ML20053E717
| ML20053E717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1982 |
| From: | Barrett L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Harold Denton, Snyder B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-TMI-82-034, CON-NRC-TMI-82-34 NUDOCS 8206090213 | |
| Download: ML20053E717 (16) | |
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LOCAL PDR Site Operations liay 24, 1982 File NRC/THI-82-034 p
A E/.h MEMOP.ANDUM FOR:
Harold R. Denton, Director
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Lake 11. Barrett, Deputy Program Director k/ g
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Till Program Office SU3 JECT:
NRC TMI PROGRAM OFFICE WEEKLY STATUS REPORT Enclosed is the status report for the period of Itay 16, 1982 to Hay 22,1932.
Major items included in this report are:
l Liquid Effluents NRC and EPA Environmental Data Radioactive Haterial and Radwaste Shipments Submerged Demineralizer System Status EPICOR II l
Reactor Coolant System Uater Processing Reactor Building Entries Submerged Denincralizer Liner Shipment Public !!eetings Ortainalsieseeg EeheE. W Lake H. Barrett Deputy Program Director Till Program Office
Enclosure:
As stated 8206090213 820S24 PDR ADOCK 05000320 R
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Harold R. Denton flay 24, 1982 Bernard J. Snyder cc w/ encl:
ED0 OGC Office Directors Comissioner's Technical Assistants NRR Division Directors NRR A/D's Regional Directors IE Division Directors TAS EIS THI Program Office Staff (15)
Plis EPA DOE Projects Br. #2 Chief, DRPI, RI DRPI Chief, RI Public Affairs, RI State Liaison, RI i
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OFFICIR RECORD COPY.
i f RC TI'I PEOGRAM 0FFICE WEEKLY STATUS REPORT May 16, 1982 - May 22, 1982 Plant Status Core Cooling Mode:
Heat transfer from the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops to reactor building ambient.
Available Core Cooling Modes:
Decay heat removal (DHR) systems, Mini DHR (MDHR) system.
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RCS Pressure Control Mode:
Standby pressure control (SPC) system.
NOTE:
During Reactor Coolant System feed and bleed, pressure will be maintained with a Reactor Coolant Bleed Tank Pump.
Automatic back up pressure control will be provided by the standby pressure control system.
Backup Pressure Control Modes:
MDHR and DHR system.
Major Parameters (as of 0500, May 21,1982) (approximate values)
Average Incore Thermocouples:
99 F Maximum Incore Thermocouple:
127*F RCS Loop Temperatures:
A B
Hot Leg 94 F 96 F Cold Leg (1) 87*F 79 F (2) 89 F 81 F Pressure:
67 psig NOTE:
During reactor coolant system feed and bleed, pressure is maintained at approximately 70 psig.
~ Reactor Building:
Temperature:
70 F Water level:
Elevation 282.8 ft.
(0.14 ft. from floor)
Pressure:
-0.18 psig Airborne Radionuclide Concentrations:
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'4.5 E-7 uCi/cc H (sample taken 5/4/82) 85 7.8 E-6 uCi/cc Kr (sample taken 5/4/82) 5.3 E-10 uCi/cc particulates (sample taken 5/13/82) 1.
Effluent and' Environmental (Radiological) Ir. formation Liquid effluents from the TMI site released to the Susquehanna River after processing, were made within the regulatory limits and in accordance with NRC requirements and City of Lancaster Agreement dated February 27, 1980.
. During the period May 14, 1982, through May 20, 1982, the effluents contained no detectable radioactivity at the discharge point although individual effluent sources,which originated within Unit 2 contained minute amounts of radioactivity, Calculations indicate that less than seventy millionths (0.000070) of a curie of tritium was discharged.
2.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Environmental Data The EPA.Middletown Office has not riceiied the environmental Kr-85 analytical results for the samples which were taken April 16, 1982, through May 7, 1982, from the EPA's Counting Laboratory at Las Vegas, Nevada.
These results will be included in a subsequent report.
No radiation above normally occurring background levels was detected in any of the samples collected from the EPA's air and gamma rate networks during the period from May 12, 1982 through May 20, 1982.
3.
NRC Environmental Data The NRC continuous air sampling equipment was placed out of service for the period May 8, 1982, through May 17, 1982.
Repairs to the eouipment are completed, and the unit is back in service.
Resuits for sample HP-320 (May 17, 1982, through May 26,1982) will be included in next week's report.
4.
Licensee Radioactive Matcrial and Radwaste Shipment On Monday, May 17, 1982, one Unit 1 sample (250 milliliter, decay heat A) was shipped to Westinghouse Corporation, Madison, Pennsylvania.
On Monday, May 17, 1982, one drum containing Unit 2 Reactdr Building sample equipment was shipped to EG&G Idaho, Inc., Scoville, Idaho.
On Monday, May 17, 1982, one box containing Unit 2 Reactor Building samples (strippable coating samples from the decontamination.
experiment) was shipped to the Brookhaven National Labs, Upton, New York.
On Wednesday, May 19, 1982, one container of Unit 1 samples (various locations) was shipped to Westinghouse Corporation, Madison, Penn-sylvania.
On Friday, May 21, 1982, a Unit 2 SDS (Submerged Demineralizer System) vessel D-15,.was shipped to the Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Hanford, Washington.
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. On Tuesday, May 18, 1982, Three Mile Island Unit 2 regained the-right to deposit low-level radioactive waste (rags and clothing) at the U. S. Ec' ology, burial site in Richland, Washington.
TMI-2's burial permit was restored based on a ccmmitment by GPU Nuclear to tighten its inspection of drums before shipment and to discuss the problem with the vendor of the shipping drums.
The burial permit had been suspended by the state of Washington on May 5, 1982. after U. S. Ecology received one drum.containing low specific activity fro.m TMI-2 with a broken locking rincf.
Major Activities 1.
Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS).
Processing of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) water commenced on May 21, 1982.
When processing of this batch is compicte, the SDS effluent will be sampled to ensure the water chemistry is in specification for makeup to the RCS.
This water will then be used to feed the RCS during the next feed and bleed cycle.
2.,
EPICOR II. The EPICOR II system is shutdown because no water is ready for processing.
3.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Feed and Bleed.
The first RCS feed and bleed cycle commenced on May 17, 1982.
Flow rate from the letdown was greater than anticipated, reducing the time required to feed and. bleed the first batch (approximately 50,000 gallons) to four days.
RCS: letdown samples taken prior to and during the feed and bleed are shown in.
4.
Reactor Building Entries.
No reactor building entry was conducted during the week of May 17,1987 through May 21, 1982. The next reactor building entry is scheduled for Wednesday, May 26, 1982. The following support activities for the control rod drive lead screw removal project are planned.
' repositioning of closed circuit television cameras entry into the "D" ring area for visual inspection control rod drive mechanism tool inventory Other activities include:
radiological survey to support entry personnel removal of HPR-214 (drum containing dome' radiation monitor) from the reactor building 2
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retesting of smoke detectors The lead screw removal and closed circuit television inspection of the reactor vessel upper internals are scheduled for July 1982.
s 5.
Submerged Demineralizer System Liner Shipment.
On May 21, 1982, the first SDS waste vessel (D-10015) was snipped from TMI to Richland, Washington.
This ten. cubic foot SDS vessel, which was used to process wasts water from the reactor coolant bleed tanks (RCBT's), contained approximately.13,000 curies of total radioactive material and was shipped in a special type B (designed for accidents) cask.
The DOE, who took possession of this waste material at TMI, will sponsor research and development glass vitrification (splidi.fication) testing at the Hanford, Washington facility. The NRC and DOT inspected the shipping container and transport vehicle to ensure conformance with applicable Federal regulations.
The shipment is scheduled to arrive at the DOE facility on May 24, 1982.
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r Past Meetings 1.
On May 19, 1982, Lake Barrett met with a group of Concerned Mothers to discuss the TMI-2 cleanup funding impasse.
They expressed their concern that the cleanup was not progressing at full speed and the uncertainty of future funding may further* reduce cleanup efforts.
They st'ated their willingness to work with all interested parties to promptly resolve the funding problem since cleanup delays increase the risk of adverse health effects on their families and cause considerable psychological stress.
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As non-GPU ratepayers they realize that they, as well as all electricity users, need to cooperate and contribute to resolve the financial problem.
2.
On May 20, 1982, Harold Denton and Bernard Snyder testified before Senator Staffords Committee on Environment and Public Works in Washington.
NRC testimony is attached.
Future Meetings 1.
On May 24, 1982, Lake H. Barrett and Richard Bangart, Effluent Treatment Systems Branch, will be keynote speakers at the Center for Nuclear Studies, Memphis State University,, Memphis, Tennessee.
2.
On May 26, 1982, a public meeting will be held.
On that date a briefing will be held by the DOE to the NRC Commissioners on DOE activities at TMI.
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Mr.
Shelby Brewer and staff will make the presentation.
.3.
On May 27, 1982, Ronald R. Bellamy will present a talk on basic radiation principles to the fifth graders in the Derry Township Elementary School, Hershey, PA.
ATTACHMENT 5 Feed and Bleed Start 5/17/82 - Stop 5/20/82 Date Time Cs-137 (uc/ml) Sr-90 (uc/ml)
Sb-125 (uc/ml) Turbidity (JTU) 5/10 1000 14 18 5/17 1300 13 16
<8.4 x 10-2 28 5/17 ~2000 16 17
< 9.3 x 10-2 36 23 5/18 2000 8.7 16 5/19 0900 8.2 11
<6.5 x 10-2 24
-2 5/19 2030 8.3 7.9
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TESTIMONY OF HAROLD R. DENTON DIRECTOR - CFFICE OF NUCLEAR REA'CTOR REGULATION NRC STATUS OF THE THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 CLEANUP U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBL'IC WORKS May 20, 1982 i
Mr. Chaintan, my colleagues and I are pleased to be invited to testify todgy on the status of the cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2 and the implications that a prolonged cleanup might have on the health and safety of the general public and the TMI-2 vork force.
Before I introduce Dr. Bernard Snyder who will present tne more detailed portions of our testimony today, I would like to make a few preliminary remarks, t'
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Although it hardly seems possible, more than three years have passed since I was sent to Three Mile Island during the accident in March 1979. One of my most vivid recollections of the period during the accident and t'he weeks shortly thereafter is of the cooperative -- almost infectious spirit -- of the many organizations, individuals and governments who worked toge.ther to bring the situation under control.
It was a monumental effort carried out effectively and efficiently with one ultimate goal - to eliminate the danger to the public and the environment.
In the midst of al'1 this national attention and' selfless cooperation..I could
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hardly have guessed that three years later I would be sitting here before a Senate subcommittee. testifying about the continuing threat posed by conditions at TMI-2.
Wnile the cleanup is progressing, its pace is painfully slow.
I find the sharp contrast between the active progress early-on and the current situation very discomforting.
Accordingly I have been emphasizing to all l
. Testin.ony of Harold R. Denton who can play some role in the cleanup that the potential for harm to both the public and TMI workers still exists.
Although we believe that the likelihood of an accident involving a release.of s.i,gnificant amounts of the radioactive materials currently contained at TMI-2 is small at present, the possibility will certainly increase as the cleanup is further delayed.
I am comnitted, as I know the Commission is, to seeing that the entire cleanup is expedited in order to eliminate all potential for mishaps.
In order to move ahead as swiftly as safety will permit, the fundamental issue of financial assurance will need to be resolved.
I agree with the assessment expressed in Chairman palladino's recent letter to the Congress that a " greater rederal participation in assuring financial viability is
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a prerequisite to an acceptably rapid (cleanup) program."
Our purpose in requesting Federal support for some form of cleanup funding is to do all we can to bring about the safe and expeditious comple. tion of all TMI-2 cleanup activities.
TMI is not yet behind us.
I would now like to have Dr. Snyder, Director of the Three Mile Island Program Office,present the more detailed NRC testimony.
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. TESTIMONY OF DR. BERNARD J. SNYDER, DIRECTOR I
TMI PROGRAM 0FFICE, NRC STATUS OF lHE THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2-(LEANUP U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS May 20, 1982 Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to present the Nuclear Regulatory Comission staff testimony on the status of the cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit-2 and the implications that a prolonged cleanup might have on the health and safety. of the TMI-2 work force, as well as the general public.
As NRC Chairman Palladino testified last October, our principal responsibility is the protection of the health and safety of the public, including the work force at the site, as well as protection of the environment.
We are concerned that if the pace of the cleanup is not accelerated, the capability for continued maintenance of the health and safety will become more uncertain.. These concerns were also conveyed to you in a letter from the Comission on March 22, 1982.
Before I elaborate on our concerns regarding the future status of the plant I want to briefly give you NRC's views on the legislation you are considering today.
I will then provide you with a su= nary of the cleanup progress to date.
The Energy Comittee substitute amendment to 5.1606 provides for an assessment by the Department.of the Treasury on nuclear utilities in order to provide funds toward the cleanup of TMI-2 over a six-year period.
As Chairman Palladino testified last fall in connection with the original proposal for S.1606, while the Comission takes no position on t he specific methods of cbtaining funds for TMI-2 cleanup proposed in this or other legislation, we welecmc the approach encompassed in the fproposed legislation as a reasonable mechanism for solving this continuing problem.
More than three years have passed since the accident and progress in the cleanup The accident left large bodies of very contaminated water in has; teen limited.
the basement of the reactor building and in tanks in the auxiliary building.
Virtually every exppsed surface of the floors, watts and equipment in the reactor, euxiliary and fuel handling buildings was contaminated to varying degrees.
The reactor building atmosphere was contaminated with a large inventory of radioactive gases and the water in the reactor coolant system was extensively contaminated with fission products.
1.astly, we know that the reactor core suffered significant damage.
It is probable that small particles of fuel had cladding, along'with control rod and core structural material were distributed throughout the reactor coolant system, with some materials ending up in the lower level of the reactor building.
No one knows the actual conditions I
within the reactor vessel, but realistic estimates suggest that the upper half of the core contains a rubble bed of damaged fuel and other materials.
Additionally, some of this material and individual fuel assemblies are suspected to be fused This is the condition we believe has existed since the accident in together.
It is important to note that the plant has been in a condition March 1979.
for which it was not designed.
This situation causes us increasing concern.
The Nuclear Regulatory commission's program for carrying out its regulatory responsibilities during the TMI-2 clanup is centered in the TMI Program Office (TMIPO) within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Established fonnally in March 1980, the TMIPO evolved from NRC's early regulatory efforts involved in mitigating the accident and initiating the cleanup.
The TMIPO is dedicated solely to the cleanup and consists of technical and manage-ment staff located both at NRC head:;aarters and THI site.
Currently the TMIPO is staffed with approximately 30 technical management and administrative staff.
The res::ensibilities of the D'.IPO include the fellcwing; 1) overall planning and
P Imenagement of all NRC TMI-2 cleanup activities, 2) approval of licensee cleanup l and
.procedurcs and proposals, 3) coordination with DOE, EPA and other Federa State agencies, 4) preparation.of safety and'enficonmental reviews, and 5) advising The TMIPO efforts have been given the the Conaission on major cleanup actions.
highest priority category within the agency.
Within several weeks of the accident, the decontamination of the floors, walls, and equipment in the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings was initiated.
At preserit, approximately 70 percent of the contaminated area in these buildings has been cleaned up, but this represents removal of 'only 10% of the radioactivity since some of the most contaminated and difficult areas were bypassed and remain to be cleaned up, a
In addition to the decontamination efforts to date in the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings, other significant cleanup accomplishments include:
purging of the contaminated atmosphere from the reactor building, process.ing of accident generated water which collected in auxiliary building tanks and the reactor building basement, and shipment and disposal of some of the radioactive solid waste generated as a result of cleanup activities.
Approximately 750,000 gallons of moderately contaminated water from auxiliary building tenks and 600,000 gallons of highly contaminated water from the reactor building basement have been processed; however, none of this water has been permitted to be disposed of and it is currently stored in on-site tanks.
The reactor building atmosphcre f
was purged of the 45,000 curie inventory of krypton-85 which collected during the accident.
Finally, 22 lower level radioactive waste resin containers generated as a result of accident water processing and large quantities of other low-level waste, such as compacted trash, have been shipped to a couner-cial burial site for disposal.
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d total iThe activities completed to date represents only limited progress towar plant cleanup. A great deal of difficult work remains to be done.
About 5%
of the highly contaminated water (approximately 'LO,000 gallons) and an unknown quantity of contaminated sludge remain in the reactor building basement, and still need to be removed and processed. Another 90,000 gallons of highly contaminated water remains in the reactor coolant system and will require Containers of highly radioactive resin (49) and zeolites (6) processing.
remain on-site until steps are taken to make these safe for shipment, consider-ing the hydrogen'being generated.
The balance of the most contaminated floors and surfaces in the auxiliary building remain to be cleaned up. Although a large-scale experimental program for gross decontamination was conducted over large portions of the reactor building, preliminary results indicate that general area radiation levels have not been reduced sufficiently to support large scale cleanup activities in the building.
The entire building will have to undergo further detailed decontaminatinn.
Decisions on the degree of further decontamination required await the final results from this experiment.
Reduced radiation levels in the reactor building is a pre-requisite for the most difficult task ahead -- the defueling of the. damaged core.
The defueling will be a long, carefully controlled effort, which is not anticipated to be completed for at least several years.
Following defueling, the reactor coolant system surfaces will require decontamination.
The processed accident-generated water will require ultimate disposition.
The higher level radio-active solid waste resulting from water processing and other decontamination activities will require offsite shipment to a commercial or federal facility for disposal or research, as appropriate.
Finally, all fuel assemblies and packaged dore debris and internals will require shipment offsite for research and/or disposal. As you are aware, the schedule for the completion of these vital l
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. cleanup activities is essentially. indetennin'a'te because of uncertainties regarding the availability of funds to support the work.
With only limited progress, and no end in sight, we are extremely concerned about the future status of the plant
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and the licensee's capability for maintaining the pilnt in a stable condition to adequet.ely protect the on-site work force and offsite public over the long term.
Further delays in completing the cleanup can no longer be tolerated.
The risks associated with indefinite delays of the cicanup are real, especially for workers at TMI and, to a lesser extent, for the public offsite.
Currently the plaht is safe but no' one can give assurances that the present situation Will remain stable for an indefinite period.
Over time, as equipment deteriorates the probability of incidents involving radiation leakage and subsequent exposure to workers and the public will increase.
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5everal incidents of this type have already occurred.
In 1979, leakage of highly centaminated water in the auxiliary building resulted in overexposure to several workers during subsequent maintenance efforts to contain the leakage'.
In 1980,
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another leak of highly contaminated reactor coolant caused high airborne levels and contaminated several workers.
This past year, an inacce:sible valve in the reactor building in a line connected to the reactor coolant system started leaking during testing, increasing the normal system leakage by about a factor of ten until the source could be identified and the valve resented.
During each of the first four months of 1982, separate incidents have occurred, In January, workers inserted an air hose in a contaminated floor drain and spread radioactive material into the auxiliary building atmosphere.
This caused alarms on local radiation monitors within the building, as well alarms on the effluent release monitor in the plant exhaust stack.
In February some porteble instruments used to sa[nple the containment building atmosphere indicated the presence of ccmbustible gases, possibly hydrogen.
These readings were subsequently shown to be
. crroneous, but not before the licensee declared an " unusual event" (the lowest I
level in their emergency response' plan) and made the required offsite notification to' local officials.
In March, another " unusual event" was declared when increased makeup water was noted to be going into the reactoy coolant system, indicating a possible leak.
I't was determined that a valve was leaking which resulted in spillage of about 150 gallons of water onto the floor when contaminated filters i
from the reactor coolant purification systera were removed.
Although each of these events did not cause any harm, they did cause considerable concern among erea citizens.- Just two weeks ago, a health physics technician was unable to exit from the containment building because the airlock doors were jammed shut.
8t took nearly an hour before the doors could be opened.
Although this individual was never in any danger and received only minimal radiation exposure, this incident does clearly show one of the potential risks that exist for the TMI cleanup workers.
fnevitably, as the result of restricted access to areas of the facility in which l
high radiation levels persist, maintenance will continue to be limited and equipment will continue to deteriorate.
Similar problems can be anticipated to occur in the future. The frequency and risks from these events, although small now, are likely to increase as the cicanup is prolonged.
There is also an exceedingly small, but not zero, probability for a criticality accident in the react.or vessel.
The present core configuration will remain unknown until at least a camera is inserted.o obtain information. There is even some small potential for a crii.icality event outside er the core because of the unknown quantity of fuel materials which were transported out of the. reactor pressure vessel.
To the best of.our ability, all cleanup activitics have been planned, approved and conducted to preclude, with a large margin of safety, criticality
7-anyobere within the plant.
While the incidents to date have been of a controllable nature, it is not inconceivable that a future leakage incident could, result 'in an unisolable leakage from the riactor coolant system.
Considering the plant condition, such leakage cannot be ruled out, and this possibility is of serious concern l
Reactor system valves and other components have the greatest likelihood l
to us.
of failure. However, we are also concerned about the condition of the 52 instrument tubes which penetrate the bottom nf the reactor pressure vessel and constitute a part of the reactor coolant system bonndary.
These tubes were submerged in the highly contaminated and possibly corrosive water in the reactor building basement for approximately three years.
Corrosion and subse-quent inakage through any of those tubes would be unisolable.
If the leakage
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rate from failures in the reactor coolant system boundary were high enough, use of the safety systems and equipment would be required.
Much of this equipment has not been used since before the accident or prev _iously subjected to contamina ted water.
If an incident of this type occurs prior to completing
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defueling of the core, the cleanup would be setback and beccme even more difficult than presently anticipated.
Experience has shown that delays in cleanup cause radioactive contamination to be more dif ficult to remove from surfaces and equipment.
Radioactivity tends to
" soak into" concrete surfaces, and rusting of metallic-surfaces compounds the probicm.
For this reason, the cicanup will be more cestly in terms of worker radiation exposure as further delays result.
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l The mechanical deterioration of components and systems over time may reduce the plant's ability to respond to natural phenomena (e.g., tornados), and other adverse events (e.g., fire) thereb'y posing potential threat to continued success-ful containment of TMI-2 contamination and stored waste.
Although the likelihood of severc natural phenomena or a fire resulting in a radiation release to the environment is small, the possibility does exist, and 'the probability for such events occurring increases with time.
Only the timely completion of all cleanup and radioactive waste disposal activities at the TMI-2 site will eliminate the associated risks to the ' workers and all possibility of inadvertent offsite radioactive releases.
The damaged fuel and other materials at the TMI site will remain radioactive for many hundreds of years.
The threat remains until the facilities are
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decontaminated, the fuel is removed from the site and all radioactive wastes are disposed of safely.
In addition to the increased possibility of radioactive releases as the claanup is further delayed, we are equally concerned about unnecessary radiation exposures to plant workers.
The NRC will continue to assure that the licensee takes all steps necessary to ensure that radiation exposures to the workers are kept as low as reasonably achievable.
However, as the cleanup is stretched over an unnecessarily long' time due to lack of adequate finances, workers inevitably will he exposed to radiation and will accumulate increased exposures while -
performing maintenance activities.
These activities by workers in radiation zones will be required to maintain the status quo, even though little or no progress is made toward cleanup.
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1 Ic is simply imperative that the pace of the cleanup be conducted in an expeditious manner and that the financial problems which are hindering this pace be resolved In the interests of pr.ote.cting the health and safety l
as quickly as possible.
i of the site workers and general public we would support any initiatives to expedite the cleanup.
The issue of expediting the cleanup and The concern is more than a local one.
belotedly bringing the TMI-2 accident to a conclusion is of national importance and demands the attention of, and resolution b,x the industry, the Administration, the Congress'and government agencies.
Anything less will perpetuate an intolerable situation at TMI, having significant impacts on the local population, the government, the industry and, most importantly, the nation.
This concludes my prepared testimony and I would he glad to answer any questions the Committee night have.
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