ML20052H413
| ML20052H413 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | General Atomics |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052H410 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8205200355 | |
| Download: ML20052H413 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
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g NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION g.(
j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 r
q..... f SAFETY' EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING MENDtENT NO. 30 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. R-67 GENERAL ATO'ilC C01PANY TRIGA MARK F DOCKET NO.
50-163 Introduction By letter dated November 2,1981, as supplemented by letter dated February 22, 1982, the General Atomic Company (the licensee) requested an amendment
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to Facility Operating License No. R-67. The amendment would change the.
Appendix A Technical Specifications to pennit the neutron radiography program to be extended to include certain new explosive devices being used or studied by various government agencies and their contractors.
Evaluation The licensee's information supporting this request,was reviewed under contract by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The LAML Technical Evaluation Report (TER) docunenting this review is attached. The LANL TER indicates that the applicant has demonstrated a working knowledge of the handling of these explosives and has used neutron, radiography to examine devices that contain explosives at the facility in the past. LANL indicates that the radiation levels used in this radiography are significantly less than required to affect the explosives being radiographed. LANL concludcd that there is no credible scenario for explosive initiation while being radiographed. The staff has reviewed the LANL TER and concurs on and endorses it. Thus, the requested changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents.previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin nor do they involve a significant hazards consideration.
8205200355 820511 PDR ADOCK 05000163 P
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k e Envi_ronmental Consideration The staff has determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, the staff has further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is.
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insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative decla-ration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:.
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the proba-bility or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a l
significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the-health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of~
the public.
Dated: yay 111982 4
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT ATTACHMENi 6,' MARK F SAFETY ANALYSIS, LETTER 38/3020, DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1981, WITH REVISIONS DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1982 1.
INTRODUCTION
- -This report provides the basis for the evaluation performed by the Los Alamos'Naticnal Laboratory on the General Atomic Company License Amendme-t Docket 50-163, Mai k F rear. tor. The following docu. men'ts were used in the ggi.
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1.
Letter from Milliam R.~ Mowry, General Atomic, to James R. Miller,
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USNRC, dated N6vember 2,1981-Application for License Amendment.
2.
Let'ter from Wiliiam'R. Mowry, General Atomic, to James R. Miller, t
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USNRC, dated February 22,198?-Revision to. Application for License Amendment.' '
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Att'achment $, ExccVptd fYom EUE25000-A publishing Hazardous Materials j-Regulations of the Department of Transportation, Letter 38/67-3020,
'A dated November 2, 1981.
- 4., Technical Specification, Mark F, Letter 38/67-3020, dated Novenber 2',1981.
- 5., Mark F Safety. Analysis, Letter 38/67-3020,-dated.
November 2,'T981.
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E.
'The above' documents providej.the G neral Atomic technical basis for the application for l'icense amendment to use its Mark F TRIGA reactor at San Diego.
for, neutron radiography beyond the levels originally licerised. Los Alamos comments are directed towards Attachment 6-Safety Analysis.
II.
BACKGROUND A number of f acilities throughout the United States use neutron radiography to examine devices that contain explosives.
General Atomic has been using this tech'lique at this f acility in the past arid is now requesting that they be permitted to radiograph larger amounts.of the same type'of explos'ive device containing only Class B and' Class C explosives with a
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~ quantities limited in.the beam of 5 lbs of explosive (equivalent TNT) if the individual devices contain no more than 0.25 lbs (114 g) or up to 2 lbs of explosive (equivalent TNT) provided that cnly a single device is radiographed at one time.
III.
COMMENTS ON SAFETY ANALYSIS SECTIONS A.
Introduction No coment
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B. -General Discussion of Safety Aspects-of-Explosives Related to Neutron Radiography
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- ' nef We find no problem with-the General Atomic descriptions-of types-of explosions and explosives. We would only disagree with the General Atomic conclusion that propellants are considered low explosives characterized b'y
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slow burning.
Some types of newer missile propellants may be high explosives and subject to detonation. The more important portion of, the safety analysis is included in,the section dealing with hazards induced in explosives by irradiation.
It is our contention that the neptron' radi.ation levels are.so
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'J' low as to constitute no hazard from using them on explosives.
Sec. 2.2.
mentions that the gama doses are typically a few hundred roentgeris and 9
10 neutron doses of 10 - 10 nyt.
Clearly, these levels are far be' low the values needed to affect the explosives.
Experimental work done at 1
2 Los Alamos and work done by Voreck and Avrami verify that much higher levels of neutron and gama flux are needed to affect explosives.
The experi'm 5~tal work done ori neutron ana gamma iri"a'dthtion ~of explosives included both primary and secondary. explosives for organic and. nonorganic explosives.
Although the' impetus for the experiments was not neutron radiography (NR) related, the' principles learned are applicable to NR.
Los Alamos used the Omega West Reactor, which is capable of 13 10 nyt-f ast neutrons in the channel, and the Godiva burst reactor, which 16 5
is capable of 10 nyt. Avrami's experiments showing doses of 10 -R gamma 7
generally support the conclusions that irradiation levels.of n 10 Rads 16 (g amma), > 10 nyt are ' required to cause chemical change in explosives.
Our calculations show that anticipated doses of 61 R (steady-state).and 50 R (burst) gama and 2.7 x 10 nyt (steady-state) and 2.8 y. 1011 (burst) 10
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e would be experiencad at'the target area of the TRIGA reactors, which generally confirms the applicaat's. estimate of a few hundred roentgens gamma and neutron 9
10 dose'of 10 - 10 nyt.
Although of interest, the subsequent analysis dealing with~ the characteristics of a detonation is only required if some other credible initiation source is identified.
We cannot identify any other source of a
detonation other than gross handling or incredible random detonation.
Given the probability of these not occurring, it is our opinion that there is no credible scenario for explosive initiation.
C.
Safety Consideration for Radiography of Explos'ives with the Mark F Reactor The majority of this section deals with the protective devices employed to prevent reactor damage or personnel injury in the event of an explosion.
Our opinion as stated previously-there is no credible scenario for explosive detonation.. However, Sec. 3.3. deals with the fission product inventory and resulting dose rates.
Unfortunately, General Atomic does not identi.fy the f
accident scenario causing the release.
The gaseous fission product inventory is identified for the hottest fuel element and the resulting dose at site boundary is calculated.
Since this Safety Analysis is being used to support V.
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General Atomic's application for increased explosive NR capability, it is not
' clear why this accident is included.since it does not appear to be a function of NR nor is the accident scenario identified.
D.
Mark F Facility Accident Analysis' No comment E.
Description and Radiography of-Explosives Our concern that the applicant recognize that certain propellants may als.o be high explosives is reiterated here.
F.
Storage of Explosives No comment' G.
Summary We would support the applicant's proposal to permit. radiography of explosive devices containing only Class B and Class C explosives with the O
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restrictions-that the radiography of explosives present in the beam be limited to a quantity of (a) ~5 lbs of explosive (equivalent TNT) if the individual devices contain no more than 0.25 lbs (114 g) or (b) up to 2 lbs of explosive (equivalent T.NT) provided that only a single device is radiographed at one time.
It is our contention, based on our Los Alamos work and comparison work done by Voreck and Avrami, that the radiation levels used in this radiography to be significantly less than required to effect the explosive devices being radiographed.
General Atomic has demonstrated a working knowledge of the handling of these explosives.
It is our belief that Class C dev. ices may contain Class A and/or B explosives that can detonate under the proper stimulus.
Further, high-energy pro'pellants (HEP) now used.in missiles can also detonate under the proper stimulus and should be classed as Class h explosives. We have reservations about the adequacy of some of the proposed shielding; however, these reservations are probably not important when balanced by the low probability of detonation from irradiation.
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REFERENCES 4
1.
M. J. Urizar et al., "The Effects of Nuclear Radiation on Organic Explosives," Explosivstoffe, No. 3, 1962.
2.
L. Avrami and W. Voreck, "A DetArmination of Reactor' Radiation Resistant Explosives, Propellants, and Related Material," Technical Report, No. 3782 Frankfurt Arsenal, US Army (November 1969).
R. A. Haarman, Q-6, MS G777 B,
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M. 5. Urizar, M-1, MS C920
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