ML20053D599
| ML20053D599 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8206070107 | |
| Download: ML20053D599 (2) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II May 24, 1982 BLRD-50-438/82-33 BLRD-50-439/82-30 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM - BLRD-50-438/82-33, BLRD-50-439/82 FIRST INTERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on April 22, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8203 Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report by December 31, 1982.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY f
L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing E.4 closure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 OFFICI AI, COPY
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e ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM NCR BLN NEB 8203 BLRD-50-438/82-33, BLRD-50-439/82-30' 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT Description of Deficiency A pipe failure of the nonsafety grade Steam Generator Startup and Recirculation System in the Auxiliary Building could result in a harsh environment that exceede the qualification limits for safety-related electrical equipment. Failure of nearby safety-related equipment in one system train because of the harsh environment caused by the pipe break coupled with an assumed failure in the same safety system in the other train may result in a situation that could adversely affect safe shutdown of the plant.
The cause of this deficiency was determined to be lack of sufficient pipe break analysis criteria at the time of system design. No other TVA facilities are affected by this deficiency.
Interim Progress
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Meetings are being scheduled to better define the problem and to determine the best course of corrective action. Once corrective action is determined, it will be scheduled and implemented.
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