ML20049H822
| ML20049H822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1982 |
| From: | Mardis D FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.2.16, TASK-TM 3F-0282-17, 3F-282-17, TAC-48298, NUDOCS 8203040139 | |
| Download: ML20049H822 (2) | |
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M Power C 0 e r O a a f e 0 es February 26,1982
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File:3-0-26 RCUDIVED Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief p
g Operating Reactor Branch #4 M A9 0 0 79S2 A
-l Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (g
Washington, D.C. 20555
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Subject:
Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 NUREG-0737, item II.K.2.16 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Damage
Dear Mr. Stolz:
Florida Power Corporation (FPC) has reviewed your letter of January 21,1982 (received January 25, 1982), requesting our commitment, description of method and schedule for resolution of Item II.K.2.16 based on your determination that either of the following actions will resolve the Item: (1) confirmatory experimentation demonstrating the RCP seal integrity is maintained af ter two (2) hours of coolant deprivation and quenching as a result of reinstating seal injection water; or (2) automation of the cooling systems such that seal injection water is automatically maintained following loss-of-offsite power; or (3) reanalysis of FSAR Chapter 14 transients and accidents demonstrating the seal failure will not result in unacceptable consequences.
In NUREG-0737, the Item II.K.2.16 Position is to "(e) valuate the impact of reactor coolant pump seal damage and leakage due to loss-of-scal cooling upon loss of offsite power. If damage cannot be precluded, licensees should provide an analysis of the limiting small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) with subsequent reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal damage."
On December 10, 1979, FPC responded to an NRC Request for Additional Information (Hancock to Reid). That response stated, in part, that "...significant seal degradation would not be expected up to a period of approximately one (1) hour after (the time at which offsite power is lost)."
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82203040139 820226 PDR ADOCK 05000302 g
p PDR General Office 3201 Tmrty fourin street soutn. P O. Box 14042. St. Petersburg. Ferida 33733 813-866-5151
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3 Mr. John F. Stolz February 26,1982 Page 2 A test, as described in a ASME Technical Paper No. 80-C2/PVP-28, " Loss of Component Cooling Water Capacity of a PW(R) Reactor Coolant Pump" indicates that a Byron-Jackson pump operated without seal component cooling water flow for 30 minutes without any significant increase in RCS leakage. The total leakage did increase, but it returned to pre-test valves af ter component cooling water was reestablished. The seal did show signs of degradation, but it did not catastrophically fail and become a small break LOCA.
Experience with seals similar to those installed at Crystal River Unit 3 corroborates the results of the test described above. This is considered to be similar to the loss of seal water flow to a static pump due to a loss-of-offsite power event.
Crystal River Unit 3 Emergency Procedure, EP-101, " Unit Blackout," in Section 1.0,
" Complete Loss of External AC Power Supplies," lists the opeator follow-up actions (Section 1.4) after a loss-of-offsite power. Steps 1.4.8 requ.es the operator to very b
slowly reestablish RCP seal injection in order to prevent thermal shock to the seal. The procedure calls for increasing the flow to each seal from two (2) gallons per minute to eight (8) gallons per minute over a thirty (30) minute period. This is less than the one (1) gallon per minute per minute increase stated in the December 10, 1979 letter.
(The supply for seal water injection must be manually started when the emergency diesel generators power the emergency busses subsequent to a loss-of-offsite power event. This can be accomplished within 30 minutes from the time of the loss-of-offsite power and in fact was performed within 4 minutes during our incident on June 16, 1981.)
Based on the above information, FPC has determined that additional actions, beyond those referenced above, are not necessary to assure the integrity of the RCP seal (s) during a loss-of-offsite power and thus protect the health and safety of the plant personnel and the public.
For further clarification or additional information concerning FPC's position, please contact this office.
Very truly yours, OJ&A David G. Mardis Acting Manager Nuclear Licensing RMB:mm cc:
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, GA 30303 Y
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