ML20050C164
| ML20050C164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Crane |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1982 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Simpson A SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050C153 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204080228 | |
| Download: ML20050C164 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES g
P' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
i WASHINGTON, D
- M565
% * * * * *,o March 22, 1982 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Alan K. Simpson, Chairman s
Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D. C.
20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Last October the Nuclear Regulatory Commission provided testimony to you on nuclear accident cleanup insurance legislation (S-1606) introduced by Senator Heinz.
In that testimony we supported prompt steps to overcome the finan-cial problems which are hindering the cleanup of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear po'wer plant.
It is now three years since the TMI-2 accident and the financial problems, if anything, appear further from solu-tion than they did last fall.
My fellow Commissioners and I therefore want to emphasize our belief that the cleanup of TMI-2 must be accelerated.
The potential for slow degrada-tion of containment integrity and equipment capability plus the increasing concern for a'n unexpected release of radio-active material argue that, as a last resort, it is time for the Federal Government to take a more aggressive role.
A more detailed explanation of our concerns is enclosed.
Our purpose in pointing this out to you is to ask that you support: (1) establishing some form of funding that will guarantee a rapid cleanup; and (2) DOE plans to take posses-sion and dispose of the entire damaged reactor core as soon as technically feasible.
We believe greater Federal participation in assuring finan-cial viability is a prerequisite to an acceptably rapid program.
If the owners of the damaged reactor go bankrupt, the cleanup will still have to be done and the entire job and associated costs may fall upon the Federal Government.
That possibility has recently become more likely.
Restart of the undamaged Unit 1 reactor at Three Mile Island is the principal element in the owner's plan to finance the cleanup of Unit 2.
Serious new technical problems, however, now indicate a 6-12 month or longer delay before Unit 1 could be in a position to generate any revenue.
This setback adds a new degree of urgency to the increased Federal involvement we are recommending for clean up of TMI-2.
820408022B 820322 PDR ADOCK 05000244 T
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The Honorable Alan K. Simpson 2 We support DOE's decision to accept and manage all the high-level waste, including taking possession of the entire core of the damaged reactor for research and eventual disposal.
For our part, we in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are committed to a timely as well as thorough execution of our responsibility to regulate the cleanup of THI-2 in the interests of public health and safety.
Commissioner Gilinsky adds that he agrees with the Commis-sion's statement regarding the pressing need to assure adequate financing for a prompt cleanup of TMI-2.
- However, he thinks th'e Commission should limit its advice to health and safety questions and leave it to the President and the Congress to strike a balance among the competing equitie: of the licensee, the affected States, and the Federal Government.
I would be pleased to meet with you to discuss this matter further.
Sincerely, (h
)
t Nunzio a
adino
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
The Honorable Gary Hart l
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ENCLOSURE The TMI-? reactor and related facilities have remained in a condition for which they were not designed for three years.
Only limited progress has been made in the cleanup, 1/ and uncertainties about long-term plant capabilities persist.
Even though TMI-2 is presently in a safe shutdown condition and public health, safety and the environment are being adequately protected, this situation is not certain to remain stable.
If TMI-2 is allowed to remain in its present condition over the long term, accidents involving radiation leakage and subsequent exposure to workers and the public have a greater probability for occurrence.
The potential for these adverse events 2/, although small now, will increase with time as THI-2 equipment deteriorates.
Such deterioration will be the inevitable result of maintenance limitations in areas of the THI-2 facility where high radiation fields persist.
Since the radioactive fission products and the damaged fuel presently contained in the reactor and the cont.ainment building will remain radioactive for an extremely long time, potential leakage of radioactive materials to the environ-ment will continue to pose a serious threat until the fuel is removed, the facilities are decontaminated and all radioactive wastes are disposed of safely.
In combination with mechanical deterioration over time, natural phenomena (e.g., unexpectedly severe weather) and l
other adverse scenarios (e.g., fire) pose a potential threat to continued successful containment of TMI-2 contamination l
and stored waste.
Although the likelihood of severe weather or a fire resulting in a radiation release to the environ-ment is small, the possibility does exist, and the proba-bility for such events occurring increases with time.
Only the completion of all cleanup and radioactive waste disposal activities at the THI-2 site will eliminate all possibility of inadvertent radioactive releases.
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2 Footnotes
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March 1982 Status of TMI-2 Cleanup:
Within several weeks of the accident, the decontamination of contami-nated areas in the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings was initiated and approximately 70 percent of the area has been decontaminated.
However, some of the more difficult areas to clean up were bypassed.
Other significant cleanup accomplishments include the purging of the contaminated atmosphere from the reactor building, the processing of accident-related water which collected in the auxiliary and reactor buildings, and the shipment of some of the radioactive solid waste generated as a result of cleanup activities.
Approxi-mately 750,000 gallons of moderately contaminated water from the auxiliary building and 600,000 gallons of highly contaminated water from the reactor building have been processed.
The reactor building has been purged of the 45,000 curie inventory of Kr-65 which collected during the accident.
Lastly, 22 low-level waste resin liners generated as a result of accident water processing, and large quantities of other low radiation level waste, have been shipped to a commercial burial site-for disposal.
While the cleanup completed to date represents a degree of progress toward total plant cleanup, a great deal of difficult work remains to be done.
About 5% of the highly contaminated water remains in the reactor building (approximately 30,000 gallons) and 90,000 gallons in the reactor coolant system require proces-sing.
The balance of the most contaminated floors and surfaces in the auxiliary building remain to be decon-taminated.
Although a large-scale experiment for gross decontamination is in progress in portions of the reactor building, the entire reactor building will have to undergo detailed decontamination.
The most diffi-cult task ahead, defueling of the damaged core, is not anticipated to be completed for at least several years.
Following defueling, the reactor coolant system sur-faces will require decontamination.
The processed accident-generated water will require ultimate dispo-sition and the higher level solid. waste resulting from water processing and other decontamination activities will require o.ffsite shipment to a commercial or Federal facility for disposal or research, as appro-priate.
Finally, the damaged fuel assemblies and reactor vessel internals will require offsite disposition.
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Potential Health and Safety Events:
Specifically, potentially adverse public health and safety events fall in two general categories:
(a)
Accidents resulting in worker exposures -- leakage from valves, pipes or tanks which does not reach the environment but which does expose workers either accidentally or while attending to the problem.
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Accidents resulting in radioactive releases to. the environment -- leakage resulting from a breach of the reactor building or processed water storage i
tank integrity and airborne releases generated by a mishap inside the plant and not removed by the plant's filtration system.. There is also potential for releases from the interim storage of radioactive waste materials external to the plant buildings.
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