ML20053C816

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Spent Fuel Storage Mod for Increased Storage Capacity,In Response to Licensee 820312 Request.Response Requested within 30 Days
ML20053C816
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 05/20/1982
From: Clark R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: William Jones
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
References
NUDOCS 8206020594
Download: ML20053C816 (7)


Text

_-

S M S-Ol(c.

MAY 2 01982 DISTRIBUTION LAfocket File BTurovlin i

NRC-PDR JMinns L DPR CMiller i

ORB #3.Rdg ORothberg Docket No. 50-285 DEisenhut WBrooks 0 ELD AE00 N

p g

f I&E

\\

b' ACRS-10 g

Mr. W. C. Jones i

Division Manager, Production ETourigny 9

gg g YED i

Operations PMKreutzer-3

. M4Y 2519825

,10 Omaha Public Power District RAClark D

  1. g;29, 1623 Harney Street Gray File 8N Qely V,-

r Omaha, Nebraska 68102 MWuhl

Dear Mr. Jones:

g t

In conducting our review of your March 12, 1982 request relating to Spent Fuel Storage Modification for Increased Storage Capacity at the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, we have determined that we will need the additional information identified in the enclosure to continue our review.

In order for us to maintain our review schedule, your response is requested within 30 days of your. receipt of this letter.

4 1

The reporting /and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter are approved under 0MB clearance #3150-0065 which expires on May 31, 1983.

Please contact us if you have any questions concerning this request.

Sincerely, Criginal;!;ned by

[ L. Conner hor.

Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of. Licensing

Enclosure:

i Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:

See next page i

820 6 0 2 0 ye)f.g ornce>.08B44:DM

.DREM:.0L.......

..PMKf..e..u".. tie..r...

..E

.........r. R..A6.1..a..r..i...C......

p sua m eb 5M.8.2...... Me.B2......... 5L2.Un........

om>

nac ronu ais tio soi nncu o24a OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usom. mi.-m*o

~4 Omaha Public Power District cc:

Marilyn T. Shaw, Esq.

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MccRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C.

20036 Mr. Jack Jensen Chairman, Washington County Board of Supervisors Blair, Nebraska 68023 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region VII ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative 324 East lith Street Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Mr. Frank Gibson W. Dale Clark. Library 215 South 15th Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Alan H. Kirshen, Esq.

Fellman, Ransey & Kirshen 1166 Woodmen Tower Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Mr. Larry Yandel.1 U.S.N.R.C. Resident Inspector P. O. Box 309 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman Manager - Washington Nuclear Operations C-E Power Systems Combustion Engineering, Inc.

4853 Cordell Avenue, Suite A-1 Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV Office of Executive Director for Operations 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 l

{

r FORT CALHOUN SPENT FUEL STORAGE DENSIFICATION REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.

Provide the results of an accident analysis which addresses the effects of a vertically dropped fuel bundle which ends up laying horizontally on the full spent fuel storage racks. The analysis should be similar to'the accident analysis provided for a fuel bundle being dropped adjacent to the storage rack and should address criticality, reduction in cooling of the assemblies in the rack, and damage to the fuel in the rack and to the dropped fuel assembly.

2.

Regarding the use of the shutdown cooling system to cool the spent fuel pool, provide the following.

a.

The licensee states that the shutdown cooling system can be aligned to provide cooling for the spent fuel pool four (4) hours after receipt of a high pool temperature alarm.

The licensee did not

~ specify the condition of the reactor (operating mode) during the time the shutdown cooling system is aligned for spent fuel cooling.

Verify that the reactor will be in cold shutdown prior to alignment of the shutdown cooling system for spent fuel pool cooling.

b.

Until the shutdown cooling system is aligned for spent fuel pool cooling, the pool temperature wil.1 increase a's the result of inadequate pool cooling.

No statement was made in the licensee's submittal concerning the high temperature alarm setpoint or the maximum pool temperature until adequate cooling is restored.

Our concern is with the effects of the increasing temperature on the cleanup system and the increa~se in airborne radioactivity with respect to offsite dose.

Specify the high temperature alarm setpoint.

Using a heat load based on NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Section9.1.3 and Branch Technical Position ASB 9-2, specify

.the peak pool temperature and provide a discussion on the effects of this temperature on the spent fuel pool cleanup system and the

. site boundary dos, age.

3.

The licensee stated in his submittal dated March 12, 1982 that the spent fuel pool temperature would be maintained below 120*F.

The licensee did not use NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Section 9.1.3 ~and Branch Techni-cal Position ASB 9-2 for calculating the decay heat loads.

Consequently, we are not sure how much conservatism is in the licensees analysis.

Therefore provide the following information with the heat exchangers expected fouli.ng factor and pluggage factor for the life of the plant:

the poo'l temperature trith the r: xica r;omal hat lond ming the a.

hat iczd based on IU?lG-0300; b.

the pool torperature trith the ::cxic:a nomal feat load sirrg the hat load based on IUPIG-0303 cnd tha teorst s ~.ngle active fcilure.

Provide a discussion of the failure e.nd the operation of the re Aining portion cf.tha systmi

~

_y

e

~.

c.

a discussion of the capabi'.ity and procedure to remove the spent fuel pool cooling system heat exchanger from service for tube cleaning, tube clugging or retubing. The' spent fuel pool cooling system consists' of two pumps and a single heat exchanger.

Include in the discussion of the time available to, perform these tasks without exceeding any pool temperature alarm setpoints.

4.

Provide the results of an analysis of the effects of dr.opping light loads onto stored spent fuel.

The analysis should verify that the maximum potentital kinetic energy ccntained in all objects of less weight than a spent fuel assembly and its handling tool which will be handled over tne spent fuel in the storage racks will not result in fuel damage and a corresponding offsite dose in excess of that detenained in the design basis fuel handling accident in the FSAR.

5.

On April 14, 1978 a ceaeric letter ras sc::t to eli licensees dich provided" guidance concerning the infort.ation to ha provided by the utility den requesting spent fuel pool c:>dificaticns for the purpose of increasing the.,

nu.ber of fuel bundles to be stored in the pool. The licansee submittal did not contain all of the information requested by the generic letter.

Therefore, provide the following infomation.

a.

With respect to Section 1.2, verify that,no c=bir.atien of events, of the spent fuel storage and/or failures will result in a Koff arrangement of greater than.95.

b.

Provide a discussion of the onsite tests which dll be perfomad to confinn the presence and retention of the neutron absorber in the racks. The results of the verification tests shall show within a 95 confidence level that there is sufficient.ar.ount of neutron absorber to caintain Y at or less thin.95.

gf c.

Provide e discussion cf the periodic surveillance testing to verify the continued presence of a sufficient enount of neutron absorber in the racks to ceintain Keff at or below.95.

The testing should be perfomed on a statistically acceptable sc=ple size. The frequency of ' testing should ba specified.

d.

Provide a fuel handling accident analysis which includes'a quantifi-cation of the drop parameters. i'ostulated fuel drop accidents must include a straight drop on the' top of a fuel bundle in the rack, a straight drop through an individu!.1 cell all the way to the bottom of the rack and cn inclined drop on the top of a rack. A discussion of the integrity of the racks, foci pool, and the fuel pool liner as wall as the cmount of radiation raieased (compared to the FSAR design basis fuel handling accident) should be included.

Yerify that 'the seismic excitation along the'three orthogoral directions e.

are icposed situitan.cously for the design of-the nw racks.

y c

. s 6.

Verify that the seismic loads imposed on the fuel pool liner walls does not result in any damage to the liner 'such as to cause 1) significant releases of radioactivity due to mechanical damage to the fuel, 2) signi-ficant loss of water from the pool which could uncover the fuel and lead to release of radioactivity due to heatup, 3) loss of ability to cool

~

the fuel due to flow blockage caused by a portion or one complete sectica of the liner plate falling on top of the fuel rack, 4) damage to safety relat'ed equipment as the result of pool leakage and 5) uncontrolled release of significant quantities of radioactive fluids to the environs.

7.

Provide the maximum uplift forces imposed by the spent fuel handling crane including the consideration of these forces in the design of the racks and the effects on attachments to the pool liner.

8.

In the submittal dated March 12, 1982, the storage of control rods was not addressed.

Our concern is if the controls rods were stored in the fuel bundle in the pool, then the additional weight might have a significant effect on the seismic analysis. Verify whether or not bore than one con-trol rod at any time will be stored in the spent fuel pool.

If control rods will be stored in the spent fuel pool, verify that the seismic analysis provided in the submittal represents the naximum pool liner loadings on

' the walls and floor, and the maximum inter-rack reactions with consideraticn being given to the additional weight of the control rods.

9.

In July 1980 NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power plants,"

was published which requires a generic ~ review of the methodology used in routine movina of heavy loads. ' A heavy load is defined as a,ny load which weighs more than a fuel bundle and its handling tools. The re-racking of a spent fuel pool is not considered routine and therefore is not within the scope of NUREG-0612.

Ccncerning the moving of spent fuel storage racks, we have the following questions:

a.

Verify that the special lifting devices for the removal of the existing spent fuel storage racks and the installation of the new spent fuel storace racks meet the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30.9-1971 for,non-sp,ecial lifting devices.

b.

Verify that procedures are developed, which include the safe lead paths, for the removal of existing spent fuel storage racks and installation of new spent fuel storage racks.

Verify that all safe load paths for thue operations are clearly marked on the floor.

Provide drawings which show the load paths of the new and existing spent fuel racks and all other heavy loads associated with this modification of the spent fuel pool.

D 6

e

10.

The information provided in the licensee's submittal dated March 12, 1982 did not include a discussion of the capability of the ccmponent cooling water system and the raw water system to remove the additional heat from s

~

the spent fuel poal. Based on the heat loads using NUREG-0300, Standard P.eview Plan, Section 9.1.3 and Branch Technical fesition ASB 9-2, provide the results of a revised FSAR analysis which shows the increased heat loads from the spent fuel storege expansion on the component cooling water system and the raw water system.

Include information which shoss the design heat load capacities and the imposed heat loads for nonmal operation with ncrmal refuelings and for all design btsis accident heat loads.

For each system, include an analysis of the capability of the system to remove the new spent fuel cooling heat loads and all normal and accident heat loads while maintaining the original design margins for tube fouling and pluggage.

No single failure should prevent pr'oper spent fuel pool cooling or safe shutdown.

No credit can be taken for-any redundant train or component which is not properly qualified for the accident being considered, such as a safe shut-down earthquake, or which requires operator action within 20 minutes (30 minutes if. the single operator action is required outside of the control room).

I o

S d

I I

e i

r-

- g-11.

Outline by major tasks, the methods to be used in the pool modification.

You'should specify the man-hours and average dose rate for each task u.d the expected total man-rem for the entire pool modification.

12.

Outline the actions that will be taken to assure' that occupational doses during each task of the pool modification will be ALARA.

13, Provide an estimate of the increase in annual man-rems from more frequent changing of the demineralizer resin and filter cartridge.

14 Identify the monitoring systems that will be used, and its location in the spent fuel pool area, that would warn personnel whenever there is,

an inadvertent increase in radiation levels that could trigger the alarm set-point.

i 15, Describe the methods used to preclude spent fuel pool water from over-1 flowing onto the spent fuel pool area floors.

I6. Specify the present dose rate in occupied areas outside the spent fuel pool concrete shield wall and provide'an estimate of the potential increase of this dose rate if the space between the spent fuel and inside concrete shield wall is reduced due to the modification.

S e

--- N