ML20052H400
| ML20052H400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1982 |
| From: | Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Tallman W PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8205200324 | |
| Download: ML20052H400 (6) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. _ _ 1 r; SAFEGUARDS INF(>RMATION Distribution: w/ enclosures ENCLOSURE A TO BE WITHHELD FROM SSPB Branch Chief PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w/o enclosure A eDocument Control-50-443 444L Docket Nos.: 50-443 MAY 141982 NRC PDR o> ,o 'g and 50-444 L PDR N TERA ? RECEll?go h. 9 /d4y 2 Mr. William C. Tallman unemg.,g 882A Chaiman and Chief Executive Officer LB#3 File Public Service Company of New Hampshire JLee q D*g.:u M, D Post Office Box 37 LWheeler Manchester, New Hw.pshire 03105 GWMcCorkle, N 4 RLessy, OELD io g
Dear Mr. Tallman:
Subject:
Request for Additional Information (Physical Security Licensing Branch) This is in response to your submittals of December 12, 1981 regarding the Seabrook Physical Security and Guard Training and Qualification Plans. We have determined that additional information is necessary to complete our I evaluation. Please provide the items of infomation set forth in the enclosures within 30 days of receipt of this letter. Enclosure A contains Safeguards Information required to be protected in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21. Sincerely, 0r18121 nigned by Frank J. Miraglia Frank J. Miraglia, Chief Licensing Branch-No. 3 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
A) Security Plan Review Comments SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION B) Guard Training Plan Comments ENCLOSURE A TO BE WITHHELD C) Perimeter Intrusion Detection FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE System D) Review Guideline Number 7 cc w/o Enclosure A: See next page g5gog4M F "0NCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPA,ATED FROM ENCLOUSRE A"
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SEABROOK William C. Tallman Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Public Service Company of New Hampshire P. O. Box 330 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 00' John'A. Ritscher, Esq. E. Tupper Kinder, Esq. Ropes and Gray Assistant Attorney General 225 Franklin Street Office of Attorney General Boston, Massachusetts 02110 208 State House Annex Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Mr. Bruce B. Beckley, Project Manager Public Service Company of New Hampshire The Honorable Arnold Wight P. O. Box 330 New Hampshire House of Representatives Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Science, Te hnology and Energy Committee State House G. Sanborn Concord, New Hampshire 03301 U. S. NRC - Region 1 631 Park Avenue Resident Inspector King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Seabrook Nuclear Power Station c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Elizabeth H. Weinhold P. O. Box 700 3 Godfrey Avenue Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 Mr. John DeVincentis, Project Manager Robert A._Backus, Esq. Yankee Atomic Electric Company O'Neill, Backus and Spielman 1671 Worcester Road 116 Lowell Street Farmingham, Massachusetts 01701 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Mr. A. M. Ebner, Project Manager Norman Ross, Esq. United Engineers and Constructors 30 Francis Street 30 South 17th Street Brookline, Massachusetts 02146 Post Office Ecx 8223 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Karin P. Sheldon, Esq. Sheldon. Harmon & Weiss Mr. W. Wrignt. Project Manager 1725 I Street, N. W. Westinghouse Electric Corporation Washington, D. C. 20006 Post Office Box 355 Pittsburg, Pennsylvania 15230 Laurie Burt, Esq. Office of the Assistant Attorney General Thomas Dignan, Esq. Environmental Protection Division Ropes and Gray One Ashburton Place 225 Franklin Street i Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Boston, Massachusetts 02110 D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr., Esq. i General Counsel l Public Service Company of New Hampshire P. O. Box 330 l Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 r
it J t .' J1 l' Ef' CLOS'JRE B COMMENTS ON SEABROOK GUARD TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PLAN PAGE SECTION COMMENT e 910.44 3 1.2.1.3 Appendix B.I.B.(1)(b) requires that corrective eyeglasses be safety glasses. Please specify that all plastic lenses will be shatterproof. 910.45 5 1.3 Commit to the requirements of Appendix B.I.C. which states that a medical examination be conducted within the 30 day period prior to physical fitness qualification. 910.46 Task 18 p.25 Reference a comitment either in the Contingency Plan or the Security Plan to contact LLEA. This commitment should also identify the individual responsible for notification of LLEA. 910.47 ADDITIONAL TASK INFORMATION It is acknowledged that access control procedures are addressed in Tasks #2, #8,
- 11 and #37, however, there is no reference to procedures during security or site emergencies. While your response states the procedures are " essentially" the same as those for normal conditions, provide additional information specifying variations and/or referencing normal procedures.
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nn -reagnc U n i t d U A n, u a. > r. ;,,, " s..; n l g a; nrun i ENCLOSURE C REVIEW 0F ATTACHMENT B " PERIMETER INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM" DAltU UGIUBER 12, 1981 INTRODUCTION The requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 state that " Detection of penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area or the isolation zone adjacent to the protected area barrier shall assure that adegaate response by the security organization can be initiated." lie have reviewed the arguments presented by the Public Service Company of New Hampshire (the applicant) to determine if the perimeter intrusion detection systen proposed for installation at the Seabrook Station meets the regulation or the intent of the regulation. During this review the staff was assisted by security experts of the Sandia National Laboratories and other government agencies. DISCUSSION As stated in the Regulatory Guide 5.44, " Perimeter Intrusion Alarm System," the use of vibration or strain-detection systems should be used only as a secondary or back-up perimeter alarm system except when none of the other five types of perimeter alarm systems will work (e.g., because of the environment) and after the NRC's approval has been received. The argumnts presented in the report (" Perimeter Intrusion Detection System") that the "Inertiaguard" system represents the only type of system that could withstand the environmmental conditions at the Seabrook Station were not persuasive for the following reasons: 1) There is no body of evidence indicating that fence mounted vibration or strain-detection systems are significantly less r,-- - ~ - - - ? c r., c m e -.,,. 1 g .g 2 tu. .. ' c..: LexONll%f ? - - t p rc ; r clac c $.r i e,t < ciy., 7 7 :-.,5 i f, @! d }a u m u ",' ' ' ?'ij Q Mr=6 n*'f[}~~!} -fi 9 ' ? g' . n.b d h.
QDi/0 TIT! cprt N !i n n O fTj[b! tis 5ftiIb \\ ]l7;'[d gh0.Ud li si affected by environmental conditions than are microwave or E-field devices. 2) There is ample proof of the successful employment of microwave and E-field systems at power reactors having similar environmental extremes as Seabrook. In a related matter, there are serious doubts that "Inertiaguard" systems meet the tamper indicating and/or self-checking requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e)(2). CONCLUSION The proposed system is inconsistent with the criteria in Regulatory Guide 5.44 and possibly fails to satisfy regulatory requirements. This system cannot be approved without substantial site testing that verifies the ineffectiveness of the other approved d'etectors. Due to the environmental extremes discussed in the referenced report it is recommended the applicant utilize two perimeter intrusion detection systems. These systems should be chosen such that the enviornmental condit'ons affecting i one system will have a reduced impact upon the other. For example, a volumetric detection system'and a fence mounted system would tend to provide detection inforration to the central alarm station operator such'that alarms could b' resolved during environmental extremes.
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p.qr n, c I UI . a g k,J b$ li y,3 r' 'i $ l itui) .fm cg -u li.; M a ) {$ CLOSURED y p ,g UNITE D sT ATEs l ,,,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U -{'M. M [ h / E WASHING TO N, D. C. 20L55 Vf /! %..v *' f pg 1 E 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch Members FROM: George W. McCorkle, Chief Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch
SUBJECT:
REVIEW GUIDELINE FUMBER 7 REVISION 3 - REDUCING THE PROBABILITY OF COMPR0i4ISE THRU KEY CONTROL (APPLICABLE TO POWER REACTORS IMPLEMENTING 10 CFR 73.55) 10 CFR 73.55(d)(9) states: " All keys, locks, combinations and related equipment used to control access to protected and vital areas shall be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there is evidence that any key, lock, combination, or related equipment may have been compromised it shall be changed. Upon termination of employment of any employee, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment, to which that employee had access, shall be changed." The objective of controlling keys, locks, combinations, and related equip-ment is to reduce the probability of compromise. An acceptable apprcach to lock and key control should irc'ude a rotation program, limiting employee access to locks, keys, combinations and related equipment, changing locks, keys, combinations and related equipment wt.en an individual is t:rminated for cause or there is evidence that such equipment or devices have been lost or compromised. The following set of act.ons describes an acceptable program for reducing the probability of compromise: (1) Change all keys, locks, and combinations and related equipnent used to control access to protected areas and vital areas at least every 12 months. (2) Issue keys, locks, combinations, and other access control devices to protected and vital areas only to those individuals whc possess access authorization to those areas. (3) Chunge keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which an individual had access within five days, and immediately for card keys, after access authorization is withdrawn due to lack of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance. l (4) Change keys,1ocks, ccmbinations, and related equipment within five days, and immediately for card keys, when there is ev'idence that such equipment or devices have been lost or compromisec. ~ =*-0.n oc1eum( ,9 ,,, lh ( c.. -..a ,j _ _f02 + TA. //'9; George W. McCorkle, Chief cTrcr 'cln:n;;: t i en g-Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch cc: R. F. Eurnett o a, -- -.. ; ; m ~ c., . c. ~., -.., 7.. n., ,((. U o\\!.d't,[_; ',,((}}