ML20050D150

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Summary of 820302 Meeting W/Util & B&W in Bethesda,Md Re Leaking Fuel Rod Investigation.Viewgraphs Encl
ML20050D150
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/05/1982
From: Vissing G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20050D151 List:
References
NUDOCS 8204120075
Download: ML20050D150 (22)


Text

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UNITED STATES r.

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! APRIL 0 5 1982

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Docket flo. 50-313 RECENU p

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LICEllSEE: Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)

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FACILITY: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit flo.1 (Atl0-1)

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEETIflG WITH AP&L C0flCERNIllG THE ANO-1 LEAKING FUEL ROD IflVESTIGATI0ft Introduction This meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland on March 2,1982, at the request of the NRC staff to discuss the Final Report on ANO-1 Leaker Fuel Investigation and the conclusion of the report.

In particular the staff was seeking) additional information to support the report's conclusions that:

(1 the most probable cause of fuel failure was "some form of internal clad attack", (2) there are no indications that the leaking resulted from PCI, (3) there are no indications the leaking rods resulted from manufacturing related sources, and (4)

"further work to establish the exact nature of the attack appears unwarranted".

In addition, the staff wanted more detail on:

(a) radiochemistry techniques to infer the number of failures, and (b) methods that could be used to further examine failed fuel rods.

The attendees for the meeting are identified in Enclosure 1.

The presentation material for the meeting by AP&L is included in Enclosure 2.

Discussion and Conclusion AP&L initially predicted 40-70 failed fuel rods. As it was later dis-covered during the refueling outage in April 1981 there were a total of 24 leaking assemblies.

Five leaking assemblies were returned to the core in the outer periphery of the core. Most leakers were in high powered density areas.

There was a slight power tilt towards quadrants 1, 4 at the time of first indication of failure.

The investigation could find no power related event to cause the fail ures.

There was no rod drop or detremental rod movement at time of the failures. There was no trigger event related to the following:

1.

fio significant transient 2.

No significant system imbalance, and 3.

No obvious chemical imbalance.

B&W investigated the manufacturing records. They could find no batch dependency, no lot dependency or no correlation with ingots for the cladding.

8204120075 820405 PDR ADOCK 05000313 P

PDR

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+

-0 AP&L The investigation could draw no conclusions as to what caused the failures.

The investigation did draw conclusions as to what did not cause the failures. The investigation did not reveal any PCI effect, or evidence of internal attack or failure due to rod bow. The chemistry records revealed no evidence of abnomal conditions.

It was conjectured that the failures at the top of the fuel rods were hydride failures.

B&W's opinion was that the failures are secondary.

It was agreed that there must have been a trigger event.

However, the evidence does not identify such a trigger.

Therefore, it was concluded that AP&L and B&W do not know the cause of failure and that further work to establish the cause of failures appears unwarranted.

I The staff indicated that even though the licensee was unsuccessful in identifying the cause of the fuel failures the licensee has followed up on the investigation in an acceptable nanner and that no further work is necessary.

Original Signed By:

Guy S. Vissing, Project Mcnager Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing Enclosures :

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Presentation Material (AP&L's) cc w/ enclosures:

See next page ORB #4:0L omes >

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sunnsun 4, ourp nac rosu sie (io-so Nacu o24o OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usoeo. =>--meno

ORBf4:DL MEETIflG

SUMMARY

DISTRIBUTION Licensee:

Mr. William Cavanaugh, III Arkansas Power & Light Company

  • Copies also sent to those people on service (cc) list for subject plant (s).

Docket File flRC PDR L PDR ORB #4 Rdg TNovak JStolz Project fianager GVissing Licensing Assistant-RIngram OELD Heltemes, AE0D IE SShowe (PilR) theting Summary File-ORB #4 RFraley, ACRS-10 Program Support Branch ORAB, Rm. 542 BGrimes, DEP SSchwartz, DEP SRamos, EPDB FPagano, EPLB JPellet itTokar ROMeyer SRubin

4.

ATTENDANCE FOR MEETIllG WITH AP&L CONCERNING

]

LEAKIflG FUEL RODS AT ARKANSAS tlVCLEAR ONE, UtlIT 110. 1 MARCH 2, 1982 NRC AP&L John Pellet David E. Baxter Michael Tokar Tony Mansell Ralph 0. Meyer Larry Young Guy S. Vissing Don Lomax Stuart Rubin B&W Kim O. Stein j

DeWayne L. Husser I

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SAMPLE DATA SAMPLE DATE = SEPTEMBER l', 1980 RCS I-131 ACTIVITY = 0.5324 uCI/ML RCS I-133 ACTIVITY = 0.6697 uCI/ML ESCAPE RATE COEFFICIENT MODEL RESULTS ASSUMED RCS LETDOWN FLOWRATE = 70 GPM RCS I-131 ACTIVITY FROM ONE FAILED FUEL PIN = 0.006998 uCI/ML RCS I-133 ACTIVITY FROM ONE FAILED FUEL PIN = 0.009679 uCI/ML NUMBER OF FAILED FUEL PINS 0.5324 uCI/ML 1-131 0.006998 uCI/ML 0.6697 uCi/ML I-133 0.009679 uCI/ML PERCENT FAILED FUEL 70

% FAILED

=

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ANO-1 CORE LOADING PLAN CYCLE 4 00XY 00X0 CCHS 00X5 00XW A

lCCX7 00HM 00WU 01EL 00XT OiFG 00WO 30H3 00XR B

C30 C1H C31 R-03 00JB 01EG CCWV 01G3 CCHS 01EJ 00hD 01EW 00XS 01EN 00GZ C

B215 CH3 8219 C52 B20V C38 820U C57 820T 00XF 01EP }0XS 31EV' 00HW OiEZ 00HS OiFN CCHR 01EA 00WZ 01EH 00Xi D

B216 C10 320Y ACH 821P C13 B21N A05 820X C16 820S 00J9 00Y3 'b1EB CCHX 31FI 00H7 01F1 CCHA 01FM 00HJ OiEU 00YO 00HC E

C55,320Z C35 C23 S21M CCS 8213 C26 820W C47 00J831E9[g 00WX 00WP OiG2 30WY 01FA 00JC 01FB 30X4' 01F4 00JA OtG1 00XS 00XD I

C28 9217 A33 321A(C60 S20A C95 S209 C59 8212 A06 8200 CSS 00XA '31Fh7 00H1 01FD 00H3 01G0 00JC 00WS 00HY 01FF 00HH 01F9 COHP OiFV 00XS 6

C50 SaiS C21 8209 C12 C18 9208 C05 821K C90 00HE 00XV 01EC 00HU 01EX 30H5 00WM 1A41 00WT 00JG 01FJ OCHS O!EQ 00Y2 00HQ H

C08 B218 C07 BaiR, C91, C61 C99 B210 C19 B20G C20 00XH 01FH '0 0J3' 01FK 00JD OiFY 00HF COWL 00H9 01FR 00HV 01FL 00H9 01FS 00XE

.K C98 B21T C17 820C CC6 C29 8207 CCS B21F CH2 31F6{30Xf31FC 00GW 01FE 30Yi 01ET 00JS OiEY CCWN 00Y9 00XX 00WR 01F8 00GX L

C27 821C A02 SP.iB; C58, 320D C37 620E, C56[B20N A07 82CH C99 20H2' 00XZ '31FP 00HN OY7 ECHG 01F0 00J1 01F5 00HL 01F2 00YS DOHZ M

C99 3210 C32 32iE[, C15 821H, C11 B20P C29 820F C59 x

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U Source !.0. (R=4egenerative) or Control Ccmo.1.D. (C=CRA, A=APSRA, B=SFRA)

Retainer I.D. (RTXX = BPRA Retainer; L*** = Source Retainer)

Note: All FA I.D.'s are prefaced by NJ0.

The Lead Test Assemblies (LTA's), wnich are underlined, each contain reduced diameter fuel l

pellets as well as 4 rocs with annular fuel pellets; the LTA's underlined twice also con-tain 8 secmented fuel rods each.

The Standard Control Assemblies (SCA's), wnich are starred have windows in the end grids; the double starred SCA also has annealed structural tuoing.

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- RPD DEPENDENCE (~45 EFPD'S) -

RPD*

PERCENT RANGE LEAKERS W/IN RANGE 0.40 - 0.59 4 0F 40 10%

0.60 - 0.89 0 0F 9

0.90 - 1.09 5 0F 48 10%

1.10 - 1,29 3 0F 48 6%

1.30 - 1,41 12 0F 32 38%

I

  • RELATIVE POWER DENSITY = ASS'Y AVG, PWR./ CORE AVG. PWR,

. MORE FREQUENT OCCURRENCE IN HIGH-POWER LOCATIONS

=

J ANO-1 CYCLE 4 LEAKERS l

BATCH DEPENDENCE -

1 F

BATCH LEAKERS PERCENT OF BATCH 6

9 0F 64 14%

5 6 0F 56 11%

4 9 0F 56 16%

1 0 0F 1

TOTAL 24 0F 177 13.5%

LEAKERS DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THREE BATCHES N0 BATCH DEPENDENCE y

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ANO-1 CYCLE 4 LEAKERS

- BURNUP DEPENDEilCE~-(~ 45 EFPD'S) -

BURtlVP PERCENT RANGE, MWD /MTU LEAKERS W/IN RANGE

< 2,000 9 0F 64 14%

i 7,600 - 9,100 2 0F 32 6%

11,400 -13,700 4 0F 24 17%

l 16,100 -19,000 2 0F 29 7%

19,800 -21,400 7 0F 28 25%

. LEAKERS DISTRIBUTED OVER ALL BURNUP RANGES

, NO DISTINCT CORRELATION WITH BURNUP l

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OPERATIONAL DATA POWER HISTORY

+ STEADY STATE POWER

, -v30 DAYS PRIOR TO I0 DINE INCREASE

+ CORE POWER TILT

. TILT POSITIVE IN " LEAKER" OUADRANTS ( 2.5%)

+ AUGUST STARTUP

. STARTUP WITHIN B&W GUIDELINES

. DETAILED FLAME MODELING

- NO LARGE Axw/FT

( >l)

- NO ABNORMAL Kw/FT (10 - 11 Kw/FT)

+ NO UNUSUAL R0D MOVEMENT CONCLUSION:

NO OBVIOUS POWER RELATED " TRIGGER" EVENT i

TILT.MAY BE SECONDARILY RELATED TO LEAKERS

SYSTEM BEHAVIOR

+ NO SIGNIFICANT TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS

+ NO SIGNIFICANT SYSTEM IMBALANCE

+ NO OBVIOUS CHEMISTRY IMBALANCE CONCLUSIONS:

- NO OBVIOUS SYSTEM RELATED " TRIGGER" EVENT,

MANUFACTURING PARAMETERS FUEL PELLET

, DIMENSI0tlAL

- DEllSITY

- DIAMETER

- LENGTH

, CHEMICAL

- IMPURITIES (FE, HALOGENS)

- M0ISTURE (PRE & Post DRYING)

- 0/U CONCLUSION:

NO ABNORMALITIES

FUEL PELLET BATCH - 4

.5

. LOTS

, MAX. (SIflGLE LOT) - 4 ASSEMBLIES BATCH - 5

,7 LOTS

, MAX. (SINGLE LbT) - 2 ASSEMBLIES BATCH - 6

, 10 LOTS

. MAX, (SINGLE lot) - 4 ASSEMBLIES

+ CONCLUSION:

NO INDICATION OF LOT DEPENDENCE

b-i CLADDING

. DIMENSIONAL I.D.

0.D.

OVALITY

, CHEMICAL COMPOSITION 1-

- IMPURITIES 1

i

~

CONCLUSION:

NO ABNORMALITIES J

4

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4 CLADDING BATCH - 4

, 15 CLAD LOTS

, MAX, (SINGLE lot) - 4 ASSEMBLIES BATCH - 5

, 14 CLAD LOTS i

, MAX, (SINGLE LOT) - 2 ASSEMBLIES BATCH - 6

, 17 CLAD. LOTS

. MAX, (SINGLE LOT) - 4 ASSEMBLIES I

+ CONCLUSION:

4 NO INDICATION OF LOT DEPENDENCE 4

f t

L l

l

SUMMARY

. LEAKER ASSEMBLIES EVENLY DISTRIBUTED

- 9 BATCH 11

- 6 BATCH 5

- 9 BATCH 6

. FABRICATI0f1

- EACH BATCH SIflGLE CAMPAIGN

- rul YEAR SEPARATION

. NO APPARENT LOT DEPENDENCE

- CLAD

- FUEL PELLET

+ FAILURES OCCURRED "SIMULTANE0USLY"

+ FAILURES APPARENTLY HAVE POSITI0tl DEPENDENCE

+ FAILURES APPARENTLY HAVE POW $R LEVEL DEPENDENCE

+ N0 " TRIGGER" EVENT IDENTIFIED

s.

{

VISUAL EXAMINATIONS OF

^

ANO-1 FUEL /.SSEMBLIES Assembly No.

Cycle 4 Outage PIE Exam I

Batch 6 01E9(Leaker)

Yes Yes OlF6 Yes Yes 01F3 Yes Yes OlF7 Yes Yes OlEV Yes No i

OlEB Yes No i

OlFW Yes No i

OlFP Yes No OlFC Yes No

-OlFU(Sound)

Yes No OlEQ Yes No l'

Batch 5 1

00XS (Leaker)

, yC5 Yes 00XM yC5 Yes 1

00X4 NO Yes 4

00Y1 No yes 00WY No

-Yes 00XJ n

5 00WZ (Sound) n 3

l Batch 4 00HG(Leaker)

No Yes 00JI No Yes 00J3 No '

Yes 00H5 No Yes 00J5 Yes Yes

-00JB(Sound)

'Yes No 4

I

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