V Lighting Transformer LP-lT Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Lighting Transformer LP-lM Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Lighting Itansformer LP-lL Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Lighting Transformer LP-1Q Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Lighting Transformer LP-lP Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Elevator Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Lighting Transformer Circuit Breaker, Thermal LP-NE-1B Magnetic RRU-13 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic SLC Tank Heater Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic SLC Pump 45-1A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic RRU-3 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic
4 P g2 2 TABLE I (Cont.)
Bus #
Voltage Circuit Interrupting Device MCC 98 480 V Containment Air Compressor Circuit Breaker, Magnetic CRD Pressure Reg. Valve Circuit Breaker, Magnetic V3-20 CS Discharge Valve V14-5A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Emergency Intertie Valve Circuit Breaker, Magnetic V10-184 Cleanup Return Isol. Valve Circuit Breaker, Magnetic V12-68 CS Discharge Valve V14-11A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic CS Discharge Valve V14-12A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic RHR Pump Bypass Valve
. Circuit Breaker, Magnetic V10-16A Suppression Fool Suction Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V10-13C Containment Spray Isolation Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V10-26A CS Suction Valve V14-7A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Containment Spray Inj.
Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V10-31A Suppression Chamber Spray Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V10-38A CAD Air Compressor C-105B Circuit Breaker, Magnetic CS Test Valve V14-26A Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Recirculation Supply Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Suction Valve V10-15C Vent System MOV-VC-22B Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Supply to MCC 89A Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic MCC 9C 480 V Power Receptacle Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Cooling Tower Fan Feeder Circuit Breaker, Thermal j
Magnetic j
Station & Instrument Air Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Compressor C-1-1B l
TB Cooling Water Pump Circuit Breaker, Magnetic i
P-58-1B DC-1-1A Air Compressor Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Fuel Storage Area Sump Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Pump P94-1A l
Lighting Panel LP-1AH Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic Steam Packing Exhauster Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Blast Valve V65-12A Steam Packing Exhauster Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Blast Valve V65-12B DG 1-1A Auxiliaries Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic CR Air Conditioner Standby Circuit Breaker, Magnetic j
Fan SAC-1B
P;gs 3 TABLE I (Cont.)
Bus #
Voltage Ci rcui t Interrupting Device MCC 9C 480 V Service Bldg. Chilled Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Water Pump SP-2 Water Chiller SCH-2 Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic MCC 9D 480 V 24 V de Battery Charger B Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic RHR Loop Cross Tie Valve Circuit Breaker, Magnetic V10-20 HPCI Isol. Valve V23-15 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic RRU-4 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Distribution Transformer Circuit Breaker, Thermal DT-10 Magnetic Cooling Water V70-118 Circuit Breaker, Magnetic CRD Removal Hoist Receptacle Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic MCC 89A 480 V Maintenance Tie to 480 V Circuit Breaker, Thermal MCC 9B Magnetic Recirculation Discharge Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V2-53A Potential Transformer Fuse Recirculation Discharge Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V2-54A Recirculation Cross Tie Circuit Breaker,. Magnetic Valve V2-65A Recirculation Bypass Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V2-66A MCC 89B 480 V Recirculation Discharge Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Bypass Valve V2-54B Recirculation Di3 charge Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V2-53B Recirculation Suction Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V2-43B Recirculation Manifold Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Cross Tie Valve V2-65B Recirculation Manifold Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Cross Tie Bypass V2-66B Potential Transformer Fuse l
RHR Upstream Isolation Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V10-27B RHR Downstream Isolation Circuit Breaker, Magnetic Valve V10-25B Maintenance Tie to MCC 8B Circuit Breaker, Thermal Magnetic MCC DC-2B 125 V de No Associated Circuits.
TABLE II ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ISO M E T0' SPURIOUS OPERATION Purpose Circuit Punction RCIC System LCV-13-12, LCV-13-13 Condensate Pump Isolation Control Valves V13-1 RCIC Trip Throttle Valve Control RCIC Cland Seal. Vac Tank Condensate Pump Control RCIC Cland Seal Vacuum Pump Control V13-15 Steam Supply Line Isolation Valve Control V13-16 Steam Supply Line Isolation Valve Control V13-18 Pump Suction from Cond. Stg. Tk.
Control V13-20 Pump Discharge Valve Control V13-21 Pump Discharge Valve Control V13-27 RCIC Minimum Flow Bypass to Supp.
Control Chamber V13-30 RCIC Test Bypass to Condensate Storage Control Tank V13-39 RCIC Pump Suction from Suppression
. Control Chamber V13-41 RCIC Pump Suction from Suppression Control Chamber V13-131 RCIC Steam to Turbine Valve Control V13-132 RCIC Turbine Cooling Water Supply Control Valve j
RilR System V10-15A Recirculation Supply to Pump Suction Control j
Valve V10-13A Suppression Pool to Pump Suction Control Valve
+
1 V10-17 RIIR Reactor Head Spray Isolation Valve Control V10-29A RHR Inboard Injection Valve Control V10-27A RIIR Outboard Injection Valve Control l
V10-34A Suppression Chamber Spray Bypass Control Valve l
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. TABLE II (Cont.)
Purpose Circuit Func tion RHR (Cont.)
V10-39A Suppression Chamber Spray Upstream Control Valve V10-65A RHR Pumps Discharge Valves Control V10-89A RHR Service Water Discharge Valve Control V10-18 RHR Reactor Shutdown Cooling Isolation Control Valve (Inboard)
V10-66 RHR Discharge to Rad Waste Isolation Control Valve V2-43A Recirculation Pump A Suction Control RRU-5 RHR Service Water Pump Area Control RRU-7 RHR and Core Spray Pump Area Control Service Water V70-20 Turbine Building Cooling Water Valve Control System Reactor Vent FCV-2-17, FCV-2-18 Reactor Vent Valves Control Valves
TABLE III CABLES TO BE PROTECTED BY FIRE BARRIER Location of Existing Cable No.
Purpose Fire Barrier Suppression 1335J1SII MCC 9B, Switchgear Room /
Automatic CO2 1335J2SII 480 V Feeder Cable Vault C-115 50A, B,C,
D,E,F,G,L, M,N,P.S,T, U,V C-115 51 A, B C,
D.E,F,G,L, Reactor Feed Pumps Switchgear Room /
Automatic CO2 H,N, P, S,T, Control Circuits Cable Vault U,V C-115 52A, B,C,
D,E,F,C,L, M,N,P,S,T, U,V 4
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