ML20049A608
| ML20049A608 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1981 |
| From: | Delgaizo T Franklin Research Ctr, Franklin Institute |
| To: | Huang Y Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049A609 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-79-118, CON-NRC-3-79-118, TAC 08859 NUDOCS 8107280638, TER-C5257-21 | |
| Download: ML20049A608 (18) | |
Text
.
i I
~
TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE RATE TESTING CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT
~
l NRC DOCKET NO. 50-213 NRCTACNO. 08859 FRC PROJECT C5257 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC43-79-118 FRC TASK 21
/
1 Preparedby Frank!In Research Center Author:
T. J. DelGaizo The Parkway at Twentieth Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:
T. J. Delcaizo Preparedfor Nuclear Regulatory Cornmission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:
Y. S. Huang July 23, 1981
,~t l
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States, l
Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, l
makes any warranty, expressed or impiled, or assumes any legal
'llability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.
1 A
- 0. Franklin Research Center l
1 h./ 6' '/ '2 8 @ 5 6 )( A i
A Division f The Franklin Institute The Ben,emn Franun Pertwey. PMa Pa 191c3 (215) 448-1000
\\
TER-C5257-21 CONTENTS Section Title Pace 1
1 BACKGROUND.
2 EVALUATION CRITERIA.
2 3
TECHNICAL EVALUATION 3
3.1 Type B Testing of Containment Airlocks.
3 3.1.1 Airlock hating Exemption Request 3
3.1.2 Airlock Testing hchnical Specification Change e
5 Request.
3.2 Type C Testing of certain containment Isolation valves.
5 3.2.1 RER System (Penetrations P-1 and P-2) 5 3.2.2 Main Steam and Feedwater Lines (Penetr ations P-42 through P-49) 6 3.2.3 Service Water Tc and From Containment Recircula-tion Units (Penetrations P-51 through P-58).
7 3.2.4 N Supply (Penetrations P-20) 8 2
~
3.2.5 Reactor Coolant Charging (Penetrations P-8)'and RCP Seal Witer Supply (Penetrations P-74 through P-77) 8 3.3 Type C Msting with Water as a Test Medium in Lieu of 9
A}r or Nitrogen 3.4 Type C Testing in the Direction Opposite That of Post-10 Accident Containment Pressure 3.5 Acceptance Criteria for Type B and Type C Testing.
12 4
CON:LUSIONS..
13 5
REFamCES.
15 iii N
- 1. J FrankJin Researth Center a w s N r- -
TER-C5257-21 1.
BACKGtOUNC In response to an NRC letter of January 2, 1975 (1], the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) submitted poposed technical specifica-tion dianges for the Haddam Neck plant that were intended to implement the containment testing requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J.
Se poposed techni-14, 1975 (2].
cal specification changes were forwarded in a letter dated March In a letter dated April 11, 1975 [3], the NRC staff requested additional jus-tification for each section of Appendix J for which exemption was sought.
CYAPCO responded on May 28, 1975 (4), requesting certain exemptions from the requirements of Appendix J.
l Subsequently, CYAPCO submitted correspondence which provided additional I
information relative to these exemption requeets, modified the exemption requests or sought additional exemptions (5 through 11], and proposed additional changes to the Technical Specifications for Haddam Neck ll2 and In addition, meetings were conducted between the NRC staf f and 13 ].
regesentatives of CYAPCO on December 2, 1976 (14] and November 17, 1977 (15]
during which the status of the containment leakage testing pcogram at the l
Eaddam Neck plant and the various submittals by CYAPCO were discussed.
We purpose of this report is to provide technical evaluations of all outstanding requests for exemption from the requirements of 10C$50, Appendix
.J, and all outstanding proposed changes to the hehnical Specifications for In order to Haddam Neck relative to the containment leakage testing program.
fu,1f tll this objective, Mtc has categorized the content of the correspondence outlined above into five issues and has technically evaluated the requests for We issues exemption or technical specification changes contained therein."
l I
ar e n 1.
Type B testing of containment airlocks Type C testing of certain containment isolation valves 2.
Type C testing with water as a test medium in lieu 3.
of air or nitrogen Type C testing in the direction opposite that of post-4.
accident containment pressure
~
5.
Acceptance eriteria for Type B and Type C testing.
l l
@r...; Franklin Res,earch Center a w.s n. -
TER-C5257-21 2.
EVALUATION CRITERIA Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 (10CFR50), Appendix J, Containment Leakage Testing, provided the criteria upon daich the submittals were evaluated. The criterion for a specific issue is either referenced or briefly stated, where necessary, in support of a determination or conclusion.
In addition, in recognition of plant-specific conditions which might give rise to circumstances not specifically covered by the Regulation, the NIC directed that the technical evaluations constantly es@asize the intent of Appendix J, that potential containment atmos @eric leakage be identified, monitored, and maintained below established limits.
/
N 6
,. t 9
9 D' T.'. Franklin w,earch Center Res
TER-C5257-21 3.
TECHNICAL EVALUATION 3.1 TYPE B TESTING OF CONTAINMDIT AIRLOCKS 3.1.1 Airlock 'Itsting Exemption Request In Reference 4, CYAPCO requested an exemption from the requirements of Appendix J in order to test containment airlocks at 6-ecnth intervals only.
CYAPCO stated that the design of the airlock hatch makes more frequent testing impractical, specifically because the hatch does not employ a double-O-ring design. Further, CYAPCO stated that monitoring of leakage from the personnel hatch is accomplished, on a continuous basis, by the continuous monitoring system (CMS), which has scoven by experience to be sensitive to any signifi-cant leakage that could result from use of the hatch between the semiannual tests. In addition, CYAPCO requires a visual inspection of hatch seals on a weekly basis and is implementing a " soap bubble" technique during these inspections.
In Beference 7, CYAPCO stated that the CMS was capable of detecting a containment air leakage rate of 0.01t/ day over a short period of time follow-ing the first series of airlock openings, that the CMS instruar.nt'ation had an accuracy of 924, that the leakage rates calculated by the CMS were determined at 1.5 psig, and that CYAPCO believed the sensitivity of the soap bubble tech-nique, although difficult to quantify due to its dependence on actual test conditions, was sufficient to detect tignificant leakage.
l
,. s
(
In Reference 10, CYAPCO modified its position regarding the testing of containment airlocks to require a reduced pressure airlock test (10 Esig) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of every first of a series of openings between the 6-month tests. In this letter, CYAPCO stated that its airlock testing program would include:
1.
A test of the personnel hatch assembly at peak calculated accident pressure (Pa) of 40 psig at 6-month intervals.
2.
A reduced pressure (10 psig) test of the personnel hatch assembly within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of every first of a series of openings during the interval between 6-month tests.
O_
~ _3
.... F*anidin Research Center A towem W *% Fremma mismaae
TER-C5257-21 A conservative extrapolation of the results of the reduced 3.
pressure test to full pressure (Pa) to determine accept-ability.
1he above tests to be conducted whenever containment 4.
integrity is required.
CYhPCO further stated that the CMS is sufficient to detect any apsreciable leakage through the personnel hatch but that the grocedure cutlined above would provide better quantification of that potential leakage.
l CYAPCO proposed to commence this testing yrocedure following the 1979 refueling outage.
Evalua tion. Reference 10 was written in 1978. Effective October 22, 1980, the NRC revised Section III.D.2 of Appendix J with regard to the f
In essence, this rule change requirements for testing containment airlocks.
requires the. testing of containment airlocks at peak calculated accident pressur e (Pa) every 6 months (and following periods when the airlock has been opened while containment integrity was not required), but permits reduced pressure testing of airlock door seals within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />'s of opening (or every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during periods of frequent opening) when certtainment integrity is In view of CYAPCO's modified position of Reference 10 and the requir ed.
l revised requirements of Section III.D.2, an exemption from Appendix J l
is no longer required.
In addition, FRC has reviewed CYAPCO's Irocedure for extrapolating full (Special pressure data from the results of the reduced 3ressure test haintenance Procedure SPL 10.7-20, Rev.1) and finds that it is an acceptable method for determining the correlation factor, Irovided that the procedure is used with sufficient frequency to ensure that the leakage characteristics of the airlock have not changed significantly in the interim between the special procedure testings,and that it is used following any major maintenance to the Per example, this airlock which could alter airlock leakage characteristics.
procedure could be used at each 6-month Pa airlock test until experience shows that the correlation factor will remain essentially constant for a longer The Licensee should establish a minimum frequency for period of time.
per formance of the special procedure.
. +___
.,LU. Franidin Research Center A W af The Fremma e=sumwie
TER-<5257-21
- 3.1.2 Airlock hsting Technical Specification Change Request In Beference 13, CYAPCO proposed a revision to the hchnical Specifi-cations for Haddam Neck regarding the testing of containment airlocks.
The proposed Technical Specification reads as follows:
The personnel air-lock assembly shall be leak tested at not less than 40 psig at least once every 6 months. If the airlock is opened during the interval between these tests, and containment integrity is required, the air-lock door seals shall be tested at not less than 10 psig within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the first of a series of openings.
The 10 psig test results shall be conservatively extrapolated to a leakage rate at 40 psig.
Evalua tion. 1his proposed technical specification change is acceptable in view of the revision to Section III.D.2 of Appendix J, effective October 1980. FRC interprets this wording to mean that a new series of openings coz::mences with each reduced fressure test (i.e., at no time when containoent integrity is required will an airlock be opened without testing within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />). However, to avoid any confusion, it is advisable that this specification be reworded to more closely parallel the wording of the revised Section III.D.2.
3.2 TYPE C TISTING OF CERTAIN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES In Reference 4, CYAPCO identified 40 containment penetrations which are not locally leak tested and for which exemptions from the testing require-ments of Appendix J were requested. Of these,16 penetrations were spare pdnetrations which are seal-welded shut and therefore do not require Type C testing in accordance with Appendix J.
In Reference 7, CYAPCO provided additional justification in support of the exemption requests for the remaining 24 penetrations. Technical evaluations of the exemption requests for these penetrations are provided in the following subparagraphs.
3.2.1 RER System (Penetrations P-1 and P-2) l CYAPCO requested exemption from the Type C testing requirement of Appendix J for penetrations P-1 and P-2, RER supply and return lines to the j
reactor coolant system. CYAPCO's basis for this request is that these are not conta inmen t isolation valves which can become leakage barrief s in the event of 4-d.2 Frankhn m aRewarth Center
~-
TtR-CS257-21
'a single active failure to the system. CTAPCO believes that adding isolation valves to either penetration would create a condition in which isolation valves could fail in the closed position and RER, vital to safe shutdown of the plant, would be lost.
Evalua tion.Section III.A.l(d) of Appendix J requires that the contain-o ment isolation valves in systems that are normally filled with water and operating af ter the accident must be tested in accordance with Type C procedur es.
Section II.B further defines containment isolation valves as those valves which are relied upon to perform a containment isolation function.
The isolation valves in penetrations P-1 and P-2 (10-in motor-operated isolation valves 780, 781, 804, and 805) are normally shut during plant operations and remain shut in the post-accident condition. Any potential f
leakage of containment atmosphere through these penetrations is prevented by the RHR system which will be filled with water and operating in the past-accident condition despite any possible single active failure. Since these valves are not relied upon to perform a containment isolation function, Appendix J does not require that they be tested, and therefore, no exemption from the requirements of Appendix J is necessary.
3.2.2 Main Steam and Feedwater, Lines (Penetrations P-42 throuch'P-49)
CYAPCO has requested exemption from the Type C testing requirements of Appendix J for penetrations P-42 through P-49, the main steam and feedwater lines. CYAPCO's basis for this request is that these systems inside the containment are seismically designed and the penetrations would not become containment leakage paths in the event of a limiting single active failure.
In addition, main steam and feedwater penetrations of PWRs are not required to be tested in accordance with Section II.B of Appendix J.
Evaluation.Section II.H.4 of Appen?ix J excludes Type C testing of main steam and feedwater isolation valves of PWRs (unless testing is required by II.H.1 to II.H.3), since it specifically requires testing of these valves in BWRs but does not mention PWRs. This is because the main steam and feedwater l
. ~
J. A Franklin Research Center a n a w vm.ma.
TER-C5257-21
. systems in PWRs are not directly connected to the reactor coolant system and do not rupture as result of a loss of coolant accident (IDCA). Consequently, these systems are not generally subject to post-IDCA leakage of containment atmosphere. At the same time, to preclude possible post-eccident air leakage due to steam generator tube leakage, the Licensee should establish post-accident pocedures to saintain generator water level above the tube bundle and also to gessurize the secondary side to a pessure greater than Pa as soon as practical following the onset of the accident.
CYAPCO has indicated that Section II.H of Appendix J does not require testing of the main steam and feedwater isolation, valves at Haddam Neck.
Assuming procedures to gevent air leakage due to tube leaks are established, these valves do not require testing because they 'are not relied upon to prevent the escap of containm'ent air, and no exemption from the requirements of Appendix J is necessary.
l t
3.2.3 Service Water To and From Containment Recirculation Units (Penetr ation s
(
P-51 throuch P-5 8)
(
CYAPCO requested exemption from the Type C testing requirements of Appen-dix J for Mnetrations P-51 through P-58, service water to and from the con-tainment recirculation units. CYAPCO's basis for this request 14 that the penetrations do not become leakage paths for containment atmosphere even con-sidering the possibility of a single active failure. CYAPCO has also indjca,ted that the service water system is a seismically designed closed system with isolation valves which are not relied upon to per form a contain-l ment isolation function, considering a possible single active failure.
l l
Evalua tion. Appendix J does not require Type C testing of isolation' l
i valves in closed systems inside containment which do not rupture as a result of a IDCA.
Ibrthermore,Section II.B of Appendix J defines containment I
isolat.an valves as those valves relied upon to perform a containment isolation function. Consequently, Appendix J does not require that these valves be tested. No exemption from the requirements of Appendix J is neces-sary.
e 4-1 i
..d. Frank!in Res,earch Center i
a w a m.~amme
TER-C5257-21
- 3.2.4 N2 Supply (Penetration P-20)
CYAPCO requested exemption from Type C testing requirements of Appendix J for penetration P-20, the nitrogen supply line to the pressurizer relief tank.
In Reference 7, CYAPCO stated that this line is not seismically designed and the isolation valve (check valve 3/4-in C-32-557) could become a containment leakage barrier if the pessurizer relief valves were to open or the nitro-gen supply syrten were to fail. In order that this valve not become a leakage barrier, CYAPCO proposed to install two additional deck valves inside the containment and to seismically qualify the line between the three check valves.
In Reference 9, however, CYAPCO indicated that after reviewing all possible alternatives, it was decided that this valve would be Type C tested with
/
i nitrogen.
l Evalua tion. Since the Licensee has indicated that this valve will be t
Type C tested in accordance with Appendix J, no exemption is required and no further evaluation is necessary.
3.2.5 Reactor Coclant Charcing (Penetration P-8) and RCP Seal Water Supply (Penetrations P-74 throuch P-77)
CYAPCO requested exemption from the Type C testing requirements of Appen-dix J for penetration P-8, the, reactor coolant charging penetrat, ion, and pene-trations P-74 through P-77, the reactor coolant seal water supply penetrations of the chemical and volume control system. In order that the isolation valves ofl,.t!kse penetrations not become containment leakage barriers, CYAPCO proposed to seismically qualify the piping from the water sources to the isolation 1
- This, valves, including the piping connected to the RHR and darging peps.
in conjunction with the fact that the discharge pessure of the pumps is much higher than the containment accident pressure, would cause leakage through these penetrations to be into the containment and not out. Thus, CYAPCO l
maintains that no Appendix J Type C testing would be required.
Evaluation.Section III. A.1(d) of Appendix J requires Type C testing of containment isolation valves which are directly connected to the reactor cool-Section II.B defines containment isolation valves as those valves ant system.
1
)
-e-l l
,,.U FrankJr Research Center a :- w N rrw.sa -
l 1
TER-C5257-21
' relied upon to perform a containment isolation function. FRC concurs that if CYAPCO can modify or qualify the piping from the source of water to the isola-tion valves such that water pressure higher than Pa will be maintained at the isolation valves, the vals as are not relied upon to per form a containment isolation function and, therefore, Type C testing would not be required.
Consequently, CYAPCO's Iroposal will be acceptable once the qualification of tne piping has been completed, and no exemption from the requirements of Appendix J will be needed.
3.3 TYPE C TESTING WITH WATER AS A TEST MEDIUM IN LIEU OF AIR OR NITROGEN In Reference 4, CTAPCO requested to substitute liquid collection or liquid displacement techniques for testing with air or nitrogen as a medium as required by Appendix J.
CYAPCO stated that design limitations necessitated the use of the liquid techniques. In order to relate the measured liquid rate to an air leakage rate, CYAPCO proposed using a correlation based on ORNL-NSIC-5. CYAPCO stated that these methods had been used extensively in the past at Haddam Neck and were felt to yield acceptable results.
In Beference 7, CYAPCO stated that it was evaluating a correlation at various test pressures which had been developed by another PWR licensee and was then under NRC staf f review. CYAPCO and Northeast Utilities' Service Com-
,pany (NUSCO) believed that the correlation could be applied to Appendix J testing at the Haddam Neck plant. CYAPCO proposed to apply this correlation to,.the specific design at Haddam Neck upon approval.of the correlation by the NRC.
Evaluation.Section III.C.2 of Appendix J requires that Type C testing of containment isolation valves be performed with air or nitrogen as a medium because the objective of Appendix J is to test the ability of the containment boundary to prevent the leakage of containment atmos;ttere. Consequently, testing with air or nitrogen as a medium is desirable since these media most closely represent the actual post-accident containment atnesphere. However, where it becomes preferable to perform local leakage tests with water as a medium because of system design or other cor:siderations, such as minimizing l
l 4.... Franian Res,eerth Center A Cpmence ed % rwuse pustee
TER-43257-21
- exposure to plant personnel, the objective of Appendix J can be achieved if an acceptable method is used for correlating measured liquid leakage to equiva-lent air leakage or where the hydraulic test'is employed to demonstrate the existence of a water seal.throughout the post-accident period.
Nevertheless, it has been shown to be very difficult ta establish a feasonable correlation between liquid leakage and air leakage because of the e
low flow rates and unpredictable leakage path characteristics involved. Te date, no such correlation has been accepted by the NRC.
Consequently, at this time, hydraulic testing in lieu of pneumatic testing is acceptable only where the hydraulic test is used to demonstrate an effective water seal at the penetration, which is therefore equivalent to the water-seal system of Section III.C.3 of Appendix J.
Itaere hydtaulic testing cannot be used to demonstrate a water seal, substitution of hydraulic testing for pneumatic testing is not i
authorized.
3.4 TYPE C TESTING IN IEE DIRECTION OPPOSITE THAT OF POST-ACCIDDIT CONTAINMENT l
PRESSORE l
~ '
In Reference 8, CYAPCO responded to a question. from the NRC staff, which originated in the Office of Inspection and Irifercement, regarding valves which were being tested in a direction opposite that of post-accident containment pr essur e. Reference 8 indicated that CYAPCC, in conjunction with NRC I&E personnel, had determined that an appropriate criteria for determining the acceptability of reverse direction testing would require that:
,. A 1.
test pi' essure tends to unseat the valve and accident pres-l sure tends to seat the valve, or l
l 2.
the seating force be at least 10 times greator than the test pressure force.
Based upon thls criteria, CYAPCO evaluated the isolation valves that are tested in the reverse direction et the Baddam Neck plant. The result of this i
evaluation was that one valve (DH-IV-5 54 ) had a seating force only 5.2 times 1
greater than the test pressure. CYAPCO proposed to sodify the actuator of this valve to increase the seating force to at least 10 t' mes greater than the i
rankLn Research Center a w n.n
. ~
TER-C5257-21 CYAPCO also identified a manual ball valve (VH-V-507) which
- test pressure.
did not meet the above-sentioned acceptance criteria for reverse direction testing. CYAPCO requested an exemption from the requirements for this valve, stating that ball valves seal well from either direction because the pressure dif ferential force (equal to the seating force) tends to seat the ball on the CYAPCO did not believe that the addition of a' 2-in stop a
downstream seat.
valve and a test connection necessary to test this valve in the forward direction was warranted for this reason and also by reason of the excellent Subse-leakage record of two identical ball valves in penetration P-71.
quently, however, in Reference 9, CYAPCO agreed to modify this penetration in order to test this valve in the forward direction.
Evaluation.Section III.C.1 of Appendix J permits testing isolation valves in the direction opirsite that of its safety function if it can be determined that the results of the tests for a pressure applied in the FPC opposite direction provide equivalent or more conservative results.
concurs with the criteria used by CTAPCO to determine if the Appendix J requirements have been cet, particularly since CYAPCO has also proposed to revise or write procedures to require that the valves be torqued to the values necessary to provide the 10 times greater seating force whenever 'they are closed. In the case of ball valve VH-V-507, however, DC finds that testing s
in the reverse direction does not fulfill the requirements of Appendix J.
Although ball valves seal well in either direction, and this type of valve has a p history of leak-tightness, testing in the reverse direction does not v'erify the integrity of the valve's contact sur faces required to seat during accident conditions. Consequently, FRC concurs with CYAPCO's commitment of Reference 9 to modify this penetration to permit testing in the forward dir ection.
DC finds th'at no exemptions are necessary for the valves which meet the CYAPCO acceptance criteria, since these valves may be tested in the reverse l
direction in accordance with Appendix J.
In view of CYAPCO's commitment to make provisions to test valve VH-V-507 in the direction of its safety function, no exemption from the requirements of Appendix J is necessary.
l 41.... Frankhn Resenten Cea,ter a w as N nw.ar e.amme l
TER-CS257-21 3.5 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR TYPE B AND TYPE C TESTING In Reference 12, CYAPCO proposed to modify the Technical Specifications for the Haddam Neck plant to require that the sua of measured local leakage from all penetrations and isolation valves not exceed 0.6 La.
~
Evaluation. Ibis requirement is in accordance with Sections III.B.3 and III.C.3 of Appendix J and is therefore acceptable.
i l
l
~
l P
1 l
l
. G.!J Frankhn Research Center 4Md%FM W l
l TER-C5257-21 4.
CONCLUSIONS FRC conducted technical evaluations of outstanding Licensee submittals regarding the implementation of 10CFR50, Appendix J, Containment Leakage Test-ing, at the Haddam Neck plant. De conclusions of these evaluations are set forth belows 9
CYAPCO's proposal to test containment airlocks at the reduced o
l pressure of 10 psig within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the first of every series of openings during the interval between 6-month Pa air tests and to t
l conservatively extrapolate the results to 40 psig (Pa) is acceptable. No exemption from the requirements of Appendix J is necessary because of the revision to Section III.D.2, effective l
October 1980. Special Maintenance Procedure SPL 10.7-20 is an acceptable method for determining the extrapolation correction factor.
me isolation valves in the following pe'netrations for which o
exc=ptien from the Type C testing requirements of Appendix J were requested do not need exemptions because Appendix J does not require
(
that they be tested:
RER system (penetrations P-1 and P-2)
- Main steam and feedwater lipes (penetrations P-42 through P-49)
Service water to and from containment recir-culation units (penetrations P-51 through P-58)
- Reactor coolant charging (penetration P-8)
- RCP seal water supply (penetrations P-74 through P-77)
Exemption from the Type C testing requirements of nitrogen o
supply valve 3/4-in C-32-557 is not necessary. The Licensee has itemitted to perform this Type C testing in accordance with Appendix J.
Type C testing with water as a test medium in lieu of air or o
nitrogen is acceptable only where the hydraulic test is used to demonstrate a water seal at the penetration throughout the Ecst-accident per iod.
- Chee certain post-accident procedures are established.
"Once the proposed qualification of piping has been completed.
4,J.J Franadin Research. Center aw wwr a
u.
TER-C5257-21 a
CYAPCO's proposals for reverse direction testing of certain o
isolation valves is acceptable with exception of valve VH-V-507, which must be tested in the direction of its safety function. De Licensee has committed to mdify this penetration to permit this testing.
ne following proposed technical specification changes for the o
Haddam Neck plant have been found acceptable as related to containment leakage testing (Section 4.4):
Reference 12 (Mtal leakage from local testing not to exceed 0.6 La)
Reference 13 (Changes related to airlock testing).
[
1 l
l l
l l
D l
.,;;J Frank!in Research Center A Commaan of TM Frerwea vemmeer
TER-C5257-21 5.
RITERENCES 1.
E. J. Brunner (NRC, I&E Region 1)
Intter to D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO)
January 2,1975 2.
D. C. Switzer (CTAPCO)
Intter to R. A. Purple (ORB-1)
March 24,1975 3.
R. A. Purple (ORB-1)
Imtter to D. C. Switzer (CTAPCO)
Apcil 11, 1975 4.
D. C. Switzer (CYAP.T)
Intter to R. A. Purple (ORB-1)
May 28, 1975 5.
D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO)
IAtter to R. A. Purple (ORB-1)
August 20, 1976 6.
D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO)
Intter to A. Schwencer (ORB-1)
December 27, 1976 7.
D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO)
Ietter to A. Schwencer (ORB-1)
August 8,1977 8.
D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO)
Intter to A. Schwencer (ORB-1)
Se ptember 19, 1977
,. ~ %
9.
W. G. Counsil (CYAPCO)
Letter to D. L. Ziemann (ORB-2)
June 12, 1978
~
10.
W. G. Counsil (CYAPCO)
Ietter to D. L. Ziemann (ORB-2)
November 13, 1978 11.
W. G. Counsil (CYAPCO)
Intter to D. L. Ziemann (ORB-2)
July 24, 1979 12.
D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO)
Letter to A. Schwencer (ORB-1)
June 27, 1977 4..J.' Franklin Res,earch Center a w w m --
TER-C5257-21 13.
W. G. Counsil (CRPCO)
Intter to D. L. Ziemann (ORB-2)
September 21, 1979 14.
NRC/CYAPCO Meeting December 2, 1976 15.
letc/CYAPCO Meeting November 17, 1977
+e-
0 e
G h.h') Frankhn Res,earch Center L a w w n.
.