ML20049J367
| ML20049J367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1982 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, SD-413-82-03, SD-413-82-3, NUDOCS 8203170633 | |
| Download: ML20049J367 (3) | |
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Vice PatsiotNT ICLEPMolut; Anta 704 Svtane Paoouctions March 2, 1982 3 7 3-
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O Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissior.
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-7 101 Marictta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 C/c 0n Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
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Unit 1
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Docket No. 50-413 s., > - -, -
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report SD 413/82-03.
Very truly yours, 9 (D. /
William O. Parker, Jr RWO/php
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Attachment cc: Director Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attorney-at-Law U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 314 Pall Mall Washington, D. C. 20555 Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Mr. P. K. Van Doorn Palmetto Alliance NRC Resident Inspector 2135 Devine Street Catawba Nuclear Station Columbia, South Carolina 29205 c
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J DUKE POWER COMPAhT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION Report Number: SD 413/82-03 Report Date: March 2, 1982 Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Identification of Deficiency:
Unauthorized alterations were made to Rotork EMO on valve tag INS 020A, Rotork S/N A 3157E4. The following alterations were found in terminal block compartment:
1.
Stud #22 had been wrung off, removed and replaced by stud #43.
2.
Stud #44 had been damaged.
3.
Wire #22 which goes from Add-on-Pak to terminal #22, had the lug replaced at terminal #22 by an oversized lug.
4.
The 0-Ring that seals the terminal block compartment was broken.
These deficiencies were identified on Nonconforming Item Report No.
13745 dated 1-12-82.
During the investigation of the above items, similar problems were found on valves INS 012B and 1KC001A.
Initial Report:
On February 1, 1982, Mr. Ignatonis of NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified of this deficiency by W. O. Henry and H. E. Edwards of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina.
Supplier and/or Components:
Valve tag 1NS020A is Duke Item 9D-207. The valve is a 12 inch Westinghouse gate valve. The EHO is Rotork Model 70NAX2.
Description of Deficiency:
The above alterations were made by Duke construction personnel during wiring of terminals. Alterations were not authorized and quality assurance procedures were not followed when the alterations were made.
Analysis of Safety Implications:
Valve INS 020A is Class lE, active. It is interlocked by switches in the Rotork Add-on-Pak to valve INS 018A. Valve INS 020A must close to allow 1NS018A to open during containment spray realignment from refueling water to recirculation from containment sump. The Rotork operator is subject to postulated high energy line break environments. The broken 0-Ring could possibly allow entrance of steam and water which could cause mal-
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function of the Rotork operator and Add-on-Pak limit switches. The broken 0-Ring would therefore violate environmental qualification of the Rotork EMO. This deficiency could affect one redundant channel of the Containment Spray System.
The other affected valves (lNS012B and 1KC001A) discovered af ter the initial report are also active and have Class lE EMOs.
Corrective Action:
The EMOs on valve tags 1NS020A, INS 012B, and 1KC001A will be repaired and restored to qualified condition by June 30, 1982. Repairs will be covered by appropriate quality assurance procedures.
The work crew responsible for these unauthorized repairs has been identified.
All safety related active EM0s wired by the crew will be inspected and any identified problems will be reported to NRC and resolved as required. The crew responsible for these unauthorized repairs has received additional instruction and training on required procedures for safety related EMOs and is now using these procedures.
Duke considers this deficiency to be an isolated case at Catawba, and not applicable to other Duke projects.
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