ML20052D064
| ML20052D064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1982 |
| From: | Aherns R, Brown R, Frank R MAINE, STATE OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8205060239 | |
| Download: ML20052D064 (12) | |
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April 30, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
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Docket No. 5 -309-OLAD /
(Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station) )
(Spent Fuel C'Udpactionf4Sj
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-O INTERVENOR STATE OF MAINE
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PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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The State of Maine respectfully requests the Ato and Licensing Board reconsider its Order of April 12, 1982 with regard to its rejection of two contentions, numbers 2 and 16, for the reasons stated herein.
For the convenience of the Board, a copy of the two contentions is attached.
The State does not mean to imply by this petition that it agrees with the Board's rejection, temporary or otherwise, of other of the State's contentions.
The State reserves its full rights of appeal.
However the State believes contentions 2 and 16 should be admitted, both as a legal matter and as a practical matter, at this initial stage of the proceeding rather than later in the proceeding, when other documents 3
become available, or upon appeal of the initial or final
)3c3 decisions.
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8205060239 820430 PDR ADOCK 05000309 0
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.. The State is filing this Petition for Reconsideration on the tenth day af ter it received the ASLB Order dated April 12, 1982.
Contention 2 The Board rejects State's Contention 2 because "[nlo reasonably specific mechanism for such an accident is alleged, nor is it clear how the probability of an accident would be increased."
ASLB Order dated April 12, 1982, page 17.
The basis for State's Contention 2 is the same as its basis for Contention la and was incorporated by reference.
See Amended Contentions of.the State of Maine (October 5, 1981), p.
7 (copy of Contention No. 2 and its basis statement attached).
In its basis statement for Contentions la and 2, the State spelled out 2 categories of possible accidents:
(1) those accidents which prevent access to the spent fuel pool and cause a loss of cooling capacity as a result of pool water evaporation, such as brittle fracture in the-reactor vessel resulting from thermal shock and (2) those accidents which directly impact on the spent fuel pool and cause a rapid release of pool coolant, such as sabotage, earthquake or the dropping of a heavy object such as a shipping cask.
The State further indicated how the probability of an accident would be increased.
See Basis for Contention la and 2, attached.
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. Recalling the admonition of the Appeals Board in Houston Lighting and Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980) that a licensing board is not to consider the merits of a contention, the State believes Contention 2 is admissible at thic time and requests on reconsideration such a ruling by the Board.
Contention 16 The Board rejects Contention 16 because ".
the State has not shown how (unresolved generic safety issues) relate to the spent fuel pool expansion other the (sic) than to boldly assert that they do so."
ASLB Order dated April 12, 1982, page 22.
In light of the Appeals Board decision in Allens Creek and its progeny, the State believes Contention 16 is admissible at this stage of the proceeding.
Although the State need do no more than " assert" that specific unresolved generic safety issues directly or indirectly affect the proposed expansion of Maine Yankee's spent fuel pool, the State went beyond the requirements of Allens Creek and mentioned the specific aspects of each of the generic unresolved safety issues which were of concern.
We respectfully request on reconsideration that the Board admit Contention 16.
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e CONCLUSION The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board should admit State of Maine Contentions Nos. 2 and 16.
RespecEfilll.
submitted,
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BROWN DepptyAttorneyGeneral NAS PHILIP F.
AHRENS Assistant Attorney General
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lvik ROBERT S.' FRANK Assistant Attorney General State House - Station 6 Augusta, Maine
'04333 Telephone (207) 289-3051 1,
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April 30, 1982
. ATTACHMENT TO INTERVENOR STATE OF MAINE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION -
RESTATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS 2 AND 16 FROM AMENDED CONTENTIONS OF THE STATE OF MAINE (OCTOBER 5, 1981)
CONTENTION NO. 2: The proposed license amendments to permit reracking and pin compaction significantly increase both the probability of occurrence of a release of radiation or radioactive materials into the environment and the environmental consequences of such a release in the event of a total or partial loss of coolant at the spent fuel pool.
The licensee has failed to demonstrate, as required by the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR, Part 50, that there is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered by these risks.
BASIS FOR CONTENTION NO. 2:
The basis for Contention No. la is incorporated herein by reference as the basis for Contention No.
2.
BASIS FOR CONTENTION NO. la:
The proposed reracking and pin compaction will increase both the probability of occurrence of a release of radiation or radioactive materials and the probability of the environmental consequences resulting from.
such a release in the event of a loss of coolant accident involving the spent fuel pool.
The increased risks of such a l
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! release and its consequences must be analyzed in an Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51.
See, " Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969," 45 F.R.
~'*1 (June 13, 1980).
More specifically, a total or partial loss of coolant at Maine Yankee's spent fuel pool could be initiated by two s.
categories of accidents.
The first category is a reactor accident that prevents access to the spent fuel pool and a loss of cooling capacity resulting in an evaporation of the pool water.
This first category of accidents includes:
(a) those postulated in the Reactor Safety Study (Wash-1400) issued in October, 1975, (b) those described in the " Technical Bases for Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR Accidents," s u
NUREG-0772 (June, 1981), and (c) a brittle fracture in the reactor vessel resulting from a thermal shock following by
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repressurization, Task A-11, " Identification of Unresolved SafetyIssuesRelatingtoNuclearPowerPlants,"NUREGh0510_[
(January, 1979).
The second category consists of acciden'ts
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that directly impact on the spent fuel pool resulting insa Ng, N_1 s
-breach of the spent fuel pool and a rapid' release of pool; T
. coolant.
These accidents include sabotage, an airplane d4 g
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accident, a missile, an earthquake, aN' accident involvins(the i
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q fuel transfer tube, and theidrog o'f#<a heavy object such asya
>e shipping cask.
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..In the event of either categgry of accidents, resulting in a total or partial loss of coolant 1.in the spent fuel pool, thore is a recognized risk that the heat generated by the spent fuel could cause che zirconium cladding-of the spent fuel rods to reach sustained oxidat' ion resulting in a release of l
radiation or radioactive matedials.
There is also a risk under i
thes'e circumstances that'the zirconium cladding could react oxothermically with steam to produce-hydrogen gas leading to a hydrogen explosion causing dispersion of radionuclides into.the i
atmosphere.
The probability of the occurrence of such risks is increased by both the proposed reracking and pin compaction i
because the denser' configuration of spent fuel assemblies proposed by the applicant will decrease natural convection cool'ingsin the event of a loss of-coolant accident, causing both'old and new fuel rods to heat up to the point of sustained i
oxidation and an exothermic reaction.
In addition, the increased number of fuel assemblies to be stored in the pool as adresult of the proposed reracking and pin compaction increases 4
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the environmental consequences of a loss of coolant accident by L
- increasing the amount of radiation or radioactive material released into:the atmosphere through such an accident.
CONTENTION NO. 16:
Neither the licensee ~nor the NRC staff have addressed the extent to.which unresolved generic safety ~ issues i
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will' affect <the, proposed expansion of Maine Yankee's spent fuel p
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. BASIS FOR CONTENTION NO. 16:
A number of unresolved generic i
safety issues identified in " Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0510 (Janua ry, 1979) and " Identification of New Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0705 (March, 1981) directly affect the safe operation of the spent fuel pool, or, through an accident in the reactor core, indirectly i
l affect the safe operation of the spent fuel pool.
Such safety issues must be evaluated by the licensee and NRC staff to determine whether Maine Yankee can safety operate following implementation of the proposed new storage methods pending resolution of these issues.
The following unresolved generic safety issues directly affect the proposed expansion of Maine Yankee's spent fuel pool:
Task-A-17 (systems interaction in nuclear power plants) relates to the proposed license amendments because the design and analysis of spent' fuel systems and storage racks are 1;
assigned to teams with functional engineering specialites, such i
as civil, electrical, mechanical or nuclear.
The question
-t raised in Task.A-17 is whether the design, analysis-and review activities of these functional specialists is sufficiently integrated to enable them to identify adverse interactions between and among systems.
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. Task A-24 (qualification of Class lE safety-related equipment) involves questions concerning the environmental qualification of Class lE electrical equipment to assure that such equipment in safety systems will perform its functions under accident conditions.
This task affects such equipment located in the spent fuel pool, including the spent fuel storage pool filtering and cooling system.
Task A-36 (control of heavy loads near spent fuel) is directly related to Contention 10.
Task A-40 (seismic design criteria) requires a re-evaluation of seismic design criteria of existing spent fuel pools, in view of current seismic regulations and regulatory guides that became applicable after the plant was licensed.
This re-evaluation is necessary to assure that the old designs do not present undue public safety risks.
Task A-46 (seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants) involves a reassessment of the design criteria and methods for seismic qualification of mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants which have undergone significant changes since Maine Yankee was originally licensed.
Task A-47 (safety implications of' control systems) concerns the potential for accidents or transients being made more severe as a result of control system failures and malfunctions.
Together with Task A-17, this task requires a detailed plant-specific analysis of Maine Yankee's spent fuel
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i pool, storage racks and associated systems to assess the potential safety improvements available through a reduction of potential system interactions by a careful consideration of multiple failures and associated mechanisms.
All of the foregoing generic unresolved safety issues directly relate to Maine Yankee's proposed expansion of the spent fuel pool because they directly impact on the safety of the spent fuel pool.
Also the increased density of spent fuel storage capacity at Maine Yankee will increase the consequences of an accident caused or exacerbated by the safety issues identified above.
The foregoing generic unresolved safety issues must also be examined on the record in this proceeding because they indirectly affect the proposed spent fuel pool expansion.
All involve safety concerns which may cause or exacerbate a reactor accident.
Such issues are relevant to the present proceeding because, as asserted in Contention No.
1, a reactor accident is one cause which may prevent access to the spent fuel pool resulting in a loss of coolant.
In addition the following unresolved general safety issues indirectly affect the spent fuel pool expansion for the same reason:
Task A-1 (water hammer); Task A-4 (steam generator tube integrity) ; Task A-9 (anticipated transient without scram); Task A-ll (reactor i
I
. vessel materials toughness); Task A-12 (toughness of steam generator and reactor coolant pump supports) ; Task A-43 (containment emergency pump performance); Task A-44 (station black-out) ; Task A-45 (shutdown decay heat removal requirements); and Task A-48 (hydrogen control measures and effects on hydrogen burns on safety equipment).
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9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on April 30, 1982 he made service of the within document by mailing a copy postage prepaid to:
Robert M.
Lazo, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Dr. Cadet H.
Hand, Jr.
Director, Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California P. O.
Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 Dr. Peter A. Morris Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 office of the Executive Legal Director U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,.
D.C.
20555 Jay M.
Gutierrez Staff Counsel U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
R.
K.
Gad, III Ropes and Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 David Santee Miller 213 Morgan Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20001 David Colton-Manheim Box 386, Bedford's Barn Gouldsboro~, Maine 04607 John H.
Garrity, Director Nuclear Engineering & Licensing Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Edison Drive
. Augusta, Maine 04336 11 j)
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l&e &%M PHILIP AHRENS
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Assistant Attorney General State House - Station 6 Augusta, Maine 04333 Telephone No.: (207)- 289-3661 7
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