ML20054D186
| ML20054D186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D173 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204220421 | |
| Download: ML20054D186 (4) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMEN 0 MENT NO. 50 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 000VESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHIO EDISON COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET N0. 50-334 Rackground By letter dated November 9,1981, Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) proposed five revisions to the Technical Specifications of Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1.
Two of these proposed changes were evaluated in a Safety Evaluation issued March 16, 1982, the remaining three are evaluated herein.
Item 1 The technical specifications require that the Solid State Protection System along with its instrumentation channels, interlocks and the automatic logic and relays be operable.
Presently the technical specifications allow one channel to be bypassed for up to one hour while surveillance testing is being performed.
The licensee has proposed that the time allowed for surveillance testing be expanded to two hours.
Item 2 Periodic leak rate testing of the containment is required by Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.
Presently the technical specifications references the testing methods of ANSI N45.4-1972, " Leakage Rate Testing of Containment Structures for Nuclear Reactors."
The licensee has proposed referencing ANSI N56.8-1981, " Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," and deleting the reference to ANSI N45.4-1972 for their leak testing methods.
8204220421 820405 PDR ADOCK 05000334 p
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Item 3 The containment purge and exhaust isolation valves are required to be locked closed during operating modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
During operating modes 5 and 6 the technical specifications presently require that the isolation valves be operable.
The licensee has proposed that the stroke times for the isolation valves only be applicable during mode 6 operation.
EVALUATION Item 1 The present technical specifications allow bypassing of a Solid State Protection System instrumentation channel for up to one hour while surveillance testing is being performed.
If the surveillance testing cannot be completed in this time frame, the plant must begin shutting down and be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The licensee has requested that the Action Statements 13 and 15 accompanying Table 3.3-3 of the plant's technical specifications be revised to allow bypassing of a channel for up to two hours while surveillance testing is being performed.
The additional time is being requested to allow sufficient time for testing without running the risk of shutting the plant down.
The NRC staff is in agreement that one hour may not allow sufficient time for testing and that two hours would be a more appropriate time.
In September 1981 the NRC standard technical specifications for Westinghouse plants (W-STS) were revised to allow bypassing of instrumentation channels for up to two hours while surveillance testing is being performed.
Therefore, we find the licensee's proposal acceptable since it has already been found acceptable and incorporated in the W-STS. As shown in the attachment (page 3/4 3-20), the licensee has agreed to add the phrase, "provided the other channel is OPERABLE" to be in compliance with the wording of the W-STS.
Item 2
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ANSI N45.4-1972, " Leakage Rate Testing of Containment Structures for Nuclear Reactors," is referenced in Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 as representing acceptable methods of performing required leak rate tests. Similarly, the.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 technical specifications state that the leak tests will be performed using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972.
l l
The licensee has proposed deleting the references to ANSI N45.4-1972 ano l
replacing it with ANSI N56.8-1981, " Containment System Leakage Testing l
Requirements." The licensee has requested this because ANSI N56.8-1981 l
permits testing of containment penetrations using water, instead of gas, i
as the pressurized fluid for Type C leak testing.
1
There are a nunber of differences in the leak testing methods between ANSI N45.4-1972 and ANSI N56.8-1981.
The provision to use water for the test fluid for Type C leak rate tests is only one such difference.
The staff has previously reviewed ANSI N56.8-1981 and has chosen not be endorse the standard because of the differences in leak testing n'ethods.
Therefore we find the licensee's proposal to be unacceptable.
However, with regard to using water as the test fluid for Type C leak testing, the staff has found this practice to be acceptable on a qualified, case-by-case basis. The NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research is currently in the process of revising Appendix J to define the criteria which will allow Type C leak testing using water as the test fluid.
We have informed the licensee that a blanket reference to ANSI N56.8-1981 is unacceptable. However, we have also informed the licensee that Type C leak testing using water as the test fluid can be found acceptable if certain conditions are met. The licensee has agreed to submit an itemized list of the containment penetrations to be tested in this manner. The staff will review this list upon its submittal.
Item 3 The containment purge and exhaust isolation valves are required to be locked closed during operating modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The current technical specifi-cations require that the purge and exhaust system isolation valves be operable during operating modes 5 and 6 and capable of automatic isolation with isolation times as specified in Table 3.6-1.
Operability during modes 5 and 6 is itended to provide protection against fuel handling accidents.
The licensee's present technical specifications do not allow any time for the isolation valves to be out of service for maintenance or inspection.
The valves are required to be locked closed during modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 and OPERABLE during modes 5 and 6.
If the valves are found to be inoperable during modes 5 and 6, they are then required to be closed.
The licensee has proposed that the stroke times for the isolation valves only be applicable during mode 6 operation. However, after discussions with the staff, the licensee has agreed to incorporate the wording of the W-STS.
As shown in the attachment (pages 3/4 6-19c and 3/4 9-9c) operability of the purge and exhaust system isolation valves will only be required during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel. We believe these changes wil1 meet their objective of protecting against a fuel handling accident. Therefore, we find these changes acceptable because it has been previously found acceptable and incorporated into the W-STS.
The proposed technical specification changes regarding Solid State Protection System instrumentation channels and the purge and exhaust system isolation valves have been found to be acceptable primarily because they are now consistent with that found in the W-STS.
The proposed change to delete the reference to ANSI N45.4-1972 and insert ANSI N56.8-1981 was not found acceptable. The basis is that the staff review of ANSI N56.8-1981 did not result in an endorsement of the standard. However, as stated previously, the licensee plans to submit a separate proposal for alternative means to Type C leak testing. The staff will review this item when it is received.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amocnts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant envirormental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR Sl.5(d)(4),that'an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
t Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
i (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3i such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date:
April 5,1982