ML20052C304

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Proposed Tech Spec Change Re Movable Control Assemblies. Safety Evaluation Encl
ML20052C304
Person / Time
Site: Farley 
Issue date: 04/28/1982
From:
ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20052C303 List:
References
NUDOCS 8205040596
Download: ML20052C304 (4)


Text

.

ATTACHMENT 1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 1

MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

    • /4.1. 3 I

GROUP HEIGHT _

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION All full length (shutdown and control) rods shall be OPERABLE and t

positioned within i 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step c 3.1.3.1 I

demand position.

l r

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

With one or more full length rods inoperable due to being immova as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference a.

ment of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With more than one full lengt'h rod inoperable or misaligned fro i

b.

group step counter demand position by# hours.

position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 With one full length rod inoperable due to causes other than ad by ACTION a, above, or misaligned from its j

t c.

may continue provided that within one hour either:

The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above 1.

alignment requirements, or The remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within i 12 steps of the inoperable rod within l

2.

one hour while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2; the THERM subsequent operation, or The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN POWER requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied.

3.

OPERATION may then continue provided that-A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm a) that the previously analyzed results of these r m dents remain valid for the duration of operation undst tnese l

conditions.

C~

  • See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3
  1. 0nc tine only exception allowing time for being in HOT STANDBY to be extended from 6 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> for completion for surveillance testing on April 28, 1982.

8205040NEIi26We' 3/4 1 14 PDR ADOCK 05000364

ATTACHMENT 2 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR CHANGE TO REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (FNP-2)

===1.

Background===

During performance of a scheduled surveillance test at 11:35 P.M. on April 27, 1982, Shutdown Bank A Group 1 could not be inserted in accordance with surveillance requirement 4.1.3.1.2.

Action statement (b) of LCO 3.1.3.1 was invoked at 11:35 P.M.

Subsequently, it was determined that Group 1 of Control Banks A and C could not be inserted per the surveillance requirement.

At no time was it determined that these rods could not be f ully inserted if required by a reactor trip condition.

Troubleshooting determined that power cabinet 1 AC was not receiving the signals required for the rod control system to insert the above rods upon operator demand.

It was determined that the slave cycler step counter encoder card was defective.

The card was replaced and the applicable surveillance test was successfully performed resulting in all rods being declared operable at 5:53 A.M. on April 28, 1982.

II.

Reference Technical Specification 3.1.3.1

!!I.

Bases The Farley Rod Control System consists of two Shutdown Banks (A & B) and four Control Banks (A, B, C and D) each with two groups of four rods.

During normal power operation, all banks except control bank D are fully withdrawn.

Control Bank D is slightly inserted for power shape control purposes.

The Control Rod System is described in FSAR Section 7.7.

During performance of the technical specification surveillance test described in Section I, only Group 1 of Shutdown Bank A and Group 1 of Control Banks A and C were af fected.

It was determined that these three rod groups, controlled by power cabinet 1 AC, failed to move upon operator demand.

The " group cycling" light did not illuminate indicating that the groups were not receiving a demand signal to move.

It was apparent that the electronic portion of the control system was inoperable; however, no evidence existed to indicate these rods were incapablu of insertion under trip conditions.

This conclusion was verified upon correction of the electrical malfunction which 611 owed the surveillance test to be successfully completed.

IV.

Conclusion The original LC0 action statement allows six (5) hours to return the rod control system to operable status.

Since the af fected rod bank

groups could br<e performed their trip function during the requested d

extension it is the judgement of Alabama Power Company that this extension did not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59.

This one time exception to the Technical Specification did not affect the safe operation of Farley Unit 2.