ML20052G360

Part 21 Rept Re Leak or Break Outside Pipe Tunnel on Connections to Main Feedwater Lines Not Detected &/Or Terminated by Existing Sys.Supplemental Response Will Be Issued by 820831

ML20052G360
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	04/30/1982
From:	Dietz C CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-PT21-82-619-000 BSEP-82-932, PT21-82-619, PT21-82-619-000, NUDOCS 8205180291
Download: ML20052G360 (2)

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Carolina Power & Light Company Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Y 5A7*51 82 MA P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461-0429 April 30, 1982 FILE: B09-13520 SERIAL: BSEP/82-932 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30303 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-324 AND 50-325 LICENSE NOS. DPR-62 AND DPR-71 IDENTIFIED 10CFR21 DEFICIENCY

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This confirms the telephone conversation at 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br /> on April 29, 1982, between Mr. R. M. Poulk, Jr., Brunswick Regulatory Specialist, and.Mr. C. A.

Julian, of your office, concerning an item determined to be reportable per 10CFR21.

At a recent meeting between Carolina Power & Light Company and its architect-engineer, United Engineers & Constructors, to review the Reactor Building environmental report, it was determined that a postulated pipe crack in the HPCI, RCIC, RWCU, and main steam line drains could result in a limiting environment for the Reactor Building for both units.

Specifically, a deficiency in the leak detection system exists such that a leak or break outside the pipe tunnel on these connections to the main feedwater lines will not be detected and/or terminated by an existing system. Due to the lack of humidity or temperature detection in the area of these pipes, a postulated critical crack would allow the Reactor Building to reach a steady state temperature of 212 F at 100 percent relative humidity, which creates a Reactor Building environment that exceeds that for which the equipment is currently

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qualified, and therefore, a safety hazard would exist. Modifications which have been discussed to date to mitigate or limit the eftects of other HELB's in the Reactor Building would not limit the effects of these cracks.

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly April 30, 1982 CP&L and UE&C are currently reviewing various modifications to correct this problem. The most probable solution would be the installation of check valves in each of these lines inside the main steam line tunnel. These check valves would prevent the backflow of feedwater through the postulated critical crack In the event that such a crack did materialize. An engineering solution to

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this problem has not been definitely decided on, and therefore, the engineering and procurement of components has not yet begun.

It is currently impossible to project a completion date for modifying these systems. A supplemental response to this report will be issued by August 31, 1982, providing a schedule for determining the corrective action required and the installation of any required modifications.

The stress levels in the subject piping are well within the limits for this size piping; therefore, the occurrence of these cracks is a very remote possibility.

It is concluded that the Brunswick Unit Nos. 1 and 2 may j

continue to operate until such modifications are made with no undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, 1

y C. R. Dietz, General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant RMP/gvc Enclosure 1

cc:

Mr. V. Stello, Jr.

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