ML20052F243
| ML20052F243 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1982 |
| From: | Dignan T, Gad R Maine Yankee, ROPES & GRAY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8205120271 | |
| Download: ML20052F243 (6) | |
Text
'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- '"" ja m3
?
e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the (N
N
'i%
S
+, h ' 4**L ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
% ' /.
T.
%,4 /
%d Z.
S-V-
%ki'N TP g ;gTf,Y}
N
/
)
i In the Matter of
)
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-309-OLA
)
(Spent Fuel Compaction)
(Maine Yankee Atomic F)wer Station) )
)
APPLICANT'S ANSWER TO THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE STATE OF MAINE Under date of April 30, 1982, the State of Maine has filed a " Petition for Reconsideration" of two of the Board's rulings set out in its memorandum and order of April 12, 1982 (Order).
Specifically, Maine seeks reconsideration of the rulings as to Maine's contentions Nos. 2 and 16.
For the reasons set forth below, the applicant believes the petition should be denied.
Contention No. 2 Maine's contention No. 2 was:
1>5o3 "The proposed license amendments to permit i
reracking and pin compaction significantly increase both the probability of occurrence
//
of a release of radiation or radioactive materials into the environment and the environmental consequences of such a release in the event of a total or partial loss of coolant at the spent fuel pool.
The licensee 8205120271 820505 PDR ADOCK 03000309 PDR g
has failed to demonstrate, as required by the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR, Part 50, that there is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered by these risks."
The basis given for the contention was an incorporation by reference of the basis given for Contention la.
That basis stated in part:
"More specifically, a total or partial loss of coolant at Maine Yankee's spent fuel pool could be initiated by two categories of accidents.
The first category is a reactor accident that prevents access to the spent fuel pool and a loss of ecoling capacity resulting in an evapo-ration of the pool water.
This first category of accidents includes:
(a) those postulated in the Reactor Safety Study-(WASH-1400) issued in Octo-ber, 1975, (t) those described in the 'Techni-cal Bases for Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR Accidents,' NUREG-0772 (June, 1981) and (c) a brittle fracture in the reactor vessel resulting from a thermal shock following by repressurization, Task A-11, ' Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants,' NUREG-0510 (January, 1979).
The second category consists of accidents that directly impact on the spent fuel pool resulting in a breach of the spent fuel pool and a rapid release of pool coolant.
These accidents include sabotage, an airplane accident, a missile, an earthquake, an accident involving the fuel transfer tube, and the drop of a heavy object such as a shipping cask."
i 4
"The probability of the occurrence of such risks i
is increased by both the proposed reracking and pin compaction because the denser configuration I
of spent fuel assemblies proposed by the applicant l
will decrease natural convection cooling in the i
event of a loss of coolant accident, causing both old and new fuel rods to heat up to the point of sustained oxidation and an exothermic reaction."
l i
The Board rejected this contention stating:
1 I
"This contention is so lacking in specificity e
that the parties are not on notice about its content.
No reasonably specific mechanism for such an accident is alleged, nor is it clear how the probability of an accident would be increased."
Order at 17.
In its petition for reconsideration, Maine points to the above-quoted portion of Maine's basis for its Contention la as supplying the information the Board found lacking.
Petition at 2.
Maine still misses the point.
With respect to the spent fuel pool's ability to withstand sabotage, earthquake or the dropping of a heavy shipping cask - thus causing "a rapid release of pool coolant", all events which Maine says could breach the integrity of the fuel pool itself, those are dealt with at tne operating license stage and need not be relitigated
[
l now.
Maine was a party to the Maine Yankee operating license proceeding and should have raised these issues then.
It is now precluded from doing so by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
See generally Houston Lighting and Power Co.
(South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-87, 10 NRC 563 (1979),
affirmed summarily, ALAB-575, 11 NRC 14 (1980) and authorities there cited.
As to the accidents that allegedly prevent access to the pool, they are, to begin with, all Class 9 accidents which are not required to be considered in this proceeding.
Public Service i
Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-8, 11 NRC 433 (1980).
In addition, Maine makes no attempt to advise -_-,..,
4 us how the particular accidents will prevent access to the l
spent fuel pool even though they might preclude access to the i
reactor containment, Maine's statement as to probability simply will not wash.
l The probability of sabotage, earthquake, dropping casks, or brittle fracture of the -vessel (the initiating events in Maine's scenario), see Petition at 2, is not increased or decreased or.e whit by the alleged " decrease [in] natural convection cooling" which Maine alleges will result from rerack-ing and compaction.
i Contention No. 16_
4 Contention No. 16 seeks to inject a whole laundry list of unresolved safety issues into the case.
The Board rejected the contention noting that :
l "The Stat e has not shown how these matters relate to the spent fuel pool expansion l
other than to boldly assert that they do l
so.
This is not a sufficient basis'for the contention, and it is rejected."
Order at 22.
j Maine asks reconsideration of this ruling because:
"In light of the Appeals Board decision in Allens Creek and its progeny, the State f
believes Contention 16 is admissible at this stage of the proceeding.
Although the State need do no more than ' assert' that specific unresolved generic safety issues directly or indirectly affect the proposed expansion of Maine Yankee's spent fuel pool, the State I
went beyond the requirements of Allens Creek l
and mentioned the specific aspects of each of the generic unresolved safety issues which were of concern.
We respectfully request on reconsideration that the Board admit Conten-tion 16." L
1 i
While Maine may-believe it " mentioned the specific
. which were of concern", Maine does not even aspects
-[
allege, never mind show, how these " aspects" relate to the i
contemplated fuel pool expansion.
Until Maine does, there is no basis as the Board has held.
l CONCLUSION The petition should be denied.
Respectfully submitted, i
Thomas.G. Dignan, Jr.
R.
K. Gad III i
Ropes & Gray Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
R. K. Gad III Ropes &. Gray j
225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110-(617) 423-6100 i
May 5, 1982 l
t l
I i
l l
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., hereby certify that on May 5, 1982, I made service of the within document by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Robert M. Lazo, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.
Director, Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California P.O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 Administrative Judge Peter A. Morris Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Jay M. Gutierrez, Esquire
~
Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 David Santee Miller, Esquire 213 Morgan Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20001 Rufus E. Brown, Esquire Deputy Attorney General Department of the Attorney General State House - Station #6 Augusta, Maine 04333 Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.