ML20054C009

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 69 to License DPR-59
ML20054C009
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick 
Issue date: 03/26/1982
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20054C006 List:
References
NUDOCS 8204190371
Download: ML20054C009 (2)


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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N0. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET N0. 50-333 Author:

Philip J. Polk, Marvin W. Hodges 1.0 Introduction The purpose of the High Pressure Coolant Injectection (HPCI) System is to provide high pressure cooling capability to the reactor vessel.

Operation of the HPCI is fully automatic, controlled by electrical signals from reactor level, pressure and flow sensing devices. The system also shutsdown automatically when the system is no longer needed or when certain system malfunctions occur.

Automatic HPCI system shutdown occurs when a break in the HPCI turbine steam lines or instrument lines is detected.

Steam supply valves (mo 14, 15, 16) automatically close and the turbine is tripped.

In addition, valve control circuits cause an automatic isolation (closure) of turbine pump suction valves from the torus (mo 57 and mo 58) as well as pump inboard discharge valve (mo 19).

The current FitzPatrick Technical Specifications specify a minimum closing rate for the HPCI suction valve from the torus (mo 58); specifically a nominal 12-inch line shall be isolated within 60 seconds.

By letter dated March 9,1982 the Power Authority of the State of New York (licensee) indicated that this line and valve are 16 inches in diameter and requested that the Technical Specifications be revised to reflect this; i.e., valve closure l

within 80 seconds.

2.0 Evaluation Closure of the HPCI system torus suction valves upon turbine pump trip is necessary (1) to preclude flow in a reverse direction from the reactor vessel to the torus, (2) to preclude flow from the torus to the condensate storage tanks, and (3) to return the system to the valve line up which existed prior to system initiation.

From a safety standpoint none of these functions are time dependent; i.e., the period of time necessary for valve closure is not critical. With respect to reverse flow from the reactor vessel the closure of the pump outboard discharge valve and inboard check l

l valve will preclude this action.

Regarding flow from the torus to the l

condensate storage tanks the closed condensate storage tank suction valve (mo 17) will preclude this from occurring.

1 8'204190371 82O326 PDR ADOCK 05000333 p

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. The maximum closure time (60 seconds) indicated in the Technical Specifications is intended to be indicative of valve performance; i.e., the standard l

minimum closing rate for automatic isolation valves is based on a nominal line and valve size of 12 inches.

Using the standard closing rate of 12 inches per minute, 80 seconds should be indicated for line and valve sizes of 16 inches.

Valve closure in more than 80 seconds would indicate valve malfunction and necessitate corrective action. Valve closure within 80 seconds indicates correct valve performance. Thus, valve closure rate is related primarily to surveillance testing to assure valve operability.

Since the aforementioned valve closure rate is not critical to the valve performing its intended function, the closure requirement indicated in the Technical Specifications has been deleted.

However, valve operability testing will be accomplished as part of the licensee's Inservice Testing. Program.

3.0 Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR Sl.5(.d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact apprat:.cl need not fie prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in he probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: March 9,1982

Reference:

(1)

Letter from L. W. Sinclair (PASNY) to D. B. Vassallo (NRC) re: HPCI system suction valve closure, dated March 9,1982.