ML20052D811
| ML20052D811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1982 |
| From: | Gallo J CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.), ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8205070232 | |
| Download: ML20052D811 (20) | |
Text
[-
5/4/82 s
09]ETEP UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSSION"2 III-0 U BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
) Docket No. 50155-OLA CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
) (Spent Fuel Po N
)
Modificati n)
(Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant)
)
8 4
Ch e9,"e REPLY TO MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME m
- 5,
(
4%$
C#
\\%
~#
c Consumers Power Company (" Licensee") files this ly s
to the motion of the NRC Staff to postpone the May 's dZfi ng date for testimony on certain issues in this proceeding.
The Staff's motion was received at 6: 30 p.m. yesterday and this reply is being prepared on an expedited basis.
Licensee, as explained below, objects in part and acquieces in part to the Staff's motion.
I.
Background
This Atomic Safety & Licensing Board (" Board") established a schedule in this proceeding of May 7, 1982 for the filing of testimony and June 7, 1982 for the commencement of evidentiary hearings.
This schedule was established against a history of undue delay in the processing of Licensee's application for a i
license amendment to expend the spent fuel pool at Big Rock Point.
The principal party responsible for the undue delay has been and continues to be the NRC Staff.
D h 02050702 2 a5 0
o
~
(
The Staff originally committed, on a best efforts basis, to issuing their Safety Evaluation Report and Environ-mental Impact Assessment by mid-February 1980.
Order Following Special Prehearing Conference, p.
34, dated January 17, 1980. In fact, these documents did not issue until May 15, 1981, some 15 months later.
The Staff has suggested in the past that the delay was due to the accident at Three Mile Island.
However, it stretches human reason to believe the Staf f was exclusively preoccupied with the af termath of the THI-2 accident for a period of time beginning nine months after the accident (January 1980) and continuing for 15 months until May 15, 1981.
Nevertheless, the Staff was successful in delaying the issuance of the SER and EIA without any accountability to either this Board or the Commissioners.
Now, at this late date, almost one year after the issuance of these documents and their conclusion that the license amendment should issue, the NRC Staff says it is unable to complete its preparation of testimony.
Licensee does not understand and it cannot accept any longer the inexcusable delays perpetrated by the NRC Staff in this proceeding.
I Nevertheless, Licensee is a realist.
The NRC Staff enjoys an exalted position in licensing proceedings.
The Staf f is expected to make a contribution on the issues.
i
Thus, it does not appear that this proceeding can go forward without the Staff. It is this very leverage that enables the Staff to be extremely cavalier about their deadlines.
They appreciate well their position as an " indispensible party."
They know that despite the inequity of their position and the validity of the counter-arguments, Boards will be con-strained to acquiesce in their requests.
It is with this realism in mind that Licensee responds to the specific requests for a time extension.
II.
Time Extension Request With Respect to Genuine Issue of Fact (5) under Christa-Maria l
Contention 8 and O'Neill Contention IIE-2 j
The Board's Order of February 19, 1982 established the subject issues as follows:
(5)
Is the concrete in the fuel pool strong enough to resist a tempera-ture of 247'F and point loading from the storage racks?
The Staff states it needs additional time, to May 21, 1982, to prepare testimony on this issue.
The asserted good cause is that Licensee submitted a corrected analysis on April 28, 1982, and they need additional time to fully review the i
analysis as revised.
Licensee's corrected analysis, Revision 1 to NUS-3567 dated April 27, 1982, was filed on April 28 along with the affidavit of Dr. Eckert.
Dr. Eckert testified that he l
l l
participated in a meeting on April 20, 1982 with, among others, representatives of the NRC Staff.
The nature of the errors and their significance were fully discussed with the Staff at that meeting.
Thus, it should be a simple matter, one not requiring much time, for the Staff representative, who is already familiar with the substance of the document, to draw his conclusions with respect to Revision 1 and to submit testimony by May 7.
Clearly, good cause does not exist to grant the two-week extension requested by the Staff.
Nevertheless, Licensee recognizes that it has been given until May 21, 1982 to file the additional supplemental testimony of Colonel Betourne of the U.S. Air Force.
Conse-quently, as a matter of comity, Licensee interposes no objection to the Staff's request on this issue, provided:
1.
This issue continues to be scheduled for the hearing session scheduled to begin on June 7, 1982; and 2.
Licensee and all other parties be given until May 21 within which to file their testimony on the above-quoted issue.
l Licensca expects that the Intervenors will seek to postpone this issue because of the two-week delay.
Such a request should be rejected because it is not prejudicial to expect any party to this proceeding to be able to proceed on June 7 with respect to testimony filed two weeks prior to l
I I
1
that date.
Indeed, only 15 days in advance of the session of the hearing at which the testimony is to be presented, is required.
10 C.F.R. S 2.743(b).
III. Time Extension Request With Respect to O'Neill Contention II.C. as Reworded by the Board The subject issue was reworded by the Board as follows:
Is the spent fuel pool safe fiom a rupture which might be caused by a drop of a spent fuel transfer cask or of the overhead crane.
Licensee understands the NRC Staff to be requesting two extensions of time with respect to this issue.
They will be addressed seriatim.
A.-
The Time Extension Request to May 14, 1982.
It appears that the Staff is seeking a time extension to May 14, 1982, on that porticii of the above-quoted issue that relates to a drop of the spent fuel transfer cask.
The Staf f bases this request on an alleged Licensee commitment to provide additional information by May 5.
Indeed, they condition compliance with the May 14 deadline upon the receipt of this information by May 5.
i i
Contrary to the assertion of the Staff, including Mr.
Emch, no such commitment exists.
Information was sought in March 1982 by the NRC Staff with respect to the use of the crane in connection with the spent fuel transfer cask during a site visit at Big Rock Point.
Instead, of puruuing legiti-mate discovery processes in this proceeding, a conference call was instigated by the Staff on Monday, April 26.
The information sought by the Staff was provided orally at that time.
The only commitment made by Licensee was to document that conference call for the benefit of the Staff.
That documentation is enclosed as Exhibit A to this reply.
Exhibit A is an internal memorandum written by Mr.
David Blanchard on April 30, 1982.
Exhibit A merely docu-monts the discussion which ensued during the April 26 con-forence call.
Licensee is under no further commitment to provide information on this subject.
Moreover, counsel has instructed Mr. Blanchard to provide no further information in response to the informal contacts of the Staff.
The Licensee is, howeve r, always prepared to provide information pursuant to proper requests filed by the Staff with this Board.
Again, as a matter of comity, Licensee interposes no objection to the requested extension to May 14, 1981, provided:
i 1.
This issue continues to be scheduled for the hearing session scheduled on June 7, 1982; 2.
The time extension dead-line of May 14 is unequi-vocal and is not made contingent upon the receipt of further information from the Licensee by May 5; and i
3.
Licensee and all other parties be given until May 14 within which to file their testimony on the above-quoted issue.
B.
The Time Extension Request to June 25, 1982.
It appears that the Staff is seeking a time extension to June 25, 1982, within which to file testimony on that part of the reworded issue ~ of O'Neill Contention II.C. that refers to a drop of the overhead crane.
The Staff's truncated explana-tion of this issue fails to provide the Board with any reasonable clue as to the purpose of their request and its relationship to the above-quoted issue.
Licensee will provide that understanding for the full benefit of the Board and the parties.
The issue questions whether the overhead crane used for handling fuel assemblies and casks is seismically safe.
A seismic analysis and structural design evaluation was per-formed by Licensee and was furnished to the NRC Staff and the parties on April 15, 1982.
See " Seismic Analysis of the
75-Ton Containment Crane," dated April 14, 1982, prepared by EQE, Inc., which was enclosed with Counsel's April 15, 1982, letter to Mr. Bachmann, Counsel to the NRC Staff.
The analysis was based on two different levels of earthquake motion.
One level of earthquake motion was a zero period horizontal ground acceleration equal to 0.12g and conforming to the spectral shape requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60.
The other level of earthquake motion was the site specific response spectra, as defined by the NRC Staff, with a zero period horizontal ground acceleration of 0.11g.
(EQE report, p. 1).
The NRC Staff, through Mr. Emch, is apparently now stating that the site specific spectra developed by the NRC Staff for Big Rock Point is inadequate.
Licensee does not understand the basis for this surprising and unsubstantiated assertion of Mr. Emch.
Licensee took the deposition of Dr. Leon Reiter on April 16, 1982, for the sole purpose of exploring the adequacy of the site specific spectra established by the NRC Staff for Big Rock Point.
A copy of the deposition is enclosed as Exhibit B to this reply.*
The testimony of Dr. Reiter completely contradicts the assertion of Mr. Emch.**
- Licensee has not yet received the verified copy of the deposition from Dr. Reiter.
It should be emphasized that Dr. Reiter is a qualified siesmic expert (Exhibit 2, Tr. 6-8), whereas Mr. Emch as
Dr. Reiter was the Staff person responsible for develop-ing the site specific spectra complained about by Mr. Emch.
(Exhibit B, Tr. 10-11, 18-20, Reiter Depo., Exhibits 3, 4,
5, and 6).
Dr. Reiter's recommendations represent the position of his branch and the Staff's organization responsible for SEP plants like Big Rock Point (Tr. 111-113 and Reiter Depo.,
Exhibit 6).
At no time during the deposition did Dr. Reiter indicate any problem with the adequacy of site specific spectra developed by him for the SEP plants, generally, and for Big Rock, specifically.
To the contrary, Dr. Reiter stood by his recommendations, noting that the only unfinished business involved possible anomalous site conditions at Palisades, Lacrosse, or Yankee Rowe, this problem did not affect Big Rock Point (Tr. 157-158).
Moreover, althougn Dr.
Reiter did not know derivation of the " Reg. Guide 1.60" design spectra used for previous seismic evaluations of Big Rock Point (Tr. 148), he was of the opinion that response spectra conforming to NRC Reg. Guide 1.60 and anchored at 0.12g when applied to Big Rock Point would be very conservative in comparison with the site specific spectra established by a Health Physicist and Senior Nuclear Engineer is not qualified on seismological matters.
Hence, Mr. Emch's opinions in Paragraph 7 of his affidavit are entitled to no weight, and they should be disregarded.
. the Staff for Big Rock Point (Tr. 149).
Finally, it was Dr.
Reiter's opinion that the results of the Uniform Hazard Method and the resulting site specific spectra gave a "true message 4
that plants such as Palisades, Lacrosse, and particularly Big Rock Point have really relatively low seismic hazards, com-pared to other plants that were examined" (Tr. 144).
In view of Dr. Reiter's April 16 testimony, Licensee i
cannot comprehend the reason or the nature of the technical or i
safety problem expressed by the lay opinion of Mr. Emch.
In addition to the contrary opinion of Dr. Reiter, Mr. Emch has not explained why the crane analysis submitted by Licensee, l
l based on the Reg. Guide 1.60 spectra, is in any way invali-dated by a." mistake" in the site specific spectra, an indepen-dent vehicle for measuring earthquake motion.
In addition, even assuming that the Staff needs an extension, no justification has been provided for the lengthy delay to June 25, 1982.
Contrary to Mr. Emch's assertion, Licensee has not " committed to submit analyses of this issue by May 7, 1982."
Licensee does possess a report entitled
" Site Specific Response Spectrum for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant."
This report was prepared by Weston Geophysical for Licensee.
However, its preparation had nothing to do with the problem asserted in paragraph.7 of Mr.
Emch's affidavit.
Licensee is prepared to furnish a copy of y
_11 this report to the NRC Staff if they believe it might be helpful.
But it must be emphasized that this is a voluntary offer.
Licensee has no credible inforniation with respect to the concern indicated by Mr. Emch.
Licensee is not preparing any analysis for the Staff.
Under these circunstances, it stretches candor to imply, as Mr. Emch does, that the Licensee is working with the Staff to resolve a problem with the site specific spectra.
Thus, the Staff cannot base its request for an extension on the premise that time is needed to evaluate further information to be furnished by Licensee.
The Staff states it needs almost two months to come to grips with a problem of some unknown proportions.
No break-down of this time is provided.
It seems beyond question that site specific spectra, which were so carefully developed by the NRC Staff with the assistance of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and TERA Corporation and documented in 4 volumes, could be reviewed and evaluated in much less time.
- Again, good cause is lacking to support the Staff's request.
In view of the foregoing, the Staff's request for a time extension to June 25 should be denied.
In the alternative, the Staff should be required to:
1.
establish, if they can, the nature, extent, and relevance to this proceeding of the problem asserted by_Mr. Emch in his affidavit; l
. 2.
correct their position con-cerning the need for further analyses from Licensee; and 3.
justify, if needed, the amount of additional time required for the NRC Staff to file testimony.
The Staff should be required to make the foregoing showing at Thursday's prehearing conference under the supervision of the Licensing Board pursuant to the strictures of the Offshore Power Systems' case.*
Should it eventuate that a delay is justified,** Licensee hereby moves the License Board to enter an order to schedule a hearing within 15 days of whatever date is determined to be appropriate for the filing of testimony by the NRC Staff.
IV.
Time Extension Request with Respect to NEPA Brief Licensec interposes no objection to NRC Staff Counsel's request for a time extension to May 14 for filing their NEPA brief.
Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants),
ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194 (1978).
This position is stated for the rake of completeness rather than because Licensee believes the Staff has a valid technical concern.
7_
t V.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Licensee does not object to the time extension requested for the NEPA brief, and subject to the stated conditions, interposes no objections to the time extensions for genuine issue (5) (to May 21, 1982) and reworded O'Neill Contention IIC as it relates to cask drop (to May 14, 1982).
The motion should be denied with respect to the seismic issue (to June 25, 1982), and the inquiry indicated above should be conducted at the prehearing conference.
Finally, if the June 7 hearing is postptned for the seismic issue, a new hearing date should be established within 15 days after the date set for filing testimony.
Respectfully submitted,
%~.1 z
$Ao h fllo" '
J of he Attorneys for Consumers Power Company ISIIAM, LINCOLN & BEALE 1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 840 Washington, D. C.
20036 (202) 833-9730 Dated:
May 4, 1982 ieam
F t
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
) Docket No. 50-155-OLA CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
) (Spent Fuel Pool
)
Modification) l (Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of REPLY TO MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME will be hand-delivered to Judge Bloch, Judge Paris, Judge Shon, Janice Moore, and Herbert Semmel, on May 5, 1982, and were served on the other persons listed below by deposit in the United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, this 4th day of May, 1982.
t i
Peter B.
Bloch, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Administrative Judge Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Panel Commission U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.
C.
20555 Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Dr. Oscar H. Paris U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Administrative Judge Commission Ato-ic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.
C.
20555 2
Board Panel U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Docketing and Service Section Commission Office of the Secretary i
Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Frederick J.
Shon Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing l~
Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 t
Janice E. Moore, Esquire Judd Bacon, Esquire Counsel for NRC Staff Consumers Power Company U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory 212 West Michigan Avenue Commission Jachson, Michigan 49201 Washington, D. C.
20555 Ms. Christa-Maria Richard G. Bachmann, Esquire Route 2, Box 108C U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Mr. Jim Mills Route 2, Box 108 3erbert Semmel, Esquire Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Urban Law Institute Antioch School of Law Ms. JoAnne Bier 2633 16th Street, N.W.
204 Clinton Washington, D. C.
20555 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Mr. John O'Neill, II 11oute 2, Box 44 Maple City, Michigan 49664 Qwh Y
pcosoph Gallo j
EXHIBIT A To TCBardinc, P24-608 From
'DPBlanchard %
CONSUMERS POWER Date' April 30, 1s82 COMPANY Subject BIG ROCK POINT PLANT Internal COMMENTS ON DRAFT TSR-C5257-440 Correspondence CC DPHoffman DPB 82-02 RESchrader LFMonshor KDBrienzo, P24-406 In March, Me::ars. Emch and Clemeson of NRR and Messrs. Sargent and Vito of Franklin Research Center paid a visit to the site to examine and discuss the design and operation of the crane as it related to NUREG-0612.
FRC is under contract by NRR to review our responses to an NRC letter dated December 22, 1980 (NUREG-0612) which were submitted July 1, 1981 and September 23, 1981.
During the visit FRC presented a draft evaluation of our compliance with this letter and left a copy of this evaluation (TER-C5257-440) for Consumers Power Company's review.
One purpose of the visit was to allow Staff to examine the crane and procedures associated with its use as a part of their preparation of testimony for the spent fuel pool hearings. NRR also examined the new fuel poo) makeup line and discussed its design for the same purpose.
In preparation of their testimony the staff har requested that we review the draft TER as it relates to handling the fuel transfer cask and further requested that we respond to any deficiencies the TER appeared to identify with respect to handling this cask.
On Monday, April 26, a conference call was placed which included Messrs. Clemeson, Emch, (NRR) Sargent and Vito (FRL), T C Bordine and I (CpCo). This memo documents that conversation.
I identified the four sections of the draft TER which I believed were applicable to handling of the transfer cask; Sections 2.1.2 (Safe Load Paths),
2.1.3 (Load Handling Procedures), 2.1.6 (Lifing Devices) and 2.2.1 (Interim Protection Measure 1 - Technical Specifications).
Section 2.1.2 (Safe Load Paths)
FRC concludes that Big Rock Point is in substantial compliance with the requirements of this section, but FRC states that Consumers Power Company should provide additional information with respect to marking safe load paths and restricted areas as visual aids to the crane operator.
I proposed that the safe load path for the transfer cask is that path directly between the reactor vessel and the pool over which the operator moves the cask during refueling operation and that this path is clearly marked on diagrams within procedures which the operator is using to perform these activities, These procedures include 0-FFI-1 (Fuel Bundle Removal Procedure), TR-46 (Fuel i
Bundle Core Loading Procedure), 0-RVI-3 (Channel and Blade Removal Procedure) and ORVI-4 (Reactor Internals Reconstitution).
Deviations from the path i
specified in this procedure occur only when transporting the cask to and from its normal storage location and when activities associated with refueling dictated that the 5 ton auxillary hook be used to lift components in other i
l areas of the containment. Further the transfer cask is not permitted to be l
i ic0482-2379a123
2 handled without its safety slings installed and this was controlled by cask rigging procedures.
FRC suggested that the path between the reactor and the pool was a rather obvious path and that we not consider the transfer of the cask to and from its stand or during use of the auxilliary hook to be deviations. Rather paths for these activities should be identified and clearly marked to the operator for his use in handling the transfer cask.
I noted that it may be possible to identify the poc1 and reactor as restricted areas when the cask was being handled during situations other than refueling activities but that there was no path in this area over which the cask could be handled that was any better than any other path in terms of safety.
Selection of a particular path to which the cask would be restricted would have little basis and would effectively reduce flexibility which now exists during these activities in avoiding objects stored on the reactor deck (ie, core spray plug, stud tentioner) which currently require no designated storage location. FRC insisted that designation and marking of a path was necessary to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0612 and provide defense in depth against a load handling incident involving the transfer cask.
I agreed to examine paths that could be selected that would not reduce operating flexibility and provide detailed procedures for the operator in using this path for plant review committee consideration. The Staff suggested that it was acceptable to designate an individual at the Plant who could authorize deviations from this path in the event flexibility was compromised.
Section 2.1.3 (Load Handling Procedures)
FRC conclude that Consumers Power Company had addressed the scope of loads requiring procedural control.
They required additional information with respect to the following items:
1.
Identification of required equipment.
It was noted that cask rigging procedures MFHS-1 and MFHS-4 did identify the equipment necessary for rigging and handling the cask.
This included safety cables, lifting slings, jib crane, safety cable actuating line, turnbuckles and chainfalls.
2.
Inspection and acceptance criteria.
It was noted that Consumers Power Company is providing procedures with appropriate acceptance criteria and inspections under separate cover.
3.
Steps and proper sequence to be used in handling the load.
It was noted that steps and sequence for rigging and handling the lo d were identified in the previously referenced maintenance and refueling procedures.
4.
Safe Load Path.
l The safe load path was discussed under Section 2.1.2.
ic0482-2379a123'
5.
Special precautions, Any appropriate precautions are identified in the procedures previously referenced under sections entitled " Precautions and I4.mitations".
In particular, reference to the safe load path appears in these sections.
Section 2.1.6 (Lifting Devices)
The lifting devices for the crane are the NX01 slings and turnbuckles 1
originally supplied by General Electric with the transfer cask. FRC has requested additional information with respect to the following:
1.
Slings should be installed and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971.
The slings used to rig the cask adequately comply with the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971.
The applicable chapter is 9-2 (Wire Rope).
Documentation of the strength of the slings is provided in a General Electric document (GEI-56218) which states the rated capacity of each of the two slings which hold the cask is 12 tons, the turnbuckles 27,600 lbs and the overall sling assembly is certified for 28 tons. A copy of this document is attached. The slings are stored and used on the reactor deck complying with storage and temperature limitations required by ANSI B30.9.
The slings are approximately five feet long and are built in compliance with sling length criteria.
Slings are inspected prior to their use in accordance with procedure MFHS-1 and the daily inspection checklist and personnel performing rigging activities are trained with respect to inspection and acceptance criteria and proper rigging practices.
2.
Load rating of the sling should be based upon maximum static plus dynamic load.
l The certified strength of each sling assembly (see GEI-56218) is more than twice the working load providing compliance with this requirement.
3.
Slings should be marked with the static load which produces the maximum static and dynamic load.
These slings are not marked in this manner but meet the intent of the requirement in that the wire rope turnbuckle assemblies can be installed l
only on the transfer cask and reactor vessel head.
Section 2.2.1 (Interim Inspection Measure 1 - Technical Specifications) l To perform refueling activitien, it is required that the transfer cask be moved over the vessel and the fuel pool.
FRC required that documentation insuring that the safety slings meet the intent of the single failure proof j
crane. This documentation was provided by letter dated December 5,1980.
Additional information is being provided under separate interrogatories.
ic0482-2379a123
GEI-56218 SECTION 11 REACTOR SERVICING AND CONTROL ROD SERYlCING EQUIPMENT 2.1 NX01 Reactor Head and Transfer Coffin Sling 2.1.1 Purpose Three NX01 reactor head and transfer coffin slings are provided for the purpose of raising, lowering, and moving the reactor vessel head and the b"#17 transfer coffin. Two NXC1 sling assemblies are attached to the 75-ton overhead crane hook for moving the NW17 transfer coffin, similar to the manner shown in Figure 2-1, and three NX01 sling assemblies are used with the overhead crane to move and transport the reactor vessel head.
~g\\
. ~g.
o W96.
$;iV%@?MW "g
44
-..e o
t i
s
...Y, M l
n~
Qn; Mj{j QP-
- i n
pfy l
sJ'W5 1;
n S. W*
l c d.!
9 M %-)
((,i. -j.jid 7$ ii w
di iJ
.3
~1 a.
n W~
i.g:l
. _. _.--w d 1
- .Y., gf.s i
l ft
- 4. 9..
\\
M2 Myx 5
y" pi-r
.t
've Ei'8Q;A
, ( M; o ufG
?6t% % w L y r[ f R * %, K Q
- -=;dii.%
yN q
&Lf
.7 m
y g@, D., k[ f'O 3 M;r ik C.,.u,!
.p
- -~ 2 z.- :
i
.........es......-,.......
1 2-1
'i o
e l
G El-56216 L
2.1.2 Physical Description Each NXO! sling acaembly consists, basically, of a 1-3/E-inch-diameter wire rope sling i
attached to a 2. by 24-inch eye-to-jaw turnbuckle. The top of the sling line is formed in a 8-1/2-
~
by 17-inch standard loop for attachment to the overhead crane hook. The sling line and turn-buckle are permanently joined by a galvantaed thimble fitted to the lower end of the sling line and i
I passing through the eye of the turnbuckle. The jaw of the turnbuckle is provided with a 1-7/8-i inch-diameter eye bolt which is secured in place by a cotter pin. The sling line has a rated capa-city of 12 tons while the turnbuckle is rated for 27,600 pounds. The overall NX01 sling assembly is certilled for 28.6 tons, and weighs approximately 150 pounds.
f The turnbuckle is provided on each of the sling assemblies to permit adjustment in length..
I When the turnbuckle is extended, the sling assembly has an over-alllength of 13 feet which may be reduced to 11 feet when the turnbuckle is fully retracted.
2.1.3 Functior.al Description When utilized to move the reactor vessel head, the three NX01 s!!ngs are first attached to the hook of the 75-ton overhead crane. The slings are then lowered into position over the reactor vessel so that the jaws of the three turnbuckles may be engaged in the three lifting lugs on the domed surface of the vessel head. The eye bolts are then removed and passed through the turn-buckle jaws and the lifting lugs and prevented from slipping outof placebytheinsertionof the cotter pins.
Two of the NX01 sling assemblies are used in transporting and holding the hv17 transfer coffin in position over the open reactor vessel during refueling operations. The NX01 sling as-semblies are attached to the overhead crane hook and to the two lifting lugs on the shoulder of the NW17 transfer coffin in a manner similar to that described above. When used with the hv17 transf er coffin, the twoNX01 sling assembly turnbuckles must be adjusted so that the sling lengths are identical in order to insure a proper balance when the NW17 transfer coffin is lifted.
2.1.4 Inspection. Maintenance, g Storage l
Periodic inspection of the three NX01 sling assemblies is required for indications of wear as evidenced by frayed or broken strands of wire rope on the sling line and by excessive turnbuckle wear. The sling line should be replacedatthe first indication of frayed strands of wire rope. The i
turnbuckle should be repaired or replaced if the jaw eyes indicate excessive wear or become mis-shapen, or the eye bolt becomes damaged orbent. The turnbuckle threads should be kept properly lubricated and should be inspected frequently for indications of stripping.
Care must be taken in handling the NX01 sling asse nblies because of the excessiveweightand.
when not in use, they should be stored in a location so that the possibility of moisture corrosion r
is minimiaed.
t I-2-2 ie