ML20052G951
| ML20052G951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1982 |
| From: | UNITED ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052G947 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8205190180 | |
| Download: ML20052G951 (165) | |
Text
7 DOCKET NO. 50-460 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS NUREG - 0612 Response to NRC Request for Addit'onal Information WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM Nuclear Project No.1 I
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DOCKET NO. 50-460 L
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NUREG - 0612 I
I Response to NRC Request for I
Additional Inforniation l
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC PO.WER SUPPLY SYSTEM Nuclear. Project No.1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB I
Letter of Transmittal TAB II NRC Letter of Request TAB III Sunmary TAB IV Response to 2.1 General Requirements for Oserhead Handling Systems TAB V
Response to 2.2 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools TAB VI Response to 2.3 Specific Requirements of Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment TAB VII Response to 2.4 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing
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Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.
TAB VIII Tables 3.1 Tabulation of Heavy Loads
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3-2 Load / Impact Area Matrix
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3-2a Hazard Elimination Index 3-2b Plant Structure Analysis Summary Sheet 3-3 Comparison Sunmary - Polar Crane Vs NUREG 0554 TAB IX Attachments A-Conduit and Cable Tray Review
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B-HVAC Review C-Piping Review D-Safety Related Equipment Review TAB X
Load Path Drawings 805704 805710 805705 805711
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805706 805712 805707 805713 805708 805714 805709 i
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Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richtand. Washington 99352 (509)372-5000
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Docket No. 50-460
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May 6, 1982 G01-82-0181 Ms. E.G. Adensam, Chief
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Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
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Dear Ms. Adensam:
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 1 RESPONSE TO NUREG-0612
Reference:
NRC ltr. to All Licensees of Operating Plants &
~ Applicants for Operating Licenses & Holders of
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Construction Permits, dated 12/22/80, subject, Control of Heavy Loads
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In the reference the Staff requested that the WNP-1 Project review the controls for the handling of heavy loads to determine the extent to which the Staff's guidelines, included with the referer.ce, are presently e
satisfied at WNP-1.
The reference also requested that the Project L-identify the changes and modifications that would be required in order to fully satisfy the guidelines.
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The attached report titled, " Control of Heavy Loads NUREG-0612", is our response to these requests.
M@ h4 G. D. Bouchey, Deputy Director
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Safety and Security (370)
GDB:AGH:pp attachment cc: CR Bryant, BPA (399)
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RW Hernan, NRC AD Toth, NRC FDCC'(899)
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STATE OF WASHINGTON)
Subject:
Response to NUREG-0612 I
) ss COUNTY OF BENTON
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I G. D. BOUCHEY, being duly sworn, subscribe to and say that I am the I
Deputy Director, Safety and Security, for the WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, the applicant herein; that I have full authority to l
execute this oath; that I have reviewed the foregoing; and that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief the statements made in it I
are true.
lI DATED
- 7a q 6
, 1982 G
l bp%&
I G. D. BOUCHEY,Q puty Director l
Safety & Security I
On this day personally appeared before me G. D. BOUCHEY to me known to j
be the individual who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged
'E that he signed the same as his free act and deed for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.
GIVEN under my hand and seal this le day of % a m _
1982.
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Notary Publi& in and for the State of Washington Residing at OD$)
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[m,o UNITED STATES
[ ',.,. g, ' g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555.- -
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E December 22, 1950 gMs
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TO ALL LICENSEES OF OPERATING PLANTS AND APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSES AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS
- Gentlemen-
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads In January 1978, the NRC published NUREG-0410 entitled, "NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants -
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Report to Congress." As part of this program, the Task Action Plan for Unresolved Safety Issue Task No. A-36, " Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel," was issued.
We have completed aur review of load handling operations at nuclear power plants. A report describing the results of this review has been issued as NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants -
Resolution of TAP A-36."
This report contains several recommendations to be implemented by all licensees and applicants to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads.
The purpose of this letter is to request that you review your controls for the handling of heavy loads to determine the extent to which the guidelines of Enclosure 1 are presently satisfied at your facility, and to identify the changes and modifications that would be required in order to fully satisfy these guidelines.
To expedite your compliance with this request, we have enclosed the following:
NUREG-0612 " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (Enclosure 1).
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Staff Position - Interim Actions for Control of Heavy Loac's (Enclo'sure 2).
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Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads (Enclosure 3).
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- With the exception of licensees for Indian Point 2 and 3, Zion 1 and 2 and Three Mile Island 1 (These were previously sent a letter)
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h 2a:dcr 22,1980 I
l av You are requested to implement the interim actions described in Enclosure g
2 as soon as possible but no later than 90 days from the date of this letter.
In order to enable the NRC to determine whether operating licenses should be modified (10 CFR 50.54(f)), operating reactor licensees are reouested to provide the following:
1.
Submit a report documer. ting the results of your review and the required changes and modifications.
This reptet should I
include the information identified in Sections 2.1 through 2.4 of Enclosure 3, on how the guidelines of NUREG-0612 will be satisfied.
This report should be submitted in two parts according to the following schedule:
Submit the Section 2.1 information within six months from the date of this letter.
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Submit the Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 information within nine months.
2.
Furnish confirmation within six months that implementation of those changes and modifications you find are necessary will I
commence as soon as possible without waiting on staff review, so that all such changes, beyond the above interim actions, will be completed within two years of submittal of Section 2.4 v
for the above report.
3.
Furnish justification within six months for any changes or modifications that would be required to fully satisfy the g
guidelines of Enclosure 1 which you oelieve are not necessary.
The criteria in NUREG-0612 are also applicable to applicants for operating I
licenses.
Such applicants are expected to provide the information requested by item 1 above and to meet the same schedule of implementation as indicated in 2 above. Any item for which the implementation date is I
prior to the expected date of issuance of an operating license will be considered to be a prerequisite to obtaining that license.
For any date that c anot be met, furnish a proposed revised date, I'
justification for the delay, and any planned compensating safety actions during the interim.
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I. - - -..... -...
This request for information was approved by GA0 under a blanket v
clearance number R0072 which expires November 30,1983.
Comments on burden and duplication may be directed to the U.S. General Accounting Office, Regulatory Reports Review, Room 5106, 441 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20548.
Sincerely,
\\
qDarrel
~V G E'isenhut, Director L
Division o Licensing
Enclosures:
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1.
NUREG-0612 2.
Staff Position 3.
Request for Additional
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Infor. a tion ec: w/o Enclosure (1)
Service List w
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SUMMARY
The following report is in response to an NRC reauest dated December l
22, 1980 concerning the " Control of Heavy Load" at tuclear Power Plants. The report provides the Supply Systems review of controls for I
the handling of heavy loads to determine the extent to which the j
guidelines of NtREG 0612 are satisfied for WNP-l.
The report also identifies changes and modifications that are being implemented to satisfy the NUREG 0612 quidelines.
l The 12/22/80 letter reauested subm!ttal of a report documenting the results of the review and reouired chances.
This recuested information I
was to be submitted in two (2) parts; Section 2.1 first, and Sections l
2.2 through 2.4 three months later. Since WNP-1 is currently under construction, the recuested information has been consolidated into this one report.
The report is structured such that each auestion is stated in ouotations and followed by a response to the ouestion. Tables drawincs and attachments referenced in the responses are included, to assist in l
substantiating the results of the review.
The Supply System considers the load handlina systems and liftinq l
apparatus, discussed herein, to be in compliance with the intent of NUREG 0612.
The report reflects the results of a comprehensive review I
of the items summarized below.
1.
Evaluation of Cranes - The Cask Handling crane is in the I
process of being upgraded to single failure proof. The remainder of the load handling systems identified in Table l
3-1 emphasize utilization of increased safety factors and the ability of the floor slabs under the load handling I
system to sustain a load drop.
I 2.
Load Paths - Load paths have been developed for the crane I
load combinations identified in Table 3-1 and are identified on the load path drawinas attached to this l
I report.
3.
Procedures Plant operating and maintenance procedures are l
currently in the process of being written. These procedures will reflect the reouirements of NUREG 0612 as I
discussed herein.
All procedures reauired for handling l
heavy loads will be placed into effect upon completion and are scheduled to be implemented at least three (3) months prior to fuel load.
4.
Training The Supply System concurs with the training I
reouirements identified in NUREG 0612 and is in the process of developing a comprehensive training program as discussed l
herein.
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5.
Modifications - The Control of Heavy Loads Analysis as well as other separate analyses have resulted in several changes / modifications which improve load handling system reliability. The followinq changes / modifications are currently in the process of being implemented.
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a)
Upgrade Cask Handling Crane MHS-CRN-2 to single failure proof.
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b)
Reinforce floor slabs in two (2) areas under Filter Maintenance Monorail RSW-MRH-1 to sustain load drop.
c)
" DELETED" d)
Reinforce floor slabs in solid waste handling areas.
Floor slabs to be capable of sustainina a fully l
loaded waste container or waste cask load drop as j
reouired.
e)
Modify lifting lugs on control rod drive service structure to provide capability of retaining the reactor vessel head load during an SSE.
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f)
Relocate GSB eauipment hatch monorail MHS-MRH-5 to reduce helaht above floor slab. Floor slab will then be able to sustain a load drop of heaviest
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anticipated load.
6.
Exceptions - The Supply System has taken exception to several requirements contained in NtREG 0612. These exceptions and alternate reouirements are discussed in this i
report.,The exceptions taken do not reduce the reliability of load handling operations identified herein.
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L 1226R ds III-2
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2.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS "NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1 identifies several general guidelines related to the design and operation of overhead load handling systems in the areas where spent fuel is stored, in the vicinity of the reactor j
core, and in other areas of the plant where a load drop could result in
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damage to eoulpment reouired for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
Information provided in response to this section should identify the extent of potentially hazardous load handling operations at a site and the extent of conformance to appropriate load-handling guidance."
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9 Reouest 2.1-1 i
" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to r
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result in damage to any system reouired for plant shutdown or identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks
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technicalspecifications,operatingnm?edures,ordetailed L
structural analysis.)"
Response to 2.1-1 The overhead handling systems identified durino the plant review, from which a load drop could result in damage to spent fuel,
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plant shutdown systems, or decay heat removal systems are listed below, by structure.
Containment:
Tag.No.
Eculpment Name Capacity
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MHS CRN-4 Polar Crane 530 Ton Main 25 Ton Aux 11.
10 Ton Annul.
I MHS CRN-6 Reactor Bldg.
1 Ton Jib Crane
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MHS CRN-14 ReactoriBldg.
Jib Crane 1 Ton
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CRD Serv. Structure 2 Tons Each Manorail Holsts (4)
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General Services Ehjilding:
Tag No.
Eauipment Mme Capacity MHS G N-1 New Fuel lbpacking 10 Tons
& Inspection Crane MHS W N-2 Cask Handling Crane 105 Tons Main Auxil.
10 Tons (2)
MHS CRN-3 Radioactive Mainten.
25 Tons
& Test Facil. Crane
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MHS CRN-10 Gama Scan Facility 2 Tons Jib Crane MHS CRN-16 Machine Shop 5 Tons Bridae Crane (J
MHS MRH-2 Decontamination Rm.
3 Tons Monorail Holst
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MHS MRH-5 GS8 Eouipment Hatch 5 Tons Monorail Holst MHS MRH-9 Tank Am. Monorail 2 Tons
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Holst MHS Mrdt-10 Diesel Service Holst 5 Tons
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(Portable)
J MHS MRH-15 Safeguards Area 2 Tons
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Monorail Holst MHS MRH-18 Mechine Shop 5 Tons Monorail Holst MHS MRH-19 Eauipment Mainten.
5 Tons
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MHS MRH-20 Eauipment Mainten.
5 Tons RSW CRN-1 Solid Waste 6 Tons
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Handling Crane RSW MRH-1 Filter Mainten.
7.5 Tons Monorail
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f Reauest 2.1-2
" Justify the exclusion of any overhead handlino system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination, by inspection, that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component reouired for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
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Response to 2.1-2 The following overhead handling systems have been excluded from 2.1-1 above, since they will not carry heavy loads over eculpment reouired for plant shutdown, decay heat removal, or spent fuel.
b-Containment:
Tag No.
Eoulpment Name Capacity
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MHS CRN-5 Fuel Transfer 5 Tons l
Tube Crane MHS CRN-15 Eouipment Hatch 5 Tons Service Jib-FHS BRG-1 Main Fuel Handling 3 Tons Bridae 2 Tons Auxil.
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General Services Building:
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Tag No.
Eoulpment Name Capacity FHS BRG-2 Fuel Storace Handling 3 Tons Bridge 2 Tons Auxil.
MHS CRN-7 Diesel Generator 3 Tons Jib Crane MHS MRH-4 GSB Eouipment Hatch 5 Tons Monorail Holst 1
b MHS MRH-6 GSB Eouipment Hatch 5 Tons i
Monorail Holst MHS W H-7 GSB Eouipment Hatch 5 Tons
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Monorail Holst MHS MRH-17 Incore mnitoring 6 Tons
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System Monorail MHS MRH-23 Radwaste Compressor 3 Tons Serv. Monorail Holst MHS MRH-24 FWA Pump Monorail Holst 3 Metric Tons IV-4
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Turbine Bu]ldina:
Tao No.
Eculpment Name Caoacity MHS CRN-ll Heater Bay Crane 25 Tons MHS CRN-12 Heater Bay Crane 125 Tons Main 15 Tons Auxil.
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MHS CRN-13 Turbine Bldg. Crane
'250 Tons Main 45 Tons Auxil.
MHS MRH-3 Load Break Switch 5 Tons Monorail Holst
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MHS MRH-12 Condenser Vacuum Pump 5 Tons Gantry Holst
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MHS MRH 21 Condensate Polishing 5 Tons Monorail Holst
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spray Pond:
Tag te.
Eculoment Name Capacity h
MHS MRH-16 Stop Log Monorail 3 Tons Holst
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MHS MRH-22 Screen Removal 2 Tons Monorail Holst Circulating Water Pump House:
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Tag No.
Eauipment Name Cepacity MHS CRN-8 Circ. Water &
20 Tons Main Fire Ptap Crane 5 Tons Auxil.
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Others:
Tag No.
Eculpment Name Capacity MHS WRH-13 Portable Gantry Holst 5 Tons MHS MRH-14 Portable Gantry Holst 5 Tons
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Bulk Chlorine 2 Tons Monorail Holst Cooling Towar 2,500 lbs.
Gantries (3)
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Cooling Tower 2,500 lbs.
Davits (3)
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Reouest 2.1-3 "With respect to the desian and operation of heavy-load handlina systems in the containment and the spent-fuel-pool area, and those load handlina systems identified in 2.1-1 above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the cuidelines of NLREG 0612, Section 5.1.1.
The followina specific information should be included in your reply:"
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Respo_nse to 2.1-3 Sumary
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The Supply System's R> clear Leit WNP-] will he in full compliance with, NtREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 prior to fuel loadina with two exceptions.
They are:
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Section 5.1.l(1) of NLREG-0612, " Safe Load Paths" -
reouires that load paths should be " clearly marked on the
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floor in the area where the load is to be handled."
Coment:
Safe load paths have been defined on the drewings referenced in Response 2.1-3a.
Loads will he moved by the safest and shortest paths, in accordance with the load path drawinos and written procedures. Due to the number of paths and their confiourations (particularly in the Containment), it is felt that marked load paths generally will not contribute to ensuring the safe handlina of loads and infact may detract from safety throuah potential confusion of
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operation personnel. Therefore, with the exception of the Radiosctive Maintenance and Test Facility Crane (MHS-CRN-3), load paths wil] not he marked.
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2.
Section 5.1.1(4) reauires that "Special liftina devicen should satisfy the auidelines of ANSI N14.61978 ' Standard
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for Special Devices for Shippina Containers Weichino 10,000 pounds (4,500Ka) or more for Nuclent Materials'. This standard should apply to all special liftina devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above."
Comment:
The liftino devices identified in Table 3-1, althouoh
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not specifically desianed to ANSI N14.'61078,
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oenerally satisfies the recuirements of this standard.
The Supply System takes exception to the testing and inspection reouirements of ANSI N14.6 1978.
Further discussion reaardina our exception and
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alternate methods is located in Response 2.1-3d.
Reouest 2.1-3a
" Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe loaa paths, spent fuel, and safety-related eculpment".
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h Response to 2.1-3a The drawings listed below identify safe load paths for loads
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identified in Response 2.1-3a, above. Specific load paths have been developed for those loads that, if dropped, could cause damage to spent fuel and/or safe shutdown eoulpment. Where floor r
slabs, determined through analysis to be capable of sustaining a L
load drop, separate the load from eaulpment reouired for safe shutdown, decay heat removal, or spent fuel cooling, the load c
handling systems are not restricted to specific load paths and L
are permitted to operate within their full travel parameters if there are no other restricting conditions. One floor slab has been identified which will not sustain a load drop from an
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elevation of 1 foot above the floor, for the maximum anticipated load (MHS-ORN-3 Radioactive Eoulpment Maintenance and Test Facility Crane).
This problem has been eliminated throuah
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administrative controls by marking specific load paths on the floor over structural floor members that will sustain a load drop. A more detailed discussion will be provided in Section 2.4.
Drawing No.
Title 805704 -
Containment Building Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 479'-0" Safe Load Paths for MHS-CRN-4 805705 Containment Building
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Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 479'-0" Safe Load Paths for MHS-CRN-4 Sheet 2 of 3 805706 Containment Building Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 479'-0"
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Safe Load Paths for MHS-CRN-4 Sheet 3 of 3 805707
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GSB Fuel Storage Area Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 479'-0" Safe Load Paths for MHS-MRH-9 &
MHS-CRN-1, -2, & -3 805708 GSB Safeguards Area Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 495'-0" I
Safe Load Paths for MHS-MRH-15, -19, L
& -20
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Drawing No.
Title 805709 GSB Diesel Generator Area
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Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 395'-0" Safe Load Paths for MHS-MRH-10
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805710 GSB Filter Area Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 455'-0" Safe Load Paths for RSW-WlH-1 805711 GSB Safeguards Area Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 433'-0" Safe Load Paths for MHS-MRH-5 &
s MHS-CRN-10 s
805712 GSB Mechanical Machine Shop s
Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 455'-0" 6
- Safe Load Paths for MHS-CRN-16 &
s MHS-MRH-18
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,s GSB Solid Waste Handling Area
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i 805713 Control of. Heavy Loads - Elev. 455'-0" s
'N Safe Load Paths for RSW-CRN-1
_8057 4 GSB Decontamination Room 1
s Control of Heavy Loads - Elev. 479'-0"
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Safe " Load F'aths for MHS-WlH-2
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Reouest 2.1-3b
["A discussion of measures tEiken to ensure that load handling
' operations remain within safeJoad paths, including procedures,
.if any, for.daviation from these paths".
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Ry ponse 2.1-3b-h The safe load paths identifled on the drawings listed in our C'
' response to 2.1-3a, above, will be referenced in plant operating L
' and maintenance procedures. These procedures will be available
.s three (3) months. prior to fuel load. 7he load path drawings that p
are to be attached to.the procedures will h1 manageable in size
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.L (approximately 11" x 17").
It is premature to identify procedures by specific number; however, Table 3-1 " Tabulation of
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Heavy Loads", identifles whether a specific procedure or general handling procedure will be provided. The procedures will refer maintenance and operations personnel to applicabla load path t
drawings. The load paths follow the safest and shortest routes
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withmonsideration given to maintaining safe distances from spent fuel _and safe shutdown eauipment.
The " general" handling
- 4 procedure will be utilized during maintenance periods for
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l~ handling heavy loads that do not normally have specific procedures for movement of a load with a load handling system.
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'During crane operator training and reaualification, crane
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operators will be instructed regardina safe load paths, load heights, and as discussed in 2.1-3g.
Work efforts and load handling operations will be performed in
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accordance with written approved procedures by trained and experienced personnel under the supervision of competent foremen. Prior to initiating the work activities in the
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procedure, foremen will critioue the procedure with the work crew, to ensure each one knows the correct methods to be followed. To summarize, loads will be handled along established
. safe load paths under the control of aualified and experienced
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personnel in accordance with written and approved. procedures.
Deviation from the safe load paths will reouire approval of the Plant Safety Review Committee.
Reouest 2.1-3c
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"A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that the handling of such a load
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is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NW EG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2)".
Response to 2.1-3c
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Table 3-1, " Tabulation of Heavy Loads", lists by crane the loads normally handled by the load handling devices identified in
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Response to 2.1-1, above.
Included in the table are load weights, designated lifting devices, applicable load path drawings, and reference drawings. As discussed in response to 2.1-3b, above, specific procedures will be available three (3)
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months prior to fuel load. Table 3-1 identifies whether a special procedure or general handling procedure will be 1
provided. Specific procedures provide detailed step by step h
instruction, including identification of reouired eauipment, inspections, responsibility precautions, and referenced load paths. The general procedure will govern movement and handling
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of heavy loads where no specific procedure is reouired. The general procedure will address responsibility, precautions, inspection reouirements, references, safe rigoing practices, and identify safe load paths for all heavy loads listed in Table 3-1.
The procedures will meet the reauirements of NWEG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2).
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Reauest 2.1-3d
" Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3c, above,
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-comply with the reouirements of ANSI N14.61978,- or ANSI B30.9 1971,' as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by N WEG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4) or 5.1.l(5) are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their
[L equivalency in terms of load handling reliability".
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c Response to 2.1-3d Special Liftina Devices l
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a.
Polar Crane Lifting Beam and Tenaue I
b.
Polar Crane Lifting Extension l
c.
Tripod Handling Fixture d.
Head and Internal Handling Extension Assembly I
e.
Internal Handling Adapter Assembly f.
Solid Waste Container Lift Rig g.
Spent Fuel Shipping Cask Yoke The "special lifting devices" identified in Table 3-1 and ahove, with the exception of Item "g" (Spent Fuel Shippina Cask Yoke), have not been specifically designed to ANSI N14.6 1978. However, with the I
exception of the Solid Waste Container lifting rio, the "special lifting devices" meet the intent of ANSI N14.61978, includina the supplemental recuirements identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4),
Each of the Special Lifting devices are discussed below.
a.
Polar Crane Liftino Beam and Tonque has a design rated load (ORL) of 520 tons. The safety factor of 5 for normal I
operatino conditions is based on ultimate strenath. The Polar Crane and Liftina Beam Assembly have been desianed to retain the Reactor Vessel Head Load of "20 tons during an I
SSE. Since the heaviest load to be hardled is 220 tons, the safety factor for the crane and lifting beam assembly increnses to 10.2 when considering a static load of 220 I
tons and 15% for impact loading. Therefore, this segment of the load handling eouipment meets the recuirements of ANSI N14.6 1978.
b.
Polar Crane Lifting Extension c.
Tripod d.
Head and Internal Handling Extension Assembly e.
Internal Handlina Adapter Assembly The ricaing arrangement for handling the Reactor Vessel Head Assembly has been designed to retain the load durina an SSE.
The allowable I
stress criteria for an SSE condition is 90% of yield.
Each liftina device (a-e) has been designed with a minimum safety I
factor of 5, based on ultimate strength. The DRL includes the static load plus 15% for dynamic loading.
I I
IV-10 I
E The various loads handled by b, c, d, & e above, are discussed below:
(1)
Plenum Assembly - The riqqing configuration used to handle the Plenum Assembly (see Table 3-1) provides a
(
safety factor of 13.5 which meets the reouirements of L
ANSI N14.6, Section 6.2.1 design criteria.
(2)
Core Sucoort - Since the fue'l is removed from the
(
core support to the spent fuel storage pool, prior to handling the core support, the possibility of damage to the fuel is eliminated. The safety factor during this operation is 6.0 based on ultimate strenath when considering the static load of 180 tons and 15% for impact loads.
(3)
Reactor Vessel Head Assembly - As previously stated the crane and rigging apparatus have been designed to retain the head load during an SSE event.
In
(
addition a head load drop analysis without a concurrent SSE has been performed. The results indicate that a head load drop nf 5' over the Reactor
{
Vessel and the load at maximum heiQ t along the h
remainder of the load path would be acceptable in terms of core cooling and would not result in damaae to fuel. However due to the severe structural damaae
[<
that would result from a load drop over the internal storage ares & head laydown area it was advisable to design the crane & ricaina apparatus with increased
[
safety factors to retain the hrad load during an SSE.
The head drop analysis is provided in Section 9.1 subsection 9.1.4.3.9, " Containment Polar Crane"
{
of the FSAR.
f.
Solid Waste Container Lift Rio - has been desioned with a safety factor of 5, based on ultimate strength.
The DRL
[.
considers static load plus 15% for impact loadina.
In the unlikely event of e load drop, the floor slabs in the areas where the solid waste container is handled, will sustain
{
the load drop without damage to any safe-shutdown decay heat removal or spent fuel pool cooling eouipment.
(
g.
Spent Fuel Shippino Cask Yoke - will be of redundant design L
and conforms to ANSI N14.61978.
Inspection will be in accordance with ANSI N14.65 1978, Section 5.3.
Since the Cask Handling Crane is single failure-proof and the lifting
(
device is redundant, a load drop is not considered credible.
Special Lifting Tools
[-
a.
Stud Handling Tool b.
tew Fuel Handling Tool c.
CRDM and Lead Screw Lifting Tools The special lifting tools listed above do not handle heavy loads and are, therefore, excluded from this analysis for handling of
(
heavy loads.
IV-11
I Special Lifting Slinos a.
Stud Tensioner Sling b.
Irradiated Incore Instrument Transfer Cask Sling The special lifting slings listed above, and all other slings used to handle heavy loads, will meet or exceed the reouirements I
of ANSI B30.91971.
All slings will maintain a minimum safet',
factor of 5.
The rated load when selecting sling size will be the sum of the static load and dynamic load or greater.
The dynamic load being the greater of 15% of the static load or 5%
for every foot / minute of book speed.
The Supply System takes no exception to the reouirements of ANSI B30.9 or Section 5.1.l(5) of tAREG-0612.
Summary:
The above described "Special Lifting Devices" have been designed in accordance with accepted industry standards and good engineering practices. Most of the lifting devices, as discussed above, meet the intent of ANSI N14.61978.
However, the Supply System takes exception to imposing ANSI N14.6 1978 reouirements on all special lifting devices for the following reasons, and provides the eouivalent I
alternative, described herein, which will be placed into effect prior to fuel loading.
(1)
Test / Inspection reouirements contained in ANSI N14.6 1978 are not practical, since the special lifting devices are generally used only once per year during refueling operations.
(2)
Removal of protective coatings, on an annual basis, for POE examination of infrecuently used lifting I
devices presents unnecessary personnel exposure to airborne contamination and radiation. Yearly FOE of infrecuently used special lifting devices will not I
significantly increase load handling reliability.
(3)
Special lifting devices are stored and used indoors, I
in protected areas, away from adverse environmental conditions and physical abuse that could have detrimental effects on the integrity and reliability of the special lifting devices.
Eauivalent Alternative Inspection / Test - The Supply System is coqnizant of its responsibility to ensure that load handling operations do not jeopardize the integrity of the I
plant or affect ability to maintain safe shutdown.
The inspection program, discussed herein, provides an important segment of an overall plan for ensuring safe and reliable load handling operations.
IV-12
L Special lifting devices will receive a thorough visual examination prior to each use and an annual c
L documented 5X magnification visual examination. A non-destruction examination (POE) will be perfonned once every five (5) years, or upon determination of
(
deficiencies from the 5X magnification inspection.
Safety Factor - The special lifting devices reouired
[
for handling the Reactor Vessel Head and Reactor Internals, as discussed previously, have increased safety factors in excess of 10, or have been desioned j
to retain the load during an SSE.
The use frecuency, environmental conditions, inspection reouirements, and other segments of the prooram for safe handling of heavy loads such as operator training, eouipment
('
maintenance, and use of safe load paths provide reasonable and acceptable assurance that failure of special lifting devices will not occur.
" Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2 has been invoked,
[
with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance.
Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient Information should be provided to demonstrate the eouivalency of
(.
proposed alternatives."
Response to 2.1-3e The crane inspection testing and maintenance program to be implemented on W P -1 will be in accordance with ANSI B30.2, Chapter 2-2, as well as other standards such as the Occupational
(
Safety and Health Standards, Section 179 29 CFR, Part 1910 and ANSI B30.10 Hooks. The various written procedures which will implement the reouirements of the above referenced standards and
{
regulation will be placed into effect at least three (3) i 3nths prior to receipt of fuel. The Supply System takes no exception to the reouirements of ANSI B30.2, Chapter 2-2.
The procedures for implementing the above reouirements will be reviewed during crane operator training, to familiarize the operators with the reouirements contained therein. Maintenance
(
personnel responsible for performing inspectico testing and maintenance will also be instructed regarding the reouirements of the procedures.
E.
Recust 2.1-3f
" Verify that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMMA
[
Specification 74 and Chapter 2-1 ANSI B30.2 1976, including the demonstration of eouivalency of actual design reouirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not
(
provided.
{.
IV-13
f L
I L
Response to 2.1-3f Cranes - All cranes identified in ' cme 3-1, except the Solid g
(
Waste Handling Crane (RSW-CRN-1) hwa been designed in accordance to the guidelines of 04AA Spec 70 and ANSI B30.21967.
A comparison of design standard revisions from 830.2 1967 and B30.2
(
1976, and thited Engineers & Constructors Inc. Crane Specifications #9779-031 & -032, indicates the cranes and hoists identified in Table 3-1 comply with the reouirements of ANSI 830.2 1976. The solid waste handling crane (RSW-CRN-1) was
[
designed in accordance with CMAA Specification 70; however, no specific reauirements were referenced in the thited Engineers &
Constructors Inc. Specification 9779-019 to ANSI B30.2.
A review
(
of the specification and crane design features, however, verifies that the crane meets the reauirements of ANSI B30.21976.
Monorail /Holsts - The miscellaneous hoists and monorails
{
identified in Table 3-1 have been desianed to the reauirements of ANSI B30.2 1967 and CMAA Specification 70, except the Filter Maintenance Monorail Holst, which was desianed to ANSI B30.16
[
Overhead Hoists (underlying) and CMAA Specification 70.
Reauest 2.1-3q
" Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.21976 with respect to operator training, aualification, and conduct".
b Response to 2.1-30 m exception is taken to implementing the reouirements for crane
(
operator training, aualification, and conduct as contained in ANSI B30.2 1976. Operator training and oualification is considered to be one of the most important segments in our
{
overall program for ensurino the safe handling of loads at WNP 1.
Crane operators will be reouired to receive classroom instruction and gain practical operating experience, under the direction of
{
other cualified operators, for each crane on which they are to be come cualified.
In addition to a physical examination by a medical doctor, each crane operator trainee will be reauired to pass a written examination. Crane operators will be recuired to reaualify every three years except that if an operator does not operate a specific crane durino any one year period,
(
recualification is reauired. All crane operators will be sionalmen and all signalmen will be crane operators, except under conditions where the foreman (or higher authority) authorizes the use of a knowledaeable non-operator as a signalman.
{
The crane operator training program currently under development will consist of:
IV-14
{
I Classroom Instructions a.
Crane theory b.
Crane safety c.
Rigging theory and technioues d.
Familiarization of design features and operating characteristics for the specific crane on which the trainee is to be certified e.
Review of general procedure for operatior, testing and inspection of cranes f.
Review of other procedures pertaining to cranes g.
Review and discussion of safe load path drawings Practical Instruction - Operator trainees will receive practical " hands on" training, including actual (but non-critical) material handling. Practical training will continue until the trainee can demonstrate competent operation of the crans.
Testing - In addition to the practical test, the crane operator trainee will be reouired to obtain a grade of 70%,
or higher, on a written examination of classroom instruction subjects, lO76R ds IV-15
P L
2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD hat 0 LING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE POOLS:
g f
"NLREG 0612, Section 5.1.2, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of stored, spent fuel.
Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adecuate measures have been taken to insure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consecuences of l
such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria L
of NLREG 0612, Section 5.1, criteria I thru III."
1 I
l h
I h
l l
l 1
1 1
1 k
I h
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v-l t
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Reouest 2.2.1:
" Identify by name, type, capacity and eouipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool."
Response to 2.2.1:
CRANE NLNBER MANUFACTURER:
TYPE CAPACITY Fuel Storage FHS-BRG-2 Stearns Rogers Bridge 3 Tons (and hoist) 2 Tons Fuel Handling Bridge Reouest 2.2.2:
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above g
category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads W
or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable f
analysis demonstrating that for any failure made, no heavy load can fall into the fuel storage pool."
Response to 2.2.2:
CRANE NUMBER MANUFACTlRER:
TYPE CAPACITY Fuel Storage FHS-BRG-2 Stearns Rogers Bridge 3 Tons Fuel Handling (and hoist) 2 Tons Bridge The fuel handling bridge (FHS-BRG-2) does not handle heavy loads and therefore can be excluded from the cranes identified in our response to 2.2.1 above.
Comment & Discussion:
The New Fuel thpacking and Inspection Crane and the Cask Handling Crane operate adjacent to the Spent Fuel storage pool, but are not physically l
capable of handling loads over the spent fuel. The following discussion is provided to help eliminate any cuestions that'may develop during the review process regarding the interrelationship of these load WNP1 has been f
handling systems and the spent fuel storage pool.
3 designed to eliminate the handlina of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool to reduce the potential for damage to spent fuel.
5 l
I 1l V-2 l
I lL
I a.
The New Fuel thpacking and Inspection Crane is desianed tn provide safe, efficient handlino of new fuel shippino containers I
and new fuel assemblies.
It is a traveling overhead crane with a main hoist, rated capacity of 10 tons designed for CHAA (Crane Manufacturers Association of America), Class A-1 service, is not I
eoulpped with an auxiliary hoist, and is limited by the design of the facility to operation over the new fuel transfer canal.
The crane is designed to resist all vertical, lateral and torsional forces combined as specified in CMAA Spec 70.
Although the crane is not classified Seismic Category I, it is designed to resist SSE seismic forces to the extent that when unloaded, there will be no structural failure that could result in missile generation
'I in the event of an SSE. Restraints are provided on the bridge trucks and trolley to prevent displacement in the event of an earthouake. The new fuel unpacking and inspection crane design utilized a dynamic model analysis with linear elastic lumped mass
!I models and the MRI/Stardyne Computor program to determine internal stresses and wheel loads during the OBE & SSE.
The new fuel receiving and storage area has been analyzed for the drop of a new fuel shipping container.
The rail car area slab can withstand a thirty (30) foot drop, and the inspection and storage area can withstand a two foot (2') drop.
Additional protection I
from a load drop is provided by the conservative design of the crane. Safety factors are in accordance with the reouirements of CMAA Spec. 70 and based on a 20,000 lb design rated load. The 3
magnitude of the new fuel shipping container and new fuel g
assembly loads increase these safety factors considerably.
The controls for the new fuel unpacking and inspection area crane I.
are AC static stepless used with AC-wound rotor motors.
These controls provide precise control of bridge and trolley motion to within 1/2 inch, and hoist motions to within 1/8 inch under all load conditions.
These controls C e designed for full load operation at the following speeds:
Holst FPM (fast / slow) 15/2 Trolley FPM (fast / slow) 20/2 Bridge FPM (fast / slow) 50/2 I
The new fuel unpacking and inspection area crane is capable of sustaining these slow speeds for extended periods of operation.
This is accomplished by the controls for the trolley and hoist and by a microdrive on the bridge. All motions are controlled by
'I spring loaded, return-to-off switches such that positive operator action is reouired to initiate and sustain crane motion.
The new fuel unpacking and inspection area crane hoist is eouipped with eddy current load braking and two DC magnetic holding brakes, each rated at 150% of full load reouirements.
I All brakes set on loss of power.
The hoist drum is fabricated of centrifugal cast steel and designed to withstand the maximum combination of bending and crushing stress. The pitch diameter of the drum is 24 times the diameter of the rope.
V-3 1
(
Limit switches are provided to perform the functions listed below L
and are wired such that they will stop the drive but then allow operation in the opposite direction to back out of the limit f
switch (1)
The hoist drum contains a oeared limit switch for upper and lower hoist limits.
A separate set of contacts are provided for each function.
(2) lhe hoist cable is eculpped with a weichted block
(
type limit switch for upper hoist limit.
(3)
The bridae rails are eauipped with paddle limit switches for over-travel in both directions.
{
(4)
The trolley rails are eauipped with paddle limit switches for over-travel in both directions. These may be overriden or used as described in (5) below.
(5)
The trolley rails are also eauipped with paddle limit switches for rail stop approach. They are located 9" from each rail stop and actuate a warnino light on the pendant. This is to allow the trolley to be brought to the rail stcp.
The crane is also eculpped with a remote readino load cell which provides the operator with continuous load indication from 9 to 100% of desion rated capacity. The load cell is provided with an adjustable alarm and motor stop feature to stop upward motion at a set load.
The use of the new fuel unpacking and inspection area crane is controlled administratively to limit its use to new fuel handlino and occasional periodic maintenance as recuired.
Durino maintenance operations no heavy loads will be carried over the new fuel storace vault. Except for emeroency maintenance, the cranes use during refueling is limited to loadino.new fuel assemblies into the new fuel elevator.
b.
The Spent Fuel Cask Handlino Crane is desioned to provide a safe reliable means of transportino the spent fuel cask in the GSB.
The crane is classified as non-seismic category I, to the extent that it may not remain functional durino and after an earthouake.
It is, however, desioned, whether loaded (with 105 ton spent fuel cask) or unloaded to remain structurally intact and not generate any missiles or damage any safety-related structure or component durino an OBE or an SSE. The cask handling crane is desioned to be single failure proof. The book is sinole failure proof by utilizino an outer hollow sister hook -
and an inner sister hook, each separately ottsched to the load block.
If one hook fails, the other hook is capable of handlino the full load.
V >
C k
The single failure proof wire rope system consists of two balanced reeving systems using two individual wire ropes.
Each system is reeved to both sides of the load block and the upper block, thereby ensuring no swinging or rotation of the load block if one rope fails. With both reeving systems intact, the rope safety factor is 10.
The hoisting machinery is also sinale failure proof.
There are two gear trains on the drum, a driving gear mounted on one end and an idler gear mounted on the other end. The driving gear has two brakes and the idler has one brake and provisions to apply an additional backup brake.
The idPr brake will be applied and hold the load if a failure occurs in the driving gear train.
Then one brake would be removed from the driving gear and applied as a backup brake for the idler gear train.
Sudde.. oad drop due to drum bearing, drum shift or bearing support failure will be prevented by enveloping the hub at each end of the drum by a structural support upon which the hub will rest if any of the failures mentioned above would occur. This structural support will also ensure that the drum gear will not disengage from the drum pinion.
Two-blocking will be prevented by dual limit switches.
The cask handling crane is eauipped with interlocks as described in items (1); (2); (4); and (5) above, for the new fuel unpacking and inspection crane.
In addition, the trolley rails will be eauipped with interlocks as follows:
(
(1)
Electrical interlocks will be provided to prevent the inadvertent movement of the crane over the deep portion of the pit while a load is on the main hook.
l Actions from two operators will be reouired in order to allow bridge motion in this eastern end of the crane runway, and to keep height of the cask no more than 30' above bottom of pit.
(2)
The trolley rails in both directions are eouipped with redundant cam switches to allow crane operation only in the slow speed mode. These are located approximately 15 feet from the end of the runway.
The crane is also eoulpped with a remote reading load cell which provides the operator with continuous load identification from 0 l
to 100% of design rated capacity. The load cell is provided with an adjustable alarm and motor stop feature to stop upward motion at a set load.
V-5 i
__m___.___________
f The cask loading and fuel transfer canal areas are separated from the fuel storage area by reinforced concrete walls. Gate openings in these walls permit movement of fuel from the spent
(.
fuel storage area to the cask load area and from the fuel l
transfer canal to the spent fuel storage area. The lowest point of the gate openings (sills) are above the top of the fuel in the
(-
storage racks. The gate at the appropriate end of the pool is in l
. the closed position whenever the cask or any other hesvy loads are being handled over the cask loading or. intermediate position L
areas or whenever lifting and/or handling operations are being performed over the fuel transfer canal, other than those nomally reouired as a part of the fuel transfer cycle. With this arrangement, a cask drop or any other lifting and handling
(
accident anywhere under the two overhead bridae cranes in the fuel storage area thet could cause water loss from the cask loading pool or the fuel transfer canal to the extent that all water was lost from these two areas would not cause a significant loss of water from the spent fuel pool.
Reouest 2.2.3:
i
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.2.1 above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features. For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e. crane load-combination) information specified in attachment I."
[
Response to 2.2.3:
Only one (1) crane was listed in the response to 2.2.1.
This crane was then excitded in the 2.2.2 response since it did not carry heavy loads.
-Reauest 2.2.4:
or cranes identified in 2.2.1 above, not categorized according to "r
2.2.3, demonstrate that the criteria of NLREG 0612,' Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with criterion IV will be demonstrated in' response to section 2.4 of this reouest. With respect to criteria I through III, provide a discussion of.your evaluation of crane operation.
In the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance.
This response should include the following information for each crane."
Response to 2.2.4:
Refer to Response 2.2.3.
1196R ds V.,
--___-___----J.
I 1
8
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2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF IJ'ERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS (WERATING IN CONTAItNENT "NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.3 provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of the reactor
{
Information provided in response to this section should be core.
sufficient to demonstrate that adeouate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consecuences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III" i
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VI-l I
L
[
Recuest 2.3.1:
" Identify by name, type, capacity, and eoulpment designator, any cranes physically capable (ie., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel".
l Response to 2.3.1:
CRANE NtNBER TYPE CAPACITY Polar Crane MHS-CRN-4 Revolving Overhead 520 Ton-Main Bridge 25 Ton-Aux Reactor Building MHS-CRN-6 JIB Jib Crane MHS-CRN-14 1 Ton l
Main Fuel Traveling 3 Ton Handling Bridge FHS-BRG-1 Bridge 2 Ton Aux Holst CRD Service Structure Monorail Holst None Monorail 2 Ton Ea. (4)
Recuest 2.3.2:
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the
[
event of any load-handling system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel."
(
Response to 2.3.2:
The following load-handling systems identified in 2.3.1 above have been excluded.
The discussions below provide justification for their exclusion CRANE NtNBER TYPE CAPACITY Reactor Building MHS-CRN-6 Jih Cranes MHS-CRN-14 JIB 1 Ton The jib cranes as indicated in Table 3-1 do not handle heavy loads.
L They have been designed primarily for handlina the CRD lead screw installation and removal tool and other light loads such as R.V. Head insulation.
VI-2
E
(
CRANE NL>iBER TYPE CAPACITY Main Fuel FHS-BRG-1 Traveling
(
Handling Bridge Bridge ~
Mast 3 Ton Aux. Holst 2 Ton The main fuel handling bridge does not handle heavy loads. The 3 ton
[L..
capacity mast is used to handle fiel and control rod assemblies.
The 2 ton auxiliary hoist is used for handling special tools and handling eouipment, none of which weigh more than the weight of a fuel element and its handling tool.
Reouest 2.3.3:
I
{-
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1 above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extermely small for all loads to he carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6.,
[
or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load handling system (i.e.
crane-load-combination information
{
specified in Attachment 1. "
Response to 2.3.3:
CRANE Containment Polar Crane NO4BER MHS-CRN-4 DRL 520 Tons MCL 220 Tons MANUFACTLRER P&H The following evaluation is a " point-by-point' comparison of the Containment Polar Crane design, fabrication, inspection, testing and operations characterics to the-reouirements delineated in NLREG-0554.
j Where the design features do not conform to those of NtREG-0554, alternatives are presented along with an explanation to demonstrate their eouivalency and/or adeouacy.
Table 3-3 provides a summary of the comparison.
{
[
t VI-3
1 NIFEG 0554
" Single Failure Proof Cranes":
I l
Section 2.2 Maximum Critical Load -
Reouirement:
The Design Rated Load (DRL) should be at least l
15% greater than the Maximum Critical Load (MCL)
Actual:
The DRL is 235% greater than the MCL and is I
considered an important factor in proving the Polar Cranes adeouacy.
l Section 2.3, Operation Environment -
Reouirement:
Operating environment including minimum and l
l maximum pressure, maximum rate of pressure increase, temperature, humidity and emergency corrosive or hazardous conditions should be specified as well as proper venting and i
I drainage reouirements to avoid collapse and standing water.
j Crane design complies with this section of NUREG 0554.
I Actual:
thited Engineers & Constructors Inc. Specification 9779-031 provided information reouired in this section and is as follcws:
l Design Temerature Min
+ 15 F 0
Design temperature, Max.
+115 F Pressure Change 62 PSI in 10 seconds l
Wind Loading 36 lbs. per S.F.
Spray Solution pH 9.0-10.5 I
Baron 2200 PPM Baron PH (Min)
PH 3 Sodium R/droxide
.25 Molar Section 2.4, Material Properties -
l Reouirement:
Material testing for brittle fracture per ASTM
~
I E-208 (drop weight test or ASTM A-380 l
Charpy).. Minimum operation temperatures on drop weight test should be obtained from I
paragraph NC2300 of Section III ASME Code or l
for Charpy test from paragraph ND2300 of Section III of the ASME Code or Cold proof load tested.
VI-4 l
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/
L
^
r MREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes" (cont'd):
Actual:
Material testing for brittle fracture was in accordance with or met the above reouirements and as g
listed below:
s i
1.
Only plates Jn excess of 5/8" were considered for brittle fracture.
s 2.
Only hooks and structural load bearino members c'
in tension when loaded, were considered for brittle fracture reauirements.
0 3.
Charpy V notch test temperature was 0.
H 4
Acceptance criteria was per ASE III, NF-2300 which is 15 mils lateral expansion on plates
[
less than 1" thick and 25 mils on plates L
greater than 1" thick.
f 5.
Weld impact tests were conducted in accordance with Article T-2, ASME Section VIII Division 2.
Section 2.5, Seismic Design -
lL Reouirements:
Cranes should be designed to retain load during an SSE and remain on their respective runway
(
with wheels prevented from leaving the tracks L
during the seismic event. Design should also be in accordance with regulatory position 2 of
)
Reg. Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification.
The above reouirements are met.
E Actual:
The polar crane when loaded with the reactor L-vessel head (220 Ton MCL) and the load eoualizina beam (10 tons) is designed to retain r
the load during an SSE, to remain on the crane I
rail and generate no missiles.
The stress limits for OBE and SSE conditions are 62% and 90% respectively, of the minimum yield stress per ASTM material specification.
Earthouake restraints are provided on the E
bridge and trolley to prevent displacement L
under seismic loadings. The bridge restraints are manually positioned against the crane wall to preclude sliding of the crane in the s
direction of the bridge girder.
s.
VI-5 s.
t
{:
,NLREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes" (cont'd):
The Polar Crane design utilized a dynamic model analysis with linear elastic lumped mass models and the M I/Stardyne computer program to determine internal stress and wheel loads during an OBE and SSE.
The seismic analysis considered hook height as a variable in combination with the trolley at I
center span and 35.5 ft. from center span to result in maximum applied stresses to structural members of the crane (direct bending r
and shear). Both trolleys and the eoualizer beam were used. For purposes of analysis the minimum hook height considered was elevation 497' and the maximum was elevation 555'.
A non-linear time history analysis of the Polar Crane wire ropes under a lifted load (220 T) as I
a result of a vertical response due to an SSE L;-
was conducted. The time history analysis used a simplified crane model with a non-linear spring element representing the hoist ropes and included a comparison with a model analysis of the simplified model with a linear spring
{~,
element using simplified response spectra. The results of the analysis demonstrated that stress levels do no exceed 90% of minimum yield stress. The wire rope safety factory being greater than 5 to 1.
Section 2.6, Lamellar Tearing -
Reouirement:
NDE of all weld joints whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load.
These reouirements are met.
Actual:
IDited Engineers & Constructors Specification
[
9779-31, Section 14.A paragraph 3.8 reouired L
the crane supplier-(P&H) to NDE 100% of all major load bearing welds. Radiographic examination of girder top and bottom coverplate h
butt welds was conducted in accordance with AWS bl.l.. Magnetic Particle inspection was~
performed in accordance.with P&H procedures on-(.
100% of remaining major-load carrying welds as identified in:Section 14.a pergraph 3.8.2a specification 9779-31.
C VI-6
B l
E l
NLREG 0554, Single Failure Proof Cranes" (cont'd):
f Section 2.7, Structural Fatique -
l Reouirement:
Construction usage should be added to expected E
cyclic loading for permanent plant operation when performing fatigue evaluation.
A fatigue l
evaluation should be considered for critical N
load-bearing structures and components of the 3
crane handling system These reouirements are met.
l E
Actual:
Construction usage was identified in the Engineers specification and therefore was I
considered by the crane manufacturer in order to assure placement of the crane into the l
proper classification.
The Polar Crane was
'g manufactured in accordance with CMAA g
Specification 70.
Allowable stress factors for the Polar Crane are in acordance with Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 which takes into consideration the number of loading cycles.
The Polar Crane is classified Al (Standby Service) and meets the l
reouirements cf NWEG 0554 Section 2.7 Section 2.8, Welding Procedures -
l Reouirement:
Post weld heat treatment of welds identified in I
Section 2.6 shall be in accordance with subarticle 3.9 of AWS Dl.1 Structural Welding Code.
Actual:
Weldina was performed in accordance with AWS l
D1.1 Section 3.0, safety Features -
l 3.2 Auxiliary System Recuirement:
AuxiliaIy hoisting systems emoloyed to lift or assist in handling critical load should be single failure-proof.
1 E
1l l
E l
VI-7 B
1
NUREG 0554, Single Failure Proof Cranes" (cont'd):-
Actual:
The auxiliary hoist is not single failure proof; however, the Supply System
(
considers the auxiliary hoist to have sufficient. safety features to adeouately guard against a load drop. The auxiliary hoist is eoulpped with dual upper limit switches to prevent ~two-blocking.
The loads identified'in Table 3-1 do not exceed 50% of the auxiliary hoists rated capacity and therefore increases the Safety Factor to 10 or greater.
The Preventive Maintenance Program and Inspection Procedures to be perforw d will identify any deterioration of the lifting.eouipment and allow for repairs
{
prior to component failure.
3.3 Electric Control Systems Reouirements:
Provide fail safe controls and limiting devices such that when disorders due to
{.
inadvertant operator action, component malfunction or disarrangement of subsystem control functions occur singly
(
or in combination during load handling; L
disorders will not prevent the handlino system from stopping and holding the load.
Actual:
The Polar Crane is controlled from the operating floor by either radio control or a pushbutton pendant station attached to the crane.
All buttons or levers are i
spring -loaded return-to-off switches so that positive operator action is reouired to initiate and sustain any crane l
motion.' The controllers are eouipped with a Start-Stop-Button. The Stop button may be used during an emergency to stop the crane should it become necessary.
4 3
vl-8
I lI j
NUREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes" (cont'd):
t 3.4 Onergency Repairs l
Reouirement:
Means should be provided for repairina, I
adjusting or replacing the failed component (s) or subsystem (s) when l
failure of an actJve component or subsystem has occured and the load is I
supported and retained in the safe (temporary) position with the handlina system immobile; or a means provided for I
safely transferring the immobilized hoisting system with its load to a safe i
l laydown area that has been designed to
(
I accept the load while repairs are being j
made.
l Actual:
Polar Crane design complies with this I
reauirement. %pending on failure, l
repairs can be made in place while load I
is safely suspended or load may be I
manually transferred to a safe laydown area that will accept the load while l
repairs are being made.
Section 4.1, Reeving System -
l Reouirement:
1.
Dual reeving system each providing I
separate load balance on the head and load blocks through a configuration of ropes and rope ecualizers.
5 2.
Rope sizing should include effects of l
impact loads, acceleration and emergency g
stops. Maximum loao (including static g
and inertia forces) on each individual l
wire rope in the dual reeving system with the MCL attached should not exceed 10% of manufacturers published breaking strength, l
3.
Maximum fleet angle from drum to lead I
sheeve in the load block or between individual sheaves should not exceed (3 l
1/2 ) at any one point during hoisting 0
except that for the last IM of maximum I
lift elevation the fleet angle may j
increase slightly. Use of reverse hends should be limited.
W 4
Pitch diameter of running sheaves should l
be selected in accordance with CMAA Specification 70.
j VI-9 I
l
___I l
E NUREG 0554, "Sinale Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
j Actual 1.
The Polar Crane is eculpped with a dual trolley and utilizes a double drum reeving system and Two (2) separate ropes are reeved through upper and lower I
sheaves to an coualizino beam contained in a retaining structure which will l
retain sheave in case of pin failure.
2.
Ropes have been sized to include effects of impact loads, acceleration and emergency stops.
The maximum load on I
each of the individual wire ropes in the dual reeving system when loaded with the MCL does not exceed 10% of the manufacturers published breaking strenath The main hoist train reeving system is 32 3.
parts of 1-3/8" diameter 6 x 37 extra flexible improved plow steel IWRC.
4.
The reeving is designed such that the fleet angle relative to the drum and l
sheaves does not exceed 50 during any operatino condition. Reverse bonds have I
been kept to a minimum to reduce rope l
fatigue.
5.
The Polar Crane has been designed in P
accordance with CMAA Specification 70.
Pitch diameter of all sheaves is at leas'.
24 times the rope diameter.
I 4.2 Drum Support -
Recuirement:
Load hoisting drum should be provided with structural and mechanical safety devices to limit the drop of the drum and therby prevent it from disengaging from its holding brake system if the drum shaft bearinos were to fail l
or fracture, Each main hoist drum contains a gear at each Actual:
)
j end which is driven by a separate gear case eoulpped with one of the two DC holding brakes. Machined structural seats are provided I
and located such that a drum shaft, bearing or bearing bracket failure will not result in I
complete separation of both drum cears or pinions.
l r
VI-10 L
L, NLREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes:
4.3 Head and Load Blocks -
Reauirements:
1.
Head and load blocks should be designed to maintain vertical load balance about the center of lift from load block
(
through head block and have a dual reeving system.
L 2.
Load block assembly should be provided with two load-. attaching points such that each attachment point will be able to support a load of three (3) times the
[
(static and dynamic) load being handled without permanent deformation of load block assembly.
3 The individual component parts of the j
vetical hoisting system which include the head block, rope, reeving system, load block and dual attaching devices should 1
each be designed to support a static load
{
of 200% of the MCL.
4.
Load blocks should be N.D. Examined by surface and volumetric technioues, documented and recorded.
Actual:
1.
The dual Trolley and double drum reeving
/
system is designed to maintain a vertical L
load balance through the center of lift from load block through head block.
2.
The load block is not designed for two (2) load attachment points per the above reouirement. The main load hook is designed with a S.F of five (5) based on a 520 ton DRL.
The MCL is 220 tons therefore the safety factor is increased to 10.7 when allowing 15% for possible impact loading.
3.
The Polar Crane DRL is 520 tons. The MCL
(
is 220 tons which is less than 1/2 of the DRL therefore the crane is in compliance I
with this reouirement.
4.
Crane hooks will be NC examined in accordance with ANSI B30.10-1975. This inspection will be performed in e
L accordance with an established written plant procedure.
VI-ll l
4
NUREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
j 4.4 Hoisting Speed -
(
Reauirement:
Maximum hoisting speed for critical load should be limited to that given in the slow column on Figure 70-6 of CMAA Specification 70.
Actual:
The Polar Crane hoist speeds comply with the limits given in the slow column of Figure 70-6 of CMAA Specification 70.
4.5 Design Against Two-Blocking -
Reauirement:
1.
Provide means within the reevino system located on the head or load block combinations to absorb or control the kinetic energy of rotating machinery during two blocking or f
2.
Provide two (2) independent travel limit
(
devices of different design and activated by separate mechanical means.
The protective control system for load handling should consist of load cell system in the drive train or motor current sensing.
Actual:
The Polar Crane is eoulpped with dual limit switches which are independent and of different
/
design to prevent two blocking.
Each hoist
.L drum contains a geared limit switch for upper and lower hoist limit and each hoist cable is eouipped with a weighted block type limit
{
switch for upper hoist limit.
A load cell provides remote reading load indication from 0 to 100% of design capacity and is eouipped with an adjustable alam and motor stop feature to stop upward motion at a set load and provides (main hoist only) a loaded signal for the redundant interlock system Essociated with load l
height and the missile shield.
4.6 Lifting Devices -
Reauirement:
Lifting devices and/or lift beam yokes, trunion type hooks, slings, toggles and clevises should be conservatively designed with dual or auxiliary device combinations. Each device should be selected to support a load of three (3) times the load (static and dynamic) being handled without pemanent deformation.
VI-12'
NLREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
Actual:
Special lifting devices associat'ed inith the polar crane for R.V. head and internal handling are not redundant. However they have heen' designed to withstand and OBE or an SSE without exceeding allowable stresses when laden with the RV head and attachments. Since this arrangement is not single failure proof a load drop analysis was performsd. The results were I
that a head load drop ofL 5' would be acceptable r
in terms of. core cooling and would not result L
in damage to spent fuel.
Detail of this analysis can be found in the FSAR Section 9.1 subsection 9.1.4.3.9.
Slings used for handlina
{'
eouipment will provide-redundant load points to allow for single lift point failure and/or' I
utilize a SF of 10 or greater.
4.7 Wire Rope Protection -
Reouirement:
If side loads cannot be avoided the reevino system should be eouipped with.a guard that would keep the wire rope properly located in i
the grooves of the drums.
Actual:
Although side loads are not expected to occur the devices are eculpped with guards to assist in keeping ropes in place.
4.8 Machinery A110nment -
Reouirement:
Where gear trains are interposed bet' ween the holding brakes and the hoisting drum these gear trains should be single failure proof and
{
should be of dual design.
Actual:
Each main hoist drum contains a ~ ear at each i
g end which is driven by a separate gear case eoulpped with a DC holding brake. As previously stated machined structural seats are provided to prevent disengaging of the gearing should a bearing or bearing pedestal fail.
4.9 Holst Brakino System -
Reouirements:
1.
Each hoist brake should have a minimum capacity of 125% of the toroue developed during the hoisting operation.
2.
Mimimun hoisting braking system shot d
~
[.~
and two'(2) holding brakes.
include.one power control braking system
[
VI-13 L
4
L
[
T NUREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
c 3.
Holding brake system should be single failure proof.
4.
Manual operations of hoisting brakes during emergency conditions should be included in crane design.
Actual:
1&2.
Each of the two main hoist trains and the auxiliary hoist train are eouipped with regenerative load braking and two DC magnetic holding brakes which set on loss of power and are each rated at 150% of l
e I
full load reouirements.
l l
I 3.
The Polar Crane conforms to this I
reouirement.
4.
The load may be manually lowered during an emergency.
A special procedure will j
be written for manually lowering the load.
Section 5, Bridge and Trolley -
t l
5.1 Braking Capacity l'
Reouirements:
1.
The maximum toroue capability of the driving notor and gear reducer B,
for trolley and bridge notion should not exceed the capability of j
the gear train and brakes to stop I
the trolley or bridge from maximum speed with the DRL attached.
I 2.
Brakes should be mechanically l
I tripped to the "on" or " holding' position in the event of a malfunction in the power supply or an over speed condition.
3.
Opposite-drive wheels on bridge or trolley that support bridge or trolley on their runways should be matched and have identical diameters.
4.
Trolley and Bridge speeds should be
~
limited per Spec CMAA #70.
Actual:
Braking Capacity and System complies with the above reouirements and are in accordance with CMAA Spec 70.
r VI-14
I NUREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
5.2 Safety Stops -
I Reauirements:
1.
Limiting devices should be provided to control or prevent overtravel and j
overspeed of the trolley and bridge.
W Buffers for bridge and trolley travel should be at the end of the rails.
2.
Safety devices such as limit type switches should be provided for malfunction and inadvertent operator I
action or failure and should be in addition to and separate from the limiting means or control devices.
Actual:
The trolley ral]s are eauipped with paddle limit switch ; for overtravel in both directions.
ine trolley rails are also I
eauipped with paddle limit switches for rail stop approach and actuate a warning light on the pendant.
This is to allow the trolley to I
be brought to the rail stop. Since the polar crane is capable of 3600 rotation, no bridge travel limits are reouired. The trolley and bridge are eauipped with overspeed protection
,I devices.
Section 6, Drivers and Controls -
I 6.1 Driver Section 8
Reauirements:
Maximum toraue capability of electric motor drive for hoisting should not exceed the rating or capability of components reauired to hoist the MCL at I
maximum design speed.
I Actual:
The electric motors were selected in accordance with the reauirements established in CMAA Spec 70 and generally conform to the reauirments of this section.
l 6.2 Driver Control Systems -
Reouirements:
If crane is used to lift spent fuel assemblies, j
the control system should be adaptable to I.
include interlocks that will prevent trolley and bridge movements while the load is being hoisted free of the reactor vessel or storage j
rack.
Actual:
Polar Crane does not handle spent fuel elements.
VI-15
l l
l NUREO 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
l 6.3 Malfunction Protection -
Reovirement:
1.
Means should be provided in the motor control circuits to sense and respond to such items as excessive electric current excessive motor temperature, overspeeo,,
overload and overtravel.
I 2.
Controls should be provided to absorb kinetic energy of the rotating machinery l
and stop the hoisting movement reliably and safely if one rope or one of the dual I
systems should fail or if overloading or an overspeed condition should occur.
I Actual:
Review of the Polar Cranc Motor Control design confirms that the above reouirements have been designed into the control circuitry.
6.4 Slow speed Drives -
Reouirements:
If jogging or plugging is to be used the I
control circuit should ir.ciude features to prevent abrupt chance in motion. Drift point in the electric power system w;en provided for bridge or trolley movement should be provided for only the lowest operating speeds.
Actual:
The Polar Crane is eouipped with an electratoroue 100 solid state totally adjustable voltage control for the hoist and static stepless reversing plugging control for I
the bridge and trolley service.
These systems are" considered adecuate to protect against abrupt change in motion.
Drift Point I
reouirement identified above are satisfied by this type of control.
It should be noted, however, that proper operator training will eliminate abrupt changes in motion which cause load swings, therfore, the Supply System has placed considerable emphasis on proper training of crane operators.
6.5 Safety Devices -
I Safety devices such as limit type switches Reouirements:
provided for malfunction, inadvertent operator action or failure should be in addition to and seperate from the limiting means on control devices provided for operator, i
VI-16 I
NLREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
Actual:
The Polar Crane complies with the reauirements. Limit switches as discussed previously are separate from normal control functions provided for operation.
6.6 Control Station -
Reauirement:
Defines preferred location of operation control system.
L Actual:
The Polar Crane is eauipped with both pendant control and a radio operated remote station.
Emergency operation is available by manual operation for lowering and traversing the load Section 7, Installation Instructions -
7.1 General Reauirement:
Installation instructions should be
[-
provided by the manufacturers.
Actual:
Complete instal.lation instructions were
(
provided by'the manufacturer as well as technical representation provided to assist in crane erection and checkout.
7.2 Construction and Operating Periods Reauirement:
1.
Construction and operation reauirements should be defined separately.
2.
At end of construction period the
(
crane should be modified as needed for performance reauirements of the P4Jclear Power Plant operating
{
service.
3.
After construction use the crane
(
L should be thoroughly inspected by POE and load tested for the operating phase.
4.
POE extent and acceptance criteria should be defined in the design specification.
{
[
VI-17
?
c NLREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
5.
If allowable stress limits are to be exceeded during construction, added inspection supplementing that described in Section 2.6 should be L
specified and developed.
f 6.
During and after installation of W
the crane, the proper assembly of electrical and structural
/
compunents should be verified.
L 7.
Integrity of control operating and safety system should be verified.
F Actual:
1.
Construction and operatina reauirements were defined in the l
f Engineers Specifications.
L 2.
Modification of the Polar Crane is not.reouired.
3.
The Polar Crane will be thoroughly inspected and refurbished to restore the crane to its original new condition. The crane will be reload tested if major modification or repairs are reouired.
4.
POE extent and criteria were not defined in the specification for
(
removal from construction phase to plant operation phase. These will be defined in a written procedure
{
prior to use of the crane in the plant operation phase.
(
5.
Allowable stress limits will not be L
exceeded.
6.
Proper assembly of electrical,
(
structural and mechanical components was verified.
=
7.
Integrity of control and operating
& safety system were verified during crane checkout and load test.
[
[
VI-18
NUREG 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
Section 8, Testing and Preventative Maintenance -
8.1 General Reouirements:
1.
Make complete check of all crane's mechanical and electrical systems.
2.
Maintain records of checking and testing.
8.2 Static and Dynamic Load Test Reouirements:
1.
Perform static and dynamic load l
l test.
l Actual:
8.1 & 8.2 The Polar Crane was thoroughly inspected and checked out prior to I
testing and the records are l
I maintained on site in the Q.A.
l File.
A static and dynamic load l
test of the crane's DRL was performed in accordance with ANSI I
B30.2 8.3 Two-Block ' Test Reouirement:
1.
When eouipped with an
)
energy-controlling device between I
the load and head block, the complete hoisting machinery should l
be allowed to two block.
The test should be conducted at slow speed I
without load.
2.
Crane should be tested for load hangup.
l Actual:
1he Polar Crane upper point limit switches were B
checked out to verify proper functionino during crane check and load test. Since the crane is j
not eouipped with an energy controlling device the crane was not allowed to actually "two block". The crane is eouipped with a load cell which indicates loads from 0 to 100% of DRL to prevent load hangup and is provided with an adjustable alarm and motor stop feature to stop upward motion et a set load.
l B
1 VI-19
5 NI AM 0554. " Single Failure Proof Cranes (cont'd):
8.4 Operational Tests s
Reouirement:
Operational test should be performed to H
verify proper functionino of limit L
switches and ability to perform as designed.
Actual:
Operational tests and inspections were performed in accordance with ANSI B30.2.
8.5 Maintenance u
Recuirements:
Performance of maintenance, marking of p
MCL rating.
I Actual:
The Polar Crane as well as all other cranes are subject to a periodic l
inspection and maintenance program as outlined in this report. The maintenance I
and testing program is considered an extermely important part of safe load j
handling. The DRL is marked on the crane.
Section 9, Operatino benual -
Reouirements:
Manufacturer provide operating manual, j
Actual:
P&H provided a crane manual which provides information for checking, testina, operatino and maintaining the Polar Crane.
Section 10, Quality Assurance -
Reouirements:
Quality Assurance prooram for design I
fabrications installation, testing, operation.
Actual:
The Supply System is in compliance with this l
recuirement.
The following discussion's provide an evaluation of the lifting devices I
and attachment points with respect to the recuirements of NLREG 0612 l
Section 5.14 as reauested in attachm2nt 1 of the December 22, 1980 NRC letter.
f Lifting Device Evaluation -
Stud Tensioner Slina l
This sling has a design safety factor of 5.
Failure of one of I
the 3 legs would reduce the safety factor and result in an uncontrolled movement of the load but not a load drop. The load j
path of the stud tensioner does not pass over eouipment reouired for safe shutdown and could not cause damage to spent fuel since the R.V. Head is on the R.V. during handling of the stud l
tensioner.
VI-20
I I
RCP Motor and Pump Assembly Slings The sling assembly for handling the RCP motor and pump assembly consists of 4 legs and will maintain a safety factor of 10.
Internal Indexina Fixture Lifting Assembly Consists of the tripod and 3 pendents. The indexing fixture I
attaches at 3 points. Although failure of the spreader ring or lift point could result in a load drop, the indexing fixture would not cause damage to fuel or safe shutdown eauipment since its diameter is larger than the opening of the Reactor Vessel.
Stud Rack Lift Sling Four (4) leg sling assembly. Safety factor will be maintained at 10 or greater.
Irradiated Incore Instrument Transfer Cask Slina Four (4) leg sling assembly. Safety factor will be 10 or greater.
Core Flood Tank Plug Sling Should the core flood tank removal plug recuire handling, a 4 leg I
sling assembly will be used. The safety factor will be maintained at 10 or greater.
Miscellaneous Eculpment Slings Miscellaneous eculpment will be handled by standard lifting apparatus.
The lifting apparatus will maintain a safety factor I
of 10 and whenever possible utilize redundant lifting arrangements.
Inservice Inspection 'lo01 The inservice inspection tool is handled by a fcur (4) leg sling assembly which will maintaln a safety factor of 10. Failure of a I
single leg er attachment point will not result in a load drop.
Polar Crane Special Lifting Devices P.C. Lift Beam Assembly P.C. Lift Extension Tripod I
VI-21
.I
s F
L r
Head and Internal Handling Extension Assembly l
Internal-Handling Adapter
{.
i Spreader Ring Assembly.
1.
The above special lifting devices are designed to retain the RV Head load (220 tons-MCL) and the plenum during an SSE.
2.
Inspection of the special lifting devices will be in accordance with the program discussed in response to 2.1-3d.
{
3.
A head drop analysis was performed and verified in verification that damage would not occur to fuel
[
and/or that eouipment damaged by a drop would not affect the plants ability to maintain safe shutdown.
Details of the drop analysis may be found in sub-section 9.1.4.3.9 of the FSAR..
{
Attachment Points R.V. Head and Plenum Attachment points for the head and plenum are capable of i
(
retaining the load during an SSE.
Stud Tensioner Failure of a single attachment point would result in an uncontrolled movement of the losi but not necessarily a load drop. In the unlikely event of a load drop however damace would
{
not occur to fuel or safe shut dowr, eouipment.
RCP Motor and Pump Assembly Each of the above has four (4) lift points.. Failure of a single lift point would result in transfer of the load of two (2) points and reduce the safety factor to 2.5.
This is considered adeouate
(
since the eoulpment would be inanediately set down and not moved until repairs were made to the failed lift point.
Internal Indexing Fixture The 3 point lifting configuration has a safety factor of 5.
Failure of a lift point could result in a load drop however due to the indexing fixture configuration and the R.V. configuration during handling operations the indexing fixture would not cause
{
damage to spent fuel or safe shutdown eouipment.
VI-22 E
F Stud Rack L
Is provided with four (4) lift points.
Failure of one attachment point would result in transfer of the load of two (2) points and r
L a reduction of the safety factor to 2.5 (assumina the rack is full).
Normally only two R.V. studs or guide studs will be in the rack.
Irradiated Incore Instrument Transfer Cask p
Has a four lift luq arrangement. Failure of one attachment point would result in transfer of the load to two (2) points and a u
reduction of the safety factor to 2.5.
Transfer cask load handling cperations would be terminated until the attachment
(
point was repaired.
Inservice Inspection Tool The tool has four (4) lift attachment points.
Failure of a single attachment point would result in transfer of the load to two (2) points and a reduction of the safety factor by 50%. A load drop would not occur.
Reouest 2.3.4:
[
"For cranes identified in 2.3-1 above, not categorized according to 2.3-3, demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1 are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this report. With respect to Criteria I through III provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane
('
operation in the containment and your determination of compliance.
This response should include the following information for each crane:
a.
Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of
{
electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypasseo and the administrative procedures p
invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action.
L Discuss any related or proposed technical specification concerning the bypassing of such interlocks.
(
b.
Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considerations (e.g., refueling seouencing) provide present or proposed technical specifications and discuss
{
administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the continued validity of such considerations.
[
VI-23 r
L e
k F
c.
Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria L
I through III should conform with the guidelines of NUREG 0612. Appendix A.
AJstify any exception taken to these g
guidelines, and provide the specific information reouested L
in Attachment 2,3, or 4, as appropriate for each analysis performed.
{
Response to 2.3.4:
CRD Service Structure Monorail Holst -
The mD Service Structure Monorail consists of a sinole circular monorail beam mounted under the upper portion of the service structure and four (4) 2 ton capacity manual hoists.
This monorail is used to
[
handle studs, stud tensioner and seal plate assembly as identified in Table 3-1.
{
The CRD monorail is used only when the R.V. Head is in place over the R.V.
The loads handled (if dropped) could not possibly cause damage to fuel. Since the monorail is attached to the service structure the r
monorail is removed with the R.V. Head when it is removed thereby L
removing any possibility of handling a load over the open Reactor Vessel
[
1205R
{
ds E
[
E
[
[
VI-24
[
r
7 7
2.4 Specific Reauirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in plant u
areas containing eauipment reauired for reactor shutdown, core decay heat removal, or spent fuel pool cooling.
"NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.5 provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of eauipment or I
components reauired for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.
L Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adecuate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent p
L safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such eauipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety related
{
functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1 and their loads in your response to 2.1-3C."
r E
1l l
l l
ll 1
l l
l VII-l l
1
lI Recuest 2.4-1:
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this I
evaluation (i.e complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design feautures). For each crane so evaluated, provide the tI load-handling-system (i.e, crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment l'.
Response to 2.4-1:
The cask handling crane (MSH-CRN-2) and the Polar Crane (MHS-CRN-4) have been evaluated to have sufficient design feautes which make the I
likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads carried.
The Cask Crane is single failure proof and has been discussed in our response to 2.2 Comment & Discussion, Paragraph 2.
The Polar Crane was lI discussed in detail in our response to 2.3-3.
Recuest 2.4-2:
"For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single failure-proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information":
2.4-2(a):
"The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and
~
potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight. or cross reference to information provided in 2.1-2-C.
Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some I
other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings."
Response to 2.4-2(a):
Table 3-2 (Sheets 1 - 21) provides the load / impact matrices fnr cranes identified in Response 2.1-1 which have r.ot been designated as single-failure-proof.
3 Also included are Attachments A-D which provide the results of a 5
comprehensive safeguard evaluation for electrical, HVAC, Piping and eouipment that were used to identify safety related eouipment under or adjacent to load handling systems.
Table 3-2a is an index of crane load combinations and hazard elimination categories which have been identified for each crane load combination.
VII-2
Reauest 2.4-2b:
"For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related eauipment, mechanical stop and/or electrical interlocks, or other site specific considerations Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned considerations should be supplemented by the following specific information".
1)
"For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related eauipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not
[
affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function)."
2)
"Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be
[
provided present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which reouire bypassing have been completed."
3)
"Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other site specific considerations (e.g., maintenance secuencing), provide present and/or proposed technical
[
specifications and discuss administrative procedures or
[
physical constraints invoked to ensure the continued validity of such considerations."
{
Response to 2.4-2b:
Load target combinations eliminated because of separation and/or redundancy of safety-related eauipment are as follows:
a)
Diesel Service Holst MHS-MRH-lO Miscellaneous Loads to 7130 lbs.
The diesel generators are separated from each other by a reinforced concrete wall. Since the portable gantry cranes are used only during maintenance periods to service a diesel generator (only one Diesel Generator will be taken out of service at a time), these crane / load combinations have been eliminated as potential hazards. The diesel generator remaining in service provides system redundancy.
VII-3
L 1
Response to 2.4-2b:
b)
Safe guards Area Monorail Holst MHS-MRH-15 Dm encapsulation vessel D m Valve.
[
CSS encapsulation vessel h
CSS Valve 1
(
This monorial/ hoist services the "A" train encapsulation
(
vessels and valves for the CSS and Dm system. A completely redundant "B" train is isolated from "A" train by a reinforced concrete wall and approximately 20'.
[
c)
Eauipment Maintenance Monorial MHS MRH-19 CSS Pump & Motor lA
[
DM Pump & Motor lA This monorail services the "A" train pumps for the CSS &
l Dm system. A completely redundant "B" train is isolated from the "A" train by two (2) reinfoced concrete walls and a distance of approximately 40'.
In the unlikely event of a load drop from this load handling system, the redundant system would remain functional.
d)
Eauipment Maintenance Monorial mis-MRH-20 CSS Pump & Motor 28 DW Pump & Motor 28 Same as c) above.
{
Reauest 2.4-2c:
i "For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4-2b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e.,
complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design feautures). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1".
VII-4
l l
l l
Response to 2.4-2c:
I The interactions eliminated by hazard category d) (i.e. Section 5.1.6, NUREG 0612 satisfied) are discussed below:
l a)
Tank Room Monorail Holst MHS MRH-9 The Tank Room Monorail hoist is a 2 ton capacity "ACEC0" hand operated chain hoist eouipped with a manual chain geared trolley.
The hoist is used to assist in maintenance and movement of coulpment. During non use periods the hoist will be physically secured. The hoist chain breaking l
strength has a minimum safety factor of 6.
The DRL includes a 25% design impact factor.
The maximum load (DHR I
valve - 2200 lbs) is approximately one half of the hoists f
DRL of two (2) tons. Rigging configuration per administrative controls reauire that slings and rigging I
apparatus provide a safety factor of 10 or greater and that rigging configurations be redundant (i.e., 4 leg sling or 2 slings for single point lift).
Based on the above conditions this hoist is considered to satisfy the recuirements of NWEG 0612 Section 5.1.6.
In addition it should be noted that this load handling system and rigging apparatus is subject to inspection, testing and maintenance recuirements as discussed previously in this report. Maintenance personnel will be instructed regarding proper chain hoist use and rigging technioues, b)
Polar Crane MSH-CRN-4 The Polar Crane as previously discussed in respone to 2.3-3 l
has been evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small. The I
response to 2.3-3 provides a thorough evaluation of the P.C. handling system to the reouirements delineated in f
NUREG 0554 Single Failure Proof Cranes. Where alternatives i
to NWEG 0554 reauirements have been presented, discussions were provided to demonstrate eauivalency. Lifting devices and interfacing lift points for the load combinations identified in Table 3-1 were also discussed in our response I
to 2.3-3.
I 1
l v11-5 l
5 l
l I
F 1
Reouest 2.4-d:
"For interactions not eliminated in 2.4-2-b or 2.4-2-c, above, I
demonstrate using proper analysis that damage would not preclude N
operation of sufficient eauipment to allow the system to perform its 3
safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612 Section 5.1, l
Criterion IV). For each analysis so conducted the following information should be provided:
a)
An indication of whether or not, for the specific load I
beinc investigated, the overhead crane handling system is k
designed and constructed such that the hoisting system will B
retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations j
eouivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthcuake (SSE).
b)
The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG-0612, Apendix A.
c)
The information reauested in Attachment 4".
Response to 2.4-d:
Analysis of the interactions not eliminated in 2.4-2-b and 2.4-2-c l
above indicates that damage will not preclude operation of eauipment reauired for safe-shutdown.
l The following tables are provided to aid in demonstrating that damage I
will not eliininate safe shutdown capability.
Table:
l 3-2
" Load Impact Area Matrix" l
3-2a
" Hazard Elimination Index" 3-2b
" Plant Structure Analysis Summary" Table 3-2b provides the information reauested in 2.4-d, Para. (1) and I
(3). Tables 3-2 and 3-2a provide details of load impact areas and a summary of the hazard elimination category for each load / combination identified in Table 3-1.
3 An exception has been taken to appendix "A" General Consideration, l
Para. (3) of NLREG 0612. Load drops have only been considered along designated load paths that have been identified previously in the gg report.
l.
l lI VII-6 ll l
I I
Two load handling systems are affected by this exception, the Polar Crane and the Radioactive Maintenance and Test Facility Crane. The I
Polar Crane has been designed to retain its load during an SSE.
The loads involved are considerably less than the DRL and/or MCL. Standard lifting apparatus will maintain a safety factor of 10 or greater and I
wherever possible utilize redundant liftina arrangements.
The 5
Radioactive Maintenance and Test Facility Crane loads (above elev.
479') are also less than one half (1/2) the D8L and will maintain a I
safety factor of 10 or greater on lifting apparatus.
The crane is restricted to a maximum lifting capacity of 9500 lbs. above elev.
47P.
The heaviest anticipated load is 7750 lbs.
Safe load paths will be marked on the floor as shown on drawing #805707 (attached)
These restrictions will be marked in conspicuous locations on the walls and columns above elev. 479'.
I Operators for the above cranes will be throuchly trained on the above cranes in accordance with the guidelines discussed in our response to 2.1-3.
As reouested in Attachment 4 paragraph 2 " Method of Analysis", the method of analysis used to demonstrate sufficient load carrying capability for floor slabs is provided as follows:
METHOD OF ANALYSIS System G.S.B. - Floor Slabs Subject Effect of load drops Design Classification Category I I
Problem Statement - Verify whether the floors will withstand the Impulse load generated due to various load drops.
a)
Desion Criteria I
1)
Interaction between disciplines identified worst case i
loads 2)
GSB floor loading diagrams 3)
Extract structural seismic accelerations for OBE or SSE condition from In Structure Seismic Response 5
Spectra for Category I Structures Volume I E
VII-7 5
[.
~
l b)
Desion Procedures 1)
Structural Steel Properties
(-
Obtain stiffness k = 48 EI lbs./in.
T3 Where E =
Modulus of elasticity of steel (1bs./in.2)
I-Moment of inertia of composite steel beam or beam only, depending on whether beam is composite or non-composite (inches 4)
L-Span (inches)
Obtain eauivalent mass, Mea = 0.49M (reference 2)
Where M = W lbs.
Sec.2 i
g in.
l
(
DeterminePeriod,T=2i (Sec.)
j k
2)
Concrete Properties T=2Y w
h =y [N 2
Where w =
0 and a
P D=
Flexural rigidity of slab (lbs./in. = Ela 1:v2 (ref.: 6)
E=
Modules of elasticity of concrete (lbs./Sec.2) v=
Poisons ratio
= 0.17 (ref-1)
Ia = Average of cracked and uncracked moment of inertia A=
Shortest span length of concrete panel K and N are frecuency co-efficients, based on boundary conditions of the section of slab under consideration derived from Reference 6.
P=
Mass density per unit of plate (lbs./sec.2/in.3)
VII-8
(
3)
Ecoivalent Static Load Evaluate impulsive load (F) generated by application of Williamson and Alvy eauation (Reference 3).
F=
21 WV 1
\\ 2 A-1 i
gT W=
Weicht of drop load (1bs. or kips)
(
V=
Velocity of drop load at impact (ft./sec.)
T=
Natural period of vibration (sec.)
x=
Ductility ratio 10 for steel (Reference 8)
=
1 for concrete (Reference 4)
{
=
4)
Stress Verification Verify flexural and shear stresses of the structural
(
elements by application of eouivalent static load I
generated together with any other additional loads at l
critical sections.
l c)
Design Assumotions 1)
For steel beams, when adeauate number of shear studs are provided, composite action is considered.
2)
For steel beams, flexural stresses are evaluated on the basis that impulse loads are generated due to a
" drop load" at mid span, together with any other additio,al loads located in such a manner to provide n
worst effect.
3)
Shear stresses are evaluated by the applicat' ion of above eauivalent static load close to the support beam, together with any other additional loads located in such a manner to provide worst effect.
4)
The maximum allowable punching shear of concrete (Pv) is based on tha value evaluated from the ecuation below:
VII-9
4yf'c fhd ( ACI--318 Reference 7)
Pv
=
n effective depth in inches d
=
f capacity reduction factor'
=
f'c =
3000 PSI periphery of critical section b
=
o d)
References 1)
" Structural Analysis and Desion of HJclear Plant Facilities", ASCE Draft 1976.
2)
" Introduction to Structural Dynamics", by Bloos.
(
3)
R. Williamson and R. Alvy, " Impact Effect of Fraoments Strikina Structural Elements".
4)
5)
FSAR - WNP 1. - Sub Section 3.5.3.2
(
6)
" Vibration of Plates", Arthur W. Leissa.
7)
8)
" Standard Review Plan", dates July 1981. - Section 3.5.3 Appendix A.
The Supply System considers the load handlino systems and load / combinations, identified herein, provide more than adeouste assurance that a load drop is extremely unlikely or that, la the event of a load drop, safety-related eouipment or spent fuel will not be damaced or unable to perform its safety functinns. The load system design and operating reouirements identified herein provide reasonable assurance that a load drop will not occur.
1201R ds
(
VII-10 i
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-... _ _ _ _...... -E.. -.N
. -... -.. _ _ -. _..U... - ~. -. - - -. -. -... -
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)
CCNTROL OF HEAVY LOADS Pace 1 of 8 MPEG-0612 I
TABLE 3-1 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOACS FOR WASHPCTON PtBLIC PCG SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT - W W l i
LOA 0 PATH REFERENCE CRAPE LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT LIFTING OEVICE DRAAING PROTDt RE GRAWIN0(S) l Polar Crane Special Handling Fixtures l
1 MHS-CRN-4 P&H (A) Tripod Handling Fixture 14,200 lbs.
Polar Crane &
805705 Specific FP 505?4 Liftinq Extension l
5 530 Ton Main (B) FMad & Internal Handling 5,000 lbs.
A, D & E 805705 Specific FP-50571 25 Ton Auxil.
Exten. Ass'bly.
10 Ton outrig.
I (C) Internal Handlina Adapter 3,300 lbs.
A, D, & E an5705 Soecific FP-50520 j
Ass'bly, i
y (D) Polar Crans Lift, Beam Ass'bly. &
47,460 lbs.
Polar Crane 805704 Specific FP-51761
' Tongue (520 Ton) 5,0 M lbs.
FP-51727 1
(E) Polar Crane Liftina 13,000 lbs.
Polar Crane A 0 805705 Specific 0779 F-805700 Extension l
(F) Spreader Ring Assembly 500 lbs.
A, B, C, 0, & E 805705 Specific FP-57050 i
I Reactor Vessel Head a 220 tons A, 8, D, & E above 805706 Specific j
Service Structure 1
Plenum Assembly 159,000 lbs.
A,B,C, 0,E,& F 805706 9pecific FP-50282 i
3 above 1
Core Support 180 tons A, B, C, D, E, & F 805706 Specific FP-50787 above
)
Reactor Vessel Stud, 800 lbs.
Aux. Hook & Stud Pnt reo'd.
SpPCific FD-50280 pot % Washer Ass'bly.
Handlino Tool e
Stud Rack (Full) 8,400 lbs.
Aux. Hook & Slinos 805704 Specific FP 50233 (See rete 3)
FP-53389 i
(+)
Part of P.C. Lift Beam Assembly Weight, y
VIII-l 1
t l
1
} -_
O_
M M.
.Q O
O
'O.
.O_
M. O
_O.
.O W
3 Pace 2 of Q CONTRGL OF TMY LOADS caFEC-0612 TABLE 3-1 e
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS FOR 1
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SfSTEM UNIT WPP 1 LOAD PATH REFEREPCE s
CRANE LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT LIFTING OEVICE ORAWING PROCEDtHE ORAWINC(S)
OJide Studs 600 lbs.
Aux. Hook & Stud Not rea'd.
Specific FP-50?80 Handling Tool FP-50305 i
Stud Tensioner 2,200 lbs.
Aux. Hook & Stud 805704 Specific FP-50280 l
Tensinner Sling FP-50305
)
Reactor Coolant Pumps httor 106,000 lbs.
P.C. Main Hook 805705 Specific FP-50125
& Slings l
(See Note 3) i Rep Ass'bly.
120,000 lbs.
P.C. Main Hook 805705 Specific
& Slings (See Fete 3)
I Internal Indexino Fixture 14,000 lbs.
Main Hook with 805705 Specific FP-50521 tripod aM pendents FP-52n52 e
e In-Service Inspection Tool 15.76 tons P.C. (See Note 6)
(See Pete 6)
Specific (ARIS) t R.V. Head Insulation (In Rack)
Less than Aux. Hook & SlinQs Nnt rea'd.
reneral/ Specific FP 57326 1,500 lbs.
(See Pete 3)
FP-51016 e
lpper S/G Manway Cover Less than Aux. Hook & Slinas tnt rea'd.
reneral/ Specific 1,500 lbs.
(See rete 3)
+
e Reactor Cnolant n mp 16,5n0 lbs.
Aux. Hook & Slinqs 805704 Ceneral FP-50584 u
Storace Stand (See tote 3)
VIII-2
)
)
I
}
I bE E
E E
f U
U E
_b
[
..b Dace 3 of 8 7MRCL CF FEEVY LDADS Y PEG-0612 TABLE 3-1 TAFAR_ATION OF HEAVY LOADS f
FOR WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM tNIT WaP 1 REFERENCE LOAD PATH ORAWINCJSI PROEDLRE WEICHT LIFTING OFVI T DRAWING C4ANE LOAD IDENTIFICATION,
i Irradiated Incore Instru-10,000 lbs.
Aux. ftok, 805704 Specific FP-50764 I
FP-50447 Special Sling ment Transfer Cask (See Pete 3) l 8
771 lbs.
Slinas tot rea'd.
Spc;1fic/Ceneral FP40440 thru FP-60443 Cable Drawbridge I
Fans & Duct
)
14,000 lbs.
Slings 805704 Specific /Ceneral Core Flood Tank (See fetes 3 Removal Plug
& 7) i Miscellaneous Containment 1,750 lbs.
Slings 805704 Ceneral t4/A (See tbte 3)
I Ecolo, from Annulus Area (heaviest load) 1 275 lbs, Jib Crane Hook Not rea'd.
Specific Reactor SldQ.
Jib Cranes Installation 4 1 Ton Removal Tool i
135 lbs.
Lifting Tool Pet rea'd.
)
525 lbs.
Liftino Tool tot rea'd.
Specific FP-50331 FP 50305 MHS-CRN 4 CROM (Complete)
FP-50780 MfS-CRN-14 0
oecific F %0033 c
Varinus Refuelinq Tnols Less than Special Slings N/A 600 lbs.
l Main Fuel tendlina 8
3 Ton Capacity w w % Soent Fuel 1,530 lbs.
Special Tools N/A Specific Bridge FHS-BPG-1 Aux. Holst - 2 Ton e
VIII-3
)
I i
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M WWN W~
C Pace 4 of 8 CONTROL OF FEAVY LOADS P
PAFEC rM12 T ABLE 3-1 i
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOAOS rcq WASHINGTON PUBL!C POWER SLPPLY SYSTEM f
(NIT WFP 1 LOAO PATH REFEREPCE CAAff LOAD IDENTirICATION WEIGHT LirTING OFVICE ORAdING PROCE0tEF ORAWINO(S)
)
i CR0 Service Stud Tensioner 7,700 lbs.
Holst & Special 805706 SpeciflC FP-50780 8
i sling Structure i
Monorail-mists (4) 2 ton R.V. Head Stud, P4]t, 800 lbs.
Holst & Stud tbt rea'd.
Specific FP-50780 cacacity each
& Washer Ass'bly.
Handling Tool Seal Plate Ass'bly.
15,800 lbs.
Holst Hook &
805706 Specific FP-50305 Special Sling (See tote 8)
FP-50318 f
FP-50765 (all 4 holsts)
(See tbte 3)
Fuel Storage Various Refualing Tools Less than Special Slings &
N/A Specific s
600 lbs.
Handling Tools Fuel Handlinq i
Bridge 3 Ton Capacity FHS-BRO-2 Spent Fuel 1,530 lbs.
Special Tool N/A Specific I
2 Ton Aux. Holst I
tew Fuel thw Fuel Shipping Containers 7,000 lbs.
Soecial Slinas 805707 Specific (See obte 3)
Unpacking &
Inspection j
6 Crane Eauipment Hatches 700 lhr.
Slinos 805707 reneral MHS-CRN-1 10 Ton Capacity New Fuel 1,530 lbs.
thw Fuel HandlinQ Specific FP-50769 Tool FP-51451 6
FP 50775 l
1 i
t DW Pumps 5,100 lbs.
Slinosl 805707 Ceneral Motors 5,000 lbs.
Slinas) 805707 reneral rP-50187 (See tote 3)
CSS Pumos 7,860 lbs.
Slingsl 805707 reneral FP-51737 s
Motors 4,600 lbs.
Slims) 805707 reneral I
Cask Handling Spent Fuel Cask 105 tons Redundant Lift-805707 Specific Ina Device Crane MHS-GN-?
l 105 Ton Main 4
10 Ton Aux.
VIII-4 i
1 i
)
r
)
CONTRCL OF FOVV LOEDS Page 5 of Q GdFtEG-0612 p
TABLE 3-1 TABULATI'IN CF HEAVY LOADS FOR 1
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWCR SUPPLY SYSTEM tNIT - WP 1 i
LOA 0 PATH REFERENCE CRME LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEICHT LIFTING OEVICE
,0RA#IPC PROCEDtNE ORAWINC(S)
I I
Radioactive waste Cask 32,500 lbs.
4 Leo Slina Ass'bly. 805707 Specific FP-57202 Maintenance 6 x 37 IWRC
)
& Test Facility 1 1/4" diam.
Crane - 25 Ton Improved Plow Mf3-m N-3 Steel I
Condenser vacuum Pumo 7,600 lbs.
Slinas (See tote 3) 805707 Ceneral FP-20393
)
Aux. Feedwater Pump 5,700 lbs.
Slings (See rete 3) 805707 Ceneral FP-20305 i
MJS Pumo 7,750 lbs.
Slings (See rete 3) R05707 Ceneral FP-50186
)
DHR Valve 1A 2,200 lbs.
Slings (See Pete 3) 805707 General FP-50884 5
Gamma Scan Gamma Scan Lead Plug 750 lbs.
Sling A05711 Specific Facility Jib (See Pnte 3)
)
Crane MHS-CRN-10 2 Ton Capacity 9
Machine Shop various Feavy Lnads To 5 tons Slings 805712 General i
Bridqe Crane (See Pete 3)
MHS-CRN-16 5 Ton Cacacity i
Decontamination R.C. Pump Impeller 1,730 lbs.
Slinos 805714 ceneral Room ?4mrail (heaviest Inad)
(See fbte 3) l MHS u%-?
Fuel a ndlina Tonis 3 Ton capacity Hand Tools l
mDM Components l
Valve Components Periscopes & Dorescopes i
Makaup Pmp Rotating Assembly VIII 5
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS Pace 6 of 8 NmEG-0612 TABLE 3-1 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOAOS FOR 3
WASHIt#; TON PURLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEw tf4IT WFP 1 i
LOAD DATH REFERENCE CPArE LOAD IDFNTIFICATION WEICHT LIFTING DEVICE OR NIP, PROCEnm E N AWINC(S)
)
C.S.B.
Om Punp 5,100 lbs.
Slinos (See Pete 3) 805711 reneral rP-50187 Eoulp. Hutch totor 5,000 lbs.
Slings (See tbte 3) 805711 ceneral 3
mnorail mis-MRH-5 CSS Pump 2,860 lbs.
Slinos (See tete 3) 805711 General FP-51237 5 Ton Capacity Motor 4,600 lbs.
Slings (See obte 3) 805711 reneral i
CTMT Spray Heat 3,500 lbs.
Slinos (See Pete 3) 805711 Specific /Ceneral FP-50443 Exchanger Head 1
Tank Room DP Valves 2,700 lbs.
Slings (See rete 31 805707 General FP 50883 Monorail Holst (heaviest lift)
MHS-MRH 9 e
2 Ton Capacity p
niesel Service Miscellaneous Diesel 7,130 lbs.
Slings (See Petc 3) 805704 Specific /Ceneral Holst Components (heaviest lift)
MHS-MRH-10 Jacket Water Cooler
)
5 Ton Capacity Sa feouards Om & CSS 3,787 lbs.
Slinos 805708 Specific FP 51044 5
Area Encaosulation Vessels (See tbte 3)
Monorail Holst (partial)
MtS-MRH-15 3
2 Ton Capacity Dm & CSS Valve 7,700 lbs.
Slings 805708 Specific FP-50884 (See Note 3) i Machine Shop Miscellaneous Eculpment 7,730 lbs.
Slings 805712 reneral Monorail Holst Lnads To (See tete 3)
MHS-NRH-18 5 Ton capacity i
Eouipment CSS Pump 1A 7,860 lbs.
Slinos (See Pete 3) 805708 Snecific/ General FP-51237 Maintenance mtor 4,600 lbs.
Slings (See tbte 3) 805708 Specific /Ceneral 9
MHS MRH-19 5 Ton Capacity Dm Pump 1A 5,100 lbs.
Slinos (See tete 3) 805708 Specific /Ceneral FP-50187 totor 5,000 lbs.
Slinas (See ette 3) 805708 Specific /Ceneral 9
VIII-6 e
)
R.
_o-O.
_V U
R R
.. O
_D R
..O V
Pace 7 of @
C0t&<0L OF HEAW LOADS tWEr/A12 TABLE 3-1 TABULATICN OF HEAVY LCA05 FOR WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT W'P 1 REFERENCE LOAD PATH CPANE LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT LIFTING DEVIT DRAWING PROCEDURE ORAWING(S)
)
Eoulpnent CSS Pump 28 2.860 lbs.
Slinos (See rete 1) 80570R Specific / General t
4,600 lbs.
511nos (See Pete 3) 805708 Specific /Ceneral FP-51237 Maintenance tttor 5 Ton Capacity CW Ptsmp 29 S,100 lbs.
Slings (See tete 3) 805708 Specific /Ceneral FP-50187 8
IHS-MPH-20 Motor 5,000 lbs.
Slinos (See Note 3) 80570R Specific /0eneral P05713 Specific FP-53X)6 Solid Waste Lift Rio (electr. operated)
I,300 lbs.
)
Handlino Crane 100 cu. ft. Waste Container 10,500 lbs.
Lift Rio 805713 RSW-CRN-1 6 Ton capacity e
Filter Mainten-Spent Filter Transfer Cask 11,000 lbs.
Crane Hook 805710 specific FP 51649 4 Filter ChanQing Method for Filter Handlina ance Honorail System Protective RSW-MRH-1 Packaaino Inc.
7.5 Ton capacity PPIR-01-017 i
s t
6 l
~
\\
l VIII-7 8
)
e
m O
M G
m U
V
).
8 1
Pf1TES:
In nodition to Load Path Drawin's, see Dwa. 9779.S-805000 " containment f>neral Arrancement t.avdown & Storaop".
o 1.
2.
Sling sizes will vary accordinQ to Riacina Configuration. Site personnel determine Ricaino Conflauration. A minimtn cafety tactor of 5 shal!.
I be maintained, p
3.
Ricaino apparatus shall he sired to maintain a safety f actor of 10.
All oeneral use wire rope slinas are to be of IWRC improved plow steel construction or eoual, with swaaed fittinas.
4 5.
Procedures:
Soecific - Critical load handlina operations recuirina unioue procedures, which provide detailed instructions that covern the move 1.ent &
9 handling of critical loads or performance of complex tasks, recuirinq greater details to ensure proper results & safe handlino of loads.
Ceneral - Governs all crane & load handlina operations not recuirino a " specific" procedure, and serves as a base or reference document for specific proced. ires. The " Crane Safety Minual" could be used as the ceneral procedure.
Details are not availahle at attachment methnd to be determined prior to use, and approved by the Plant Safety Review Committee.
9 4
t.oad paths E this time.
Should it heCome necessary to remnve a plug, a four (4) point lift
)
7 Liftino luas for the Core Finnd Tank removal pluas have not been desioned.The liftino luas & slinos will maintain a safety factor of 10, nr atenter when considerino lug arranoement will be desianed and installed.
static & dynamic loads (includino allowance fnr resistance loadino, applInd due to tiaht fit of plua).
9.
This load is only handled when RV head is on the RV.
Load travels vertically only, and is not handled over Safety-related Pouipnent.
The polar crane will not normally be available for use durino actual handlino of fuel a$semblies, 6
4 p
6 1008R ds 9
8 VIII 8 8
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i t
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ll Page 1 of 21 I
CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX IIFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDI I
UNIT WNP 1 l
Date:02/24/82 CNE: CRD Service Structure Menorail Hoist LOCATION BUILDING: Containment IMPACT Zone: Column Line I
AREA Reactor Head Area Column Line Elev. 450' LOADS Safety Related Hazard Elimination I
Elevation Equipment Category
- 1) Stud Tensioners 453' RV Head e
(2200 lbs)
- 2) Seal Plate Assembly 450' RV Head e
(15,800 lbs)
I of a load drop, damage would not occur to spent consnent:
1.
In the unlikely event :
fuel &/or safeshutdown equipment. Hoists are only in une when R.V. Head I
is in position on the R.V. or head Stcrage Stand.
I I
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CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page 2 of 21 IIFAVY 1.OADS TABLE 3-2 WUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDI UNIT WNP 1 ll CRANE:
Date: 02/24/82 New Fuel Unpacking & Inspection Crane MHS-CRN-1 LOCATION BUILDINC: General Service Building
\\
IMPACT Zone: Column Line 9.2-11 I
ARFA Column Line P -W Elev. 479' Hazard Elimination LO!3S Safety Related Elevation Equipment Category
- 3) New fuel shipping 479' Not examined I
Containers floor can sustair e
(7000 lbs) a load drop
- 4) DHR Pumps 479' Not examined (5100 lbs) floor can sustair e
a load drop I
- 5) DHR Motors 479' Not examined (5,000 lbs) floor can sustair e
a load drop I
- 6) CSS Pumps 479' Not examined (2860 lbs) floor can sustair e
a load drop
- 7) CSS Motors 479' Not examined (4600 lbs) floor can sustair e
a load drop I
NOTE: Floor slah has been analized and will susta:.n a load drop of naximum anticipateil I
load.
Crane is administrative 1y restricted from carrying heavy loads over New Fuel Storage Pool. Re'fer to response 2 2 comment and discussion (1) l I
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L CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page3 of21 IlFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM tmIT k3P 1 CRANE:
n Ainnrefve Maintenance & Test Facility CRANE MHS-CRN-3 02/24/82 LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building l
IMPACT Zone: Column Line P-W Elev. 479' 1
AREA 455' Column Line 4-5.5 451' onS Related Hazard Elimination Safetfpment Elevation Equ Category
(
- 8) Waste Cask 451' Not examined 32,500 lbs 455 floor can sustain e see note 3 a load drop
- 9) Condenser Vacuum Pump 479 WA-FMP-1A, 2B (7*600 lbs)
FPC-HK-1,2 e see note (el 433) 1&2 FPC-FMP-3A,4B (el 433')
[
NSW-TK-1A,2B (el 455')
- 10) AUX.FEEDWATER Pump 479 WA-FMP-1A,2 B
(
(5700 lbs)
L (el. 395)
FPC-HX 1,2 (el 433) e see note FPC-FMP-3A,4B 1&2 (el 433')
NSW-TK-1A,2B (el 455')
- 11) MUS Pump 479 WA-FMP-1A,2 B (7750 lbs)
(el 395)
FPC-HX-1,2 e see note (el 433) 1&2 FPC-FMP-3A,4B (el 433')
NSW-TK-1A,2B
{
(el 455')
- 12) DHR Valve 1A 479 WA-FMP-1A,2B (2200 lbs)
(el 395)
FFC-HX-1,2 e see note (el 433) 1&2 FPC-FMP-3A,4B (el 433')
[
NSW-TK-1A,2B (el 455')
[
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CONTROI,OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX Page 3a of 21 IIFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTD1 UNIT WNP 1 Radioactive Maintenant.e & Test Facility CRANE MHS-CRN-3 Date:02/24/82 LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building IMPACT Zone: Column Line P-W AREA Elev. 479' Column Line 4-5.5 LOADS Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elinination Equipment Category NOTE: (1) Floor elev 479 can sustnin a load drop ol 9500 lbs over structural steel only, floor slab will be marked with lond paths for handl ing loads over
[
2000 lbs per Load Path frawing 9779-F-809707. Crane will be administrative 1y controlled by strict oporating procedures to assure loads greater than 2000 lbs runnin over structural steel.
(
(2) Crane capacity of 25 tota is restricted to waste Cask Handling Area. Loads in excess of 9500 lbs a re prohibited frosibeing handled above elevation 479'.
Signs are to be placed in conspictious areas at elevstion 479'-
restricting loads to 95 X) lbs above elev, 479.and crane operator training will stress this limit.
Load path drawing also identifies this restriction.
(3) Floor slab can sustain a waste cask load drop (4) Loads 9-12 are less the 2 of the cranes DRL. Rigging apparatus will maintain a S.F. of 10 o greater.
(5) No restrictions are pic
- ed on the crane for handling loads below 479' less than 32.5K. Load height above floor slabs shall be msintained as low as practical as def Lned by plant crar e operator traini sg.
[
E Par.c 4 of 21 CONTR0!,OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX IIFAVY I,0 ADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDI UNIT WNP 1
[
CRANE: Machina Shop Bridge Crane ) SIS-CRN-16 Date: 02/24/22 i
LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building IMPACT Zone: Column Line A-C AREA Elev. 455' Column Line 3-4 LOES Safety Related Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category
[
- 13) Various Loads 455 Floor slab can e
to (7750 lbs) sustain a load
{
drop
[
NCTIE: For loads with dimension i less p
L than 18" x 26" maximum limit is 7.5K E-
[
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Panc5 of 21 CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARPA MATRIX IfFMY LOADS TABLE 3-2
{
NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTD1 LMT L'MP 1
[
Date: 02/24/82 NE: Decontamination Room Monorail MHS-MRH-2 LOCATIOli BUILDING: General Service Building IMPACT Zone: Column Line H-M AREA Column Line 5-6 Eley. 455' E
Safety Related Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category 14)
R.C. Pump Impeller 421' Boric acid e see note 1 Fuci Handling Tools Addition. Tank-Hand Tools BRS-TK-10 MUSPump-4 CRDM Components Coreflood Tank L
Valve Components Periscopes Makeup Pump
{
Borescopes Make Up Pump-Rotating Assembly (Heaviest Load 1730 lbs)
Note:
1.
Floor slab at elevation 479 wi ll sustain a load drop. It is also noted that crane safety factor is 15 for heaviest load and the rigging apparatus is required to maintmin a SF of 10 or greater.
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L CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page 6 of 21 IIFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREC 0612 r(
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY'SYSTDI UNIT, WNP 1 P
L CRANE:
CSB Eaui-at Hatch Monorail MHS-MRH-5 Date: 02/24/82 lL LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building
[
IMPACT Zone: Column Line Ra-S AREA Elev. 433' Column Line 7.0-10 l
[
LOADS Related Hazard Elimination Safetfpment Elevation Equ Category
- 15) DHR Pump.
395 Decay Heat (5100 lba)
Removal. Cooler e
DHR-HX-2-B
- 16) DHR Motor 395 Decay Heat (5000, lbs)
Removal. Cooler e
DHR-HX-2-B
- 17) CSS Pump 395 Decay Heat
{
(2860 lbs)
Removal. Cooler e
DHR-HX-2-B
- 18) CSS Motor 395 Decay Heat r
(4600 lbs)
Removal. Cooler e
L DHR-HX-2-B
- 19) CTME Spray Heat 395 Decay Heat Exchanger Head Removal. Cooler e
{
(3500 lbs)
DHR-HX-2-B NOTE: Floor slab at elevation 43: will sustain a lad drop, based on revised monorail and reduced drop height to 5'.
Maximum anticipated load is % of Cranes DRL and Rigging apparatus" vill maintaLn a SF of 10.
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CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page 7 of 21 HFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT WNP 1 i
CRANE: Tank Room Monorail Hoist MHS-MRH-9 Date: 02/24/82 LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building IMPACT Zone: Column Line 4-11 AREA Elev. 449' Column Line W
[
8 Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elimination Equipment Category
{
- 20) DHR Valves 449' DHR-Piping (2200 lbs)
CSS Piping Trains A & B d
see note
[
[
NOTE: Failure of lied handling sy stem is externely unlikely. The heaviest load handled is approximately ona half ( ) the DRL of the monorail / moist. Rigging configurations per administ rative controls require sling configurations
{
that are redundact and provLde a safety factor of 10 or greater.
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I CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page 8 of 21:
HFAVY I,0 ADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTD1 UNIT WNP 1
)
CRANE:
Date: 02/24/82 Diesel Service Hoist MHS-MRH-10 LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building IMPACT Zone: Column Line Diesel A Diesel B I
ARFA E-F G-H Column Line 1-4 1-4 Elev. 428'-6" LOADS Safety Related Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category l
- 21) Miscelleneous Diesel 406' Diesel Generator Components-Heaviest Lif t-
"A" & "B" b
l Jacket Water Cooler (7130 lbs) l I
1 I
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1 I
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d CONTROI,OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page 9 of 21 IIFAVY 1,0 ADS TABLE 3-2 F
NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT WNP 1 i
~
L CRANE:
Date: 02/24/82 p
Safe Guards Area Monorail Hoist MIS-NRR-15 LOCATION BUILDING: Safa Guards Area F
L IMPACT Zone: Colutus Line Safe Guard Area MM U-W r
Elev. 395' L
LOADS Safety Related Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category IL
(partial)
Piping (3787 lba)
Vessel (Partial)
Piping (3787 lbs)
(2200 lbs)
Pipina
(2200 lbs)
Piping
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s CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX Page 100I 21 IIEAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREC 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT; WNP 1 4
CRANE Machine Shoo Monorial Hois t_
WRR. NRM.18 Date: 02/24/82 LOCATION BUILDING:
General Service Building f
i
(
IMPACT Zone: Column Line 1~3 gg Elev. 455, Column Line A-c AU8 Elevation Safety Related Nazard Elimination Equipment Category
- 26) Miscellar.eous Equipment 455 Floor Slab can e
(7,750. Ibs) sustain a load
'!roo NOTE: For' loads.withdimensdou s less
[
than 18" x 26" maximum limit is 7.5K
[
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CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX Page 11of 21 IIEAVY LOADS.
TABLE 3-2 WASHINGTON PUBLI.C POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT, WNP 1 '.'-
r' L
CRANE:
Equipment Maintenance Monormal NHS-MRH-19 Date: 2/24/82 L
WA ON BUIGING:
General Service Building IMPACT Zone: Column Line 6.5-9 AREA Elev. 395' Column Line T
I LOADS Related Hazard Elimination Safetfpment Elevation Equ Category
motor (4600 lbs)
(
Motor (5000 lbs)
Note: It should also be noted tha t the maximum ant Lcipated lift is a pproximately one half ( ) of the DRL, which results in a safe ty factor of approximately 10 and that Rigging apparatus will maintain a Safet r factor of 10 or greater
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Page 12of 2L CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX llEAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 I
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNI 1r WNP 1 I
L Date: 02/24/82 Equipment Maintenance Monorail letS-MitH-20
{
LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building Fk IMPACT Zone: Column Line 6.5-9 Elev. 395' AREA Column Line q r
l LOADS Safety Related Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category
30 DHR Pump 2B (5100 lbs) 395 CSS Pump 2B b
motor (5000 lbs)
It should be noted that the maximum anticipated 1.ft is approximate ly one half ( )
[
of the DRL, which results in a safety factor of approximately 10.
Rigging apparatus will maintain a safety factor of 10 or greater.
[
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I CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page 130f21 liFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2
[
NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDI LHIT.. WNP 1 I
L CRANE:
Date:02/24/82 F
Solid Wasta Handling Crana RSW-CRN-1 L
LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building
[
IMPACT Zone: Column Line 3_4 AREA Column Line P-U
(
Elev. 455' Om Safety Relate.'
Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category
(
- 31) 100 cu ft Waste Container 421 Shutdown cooling (10,500 lbs) water heat J 1,300 lbs) Lift Rig exchanger
[
11,800 lbs NSW-HX-1-A e
Component see note Cooling water
(
heat exchanger CCW-HX-1-A 339' Make Up Pumps
[
MUS-FMP-3-C e
MUS-FMP-2-B see note
[
NOTE: Floor slab at elevation 45S'.will be_ capable of sustaining a load drop of a filled 100 cu. ft, waste container which is the heaviest load handled in
[
this area. Floor slab to be upgraded to sustain a loaded was' :e container drop.
[
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g CONTR01. OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Pagel4 or 21 IIFAVY 1.0 ADS TADLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT WNP 1 u
CRANE:
Filter Maintenance Monorail RSW-MRH-1 Date: 02/24/82 lL LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building r
l IMPACT Zone: Column Line 4-9 5
ARFA Column Line L-P Elev. 455' r
Related Hazard Elimination Safetfpment Elevation Equ Category r
[
- 32) Spent filter transfer Cask 421 Botte Acid e
(11,000 lbs) ddition tank see note
~
439'6 Boric Acid storage tank e
MUS,DAR,RLW see note BES RVD Trains A&B 455 MUS filters e
L
[
NOTE: Floor slab along entire monorail travel path and roof slab over filters will be capable of sustaining an 11,000 lb. filter transfer cask load drop upon completion of modifications identified in'sunmary. The hatch area for each MUS filter and area between hatches will not sustain a load drop, however, 7
tha crane is considered to Lave adequate safety factor (6.8) and the frequency
(
of handling the MUS filters (monthly) reduces the probability of a load drop in the MUS Filter Hatch area.
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e L
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i CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX Page 15 of 21 HEAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT WNP 1 CRANE:
Reactor Building Jib Cranes MHS-CRN 6 & 14 Date: 02/24/82 k
LOCATION BUILDING:
Containment IMPACT Zone: Column Line S/G Shield Walls AREA Column Line Elev. 517' I
LOADS Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elictination Equipment Category l
- 33) The loads carried by these l
cranes are not classified as heavy loads.
1l 1l 1l 1l Li 1l 1l 1l 1
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Page I W 21 CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA HATRIX liFAVY 1,0 ADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT WNP 1 l
CRANE: Fuel Handling Bridge FHS -BRG-1 Date: 02/24/82 k
LOCATION BUILDING: Containment b4 IMPACT Zone: Column Line AREA Refueling Canal Column Line Elev. 479' r
L Safety Related Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category
- 34) The loads carried by this crane are not classified as a heavy load.
/
CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page U of U llEAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDI UNIT. WNP 1 CRANE: Fuel Storage Fuel Handling Bridge FHS-BRG-2 Date:02/24/82 L
LOCATION BUILDING: General Service Building L
IMPACT Zone: Column Line 5-10 l
AREA Column Line g
p.R Elev. 479' Ih LOADS Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elimination Equipment Category w
- 35) The loads carried by this crane are not classifeid as heavy loads.
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CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page ggof 21 HFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WAS'tlINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT WNP 1 l
CRANE:
Canana Scan Facility Jib Crane MHS-CRN-10 Date: 02/24/82 k
LOCATION BUILDING:
General Service Building I
f IMPACT Zone: Column Line Ra-AREA Column Line 7-10 Elev. 433' I
LOADS Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elimination Equipment Category l
- 36) The loads carried by this k
c ane are not classified r
g as heavy loads.
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CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX Page 19 of 21 IIEAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTD1 UNIT WNP 1 Polar Crane NHS-CRN-4 Date:02/24/82 LOCATION BUILDING:
Contairunent E
l IMPACT Zone: Column Line AREA Refer to load path Column Linedrawings 805704, 805705, 805706 F
L LOADS Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elimination Equipment Category
- 37) Tripod llandling Fixture el 479' R.V.
d (14,200 lbs)
- 38) Head & Internal Handling el 479' R.V d
Extension assembly (5900 lbs
- 39) Internal Handling adapt er el 479' R.V d
assembly (3,300 lbs)
- 40) Polar Crane lif t beam el 479 R.V d
assembly and tongue (47,960 lbs)
- 61) Polar Crane lif ting extension el 479 R.V d
(13,000 lbs)
- 62) Spreader Ring assembly el 479 R.V d
(500 lbs) 43)
R.V. IIcad & Service el 450' R.V d&b Structure DIE (220 Tons)
- 44) Plenum Assembly el 450' R.V d
(159,000 lbs)
- 45) Core Support el 450' R.V d
(180 tons)
F
{
I CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page20 of 21 I
liFAVY LOADS TABLE 3-2 hTREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDI UNIT WNP 1 B
CPANE:Po ar Crane E M-4 Date: 02/24/82 LOCATION BUILDING: Containment IMPACT Zone: Column Line refer to load path AREA drawings 805704,805705, Coluen Line 805706 Safety Related Hazard Elimination Elevation Equipment Category g
Stud Rack 479' R.V d&e I.
' 46) (8400 lbs)
- 47) Stud Tensioner 479' R.V d&e (2200 lbs) g
- 48) Reactor Coolant Pump Motor p
RC
- 49) Reactor Coolant Pump 435' DHR I
Assembly CFS d
(120,000 lbs)
RC
- 50) Internal Indexing Fixture 432' R.V d&e (14,000 lbs)
"51) Inservice Inspection tool 479 R.V d&e (15.76 Tons) ll
- 52) Reactor Coolant Pump Storage 479 d&e lB Stand (16,500 lbs)
- 53) Irradiated Incore Instrument Transfer Cask 479 RC 10,000 lbs CFS d
DHR i
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CONTR01. OF LOAD / IMPACT ARFA MATRIX Page 21 of 21 HFAVY IATADS TABLE 3-2 NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDI UNIT WNP 1 l
ANE:
Date: 02/24/82 Polar Crane MHS-CRN-4 LOCATION BUILDING: Containment h
^
Refer to load Path AR drawings 805704, 805705,805706 Column Line LO W Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elimination Equipment Category
&{
- 54) Core flood tank removal 479 CFS d
plug RV (14,000 lbs) d
- 55) Misc Equipment From Annulus Annulus area all Area elevations (1750 lbs) i
(
Control of Heavy Loads HAZARD ELIMINATION INDEK NUREG 0612 TABLE 3-2a WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDi UNIT WNP 1 Hazard Elimin.
Hazard Elimin-ation Category ation Category CRANE / LOAD Load CRANE / LOAD Load No.
a b
c d
e No.
a b
c d
e CRD Service Structure Equipment Maintenance Monorail Hoist Monorail MHS-MRH-19 L
Stud Tensioners 1
Seal Plate Assembiv 2
X DHR Pumn Motor I A 28 X
y New Fuel Unpacking & Insp.
Equipment Maintenance l
Crane MHS-CRN-1 Monorail MHS-MRH-20 New Fuel Shinoine Cont 3
X CSS Pumo Motor 2B 29 X
DHR Pumns 4
X DHR Pumo Motor 2B 30 X
f DHR Motors 5
X Solid Waste Handling Crant i
CSS Pumns 6
X RSW-CRN-1 CSS Motors 7
X 100 Cu.ft. Waste Cont 31 X
j Radioactive Maintenance &
Filter Maintenance k no-l Test Facility Crane rail RSW-MRH-1 MHS-CRN-3 Spent Filter Transfer 32 X
Waste Cask 8
X Cask Condeneer Vacuum Pumn 9
X X
Reactor Bldg. Jib Crancs Aux. Feedvater Pumn 10 X
X MHS-CRN 6 & 14 g
MUS Pumn 11 X
X No Heavy Loads 33 N
/
A-W DHR Valve 1A 12 X
X_
Fuel Handling Bridge l
Machine Shop Bridge Crane FHS-BRG-1 g
MHS-CRN-16 No Heavy Loads 34 N
/
A-g Various Loads 13 X
Fuel Storage Fuel Handling Decon. Room Monorail Bridge FHS-BRG-2 MHS-MRH-2 No Heavy Loads 35 N
/
A-Heaviest Load 14 X
Gama Scan Facility Jib GSB Equipment Hatch Mono-Crane MHS-CRN-10
[
rail MHS-MRH-5 No Heavy Loads 36 N
/
A-DHR Pumn 15 X
Polar Crane MHS-CRN-4 DHR Pump Motor 16 X
Triood 37 X
{
CSS Pu-m 17 X
Head & Int. Handling 38 X
C_,SS Pump Motor 18 X
Ext.
I CTMT Spray Heat Exch 19 X
Internal Handling 39 X
Head
_Adaoter Tank Room Monorail Hoist P.C. Lift Beam Assy 40 X
MHS-MRH-9 P.C. Liftine Extens.
41 X
DHR Valves 20 X
Sorender Rine Assv.
42 X
Diesel Service Hoist R.V. Head & Serv.
43 X
X MHS-MRH-10 Struct.
Misc. Diesel Compon-21 X
Plenum Assembiv 44 X
ents Core Suonort 45 X
l Safe Guards Area Monorail Stud Rack 46 X
Hoist MHS-MRH-15 Stud Tensioner 47 X
5 DHR Encansul. Valve 22 X
R.C.P. Motor 48 X
CSS Encansul. Valve 23 X
R.C.P. Assembiv 49 X
t DHR Valve 24 X
Internal Indexine Pxt 50 X X B
CSS Valve 25 X
Inservice Inso. Tool 51 X
Machine Shop Monorail R. C. P. Storare Stand 52 X X l
Hoist NHS-MRH-18 Irradiated Incore 53 X
Misc. Eauipment 26 X
Instr. Transfer Cask B
Core Flood Tank 54 X
l Removal Plun Misc Equip Annulus Ar 55 X
B
HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORIES Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical a.
interlocks or mechanical stops.
L b.
System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of systcm to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.
r lL Site-specific considerations eliminate dhe need to consider load / equipment
)
c.
combination, u
(
d.
Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small L
(i.e., section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied).
[
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage e.
safety-related equipment.
E e
s 1
i t
...1--
I PLANT STRUCTURE ANALYSIS TABLE 3-2b Control of Heavy Loads
SUMMARY
SHEET NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNIT WNP 1 Material f g, j
g Properties y
CRANE /
- 5. N N
Se
- $c 9
w a $$; Steel - A36 g
LOAD m
56,;
1 &os ax=
~
yg h3p y
g y
,5 g
$b op" conc.-f'c=3000 l
E2 3.oI M
y S
S j
PSI E
6 e
} $1 E
R
& QE y
1 iti i
1 4
M 3MO O
M N
N U
R F
Comments CRD Service Structure i
Monorail Hoist Stud Tensioners 1
No 2.2K Refue13'-30' 3'-5' None X
ing Canal Seal Plate Assembly 2
No 15.8K R.V.
3' N/A None X
New Fuel Unpacking &
g Inspection Crane g
MHS-CRN-1 New Fuel Shipping Con 3
No 7K 9.2-11 2'
l'-6" None X
Ra W I
DHR Pumps 4
No 5.1K 9.2-11 2'
l'-6" None X
Ra W DHR Motors 5
No 5.0K 9.2-11 2'
l'-6" None X
Ra W i
CSS Pumps 6
No 2.86K 9.2-11 2'
l'-6" None X
Ra-W CSS Motors 7
No 4.6K 9.2-11 2'
l'-6" None X
l Ra-W Radioactive Maintenance &
Load Paths are Test Facility Crane administrative 1y MHS-CRN-3 restricted per.
1 Waste Cask 8
No 32.5K I-W l'
l'-6" None X
load path draw-4-5.5 inn. 805707 Condenser Vacuum 9
No 7.6K P-W l'
l'-6" None X
1 Pumo 4-5.5 Aux Feedwater Pump 10 No
'i. 7K P-W l'
l'-6" None X
4-5.5 l
MUS Pump 11 No 7.75K P-W l'
l'-6" None X
4,5.5 g
DHR Valve 1A 12 No 2.2K PW l'
l'-6" None X
4-5.5 1
See note on Machine Shop Bridge Crane MHS-CR%16 rabic 3-2, Pg 4 Various Loads 13 No 10K A-C l'
l'-6" None X
of 21 I
3-4 l
Decon. Room Monorail MHS-MRH-2 Various Loads 14 No 1.73K ll-M 58" l'-0" None X
5-6 j
TABLE 3-2b PLANT STRUCHIRE ANALYSIS Control of Heavy Loads
SUMMARY
SHEET NUREG 0612 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTD1 UNIT WNP 1 Material g
Properties a aw y
R$E g
j8v CRANE /
ujo "tc 7
umt$
Steci - A36 m
LOAD i W**
8
- 2 ad t! O3i
.a
.2
.S 3 3, =,
Cone.-t'c-3oo0 1
E.
- 3mi E
d O
$jd PSI c'
2 8 8E i
e ti a
8
?i u
mL 8
a o
a L
m
- a 8
3 O
OAW O
A A
R F
Cor:nents i
f Monorail relo-L CSB Equipment IIntch cated to reduce Monorail MIIS-MRH-5
[
DHR Pump 15 No 5.1K 7-10' 5'
l'-0" None X
drop height below 5' Ep S l
DHR Pump Motor 16 No 5.0K 7-10 5'
l'-0" None X
Ra S r
CSS Pump 17 No 2.86K 7-10 5'
l'-0" None X
j Ra-S CSS Pump Motor 18 No 4.6K 7-10 5'
l'-0" None X
Ra-S CTMT Spray Ht. Ex.
19 No 3.5K 7-10 5'
l'-0" None X
Ra-S Head See note on Machine Shop Monorail Table 3-2, MHS-MRH-18 Misc. Equipment 26 No 7.75K A-C l'
l'-6" None X
Page 10 of 21 1-3 Solid Waste Handling Crane P-U 6'-6" Floor slab up-RSW-CRN-1 100 Cu.Ft. Waste Cont, 31 No 11.8K 3-4 to l'-6" None X
graded to sus-8'-2" tain lond droo I
Filter Maintenance Mono-L-M, rail RSW-MRH-1 5-8,5 l'-0" 2'-6" X
L M, Floor slabs up-Spent Filter Transfer 32 No 11.0K 8.5-9 5'-3" 2'-6" X
graded to sus-Cask M-Ma, tain load drop g
6.5-7 10 ' -0" 2'-0" None X
Ma-P F
6.5-7 l'-0" 2'-0" X
k Polar Crane MHS-CRN-4 Refuel Internal Indexing 50 Yes 14K ing l'- 24" 3'-6' None X
Fixture Canal RCB RCP Storage Stand 52 Yes 16.5K 18-1 l'
2'-6" None X
RCB Is
(
L 4
t
t age 1 og 2 COMPARISON
SUMMARY
Control of POLAR CRANE VS NUREC 05%
i
, Heavy Loads Table 3-3 NUREC 0612 WAS111NCTON PUBLIC PCMER SUPP1,Y SYf7Tl?t UNIT WSP 1 8
m N*
Extent o
r-h Extent S
h E
e"0 I
E r$8 Y
0 "EE S
a
" E5 0
f T
of 3
2 35 1
35 e
- v. ~ w a
a e~w u
compliance j
c y
'ompliance j
c<
8
\\
%%5 2Eb
~
m
~
a la Requirement g
g3g j
Requirement g
g cg C
w o co x
o cc S
2.1 Construction and 4.4 Operating Periods X
Hoisting Speed X
2.2 Maximum Critical 4.5 Design Against Two Load X
Blocking X
2.3 4.6 Operating Environment X
Lifting Devices X
2.4 4.7 bbterial Properties X
Wire Rope Protection X
I 8
' 2.5 4.8 Seismic Design X
Machinery Alignment X
f 2.6 4.9 Lamellar Tearing X
Hoist Braking System X
2.7 5.0 Structural Fatigue X
Bridge & Trolley 2.8 5.1 Welding Procedures X
Braking Capacity X
l 3.0 5.2 Safety Features Safety Stops X
5 3.1 6.0 General X
Drivers & Controls 3.2 6.1 Auxiliary Systems X
Driver Selection X
f 3.3 5.2 Electric Control Systems X
Driver Control Systems X
8
,' 3.4 6.3 Emergency Repairs X
Malfunction Protection X
4.1 6.4
{
Reeving System X
Slow Speed Drives X
4.2 6.5 Drum Support X
Safety Devices X
' 4.3 S.6 Head & Load Blocks X
Control Station X
8-
COMPARISON SIP 1 MARY Control of POLAR CRANE VS NUREG 0554 Heavy Loads Table 3-3 NUREG 0612 WASHINCION PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDi UNIT WNP 1 Extent 3
Extent a
y a e:
e e:
OE 5%
0 of y y%
h a.
uu a.
,5 N" * [
e e-w u
a Compliance.
8 E
ompliance j
c c
y EE3 E gg
=
Requirement g
g*[
g Requirement g
g eg g
l
_._ m w
u co a
w a ca a
r---------
! 7.0 Installation Inctructions 7.1 General X
7.2 construction &
Operating Periods X
! 8.0 Testing & Preventive
/
Maintenance 8.1 Ceneral X
i g
8.2 Static & Dynamic p
Load Test X
+
8.3 Two Block Test X
j 8.4 Operational Tests X
8.5 I
Maintenance X
9.0 Operating Manual X
- 10.0 Quality Assurance X
r 5
i 1
s I
u n~_
g :;
x.
- +
w M
G-J L
v O_
c LJ w
F M
ATVACH4Evi A Page 1 of 4
- 6:
NUREG 612 CDPfmIT & CAALE TRAY REVIEt]
NO.
PO48ER 2 EOJTFNENT NME AREA CONSIDEREn RfTERENCF ORAWTNG RFMARKS ITEM E0JIPENT '
' tot examined floor can sustain a 1.
4tS-CR%1.
tew Fuel tipacking &'
CSB Inspection Crane P W, 9.2 11 load drop. ' Ref. A58-0171 tbt examined - single failure-art,f
,i
' 2.
MHS-CRS2 Cask Handling Creae GS8 cane. Rev. Spec #32, Rev. 22.
P-W, 5.54.5 tot examined - see remarks for this p
3.
MHS-CR 4 3 Radioactive Mainten-GSB crane under eouloment review table enance & Test.racility 4-5.5 3-2 page 3a.
Crane I
).
Pbt examined - excluded by desion.
cV Aa.
MHS-CR 44 Polar Crane
'n Ab.
MHS-CR 4 4 Polar Crane CTM1 303607, 303608, See tote 81.
303614, 303615,
)
Auxil. Holst 7_
).
303621, 303622, l
l 303628 & 303620 l
tot examined - excluded by intended
'l i-P MHS-CR44 Polar Crane CTMT CTMY Holst operates over coulpment
.j
.Ac.
use.
Annulus Holst hatch (elev. 479') in CTMT durino l
l
)
refueling.
Designed to retain RV head (220 Ton).
)
5.
FHS-RMS-1 Reactor MiuVle Shield CTMT Will generate no missiles durina SSE.
tot examined - crane does not lift
_ 6.
MHS-CR S6 Reactor Area Jib Crane CTMT heavy load.
tot examined - crane does not
.p.
7.
MHS-CRW14 Reactor Area' Jib Crane CTMT lift heavy load.
8.
MHS-0145 Fuel Transfer Tube Crane CTMT 303606, 303607, See Pete #1.
8 303611 & 30V14 No electrical eoulpment in annulus.
5 9.
MHS-CR415 Eouipment Hatch Service CTMT
. Jib Inside annulus:
-0CMIVA to CCW PT-1340, Train A, 303608 outlet CCW for MUS-HX-1.
-0C01VB to CCW PT-1336, Train 9, 3r13608 outlet CCW for MUS-HX-2.
)'
10.
MHS-MRH-74 FWA Pump Monorail Holst CSB 303300 en cable trays.
No conduits other than same train.
T W, 4-6.5 303300 Both Train A & Train 8, safety-related cable trays, and/or conduits'do not exist below this crane.
tute 1:
s
-. Note 2: No safety-related cable trays / conduits in this buildino.
6
ATTACtNErfT A (cont'd)
Pa y 7 0' 4
)
PAFFG 617 TPOJIT & CARLF TRAY REVIEW D
ITEM EQUI N IT NO.
tm RFR EOTINENT NAME ARFA m NSIDERF0 REFFREFU ORAWTNG RFMAR M l
)
11.
MHSJ4sS-23 Radw nte Comoressor CSB int examined - crane does not lift l
Service Mnnorail Holst P R, 3 4 heavy inad.
17.
MHS m H-2 Decontaminaticn Room GSB mt examined - see remarkt for thl=
Monorail Holst H M, 56 crane under HVAC Poutonent review tahle.
)
13.
MHS-m N-16 Michine Shop Bridge CSR tot examined - see remarks for this Crane A-D, 3-4 crane under HVAC eculpment review table.
)
14 GDSS MRH G D Service Structure CTMT 30 M07, 30 M08, See tnte #1.
WlH N)3614, 30M15, l
303621 & 30M72
)
15.
MHS-MRH-3
- t. cad Break Switch Turbine Alda.
See hbte #2.
)
MDnorail Hoi!tt 16.
MHS-G N-7 Diesel Generator CSB tnt examined - crane does not lift
)
Jib Crane D-E, 3-4 heavy load.
17.
MHS-mN-10 Gamma Scan Facility CSB ent exanined - crane does not lift
)
Jib Crane Ra-S, 8-10 heavy load.
18.
MHS MRH-5 GS8 Eculpment Hatch CSB 303300 Train B conduits & Train A cahle
)
Mnnorail Holst Ra-S, 7.0-10 trays at elev. 345'.
303318 Train B condulta at elev. 433'.
4 19 MHS MRH-4 CS8 Eauipment Hatch CSB 303306, 303315, See inte #1 Manorail Hnist C H, 5-6 4 303378
)
70.
MHS-MRH-71 Condensate Polishina Water Treat-See tote #7.
Monorail Hnist ment Bldo.
)
71.
MHS-MRH-9 Tank Room Monorail Tank Rm.,
303415 See tote #1.
Inist CSB
)
22.
MHS-MRH-15 Sa feQua rd4 Area Sa feauards 30M06 4 30%11 AAB channel Cnnduit Can be d:4 maced Monorail Holst Area, CSB by a load dino, but only OHR Train A (safety-related) will he affected.
)
23.
MHS MRH-6 CSA Ecolpmen't GSG 303318 4 303343 See tote #1.
)
Hatch, MRH T-U, 4.7-10 24.
MHS MRH 7 CSB Eculpment GSB 303343 See tote #1.
)
Hatch, MAH tl W, 11 11.5
)
tnte 1: Both Train A & Train B, safety-related cahle trays, and/or conduits do not exist helow thic crane, on ca ety-related cah!e travs/ conduits in this huildino.
r ente 2:
)
)
l
M_
[-
O __
U.
O 1
L)
L.-- J ATTACWENT A (cont'd)
):
~'
Psoe 3 of 8 '
i
]
PAREG 612 COPOJIT & CABLE TRAV REVVEt]
t' ITEM ' - EUJIPM74T
_ NO.
J NB _ER E0JIPMENT NME AAEA CONSIDEftFC RFFERENCE ORAWING REMARKS
-l'
- 25.
VHS MRH-16
- Stop t.oq Manorall' Outside Soray See tbte #2.
toist-Pond Pumo teuse 9
26.
. **S MRH-18
% chine Shop Monorail GSB Not examined - see remarks under
~
Holst A-C, 1-3 HVAC review table.
t
- 27. '
HHS-MRH IMS NRH CTMT FD electrical eouipment inside crane wall.
t' In annulus:
30%21
-At elev. 454', channel A & X cable trays 1
30M14
-At elev. 435', Trains A&B con.
dult, channel B cable trays.
30M07
-At elev. 405', Train A&B conduit.
3
' 28.-
MHS MRH-19 Eculpment Maintenance CSB 303300 See Pete #1.
T-V, 6.5-10 9
29.
MHS MRH-20 Eaulpment Peintenance GSB 303309 See Pete #1.
A-R, 6.5-9.2
)
30.
wHS-NRH-22~
Screen Removal Soray Pond See Pete #2.
Pump tbuse p.
31.
MHS-MRH-10 Diesel Service Holst OSB 303303, M3307, See rete #1.
E-e, 1-4
& 303316 5
32.
MHS-SN-8 Circulating Water &
Cire. Water See tbte #2.
Fire Purrp Crane Pump House
-)
33.
MHS-CRN-ll Heater Bay Crane Turbine BldQ.
See Pete #2.
t (tnit #4)
E A, 1-15
)
34.'
MHS-CRN-12 Heater Bay Crare Turbine Blda.
See POte #2.
(thit #1)
E-A, 1-15 35.
"HS-CRN-13
' Turbine Building Crane Turbine Bldg.
See Pete #2.
S-E, 1-15 M.
FHS-BRG-2 Fuel Storage Handling GSB 303318 & 303343 See tete #1.
Bridge P-Ra, 5-13
-1 37.
FHS-BRG-1 Main Fuel Handling CTMT 303607, 30 M08, See tbte #1.
30Mle, 30M15, 6
. Bridge,
30 M 21, 30M 23, 303628 & 30M29 s '
t
[ Note'1: ' Roth Train A &. Train R, safety-related cable trays, and/or conduits do not exist heluw this crane.
l 7
. Pete 2:
'e safety-related cable trays / conduits in this building.
I
)
i M.
O 1.
U.
O_
V M
I W
RTTACFNENT Q (con 2'dl Page 4 of 4 i
Nt_ REC 612 C0rOUIT & CAAtf TRAY REVIED r
ITEM EGJIPMENT ti?
MNDER EQtJISENT NAME AREA CONSI P ED RFFFRENCE ORAWING RENARKS 38.
RSLCRN-1 Solid waste Handling CSB tot examined floor can sustain Crane A-U, 3-4 a load droo. Ref. AS8 r1218 &
ANA-02el, p
39.
R$W MRH-1 Filter Maintenance CS8 303306 Conduit 210IV4, elev. 395',
mnorail K P, 4-9 feeds CSS-V148 3 D m -V88.
303315 Conduit 3CLISB, elev. 421'.
40.
MHS-MRH-13 Portable Cantry Holst CSB 303308 See Pete #1, 8
R-S, 3-4 41.
MHS MRH-14 Portable Cantry Holst GSB 303300 See tote 81.
t 0 R, 4-4.5 42.
MHS-MRH-12 Condenser Vacuum Turbine Bldo.
See Note #2.
I Pumo Cantry Holst D
0808R ds e
0 1
0 t
b i
I I
mte 1: Both Train A & Train 8, safety-related cable trays, and/or conduits do not exist below thlM Crane, tote 2: to safety-related caole trays / conduits in tnis building.
)
1
7 U
_M U..
M-M..
V.
.W
)
ATTACHW NT B Page 1 of 4 NUREC 612 HVAC REVIEW I
NO.
NUMBER EQUIPMENT MAME AREA CONSIDERED NVAC SYSTFM RFFERENCE DRAWINC.
REMARKS ITEM EQUIPMENT g
Duct elev. 399'-0".
1.
MRS-CRN-1 New Fuel l'npacking &
GSB HSC 604309 604316 Duet elev. 421'-0".
inspection Crane P-W, 9.2-11 y
2.
MHS-CRN-2 Cask Handling Crane' CSB HSG 604309 Duct elev. 399'-0".
P-W, 5.5-6.5 p
3.
MHS-CRN-3 Radioactive Mainten-CSB HSC 604309 Duet elev.'399'-0".
enance 6. Test Facility P-W 4-5.5 y
Crane Not examined - excluded by design.
4a.
MHS-CRN-4 Polar Crane C1MT y
604371, 604368, see More M.
4b.
MHS-CBN-4 Polar Crane CTNT 604369 & 604370 Auxil. Holst y
Not examined - excluded by intended use.
4c.
MHS-CRN-4 Polar Crane CTMT CTMT Hoist operates over equipment hetch Annulus Holst (elev. 479'-0") in CTMT during refueling.
g Not examined - designed to retain RV head 5.
FHS-RMS-1 Reactor Missile Shield CTTY (220 Ton). Will generate no missiles 9
during SSE.
Not examined - crane does not lift
.I 6.
'MHS-CRN-6 Reactor Area Jib Crane CTMT heavy load.
Not examined - crane does not lift I
7.
MHS-CRN-14 Reactor Area Jib Crane CTNT heavy load.
604362 & 604316 See Note #1.
I R.
MHS-CRN-5 Fuel Transfer Tube Crane CTNT
' 9.'
MHS-CRN-15 Equipment Hatch Service CTMT CFC 604368 No equipment in annulus.
CFC-AHU-3 (there are four (4) units, Jib but only one (1) is necessary).
l 604309 See Note #1.
10.
MHS-MRH-24 FWA Pump Monorail GSB Hoist T-W, 4-6.5 g
3 I
Note 1: No safety-related HVAC equipment or ducts below this crane.
in this building.
_ Note 2:. Safety-related HVAC equipment and ducts do not exist 1
r
..g
)
ATTACHKENT 9 (cont'd)
Sage 2 of 4 NUREC 612 HVAC REVIEW l
NO.
NUMMER EOUTPMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERED HVAC SYSTEM REFERENCE DRAWING REMARKS ITEM EQUIPMENT CSB HCA 604354 Duet elev. 399'-0".
g 11.
MHS-MRS-23 Radvaste Compressor Service Monorail Hoist P-R, 3-4 5
604593, 604322, see Note #1.
12.
MHS-MRH-2 Decontamination Room CSB 604315 & 604308 Monorail Holst H-M, 5-6 13.
MHS-CRN-16 Machine Shop Bridge CSB HSC 604556 Duet & fan elev. 428'-6".
g 604559 Duet & fan elev. 447'-6".
A-D, 3-4 Crane 604591 buct & fan elev. 399'-0".
HCL 604591 Duet & fan elev. 399'-0".
604370, 604369, Se e Not e #1.
14.
CRDSS-MRH CRD Service Structure CTNT I
& 604368 MRH I
See Note #2.
15.
MMS-MRH-3 Load Break Switch Turbine Bldg.
Monorail Holst I
604577 See Note #1.
CSB 16.
MHS-CRN-7 Diesel Generator Jib Crane D-E, 3 -4 l
17.
MHS-CRN-10 Camma Scan Facility CSB HSC 604309 Duet elev. 395'-0".
3 l
Ra-S, 8-10 Jib Crane g
604316 & 604309 See Note #1.
CSB 18.
MHS-MRH-5 CSB Equipment Hatch Monorail Hoist Ra-S, 6.5-10
)
604322, 604315 See Note #1.
CSB 19.
MHS-MRH-4 CSB Equipment Hatch
& 604308 Monorail Hoist C-H, 5-6 9
See Note #2.
20.
MHS-MRH-21 Condensate Polishing Water Treat-Monorail Hoist ment Bldg.
21.
MHS-MRH-9 Tank Room Monorail Tank Rm.,
MER 60440R Ducts & fans elev. 509'-0" & 513'-0".
g CSB Holst l
604316 & 60430?
See Note #1.
22.
MHS-MRH-15 Safeguards Area Safeguards Monorail Hoist Area, CSB 5
(04316 & 604309 See Note #1.
23.
MHS-MRH-6 CSB Equipment CSB Hatch, MRH T-U, 9.2-10 6
604316 6 604309 See Note #1.
CSB 24.
MHS-MRH-7 CSB Equipment Hatch, MRH U-W, 11-11.5
)
i No safety-related HVAC equipment or ducts below this crane.
Note 1:
in this building.
Safety-related HVAC equipment and ducts do not exist Note 2:
I
)E
.ATTACNMENT S (cont'd)
Page 3 of 4 -
NUREC 612 HVAC REVIEW-l y
ITEM.
EQUIPMENT NO.
NIMBER EQUIPMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERED HVAC SYSTEM REFERENCE DRAWING REMARKS g
25.
MHS-MRH-16 Stop log Monorail Outside Spray See Note #2.
Hoist Pond Pump House 9
26.
MHS-MRH-18 Machine Shop Monorail CSB HCL 604556 & 604559 HCL emergency outside air ducts -
Holst
.A-C, 1-3 elev. 428'-6".
604555 & 60e590 HCL A.H. units duct -
elev. 399'-0".
1 ACT 604555 & 604590 ACT units elev.'399'-0".
3 27.
MHS-MRH-17 IMS-MRH CTwr 604370, 604369 See Note #1.
& 604368 2 8.'
- NHS-NRH-19 Equipment Maintenance CSB 604309 See Note #1.
T-v, 6.5-10 l29.
MHS-MRH-20 Equipment Maintenance CSB 604309 See Note #1.
P-R, 6.5-9.2 g
'30.
MHS-MRH-22 Screen Removal
. Spray Pond See Note #2.
Pump House 31.
MHS-MRH-10 Diesel Service Hoist CSB 604577 See Note #1.
E-P, 1-4 32.
MHS-CRN-8 Circulating Water &
Circ. Water See Note #2.
Fire Pump Crane Pump House 33.
MHS-CRN-Il Heater Bay Crane Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
(Unit #4)
E-A 1-15 34.
' MHS-CRN-12 Heater Bay Crane Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
(Unit #1)
E-A, 1-15 35.
MHS-CRN-13 Turbine Building Crane
-Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
S-E.1-15 g
36.
FHS-BRC-2 Fuel Storage Handling CSB HS.;
604309 Ducts elev. 399'-0".
Bridge.
P-Ra, 5-11 37.
FHS-BRC-1 Main Fuel HandlinR C1NT 604370, 604369, cee Note #1.
Bridge
& 604368
)
.)-
Note 1: No safety-related HVAC equipment or ducts below this crane.
'I
'. Note'2: Safety-related HVAC equipment' and ducts do not exist in this building.
)-
I. I.
R.
O_
M.
O R.
R.
1._.
O O
O R
R f
1 I
ATTACRMENT B (cont'd)
Prgs 4 of 4 NURIG 612 HVAC REVIFW ITEM EOUT PwENT MLHBER EQtIIPMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERFD HVAC SYSTEM REFERENCE DRAWING REMARKS 39.
RSV-CRN-1 Solid Waste Handling CSB HCA 604354 Ducts elev. 399'-0" Crane P-t', 3-4 g
39 RSW-MRM-1 Filter Maintenance CSB 604322, 604315 See Note #1.
Monorail K-P, 4-9
& 604308 g
40.
P'HS-MRH-13 Portable Cantry Hoist CSB 604354 See Note #1.
R-S, 3-4 41.
WHS-MRH-14 Portable Cantry Hoist CSB 604309 See Note #1.
Q-R, 4-4.5 42.
MHS-MRR-12 Condenser Vacuum Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
Pump Cantry Holst 0810R I
jmm j
l 9
1 I
I I
I I
9 8
)
)
)
Note 1: No safety-related HVAC equipment or ducts below this erane.
I Note 2: Safety-related HVAC equipment and ducts do not exist in this building.
I
M O
O_
W D
Q r~~~T O
O O
. O M.
O._
O W
..O O.
I l'
ATTACRMENT C
%Yg1 1 of 8 1
NUREC 612 PIPING REVIEW AREA PIPING REFERENCE NO.
NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED ELFVATION SYSTTMS DRAWINC REMARKS ITEM EQUIPMENT 1
MHS-CRN-1 New Fuel Unpacking &
CSB 479'-0" DWD, PSA, FHS 805214 Inspection Crane P-W, 9.2-11 DVD, PSA, IAS 805180 805181 Train A YAC r
805180 451'-0" DWD, PSA
)
805177
{
433'-0" DWD, PSA, RVD 805177
}
IAS, FPC TAC, NSW 805177 Trains A & B g
805356 Trains A & B CSS 805356 Train A DHR PSA, DWD, IAC 805356 y
411'-0" DHR, CSS 805211 Train B RVD, DWD, PSA, FPC 805211 DNR, IAC, CSS 805178 Trains A & B DWD, RVD, PSA 805178 805178 FWA, MUS TAC, DHR, NSW 805355 Train A I
805355 Trains A & B CSS FW A, DWD, PSA, RVD 805355 395'-0" NSW, CSS, DHR 805355 Train A 0
PSA, DVD, FWA, RVD 805355 805210 Train 8 NSW, CSS 805210 Trains A & B DHR MUS, RVD, PSA 805210 DWD, FPC 605210 805176 Trains A & B DRR I
CSS 805176 Train 5 I
RVD, MUS, FWA 805176 PSA, DWD 805176 I
805179 2.
MHS-CRN-2 Cask Handling Crane CSS 479'-0" DCN I
P-W, 5.5-6.5 PSA 805214 454'-0" CCW, DWD, PSA, RVD, IAS 805167 805167 Train A IAC DCN, FPC 805190 I
433'-0" FPC, DCN, DWD 805189 CLV, DWD, PSA, RVD 805!66 805166 Train B CSS, DHR, IAC I
PCS, DWD, CSS, CCw 805346 805346 Train A NSW 805165 Trains A & B 411'-0" TAC I
A05165 Train A DHR IAS, FWA, CNR, HPR, MSS 805165 PSA. DWD, MUS, RVD 805165 A05188 Train B NSW DCN, FPC, DWD, PSA A05188 CCW, HPR, FWA, MSS 805345 I
395'-0" HPR, MSS. CCW, FWA 805307 805307 RVD, CNR DCN, RLW, FPC, RVD 805187 I
DVD, HPR, PSA, FWA 805164 805164 MSS, RVD 6
i
)
ATTACHMENT C (cont'd)
Pcge 2 of 8 9
NUREC 612 PIPINC REVIEW AREA PIPING REFERENCE I
ITEM EQUIPMENT NO.
NUMBER EOUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED ELEVATION SYSTEMS DRAWING REM.3rs ME -CBN-3 Radioactive Maintenance CSB 479'-0" DWD, PSA, FPC 805179
& Test Facility Ctane P-S, 4-5.5 454'-0" CCW, DMW, FPC, MUS 805167 PCS, RVD, IAS, DWD, PSA 805167 3
NSW 805167 Train A IAC 805167 Trains A & B NSW, IAC 805190 Trains A & B y
PCS, RVD, MUS, FPC, CCW 805190 DMW, DWD, PSA, IAS 805190 433'-0" NSW 805189 Trains A & B 3
DHR 805189 Train A FPC, CCW, PSA, DVD, DMW 805189 PCS, DCN, RLW, MUS 805189 NSW 805166 Train A DHR 805166 Train B RVD, MUS, PCS, FPC, DMW 805166 I
CSS, CCW, IAS 805166 CSS, DHR 805346 Train B PCS, FWA, DMW, FPC 805346 I
MUS, RVD 805346 NSW 805346 Train A 411'-0" IAC 805165 Trains A & B I
NSW, DHR 805165 Train A PSA, DWD, CSS, MUS, FPC 805165 HPR, CNR, MSS, RVD 805165 I
CSS, DMW, CCW, PCS, MUS 805188 CNR, PSA, IAS, MSS, HPR 805188 FPC, RVD 805188 I
NSW, TAC 805188 Trains A & B DHR 805188 Train A W A, CSC, MSS 805346 I
395'-0" WA, MSS 805307 FPC, DWD, PSA 805187 CSS, I<VD 805187 I
DWD, PSA, HPR, FPC, RVD 805164 Not examined - excluded 4a.
MHS-CRN-4 Polar Crane CTMT by design.
(265/530 Tons) 4b.
MHS-CRN-4 Polar Crane Auxiliary CTMT 454'-0" MSS, WS 805332
)
Hoist (25 Tons) 445'-0" MSS, WS 805331 435'-0" HPR, SCC A05330 41R'-0" MUS, FWA, FPC, LMS 805329 I
SCC, CCW 805329 405'-0" MUS, CFS 805328 Not examined - excluded 4c.
WS-CRN-4 Polar Crane CTMT CTMT by intended use.
Hoist Annulus Auxil. Hoist a9erates over equip't.
.w.ch (elev. 479')
in CTMT during re-fueling.
)
I
O..
O W
O Q_
O O
"l~~~L O
O O
O O
R_
O O
O_
I t
ATTACHMTNT C (cont'd)
Piga 3 of 8 NTdE0 612 PIPING REVIFW ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA PIPING REFERENCE NtHBFR EOUIPMENT NA,E CONSTDERED ELEGTION SYSTEMS DRAWINC REMARKS w
I 5.
FHS-RMS-1 Missile Shield CTMT Designed to retain RV head. Will gen-l 3
erste no missiles during SSE.
6.
MHS-CRN-6 Reactor Area Jib CTMT Not examined -
Crane crane does not lift heavy load.
I 7.
MHS-CRN-14 Reactor Area Jib CTMT Not examined -
Crane crane does not I
lift heavy load.
8.
MHS-CRN-5 Fuel Transfer Tube CTMT 418'-0" FPC, CCW, DFR, NBS, PCS 805151 Crane NBS, MSS, PCS 805121 j
DHR 305121 Train B PSA, DWD 805465
9 MHS-CRN-15 Equipmer.t Match CTMT 405'-0" CCW 805135 Service Jib MUS 805328 8
418'-0" CCW, MUS, CFS 805136 435'-0" CCW, MUS 805137 445'-0" CCW, MUS 805331 454*-0" MSS, FWS, CCW 805332 10.
MHS-MRX-24 FWA Pump Monorail CSB 395'-0" DWD 805164 Hoist T-W, 4-6. 5 FWA, RVD, MSS 805307 g
11.
MHS-MRH-23 Radwaste Compressor CSB 485'-0" RSW, DWD, CCW, PSA, RCW 805385 Service MRH R-P, 3-4 RSW, CCW, RVD 805375 I
479'-0" CCW, RCW, RSW, DWD, PSA 805381 RSW 805374 461'-0" RSW, PSA 805384 RSW 805373 455'-0" RSW, PSA, DWD 805380 438'-3" CCW 805362 NSW 805362 TraiesA&n CCW 805367 NSW 805367 Trains A & B 421'-0" CCW 805361 NSW 805361 Trains A & B i
CCW 805366 NSW 805366 Trains A & B 390'-0" MUS 805360 i
IAC 805360 Train B MUS, CSS 805365 NSW 805365 Trains A & B f
9
n M.
O V
m..
m....
M
.M.
n.... n M
M.
A N
M.
M.
M.
ATTI.CHwENT C (cont'd)
Pega 4 of 8 i
NIGEC 612 PIPINC REVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA PIPING REFERENCE I
No.
NtHRER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED ELEVATION SYSTEMS DRAWING REMARKS
- 12. MHS-MRK-2 Decontamination Room CSS 479'-0" PSA, DWD, DCN, RVD 605226 Monorail Holst H-M, 5-6 455' 0" PSA, DWD, BRS DCN 805224 IAS, RVD, MUS 805224 IAC 805224 Train A 439'-6" DHR 805223 Trains A & B FPC, RSW, MUS, RVD 805223 g
BRS, RLW 805223 444'-0" MUS, BRS, DFR, DCN, RSW 805095 421'-0" MUS, BRS, PSA, DWD 805222 g
IAS, NBS, RVD 805222 411'-0" NBS, MSS, CNR, PCS, DWD 805221 IAS, DMW, RSW, CCW, RLW 805221 I
IAC 805221 Train A 395'-0" NBS, DWD 805220 13.
MHS-CRN-16 Machine Shop CSB 395'-0" IAC 805690 Trains A & B I
l Bridge Crane A-D, 3-4 IAS, PSA 805690 No safety-rela-I 14.
CRDSS-MRM CRD Service CTMT ted piping below Structure MRH this crane.
I 15.
MHS-MRH-3 Load Break Switch Turbine Bldg.
No safety-rela-ted piping in TCB.
Monorail Holst g
No piping below 16.
MHS-CRN-7 Diesel Generator CSB this crane.
Jib Crane D-E, 3-4 g
17.
MHS-CRN-10 Cama Scan Facility CSB 433'-0" FPC 805177 Jib Crane Ra-S, 8-10 NSW 805177 Train B FPC 805189 NSW 805189 Train B 411'-0" DHR 805211 I
CSS 8052'1 Train B DHR, CSS, NSW 805189 Train R 395'-0" NSW 805210 Train B I
NSW 805187 Train B 18.
MHS-MRH-5
.CSB Equipment CSB 433'-0" DWD, PSA P05166 Hatch MRH Ra-S, 6.5-10 CSS, NSW, IAC 805166 Train B g
PSA, DWD 805177 IAC 805177 Trains A & B I
411'-0" DHR 805165 Train B FWA 805165 CSS, DHR, TAC 805178 Train B I
DWD, PSA, WA 805178 395'-0" DHR 805164 Trains A & B FWA 805164 FWA S05176
)
I
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. M-O _.
M
_M_
M M_
O.
O M
M O.
O O
)
ATTACm8ENT C (cont'd)
Prgs 5 of 8
-)
NUREC 612 PIPINC REVIEW AREA PIPING REPERENCE ITEM EQUIPMENT.
g NtMBER EQUIPMENT MAME CONSIDERED ELEVATION SYSTEMS DRAWINC REMARKS
- 19. MHS-NRH-4 CSB Equipment CS5 479'-0" PSA, IAS, DWD 805252 Match MRH C-H. 5-6 NSW 805252 Train B IAC 805252 Train A
)
455'-0" PSA. IAS, DWD, BRS 805251 IAC 805251 Train A l
411'-0" DWD, PSA, IAS 805249 l
.y IAC 805249 Train A No safety-rela-
- 20. MHS-MRH-21 Condensate Polishing Water Treat-ted piping in
)
Monorail Hoist ment Bldg.
the Water Treat-ment Bldg.
)
- 21. MHS-MRH-9 Tank Room Monorail Tank Room 451'-0" DHR, CSS 805431 Trains A & B Hoist CSB PSA, DWD 805304
)
CHR, CSS 805304 Trains A & B PWA, MUS, FPC, CNM, RVD 805300 DWD, DMW 805300 3
- 22. MHS-MRH-15 Safeguards Area Sa feguard e 411'-0" DWD, PSA 805426 Monorail Holst Area, GSB CSS,.IAC 805426 Train A DHR 805426 Trains A & B g
399'-0" CSS, DHR 805425 Train A
- 23. MHS-MRH-6 GSB Equipment CSB 433'-0" NSW 805177 Train A I
Hatch MRH T-U, 9.2-10 DWD, PSA 805177 411'-0" DRR 805178 Train A 3
399'-0" CSS, DHR 805176 Train A RVD 805176 I
24.
MHS-NRH-7 Diesel Cenerator CSB Jib Crane D-E, 3-4 411'-0" CSS, DHR 805355 Train A 395'-0" DRR 805355 Train A RVD 805355 No piping be-
- 25. MHS-MRH-16 Stop log Monorail Outside Spray Iow this crane.
I Hoist Pond Pump Rse.
- 26. MHS-MRH-18 Machine Shop CSS 395'-0" IAC 805690 Train A I
Monorell Holst A-C, 1-3 IAS, PSA 805690
)
)
)
)
)
O._
M N
M_.
M M
M.
M O
M M
M
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G.
f"~~l Q
]
)
ATTACNMENT C (cont'd)
Page 6 cf 8
)
))
NUREC 612 PIPING REVIEW AREA PIPING REFERENCE ITEM EQUIPMENT No.
MtMBER _
EQUIPMEfr!' NAME CONSIDERED El.EVATION SYSTEMS DRAWING REMARKS
'27.
MHS-MRH-17 IMS-MRH CTMT 454'-0" DWD, PSA' 805467 CCW 805154 445'-0" DWD, PSA 805466 I
CCW 805153 435'-0" DWD, PSA 805466 DHR 805152 Trains A & B
)
DFR 805152 418'-0" CCW, PCS, FWA, DFR 805151 FPC, NBS 805151
)
DHR 805151 Trains A & B DWD, PSA 805465 405'-0" MSS, PCS, RCS, DFR, CCW 805150
)
DWD, PSA 805465
- 28. MHS-MRH-19 Equipment Maintenance GSB 411'-0" DRR 805165 Train A y
T-v, 6.5-10 CSS 805165 Train B 395'-0" DNR,. CSS, NSW 815164 Train A' RfD 805176 1
)
29.
MHS-MRH-20 Equipment Maintenance CSB 411'-0" DWD, PSA, FPC 805188 P-R, 6.5-9.2 395'-0" DHR, NSW, CSS 805187 Train B g
FPC, RVD 805187 No piping below'
- 30. MHS-MRH-22 Screen Removal MRH Spray Pond this crane.
g Pump Hse.
31.
MHS-MRH-10 Diesel Service CSB 406'-0" DIE, PSA, DSA, DID 202734 I
Hoist E-F, 1-4 DIE, DIA, PS A, DSA 202737 NSW 202737 Train A
(
399'-0" DWD, DFO, DSA, DLO 202735 I
NSW 202735 Train B IAC, NSW 202738 Train A DWD, IAS, DSA, DF0, DLO 202738
)
No safety-rela-3 2.' MHS-CRN-8 Circulating Water &
Cire. Water ted piping in Fire Purp Crane Pump Hoe.
Cire. Water I
Pump House.
No safety-rela-
- 33. NHS-CRN-11 Heater Bay Crane Turbine Bldg.
ted piping in (Unit #4)
E-A, 1-15 TCB.
)
No safety-rela-34.
MHS-CRN-12 Heater Bay Crane Turbine Bldg.
ted piping in (Unit #1)
E-A, 1-15 TGB.
g No safety-rela-35.
MHS-CBN-13 Turbine Building Turbine Bldg.
ted piping in g
Crane S-E, 1-15 TCB.
)
)
a.s
~.-
)
ATTACNMENT C { cont'd_)_
Page 7 of 8 NUREC 617 PIPINC RiVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA PIPING REFERENCE g.
MLHEER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED ELEVATION SYSTEMS DRAWINC RDtARKS 36.
FHS-BRG-2 Fuel Storage CSB 479'-0" FHS, PSA 805214 Handling Bridge P-Ra, 5-11 454'-0" FPC 805190 433'-0" FPC 805177 9
411'-O" FPC, DCN, DWD, PSA, RVD 805188 CSS, NSW, DHR 805188 Train B DHR 805211 Train B RVD, DWD, PSA 805211 395'-0" DCN, FPC, RLW, MUS, RVD 805187 DWD, PSA, MUS 805187 I
CSS, NSW 805187 Train 8 DHR 805187 Trains A & B Not examined -
I 37.
FHS-BRC-1 Main Fuel Handling CTMT does not make Bridge heavy lift.
)
38.
RSW-CBN-1 Solid Waste Handling CSB 461'-0" DWD, PSA, RSW 805384 Crane P-U, 3-4 455'-O" DWD, PSA, RSW 805380 3
438'-0" NSW 805362 Trains A & B CCW 805362 421'-0" NSW 805361 Trains A & B
)
CCW 805361 i
IAC 805361 Train A i
399'-O" NSW 805360 Train A
)
IAC 805360 Trains A & B CSS, MUS, DWD, PSA 805360 l
I 39.
RSW-MRH-1 Filter Maintenance CSB 455'-0" BRS, FPC, RVD 805501
(
Monorail K-P, 4-9 DCN, PCS, CHS, FPC 805224 l
444'-0" RSW, MUS, RLW, RvD 805095 l
)
FPC, DCN, BRS, DFR 805095 DHR 805095 Train A MUS, BRS, FPC 805096 3
439'-6" RLW, BRS, RSW, MUS, RVD 805223 DHR 805223 Trains A & B RVD, RSW, MUS, BRS 805238 I
DHR 805238 Trains A & B 421'-0" IAS, PSA, DWD, BRS, NBS 805222 BRS, NBS, CCW 805237 I
411'-0" PCS, NBS, RVD, DWD 805221
)
RLW, MSS, CCW, RSW 805221 IAS, PSA, DMW, CNR, HPR 805221 I
NSW 805221 Train A IAC 805221 Trains A & B PCS, NBS, IAS, DWD 805236 I
DMW, RSW, CNR, CCW, MSS 805236 IAC 805236 Train A 395'-O" HPR, RVD, NBS, CCW 805220 3
BRS, CCW 805235
)
)
M' M
M'M M - 'M e, M M
M ^ M ' M ' M ~ ~{
Q R
Q
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[ "'\\
[^ ~ '
~~
)
ATTACMMENT C feont'd)
Page 8 of 8 y
NURFC 612 FIPINC REVIEW
)
ITEM EQUIPMENT AREA PIPING REFERENCE No.
NLHEER EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED ELEVATION SYS nafS DRAWING RDLARKS
)
40.
MHS-KRH-13 Portable Gantry CSB No piping be-Hoist R-S, 3-4 low this crane.
41.
MNS-MRH-14 Portable Cantry CSB No piping be-Hoist Q-R, 4-4.5 low this crane.
)
42.
MHS-MRR-12 Condenser Vacuum Pump Turbine Bldg.
No pipinF be-Cantry Holst low this erane.
)
0819R g
ds i
I
)
)
)
I
)
)
)
)
l
)
)
)
)
)
0406R ATTACHMENT D Page 1 of 3 NUREC 612 SAFETY-RELATED EOUIPMENT REVIEW
)
ITEM EQUIPMENT No.
NUMMER EQUIPMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERED REFFRENCE DRAWINC REMARKS
)
1.
MHS-CRN-1 New Fuel Unpackinit &
CSB 105010, R05413, Not exsmined - floor can sustain a inspection Crane P-W, 9.2-11
& 805412 load drop. Re: ASB-0171.
g 2.
MHS-CRN-2 Cask Handling Crane CSB 805010 & 805417 Not examined - single failure proof P-W, 5.5-6.5 crane. Re: Spec 31, Rev. 22.
)
3.
MHS-CRN-3 Radioactive Mainten-GSB 805417 FWA-PMP-IA, 2B (Elev. 145')
enance & Test Facility P-W, 4-5.5 FPC-HI-1, 2 (Elev. 433')
y FPC-FMP-3A, 45 (Elev. 433')
Crane 805107 NSW-TK-1A, 2B (Elev. 455').
Not examined - excluded by 4a.
MHS-CRN-4 Polar Crane CTMT design.
4b.
MHS-CRN-4 Polar Crane CTMT 805003, 805002, See Note #1.
)
Auxil. Hoist 805001, & 805000 Mot examined - excluded by intended 4c.
MHS-CRN-4 Polar Crane C1MT CTMT Hoist operates over equipment use.
Annulus Hoist hatch (elev. 479') during refuel-ing.
5.
FHS-RMS-1 Reactor Missile Shield CTMT Designed to retain RV head (220
)
Ton). Will generate no missiles during SSE.
6.
MHS-CRN-6 Reactor Area Jib Crane CTMT Not examined - crane does not lift heavy load.
Not examined - cr..ie does not lift 7.
MHS-CRN-14 Reactor Ares Jib Crane CTMT l
heavy load.
8.
MHS-CRN-5 Fuel Transfer Tube Crane CTMT 805001 & 805000 See Note #1.
I 9.
MHS-CRN-15 Equipment Hatch Service CTMT 805000, 805001, See Note #1.
g Jib 805002, & 805001 10.
MHS-MRH-24 WA Pump Monorail Hoist CSB R05417 See Note #1.
g T-W, 4-6.5 11.
MHS-MRS-23 Radwaste Compressor CSB 805025 Hoist does not lift heavy loads.
3 Service Monorail Hoist P-R, 3-4 1
12 MHS-MRH-2 Decontamination Room
(..,8 805018 1.oad drop is acceptable -
g Monorail Hoist H-M, 5-6 see ASB-0294.
l
)
Note 1: - There is not any safety-related equipment below this crane.
l Note 2: - Safety-related equipment does not exist in this building.
y
)
W m
m
..n n
m.
m.
m tm 17 m_
m_
m n
M n_
m n
.m C
- )
. _ ATTACHMENT D (cont'd)
Pigs 2 of 3
):
NUREC 612 SAFETY-REiATED EQUIPMENT R_EVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT No.
NUMBER EOUTPMENT NAME' AREA CONSIDERED REFERENCE DRAWING REMARKS 1.oad drop is acceptable.
)
13.
MHS-CRN-16 :
Machine Shop Bridge CSB Crane A-C, 3-4 I
l See Note #1.
)
14 CRDSS-MRH CRD Service Structure CTMT MRH-See Note #2.
15.
MHS-MRH-3 1.oad Break Switch Turbine Bldg.
-l Monorail Holst Not examined '- crane does not lift i
16.
MHS-CRN-7 Diesel Cenerator CSS Jib Crane D-E, 3-4 heavy load.
Not examined - crane does not lift' 17.
MHS-CRN-10
.Casmaa Scan Facility CSB Jib Crane Ra-S, 8-10 heavy load.
18.
- NHS-MRH-5
.CSB Equipment, Hatch CSB 805412, 303309, DHR Trains A & B.
Monorail Holst Ra-S, 6.5-10
& 303318 19.
MHS-MRN-4 CSB Equipment Hatch CSB 805019, 805018, See Note #1.
I Monorail Holst C-H, 5-6 805017, & 805016 See Note #2.
20.
MHS-NRH-21 Condensate Polishing Water Treat-I Monorail Holst ment Bidg.
21.
. MHS-MRH-9 Tank Room Monorail Tank Rs.,
805431 See Note #1.
Hoist CSB 22.
MHS-MRM-15 Safeguards Area safeguards
'805412 See Note #1.
Monorail Hoist Area, CSS 23.
MHS-MRH-6 CSB Equipment CSB 805413 & 805412 See Note #1.
l Hatch, MRH T-U, 9.2-10 24.
MHS-MRH-7 CSB Equipment CSB 815413 & 805412 See Note #1.
Hatch, MRH U-W, 11-11.5 See Note #2.
25.
MHS-MRH-16 Stop 1.og Monorail Outside Spray I'
Holst Pond Pump House tead drop is acceptable -
26.
NHS-MRM-18 Machine Shop Monorail CSB see ASB-0294.
Hoist A-C, 1-3 27.
MHS-NRN-17 iMS-MRH C' INT 805003, 805002, See Note it.
805001, & 805000
& 805001
)'
' Note 1: - There is not any safety-related equipment below this crane.
y Note 2: - Safety-related equipment does not exist in this building.
)
)
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-ATTACMMENT D (cont'd)
Prge 3 of 3 NUREC 612 SAFETY-REl.ATED EQUIPMENT REVIEW
)
ITEM EQUIP!'ENT NO.
NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERED REFERENCE DRAWINC REMARKS 28.
MHS-MRH-19 Eculptrent Maintenance CSB 805412 See Note #1.
T-V, 6.5-10 29.
MHS-MRH-20 Equipment Maintenance CSe R05412 See Note #1.
P-R, 6.5-9.2 30.
MHS-MRH-22 Screen Removal Spray Pond See Note #2.
)
Pump House 31.
MHS-MRH-10 Diesel Service Noist CSB 202521 & 202520 See Note #1.
E-F, 1-4 32.
MHS-CRN-8 Circulating Water &
Cire. Water See Note #2.
Fire Pump Crane Pump House 33.
MHS-CRN-Il Heater Bay Crane Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
I (LSit #4)
E-A, 1-15 34.
MHS-CRN-12 Heater Bay Crane Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
I PUnit #1)
E-A, 1-15 I
35.
MHS-CRN-13 Turbine Building Crane Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
S-E, 1-15 I
36.
FHS-BRC-2 Fuel Storage Handling CSB Not examined - crane does not lift Bridge P-Ra, 5-11 heavy load.
37.
FHS-BRC-1 Main Fuel Handling CTMT Not examined - crane does not lift Bridge heavy load.
I 38.
RSW-CRN-1 Solid Waste Handling CSB 805025 Load drop is acceptable.
Crane P-U, 3-4 I
39 RSW-MRH-1 Filter Maintenance CSB 8050lR BRS-TK-3, 4 Monorail K-P, 4-9 BRS-FMP-5A, 65 -
feed to all 4 seat injection lines.
I 40.
MHS-MRH-13 Portable Cantry Hoist CSB 805025 See Note #1.
R-S, 3-4
)
41.
MNS-MRH-14 Portable Cantry Hoist CSB 805417 See Note #1.
Q-R, 4-4.5 1
42.
MHS-MRH-12 Condenser vacuum Turbine Bldg.
See Note #2.
Pump Cantry Hoist Note 1: - There is not any safety-related equipment below this crane.
Note 2: - Safety-related equipment does not exist in this building.
)
)
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