ML20045J224
| ML20045J224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1993 |
| From: | Larson C GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Kelly G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045J155 | List: |
| References | |
| CLL-93009, NUDOCS 9307230190 | |
| Download: ML20045J224 (4) | |
Text
E d!7J M T' W --~1GYIE G WJ AB.'R Projset l-San Jo'se,- California f
CLL-93009 r
f l
t r,m cc:
L. G. Frederick
/V J. D. Duncan 5
S. Vieweswaran Ler Bk 1
June 17. 1993 To:
C. L. Larson, M/C 489 i
From:
Seismic Analysis Changes to ABWR RAF
Subject:
Attached are revised sections of 19K.5 and 19K.11.7 for the ABWR Ther.s sections reflect changes in the FRA input to RAF with regard SSAR.
to seismic analysis.
These new sections will replace the sections of the same number in Also attached is a the version of Appendix 19K that is in Amendment 28.
description is modified to part of Table 19K 4 in which the " Component" agree with the revised Sections 19K.3 and 19K.11.7.
mao m*'Au" '
I will also g + 1 fiv m Jiu "m mL8
,QLf.5eewrner Iormat.
If you have any questions about the above information, please call.
aAA 6 C. L. Larson Principal Engineer ABWR Project X 3702 Post-it" brand fax transmittal memo 7671 aof pues
- T Attachments OENY WVl.l4 ~"0. lb $ SO N U SN R C.
Ge fPL-Phone #
'" 5 0 /.fb '/ *2. 7. 6 O g jgg Faz #
f i
9307230190 930630 PDR ADOCK 05200001
. n]._
[
A PDR
.m p
[
~
seructures, systems and Components" for 19x.5 Detsrmination of "Important seismic Analysis seismic analysis considers the potential for core damage from plant The results of the seismic analysis The damage resulting from a seismic event.
to reactor identified key features by consideration of those SSCs important shutdown or to decay heat removal which could potentially be damaged by seismic action.
low probability The sciemic margins analysis calculated high confidence, accident sequences and classes of failure (HCLPF) accelerations for importantThe analysis showed that all SSCs in th of accidents.
equal to or greater than 0.60g, or twice the 0.30g of the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
The two methods that were used to identify important SSca from the standpoint of seismic analysis are the following:
Identification of the SSCs whose failure would provide cue shortest path to core melt in terms of the number of failures required, and comparison of the seismic capacities of those SSCs.in terms of their effect
_ Identification of the most sensitive SSCs on accident sequence and accident clama HCLPFs resulting from variation of component seismic capacities.
The primary containment and the reactor building are the structures with since both have HCLPF greater than 1.1 no the lowest values of HCLPF, but Other SSCs special RAF activities are deemed necessary for these structures. seismic ana identified by the The diesel generators, 480Vac transformers, motor control centers and circuit breakers of the emergency ac power system The batteries, battery racks and char 5ers of the de power system The heat exchanger of the residual heat removal system The SLC tank, valves and piping and the motor driven pumps of the standby liquid control system The valves, pipin5 and diesel driven pump of the fire water system The discharge lines of the SRVs of the nuclear boiler system.
The RAF activities for important SSCs identified by this seismic analysis are S ven in Table 19K.11-1.
i
-1 19K 06/17/93
g g y g tgg ypeggy,
. v7;y -
- 1
?
i a
L19K.11.7 Seismic-Related Inspections The seismic capability of the. following equipment. is identified (Sub-
. emergency diesel generators, 480Vac section 19K.5) as risk-significant:
cransformers, motor control centers and circuit breakers of the fac power the SLC
-system;, batteries, battery racks and chargers of the de power syste system; the heat exchanger of the RHR system; the valves, piping and diesel y
and-the discharge lines of the SRVs. For driven pump of the fire. water system, this equipment,.the following seismic related inspections ^ should be conducted-
.i once every 10 years or after any earthquake equal co-or 5reater than the operating basis earthquake (OBE):
Repeat the seismic walkdown which was conducted after construction in.
1.
the general. area of the equipment.
(The examination for seismic vulnerabilitien described in EPRI NP-6041, not including a repeac of the calculational portion of the walkdown,;is one acceptable method of This examination will includeL accerritshing the desired inspection.
such issues as component functionality or integrity, component anchorage, and secondary component interaction.)
j Visually. inspect all related supporting devices and supportin5 i
2.
structures.
t 9
L 4
., 19K-5 ---06/17/93 u
I tu
[F 6,
M
.f.
FAILURE MODES & RAP ACT. IVITIES. (CONTINUED)'
TABLE 19Ke4,
.'UNATAIL-
+f,
{
ABILT W.,
TEST OR MAINTEMAalCS' FAILORE-FAILURE ^
RECCHMEW SD fa9l$rDNRifI felt!CAUG MAfiffE192g ~
_tuTERYAL
)& gig.-
SATE Structures e!
Strvetural failure of Seisato walkdown to assure 10 years Judgment.
N/A toergoney AC '
supporte during struetural integrity Visual inspection, support 10 years Judsmaat -
plA
- I
. Fever EDCe, seismic event 4BDVee Transa struetuses & devices.
formers, McCs &
After CBE or Judseent NIA atteult breaka Foot-earthquake evaluation
-eras DC larger quake.
I Batteries, Satterr Raaks &
Chargerat RRE f
Beat Esahanaerse
$LC Tank,
-Valves, Pipins &
l Pumpsi Valves.
Piptrs & Pump of ACIWA & SRV Discharge Pipins of the F35 I
1 k
i 4
t
'.' 19K-5 -- 06/17/93 k+
t 4
o q
y v
.-- -