ML20052E085
| ML20052E085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/15/1982 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Thurmond S SENATE, JUDICIARY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052E086 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8205100086 | |
| Download: ML20052E085 (4) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES pn g
F NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 y
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If4Pg IPSgg The Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman m
Committee on the Judiciary
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Washington, D.C.
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Dear Mr. Chairman:
4:a/ g g @ Q" This is in response to your lettcr of February 22, 1982 requesting the views of the Nuclear Regulatory Cornission on S.1589, a bill to improve the security of the electric power generation and transmission system in the United States.
The Commission does not see a need for Section 1 of the bill insofar as it would criminalize acts of sabotage against nuclear facilities and nuclear fuel because it is duplicative of existing law (42 United States Code 9 2284, Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities and Fuel).
We express no view on whether or not a broader need exists for legislation regarding all bulk power facilities.
The Commission does endorse Section 2 of the bill provided the words "and protected areas" are inserted after " vital areas" in 6534 (3)
(page 4, line 14 of the draft bill).
The basis for the Comission's support is contained in the enclosed statement of views.
Sincerely, bd Nunzio
. Pa'ladino
Enclosure:
Statement of Views cc: Senator Joseph Biden 8205100086 820415 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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9 COMMENTS OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY CONCERNING S. 1589 A BILL TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF THE ELECTRIC GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES At the request of Chairman Thurmond of the Committee, the Commission has reviewed S.1589, a bill to improve the security of the electric power generation and transmission system in the United States.
The views of the Commission concerning the bill are set forth below.
-Section 1 of the bill would make it a criminal offense to interfere with, injure, contaminate, or destroy a bulk power system, nuclear facility or nuclear material, or to obstruct, hinder, or delay the production, utilization, or transmission of bulk electric energy through a bulk power system, or to attempt to do any of the above specified acts.
Insofar as section 1 of the bill purports to criminalize acts of sabotage against nuclear facilities and nuclear fuel, it is duplicative of existing federal statutes. The nuclear power system is presently covered by the provisions of 42 United States Code 5 2284, Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities and Fuel, which makes it a federal crime to commit acts constituting " sabotage" against various types of nuclear facilities and fuel.
In view of the existing coverage for criminal acts in this area, we question the need for the applicability of section 1 of the bill to nuclear facilities and fuel.
With respect to section 2 of the bill, the Commission recommends its enactment subject to modifications required to correlate the proposed FBI dissemination authority with the nuclear reactor operator's need for criminal history information under NRC regulations currently under development.
Enactment of section 2 of the bill, (as modified), is recomended as a means of faciliting licensee compliance with these regulations and of promoting uniformity in industry-conducted personnel screening programs.
In a decision dated, November 17, 1980, 1/ the Commission directed the NRC staff to draf t a proposed rule to be issued for public comment.
The rule would set forth standards for an industry-conducted access authorization program at power reactors licensed pursuant to 10 CFR Part
- 50. This decision concluded an informal rulemaking proceeding in which the Commission considered the need to provide for a system of personnel security clearances in order to reduce the risk that employees will facilitate the theft or diversion of special nuclear material, or the sabotage of nuclear facilities.
The record in the informal rulemaking proceeding generally supported the need or desirability for some degree of reliability screening of employees in certain critical occupations at nuclear electric generating stations.
After detailed consideration, the Commission opted for a proposed rule containing, among other components, a requirement for a limited background investigation of the personal and 1]
CLI-80-37, In the Matter of Authority for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear Material.
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employment history of the applicant for access, including any criminal history information.
Procedures for appeals of negative access determinations and privacy protections would also be provided.
In particular, the Commission determined that the program is to be industry-conducted in order to minimize the extension of government run security clearance programs into the private sector.
In accordance with the Commission's decision, the NRC staff is currently drafting a proposed rule which requires operators of nuclear reactors to establish personnel screening programs for employees requiring unescorted access te vital and protected areas and which provides criteria to guide nuclear reactor operators in making the decision as to access authorization. With respect to prior criminal history, the Commission anticipates that information reasonably tending to establish that the individual seeking access authorization has been convicted of any felony, or series of lesser offenses indicating habitual criminal tendencies will create question as to the individual's eligibility for access authorization.
The Commission's goal in requiring detailed criteria to guide nuclear reactor operators in making the decision as to access authorization is to achieve greater uniformity in the operation of personnel screening programs throughout the nuclear industry. There was general agreement among the participants in the rulemaking proceeding that there is a need to have greater uniformity in industry-conducted screening programs and that the present industry standard, (ANS1 N 18.17), is too vague to accomplish that purpose.
Enactment of section 2 of the bill would help resolve this need by assuring uniformity'in the conviction information to be used in the industry-conducted screening programs.
At present, the nature of the information on convictions available to nuclear reactor operators through state and local criminal history record information systems varies among the different states.
Since states and local governments are free to determine the purposes for which dissemination of conviction information is authorized by state law and to enact statutes limiting such dissemination, there is an increasing amount of legislation that affects access to criminal justice information. 2/ All fifty state jurisdictions now have some type of open-record W freedom of information act several of which contain at
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The only significant Federal legislative requirements for' state criminal history information use or maintenance, (including use and maintenance of information obtained from the National Crime Information Center) are in the Crime Control Act of 1973, (P.L.
93-83, 42 U.S.C. 3701, et. _s_3. ) and in regulations enacted e
pursuant thereto by theTaw Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), in Title 28 CFR, Part 20, (28 CFR 20.1 et. se3.). The regulations do not affect disclosure of conviction information but rather, require that non-conviction data be disseminated outside the criminal justice system only pursuant to state law, regulction, executive or court order. The regulations do not mandate dissemination by state agencies of conviction information to any agency or individual.
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least some exceptions for withholding some types of criminal justice information, including conviction information.
In addition, c growing number of states 3/ have enacted statutes that comprehensively regulate and limit access to criminal history information (both' arrests and convictions) maintained in criminal justice information systems. There is a wide disparity in the nature of the access restrictions imposed by the above statutes. As a result, the information on convictions available to nuclear reactor operators varies according to the applicable state restrictions on the dissemination of conviction data.
These variations may range from the total unavailability of information concerning " lesser offenses indicating habitual criminal tendencies" to the exclusion of certain felonies from information concerning felony convictions.
Allowing nuclear reactor operators direct access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) data relevant to the rule requirements can substantially remedy this problem. However, under present Federal Statutes the Federal Bureau of Investigation will not allow direct access to NCIC criminal history data in the absence of specific authorizing federal legislation.
Proposed section 2 will authorize the FBI to disseminate data in the NCIC to nuclear reactor operators.
However, the bill should be modified to authorize dissemination of criminal history information on employees holding or applying to hold positions with access to protected areas of nuclear reactors.
As presently drafted, section 2 of the bill provides authority only with respect to the criminal history information of employees holding or applying to hold positions with access to " vital" areas. This limited authorization is not consistent with the proposed rule anticipated by the Commission which would require nuclear reactor operators to conduct personnel screening programs for employees requiring access to both " vital" and " protected" areas.
This additional requirement is necessary to alleviate the difficulty nuclear reactor operators would encounter if they had to segregate nuclear facility employees with access to protected areas from those having access to vital areas.
The desired amendment requires insertion of the words "and protected areas" after " vital areas" in 9 534(3) (page 4, after line 14) of the draft bill.
The amended provision would read as follows:
"(3) exchange these records with and for the official use of officials of federally licensed and regulated nuclear power facilities requesting records on individuals presently holding or applying to hold positions with access to vital areas and protected areas of nuclear power facilities, as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."
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Alabama, Alas ta, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia and Washington.
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