ML20050B812
| ML20050B812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kay J YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-02-03.A, TASK-02-03.B, TASK-02-03.B1, TASK-02-03.C, TASK-2-3.A, TASK-2-3.B, TASK-2-3.B1, TASK-2-3.C, TASK-RR LSO5-82-03-110, LSO5-82-3-110, NUDOCS 8204070441 | |
| Download: ML20050B812 (11) | |
Text
ib March 31,1982 Docket No. 50-29 LS05 03-110 Mr. James A. Kay
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Dear Mr. Kay:
SUBJECT:
YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - SEP TOPICS II-3.A, II-3..
II-3.B.1 AND II-3.C. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION In order to complete our review of the subject hydrology SEP topics, additional information is needed.
Please provide answers to the en-closed questions within 30 days of receipt of this request.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, Driginni cirmnd byt Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief 5
Operating Reactors Branch No. 5
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Division of Licensing
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3 881 M6 Mu
Enclosure:
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YANKEE Docket N2. 50-29 Mr. Jaires A. Kay cc Mr. James E. Tribble, President Yankee Atomic Electric Company 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Greenfield Conmnity College 1 College Drive Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301 Chairman Board of Selectmen Town of Rowe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Facilities Siting Council 14th Floor One Ashbarton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Resident Inspector Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC Post Office Box 28 Monroe Bridge, Massachusetts 01350 i
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CCIC'F G 0*'ICI?iAL Cert,'.I,1cd Ey 4; ?i6
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BACKGROUND
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This Request for Additional Information (RAI) is the result of an evaluation of the information contained in NRC Docket No. 50-29 (Yankee Nuclear Plant) relating to hydrological considerations. The four topics for which further information is sought are Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)
Topics II-3.A (Hydrologic Description), II-3.B (Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements), II-3.B.1 (Capability of Operating Plants to Cope with Design Basis Flooding Conditions), and II-3.C (Safety-Related Water Supply - Ultimate Heat Sink). The information obtained from this RAI will be used with o*ber docketed information concerning hydrological considerations at the Yankee plant to resolve outstanding issues under those SEP topics.
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t Topic II-3.A - Hydrologic Description i
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The purpose of this topic is to identify those plant interfaces with the hydrosphere that may require special plant design or operating limitations-with regard to floods and water supply requirements and the identification of surface and ground water uses that may be affected by plant operation.
These hydrologic considerations may have changed since they were reviewed at the licensing stage. A review of such changes, if any, should be performed including an assessment of their impact on the plant.
d ITEM 1 CONCERN There is an absence of information about the storm water discharge system for the Yankee Nuclear Plant yard.
REQUEST Provide the design basis for the plant area storn ' drainage network.
Include in this design basis analysis the following items:
A) The rainf all rate and duration considered, B) The routing of flood runoff on the site, C) Roughness coef ficients of ground surface employed in the design analysis, D) The presumed antecedent moisture condition; and E) Any other assumptions used in the design basis evaluation.
ITEM 2 r
CONCERN Local flooding from small streams adjacent to the site may cause flooding of the plant area during the probable maximum precipitation.
REQUEST Provide any studies which focus on rainfall runoff in minor tributaries adjacent to the site.
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T Topic II-3.B - Flooding Potential and Protection Requirements The purpose of this topic is to identify the design basis flood level for l'
the plant and site, under current licensing criteria, resulting from all potential flood sources external to the plant and site.
It includes the evaluation and discussion of significant differences between the levels or values used for design and construction and those derived under current licensing criteria. The evaluation includes the effects of flood and of e
changes in hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads on safety-related structures, systems, and equipment. The discussion includes features of existing or
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proposed flood protection measures such as revetments, flood walls, or doors, andemergencyoradministrativeprocedureb.
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ITEM 1 CONCERN Groundwater thuctuations ci changes in loads applied to buildings and flood protection' structures.
L'ne chosen design basis groundwater level should give reasonable certainty that it will not be exceeded at the plant 1
site.
Safety-related structures must be able to withstand the combined loads of design basis groundwater level and safe shutdown earthquake;
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REQUEST s
Provide the design basis groundwater levels (if any) used in the initial design of the Yankee Nuclear Plant.
To ensure that these are reasonably conservative values, provide all onsith groundwater measurements, referenced to the ground surface.
Specify l
i how long groundwater levels were monitored and stato -whether this period included seasonal fluctuations.
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ITEM 2 i
CONCERN I
f Local probable maxiaum precipitation (PMP) can cause ponding on the if rooftops. Design inadequacies in rainfall control can induce significant l
hydrostatic loads.
It is riecessary to verify that the roofs of safety-related structures can withstand the stresses resulting from PMP and other normal loads that are combined with PMP.
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l REQUEST Past practice indicates that verification of structural adequacy may be provided by either of the following methods:
1.
Where the structural distress level for each safety-related roof, I
expressed in ponded rainfall depth combined with other appropriate normal coincident loads, exceeds the height of the parapets around the roof, provide that structural distress level and the height of the parapets.
2.
Where the structural distress level for the roof of any safety-related building is less than the height of the parapets, provide the following data:
the area of roof confined by parapets a.
b.
the elevation of the roof and the elevation of the parapet walls above the roof c.
the design basis (construction) of the roof in pounds per square foot d.
the number, size, and elevation of
- 1. cuppers e.
if credit is taken for a roof drainage system, provide the capacity of the drainage system and justification for the percent blockage assumed including ice and other possible debris f.
if the above information is provided in the form of drawings, they should not be reduced and should be readily legible.
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ITEM 3 CONCERN Ponding from precipitation and runof f f rom areas adjacent to the site may present a hazard to safety-related structures and equipment housed in them.
REQUEST Provid? a list of structures housing equipment needed for safe shutdown.
For each such structure, specify the location and elevation of the lowest non-watertight openings and provide the lowest limiting elevation of safety-related equipment. To facilitate the review of this information, provide archi-tectural elevation view and plan view drawings which are keyed to the locations of the lowest non-watertight opening for each safety-related building.
ITEM 4 CONCERN It is noted that flood protection structures exist on-site and that flooding phenomena will initiate insertion of stop-logs at entrance gateways.
Such emergency procedures should be documented and incorporated into the plant technical specifications.
REQUEST Provide the most current flood emergency procedures for Yankee Nuclear Plant.
If more than one procedure is used, identify the application of each procedure. Also, indicate whether these flood emergency procedures are referenced or incorporated within the plant's technical specifications.
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i Topic II-3.C - Safety-Related Water Supply (Ultimate Heat Sink) i This topic reviews the acceptaolilty of a particular feature of the cooling water system, namely, the ultimate heat sink (UHS). The review is l
based on current criteria contained in Regulatory Guide 1.27, Rev. 2, which is an interpretation of General Design Criterion (GDC) 44, " Cooling Water," and GDC 2, " Design Bases For Protection Against Natural Phenomena," of 10CFR50, o
Appenoix A.
GDC 44 requires, in part, that suitable redundancy of features be provided i
for cooling water systems to ensure that they can perform their safety function. GDC 2 requires, in part, that structures, systems, and components l
important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of ability to perform their safety functions.
Regulatory Guide 1.27 has been specifically cited by NRC's Regulatory Requirements Review Committee as needing consideration for backfitting operating reactors. This guide is used in judging whether the facility design complies with current criteria.
The UHS, as reviewed under this topic, is the complex of water sources, including necessary retaining structures (e.g., a pond with its dam or a cooling tower supply basin), and the canals or conduits connecting the sources to the cooling water system intake structures, but excludes the intake structures themselves. The UHS performs twe principal safety functions:
(1) dissipation of residual heat af ter reactor shutdown and (2) dissipation of residual heat after an accident.
I SEP review of docketed information on the Yankee plant produced the J
following facts from the Hazards Summary Report [1], a January 3,1974 i
submittal (2 ), and FRC's technical evaluation report [3] on systems needed for safe shutdown.
o The UHS for the Yankee plant is the water confined behind the Deerfield River Dam to rorm Sherman Pond.
o Circulating and service water suction is from the bottom of Sherman Pond at elevation 925 ft through a vortex-eliminating intake crib g
located approximately 180 f t from shorte and rises through a 120-f t corrugated steel pipe to the entrance of tha screen well house.
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s The discharge of plant cooling water is directed to the discharge seal o
pit. The water is discharged to Sherman Pond over a weir with an adjustable crest normally at 1002 f t.
The water is returned at the pond surface and near the Sherman Hydroelectric Plant intake to ensure that warmed discharge water passes at once downstream.
The minimum operating level in the pond is 988 ft.
o According to drawing 9699-FM-38F, " Circulating Water System Plan," this level is the lowest level permitting operation of the hydroelectric station, which must operate to prevent recirculation and overheating of the pond when the plant is operating. Other elevations of interest are Low normal in pond 992 f t Average in pond 998 ft Sufficient demineralized water is available onsite to conduct a o
cooldown from normal operating temperatures to 330*F.
The time required to conduct this cooldown varies from 48 to 8.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, depending upon the steam vert paths assumed.
ITEM 1 CONCERN The capacity of the ultimate heat sink should be sufficient to provide cooling for the period of time needed to evaluate the situation and to take corrective action.
In addition, the ultimate heat sink should be able to dissipate rejected heat to ensure that design temperatures of scfety-related equipment are not exceeded. During a prolonged dry period and under certain possible conditions of hydroelectric power operation of the Deerfield River l
system, circulation of Sherman Pond water through the condenser could produce higher pond temperatures. The UHS must be able to dissipate the maximum l
possible total heat, including the effects of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) under the worst combination of adverse environmental conditions.
REQUEST I
Verify that the operation of the hydroelectric system and severe natural i
phenomena do not adversely affect the capability of the UHS to dissipate sufficient heat following a LOCA or plant shutdown. Clarify whether the need to have the Sherman hydroelectric facility operating is an environmental or safety concern.
Specifically, identify those situations in which the amount ll\\
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4 of water flow through the Sherman hydroelectric facility is critical to the i
l cooling water temperature at Yankee
's intake.
In making this determina-tion, consideration should be given to the environmental factors which would tend to increase pond temperature and to the potential for recirculation between cooling water discharge and intake.
If the flow is critical, then provide any transient analyses of pond tenperature performed which demonstrate the capability of the Yankee UHS.
Describe any plant technical specification which includes provisions for actions to be taken in the event that conditions threaten partial loss of the UHS.
ITEM 2 CONCERN Because of the importance of the sink to safety, the heat sink function should not be lost due to natural phenomena, site-related events, or a single failure of manmade structural features. A large lake and a cooling lake with a seismic-designed submerged pond are cited as examples of acceptable heat sinks in Regulatory Guide 1.2 7.
Although Sherman Pond and the other reservoirs upstream can be categorized as equivalent to a large lake, the heat sink function at Yankee could be lost by failure of either the corrugated steel inlet piping or the Sherman Dam.
REQUEST Describe how the heat sink function is maintained following the occurrence of severe natural phenomena or catastrophic failure of the dam or inlet piping.
A cooling capacity of less than 30 days may be acceptable if it can be demonstrated that replenishment or use of an alternate water supply can be effected to assure the continuous capability of the sink to perform its safety function, taking into account the availability of replenishment equipment and limitations that may be imposed on freedom of movement following the occurrence of severe natural phenomena.
Provide a discussion of the emergency procedures to be followed.
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REFERENCES i
1.
Final llatards Summt.ry Report l
Yankee Yankee Atomic Electric Company a
2.
L. E. Minnick (YAEC)
Letter to Directorate of Licensing
Subject:
Proposed Change to the Technical Specification of License No.
.e DPR-3 January 3, 1974 3.
G. J. Overbeck (WESTEC)
Technical Evaluation Report: Systems Needed For Safe Shutdown, Yankee Nuclear Plant i
Franklin Research Center
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August 14, 1981 TER-C52 57-310 1
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