ML20054E145
| ML20054E145 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1982 |
| From: | James Smith LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204260182 | |
| Download: ML20054E145 (7) | |
Text
P LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY r fit'O e
4.-
iremensw SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 April 20, 1982 SNRC-691 k
Mr. Ilarold R.
Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NECglVEO 9
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission b-
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023 fggg Washington, D.C.
20555 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322
/f
Dear Mr. Denton:
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Enclosed herewith please find sixty (60) copies of our responses to NRC requests 223.93 through 223.98, which were contained in NRC letter dated February ll, 1982 from Mr.
A.
Schwencer to Mr.
M.
S.
Pollock.
Please be advised that these responses will be incorporated into a future amendment to the FSAR.
If you have any additional questions please do not hesitate to contact my office.
Very truly yours, 0
J.
L.
Smith Manager, Special Projects Shoreham Nuclear Power Station CC:mp Enclosure cc:
J.
Higgins All Parties (w/ enclosure)
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Request 223.93 In Table 1 of SNRC-638, assuming a single failure of the SRV valves at the RSP, credit is being taken for the RCIC system to
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reduce reactor pressure.
Verification should be provided that the RCIC turbine steamflow is sufficient to reduce reactor presnure to achieve cold shutdown.
The time to reach cold ahutdown should be provided.
Recponse In the event of an SRV control f ailure at the RSP, RCIC uould operate manually or automatically to control RPV water level and maintain the reactar in Lhe hot shutdcun condition.
Prenaure in the reactor vould cycle betueen various high and low limits according to RCIC operation and the automatic SRV actuations.
The RPV could be maintained in this mode for as long as required from the RSP.
If no other operator actions are performed, the RPV pressure would not drop sufficiently in the short torn to allow cold shutdoun operation.
Decay heat steam production would onceed the rate of steam extracted due to RCIC turbine operation for nany days.
Uc/.; eve r, there are various oparator actions which could be utilized to depressurize the RPV and achieve cold shutdoun.
As an example, the SRVn could be operated ranuall" fron the relay roon although no credit as originall; Lat.m for accousibility to this area for thin even t.
The tim to reach cold shutdown using this method woul.a in en the order of <n hour.
A cocand e.< ample would involve a nmucl RC1C 1.ineup in the test modo to the CST depressurizing the RPV via turhjne operation.
This shutdown method would take on the order of 10 days to reach cold shutdown.
Thus the plant could ba naintained at hot shutdoun from the RSP and brought to cold shutdown via various operator actions.
223.93
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m Pequent 223.04:
In Table 1 o f S:!RC-53 8, assuning a single failure of the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System (RBCLCU), credit is being taken for the LPCI system to achieve cold shutdown.
Does this mean that the B loop of the RBCLCW will be used for LPCI operation?
If so, how is the transfer of control made, where are the B Icop controls, and does this require continuous local operation?
Pasynnnn:
A single failure of the RBCLCU system would prevent the use of ti.
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could be established through the Riin heat exchangor using the "B"
RIlR pump on the RSP in the LPCI mode.
Flow would return to the suppression pool from the RPV via the RSP control]cd SRVs.
The RHR pump can operate in this made without any RBCLCU cooling.
Continuous local operation vould not be required.
223.94
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nequest 223.95:
In Table 1 of SNRC-G38, assuming a single failure of the Reactor Recirculating Systcm, credit is taken for long term cooling using the LPCI system of the RHR system.
Explain the conflict between this statement and note 3 in Table 1 that states that the Reactor Recirculating System is required to prevent short cycling the core during RHR cooling for cold shutdown.
A]so, it is not apparent to the staff uhy the Reactor Recirculating System is includcd in Table 1 since the capability of raracte shutdo.e must be provided even with the assumption of a loss of offsite power.
.P. o, _r p o.n.r e :
A single failure of the recircu]ating system would rcduce the effectiveness of the normal RHR system since the recirculation system discharge valve would remain open and interfere with the correct flow path, even though some cooling would result.
However, if the LPCI system were employed as stated in the response to Request 223.94, the recirculation system valve would not be required and cold shutdown could be effected from the remote shutdown panel.
223.95 m _ _ w,_m.,.7-
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Pequent 223.96:
In SMRC-638, the applicant stated that assuming a single fail-ure, the plant can be brought to hot shutdown uithout leaving the RSP.
Explain the discrepancy between this statement and the information presented in SMRC-638 Table 2 which indicates that Reactor water level and Reactor Pressure indications are at locations other than the RSP.
g gonse:
The loss of reactor unter ]cvel indication on the RSP will not prevent hot shutdown from being attained since llPCI would operate automatien]ly to n-intain RPV level with CP.V norhanical c,
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h.a go to cold shutdown conditions.
Level indication outside the RSP would be utilized for verification only and would not be required for maintaining hot shutdown conditions.
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r-Request 223.97:
In Table 2 of SNRC-688, explain why an alternate indication for Reactor Pressure (IC61-P1006) is net required and why Reactor temperature indication is not needed during the 275 to 212 shttt-down phase where the reactor pressure gauge is inacctirate.
Response
A single failure of pressure indicator 1C61PIO06 at the RSP would not prevent hot shutdown from being attained from the panel.
P,ither RCIC manual operation or IIPCI automatic operation will maintain RPV level as required, with the SRVs being o--ratnd as n ~ drar; 4: a m +> m prea ra u r t i.1 +: h e n r - 11 L, :aoua in.taitiated c.o ach u ce c o..a s rc. t : ant...
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cooling valves would not operate until the RPV pressure permis-sive has been satisfied.
Following hot shutdown operations the RPV pressure could be verified by v local pressure indicator in the secondary containment.
In a similar manner, the initiation and continued use of RIIR in the shutdown cooling mode would proceed uithout the requirement for RPV temperature monitoring.
Initiation of the system is constrained by pressure interlocks (and remote indicator verification if required) and can operate continuously without ecatroll.ing or cycling operations.
The actuation or the 1011',
head spray Guring this n' ode maintains saturated conditions in the upper RPV regions.
223.97
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Request 223.98:
Explain the discrepancy between statements in the emergency procedures for shutdown fron outside the control room which in-dicate that ESF functions are lost during a transfer of control and the statement in SNRC-638 that ESP systems not controlled from the RSP, which have automatic features, will function as designed.
Ilespon se :
It is not clear from the request, as to where the discrepancy exists.
Assuning that the reviewer is referring to Enernency Procedure 29.0M -01 N.
O, n te 10, jtcm 0.3 a:d SRC 3J' 4 ' s.m 3,
there definitely is no diucrepancy.
Procedure number 29.022.01 Rev. O dated 12/5/78 titled " Shutdown from Outside Control Room" page 10 item 6.3 states " Trip func-tions and interlocks are by-passed on systems that are operated from the remote shutdown panel when the. remote transfer switches are placed in Emerg."
The full statement in SNRC-638 item 3 is
" Automatic actuation of ESP systems is not required while the plant is attaining, or maintained in hot shutdown.
Once the operator takes control of the systems on the RSP the auto-actuation circuits for these systems will be disabled.
However, other ESP systems not control 3cd from the RSP uhich have automatic features t.'ill function autonatically, as required, even after the operator has trant.ferred control to the RSP."
For those systems which are transferred to the remote shutdown panel, " Trip functions and interlocks" are bypassed.
Therefore any automatic operation is prevented once the transfer is completed to the remote shutdown panel.
This does not contradict the state-ment in SNRC-633 which is referring to those cyste"is NOT trenef"rrcd to the Re :ote Shutdown Panel.
Those othcr n' ;tcms (sucn ar, %:1 )
y Will fu:1ction nutomatically as desigaca.
223.98