ML20045G472
| ML20045G472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1993 |
| From: | Beach A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Graham P GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| References | |
| EA-93-167, NUDOCS 9307140017 | |
| Download: ML20045G472 (55) | |
Text
F,.
- pfG UMTED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f %_
=
j
- D REGION IV
?
'8 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 400 AR LINGTON, TEXAS 760114064
-(
JUL - 3 S93 Docket:
50-458 License: NPF-47 EA 93-167 Gulf States Utilities ATTN:
P. D. Graham Vice President (RBNG)
P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 7
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION This refers to the enforcement conference conducted on July 6,1993, at the Region IV office in Arlington, Texas, concerning activities authorized by NRC License NPF-47 for the River Bend Station.
The meeting was attended by those on the attached Attendance List. The subjects discussed at this meeting are described in the enclosed meeting summary.
It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and has provided a better understanding of the apparent violations identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-18 and your corrective actions. Any enforcement action taken will be addressed in separate correspondence.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss then with you.
erely.
1 ceach ivision of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
Meeting Summary w/ attachments cc w/ enclosure:
Gulf States Utilities ATTN:
J. E. Booker, Manager-Safety Assessment / Quality Verification P.O. Box 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704 9307140017 930708 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G
I
{
Gulf States Utilities,
Winston & Strawn ATTN: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.
1401 L Street,-N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005-3502 i
ATTN:
Les England,_ Director Gulf States Utilities Nuclear Licensing P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 t
Mr. J. David McNeill, III William G. Davis, Esq.
Department of Justice Attorney General's Office P.O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9095 H. Anne Plettinger 3456 Villa Rose Drive Baton' Rouge, Louisiana 70806
^
President of West Feliciana Police Jury P.O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Cajun Electric Power Coop. Inc.
ATTN:
Philip G. Harris 10719 Airline Highway P.O. Box 15540 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70895 Hall Bohlinger, Administrator Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 r
I P
e M
F1
)
JUb ~0 b00 Gulf States Utilities bcc to DMB;.(IE45) \\\\\\
bcc distrib. by RIV:
J. L. Milhoan Resident inspector Section Chief (DRP/C)
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 MIS System DRSS-FIPS RIV File Section Chief (DRP/TSS)
Senior Resident Inspector, Cooper G. F. Sanborn i
i 130004
q l
f
~
Gulf States Utilities bcc to DMB (IE45) bcc distrib. by RIV:
J. L. Milhoan Resident Inspector Section Chief (DRP/C)
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 MIS System DRSS-FIPS RIV File Section Chief (DRP/TSS)
Senior Resident Inspector, Cooper G. F. Sanborn RIygPE:DRP/C C:DRP/C/j Q$ [
f EkhlYns;df JEGagY6fardo (/AB k k 7M/93 7/7[93 d/93 h
F MEETING
SUMMARY
Licensee:
Gulf States Utilities (GSU)
.i Facility:
River Bend Station (RBS) l license No: NPF-47 Docket No:
50-458
Subject:
Enforcement Conference (50-458/93-18) b On July 6,1993, representatives of Gulf States Utilities' met with Region.IV personnel in Arlington, Texas, to discuss the apparent violations identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-18. The conference was held at the request of Region IV.
l t
The licensee presented a summary of the causes for the apparent violations and their corrective actions.
The attendance list and licensee presentation are attached to this summary.
t Attachments:
1.
Attendance List 2.
Licensee Presentation (NRC distribution only) l s
l
{
[
h
T ATTENDANCE LIST t
Attendance at the enforcement conference between Gulf States Utilities and NRC on July 6, 1993:
GSU P. Graham, Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group ~
J. Schippert, Plant Manager.
J. Booker, Manager, Safety Assurance and Quality Verification D. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations S. Radebaugh, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance J. Venable, Operations Supervisor B. Smith, Mechanical. Maintenance Supervisor P. Barker, Shift Supervisor l
J. Burton, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety Engineering
~
R. Biggs, Supervisor, Operations Quality Control i
r D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing D. Dawson, Control Operating Foreman M. Hora, Senior Nuclear Engineer NRC i
J. Milhoan, Regional Administrator, Region IV A. Beach, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
T. Gwynn, Deputy Director, DRP A. Howell, Deputy Director,. Division' of Reactor Safety' (DRS)
J. Gagliardo, Chief, Project Section C, DRP W. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, River Bend Station,'DRP E. Baker, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation D. Loveless, Resident Inspector, River Bend Station, DRP W. McNeill, Reactor Inspector, DRS G. Sanborn, Enforcement Officer, Region IV E. Collins, Project Engineer, Project Section C, DRP
't 1
1
ATTACHMENT 2 h
ENFORCEMENT CO:5FERENCE JULY 6,1993 GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY RIVER BEND STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 93-18 j
i
r:.
1 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AGEXDA JULY 6,1993 OPENING REMARKS PHIL GRAHAM MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW JOE SCHIPPERT AND EVENT DESCRIPTION EVENT INVESTIGATION, ROOT CAUSE, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MAINTENANCE STEVE RADEBAUGH QUALITY CONTROL B'OB BIGGS OPERATIONS DON DERBONhT JOE VENABLE SAFETY ASSESSMENT JOE BURTON CONCLUSIONS PHIL GRAEGI P
g
- g..
STUCK OPEN MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSN 9
EVENT HISTORY S
APPARENT VIOLATIONS S
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE 9
ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE 9
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l
i
~
G N
I D
L I
U v
B X
R R
O T
CA ER 2
20 F.
1 2
B N
M
A I
I S MD 8
A D
E SI 1
2B 6
B F
I N
RI L EA P V M M LE L
N L
I I
N A
U W
R S
T T
8 L
N 9
S E
0 M
M F
E G
1 N
2
'I B
P M
I VS T
GN I
D L
V I
U C
T B
EN I
B E
R N
U I
T DRU T
/
P
~
/
H
/ t i
JD
.i L
APPARENT VIOLATIONS 1
9 FAILURE OF MAINTENANCE WORKERS TO ENSURE SAFETY-RELATED WORK GOVERNED BY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES NRC IDENTIFIED 1
'I; e
LACK OF ADEQUATE QUALITY CONTROLS CONTRIBUTED TO MSIV FAILURE SELF IDENTIFIED i
9 FAILURE TO DETECT MSIV FAILURE BY OPERATORS SELF IDENTIFIED 9
PLANT OPERATION IN CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SELF IDENTIFIED i
O SURVEHLANCE PROCEDURE DID NOT ASSURE A FAILED MSIV WOULD BE DETECTED IN ALL CASES SELF IDENTIFIED
.I
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE l
9 NO ACTUAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE O
LOW POTENTIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE e
9 SIGNIFICANT INDICATOR OF BREAKDOWN IN.
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PERSOhWEL PERFORMANCE 5
t 5
i
MAIlNTENANCE 9
MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW INSUFFICIENT S
WORK PRACTICE DEFICIENCY O
WORK INSTRUCTIONS INCOMPLETE 9
PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE INADEQUATE 9
CRITICAL SELF-ASSESSMENT S
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOCUS ON ACCOUNTABILITY MAINTENANCE PACKAGE UPGRADE FmLD OBSERVATION PROGRAM 1
VALVE MODIFICATION TRAINING i
OPERATIONS S
MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW INSUFFICIENT S
TEST PROCEDURE HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES S
QUESTIONING ArniUDE NOT FULLY EFFECTIVE S
CRITICAL SELF-ASSESSMENT S
CORRECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION BROADLY BASED EXTENSIVE ONGOING l
7
MSIV MAIhTENANCE ISSUES S
DESIGN OF VALVE e
TROUBLESHOOTING EFFORTS PO 93-01 e
ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION e
ROOT CAUSE 9
CORRECTIVE ACTION
i l.
l L
W
+
c t
W,r y vv >ys P,,
,r i
i I!
$ ! R I. ). iPiI.
I.
.i F.
t k 4q [' !!
6 t'o cleed,
R e s Li m h { w n ( o. r o--
- c. ws. r
%, L ig h t-L u s k h d
~'
e O w-1) 8 to% dowr.
Q.) " Ak. '
i n.cw Pil.k I
,g,
1 $
* \\
j na s
Tob\\
f, _ _
f vah<
5WAe-j M
p
,i_
1" rit.l-s troke.
g a
y,g kN
\\
%m Poppd-i 1
m m moLATION VALVE O
d f
~
i
~*
1 STEM
/
/
STELLITE j
FACINGS
't j
/
SPRING
/
f f
/
FACINGS 7
/.
s
/
/
\\
s
-/
l f
/
/
STOP PLATE POPPET
+f-1 lrm
,/
i x
l
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
\\
/
,;l!'
\\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\'
/
t
/
/
/
INLET 4i.._
N N/
s
'////////////
///////////)
PILOT SPRING RETAINER RING ID RIVER BEND STATION UNIT 1 MSIV (IN CLOSED POSITION)
GUZJ' 374723..idr/ZJT/ES CO NO DATE REASON BY CHKD INSP APPD DRAWING NO.
SH l CONT i
NOTE 'DO NOT REVISE DRAWING MANUAILY
' ' ' ' ' * " ' " ' " * * ' ' ' ' " * * * ' ' ^"
e TROUBLESHOOTING EFFORTS S
STEM TRAVEL APPROXBIATELY 1" i
i e
POPPET WEDGED IN UPPER VALVE BORE e
LOWER GUIDE RIB WEAR O
POPPET TO GUIDE RIB CLEARANCE UNSAT AS FOUND G
STEM RUNOUTS VERIFIED SATISFACTORY S
STELLITE HARDNESS VERIFIED SATISFACTORY 11
ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION 9
FORMED MULTI DISCIPLINE TASK FORCE TWO INVESTIGATION PATHS SURVEILLANCE TEST FAILURE STUCK OPEN VALVE 4
HISTORY SEARCH MAINTENANCE LLRT CONDITION REPORTS INDUSTRY INFORMATION S
DESIGN REVIEW PIPING VIBRATION IIYDRAULICS DESIGN ENGINEERING PIPING WALKDOWN 8
CHECK INTERNALS OF B21*AOVF022C 9
LLRT ALL VALVES I 2-
a b
L ROOT CAUSE 9
EXCESSIVE GUIDE RIB WEAR 9
INADEQUATE CLEARANCE DUE TO MACHINIST ERROR i
9 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OVER RELIANCE ON VENDOR ASSISTANCE LACK OF GUIDANCE IN WORK INSTRUCTIONS LACK OF QUALITY CONTROL VERIFICATION LACK OF AWARENESS OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE MINIMAL ACCOUNTABILITY 13
1 1
i IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION e
VENDOR INFORMATION 8
WORK INSTRUCTIONS i
S COUNSELING OF MACHINISTS S
MSIV DIMENSION VERIFICATION S
LIMIT SWITCH MODIFICATION e
STROKE TESTING S
MSIV'S REPAIRED AND TESTED SATISFACTORILY IY l
2 LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION e
ADDITIONAL TRAINING IDENTIFIED S
WORK INSTRUCTIONS IMPROVEMENTS EMPHASIS ON DOCUMENTING MEASUREMENTS S
PLANNER REVIEWS / FEEDBACK IMPROVEMENTS S
DISCIPLINE REVIEW G
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW PROGRAM i
e MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS S
DESIGNATION OF SAFETY SIGNIFICAhT WORK 8
PRE JOB BRIEFINGS CHANGES e
AhTI ROTATION MODIFICATION IS i
~
^
l i
I QUALITY CONTROL INVOLVEMENT 4
IN MSIV REPAIRS j
t RF-4 MWOs FOR 1B21*AOVF022B & IB21*AOVF022C REQUIRED POST MACHINING DRIENSIONS TO BE TAKEN
~
9 QC PLANNER INSERTED NOTIFICATION POINT FOR QC VERIFICATION S
QC PLANNERS DELEmu NOTIFICATION POINT S
QUALITY CONTROL FIELD INSPECTORS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO VERIFY DBIENSIONS i
i
)
i 4
^
f M
ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION t
9 MET WITH ALL QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTORS TO DISCUSS EVENTS 9
INTERVIEWED QC PLAhWERS 9
MET WITH MAINTENANCE PLANNING AND ENGINEERING 9
CONDUCTED REVIEW OF OTHER MSIV WORK PACKAGES S
PARTICIPATED IN MULTI-DISCIPLINE TASK FORCE I
L 17 Y
4 t
ROOT CAUSE 9
PERSONNEL USING GENERIC MECHANICAL EQIEPMENT INSPECTION PLAN (QC /-0021, REV. 2) 9 CONTRIBUTION FACTORS NON-SPECIFIC INSPECTION PLANNING j
GENERIC / AMBIGUOUS PROCEDURES USE OF GENERAL CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATION FOR FORMULATION i
OF GENERIC INSPECTION PLANS I
i I8
i f
IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION O
COUNSELED QC PLANNERS 9
INSERTED NOTIFICATIO-N POINTS W11111N SUBSEQUENT MSIV MWOs TO VERIFY DBIENSIONS 9
VERIFIED VENDOR INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED WERE ENTERED INTO DOCUMENT CONTROL SYSTEM (VTI) 4 r
)
e I9 e
.e
SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION 9
IMPLEMENT JOB SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE PLANING FOR Q1/QAPA MWOs 9
REVISE QUALITY CONTROL PLANNING AND INSPECTION PROCEDURES / INSTRUCTIONS e
(QCI-3.2-AND QCI-3.7)
L 9
REVIEWED QC PLANNER'S TRAINING REQUIREMENTS l
2o i
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION l
9 EVALUATE BIPROVED OPERATIONAL PHASE MAINTENANCE SPECIFIC INSPECTION CRITERIA I
l 9
ESTABLISH QUALITY CONTROL PLANNER'$
GUIDE 9
DEVELOP TRAINING PROGRAM USING A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 9
REVISE GENERIC QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION PLANS USING MAINTENANCE SPECIFIC CRITERIA l
11
CONCLUSION S
QUALITY CONTROL PLANNERS WERE FOLLOWING PLANNING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES S
FOR THIS TYPE OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY, TIE PRACTICE ALLOWED BY QCIP-0021, REV.
2, WAS TO VERIFY / WITNESS ON A RANDOM BASIS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED BY l
AN APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION I
S THE DIMENSIONAL MEASUREMENTS-WERE NOT RANDOMLY SELECTED FOR VERIFICATION i
9 THE AWARENESS OF THE CRITICAL NATURE OF THIS AEASUREMENT WAS LACKING i
~2-2.-
.-A
I MSIV OPERATIONS ISSUES O
MSIV OPERATION / SURVEHLANCE 4
OPERATIONS SPECIAL INVESTIGATION i
TEAM O
ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Z
S CONCLUSION 1
t W
+
b
._6 J.a N
L t
P y 61
{!
n 7
g y
1
.I i.!:iPi.
8 I
M geg,gd-gwath @(.o.ve"c.ktA Eb u'
%, u.u. um s=,*L Csw-O 10% clows, (1.1 " s6ke. '.
7 R.0W
"'* \\
j g
i
,e, Tbb\\
vah<.
2__
l
,g IO" Hse
\\
r i
M p
L
.e sw p
r,, #
g Woke-htws.
- Wohe, s
M a m 9o p p t. h i
g g mg.ATION VALVE
..=..-
~^
l i
l 1
S MSIV DESIGN UNIQUENESS t
o PILOT VALVE DESIGN o
DUAL SAFETY RELATED LIMIT SWITCHES o
SINGLE NON-SAFETY RELATED LIMIT SWITCH i
G INSERVICE TESTING (IST) PERFORMED BY PARTIAL STROKE (REQUIRED QUARTERLY) 9 OPERATOR TRAINING ON THESE UNIQUE FEATURES OF MSIV
_j i
j I
LT
9 STP-451-0201 (RPS - MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION -
CLOSURE MONTHLY CHFUNCT) o VERIFY VALVE STROKE BY DUAL LIGHT INDICATION (T.S. 4.0.5) o VERIFY RPS FUNCTION (1/2 SCRAM) (T.S. 4.3.1.1) o PRECAUTION STATES 5.1 WHILE SLOW CLOSING THE MSIV'S, USE ALL AVAILABLE INDICATIONS TO DETERMINE THAT THE MSIV IS CLOSING. ONLY ALLOW THE MSIV TO CLOSE TO THE POINT WHERE:
5.1.1 THE MSIV INDICATES MID-POSITION, OR 5.1.2 RPS HALF-SCRAM IS INITIATED, OR 5.1.3 MSL FLOW CHANGES ARE INDICATED.
O PROCEDURE TITLE MISLEADING-o ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA MISLEADING 4
8.1 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST - LISTS STEP 7.4.5 8.2 PARTIAL STROKE TESTS - INDICATES VALVE TO COMPLETE CYCLE OF PARTIAL STROKE TRAVEL Zh I
s.
i I
O FAILED TO OBTAIN DUAL LIGHT INDICATION DATE 2-26 93 o
SS REVIEWED TECH SPEC, DRAWINGS, AND STP-051-0201.
o DISCUSSED WITH OFFICE SS AND OFF-GOING SS.
0 SS "ACCEFFED WITH COMMENTS" THE RESULTS OF THE STP (VIOLATION OF ADM-0015).
O MWO GENERATED TO FIX LIMIT SWITCH (IN q
DRYWELL)
O FOLLOWING MONTH SAME RESULTS ON STP-051-0201 WAS OBSERVED BASED ON PERVIOUS MONTH EVALUATION OF OPERABILITY ON SHIFT SS l
DETERMINED " ACCEPTED WITH COMMENTS" WAS APPROPRIATE DATE 4-1-93 i
9 COLD SHUTDOWN DATE/ TIME 4-18-93 / 0620 j
0 FOUND VALVE WOULD NOT CLOSE DATE/ TIME 4 19-93 / 2312 l
l 1
27 3
L ROOT CAUSE i
e PROCEDURE MISLEADING S
SHIFT SUPERVISOR - DISPLACING CONTROL ROOM FOREMAN (COF) IN PERFORMANCE OF STP S
OPERATIONS KNOWLEDGE OF MSIV INTERNAIS
. AND LIMIT SWITCH OPERATION O
MANAGEMENT DID NOT HOLD PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABLE TO SAFEIY CULTURE STANDARDS 2%
~
~
PROCEDURE REVISION O
PERFORMED A COMPLETE REVISION ON STP-051-0201 (RPS-MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE -' CLOSURE MONTHLY CHFUNCT).
o THIS INCLUDED THE USE OF AN IMPROVED OSP-005 CHECK LIST.
9 ADDED A DRAWING TO STP-4514201 FDR VISUALIZATION.
o THIS PROVIDES THE OPERATORS WITH A SIMPLE DRAWING IDENTIFYING ACTUAL SWITCH LOCATION AND FUNCTION.
9 IDENTIFIED IN THE STEPS OF STP-051-0201 THE REQUIRED SWITCH POSITION / FUNCTION.
o THIS ALONG WITH THE SIMPLE DRAWING WILL PROVIDE A VERY CLEAR IMAGE USABLE BY THE OPERATORS TO DEFECT POSSIBLE FAILURES.
i e
RESOLVED THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRECAUTION AND i
LIMITATION 5.1 AND STEP 7.4.5 FOR DUAL INDICATION AND REMOVED ALL CONFLICTING STATEMENTS.
9 STP-051-4201 WILL BE PERFORMED MONTHLY (PARTIAL STROKE).
STP-109-6302 WHL BE PERFORMED QUARTERLY (FULL "U#~
1 qq
EVALUATION OF STP'S S
REVIEWED THE IHSTORY OF STP-051-0201 REVISIONS.
o SIMILAR EVENT I2-12-86.
S STP-109-6302 (MSIV FULL STROKE / PARTIAL STROKE OPERABILITY TEST, REV. 4) DID NOT HAVE PRECAUTION AND LIMITATION 5.1. IT REQUIRED VALVE TRAVEL UNTIL i
DUAL INDICATION WAS RECEIVED.
t 9
REVIEWED ALL CURRENT (LAST PERFORMED) STP TEST EXCEFFIONS AND CURRENT STPS MARKED AS " ACCEPTABLE WITH COMMENTS".
O ALL STF'S THAT PERFORM BOTH TYPES OF SURVEHLANCE (STP'S AND IST'S) HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR "SPLTITING OUT".
s 4
A COMPLETE TECHNICAL REVIEW WILL BE PERFORMED ON' A MIL SPEC SAMPLE OF STP'S.
9 ON GOING ISE PROCEDURE UPGRADE 9
A REVIEW OF A MIL SPEC SAMPLE OF COMPLETED OPERATIONS STP'S DURING LAST 18 MONTHS FOR
" ACCEPTABLE WITH COMMENTS" O
THE HPES COORDINATOR HAS PERFORMED A BARRIER ANALYSIS ON ADM-0015.
3o
)
i
~
CREW IMPROVEME3T ITEMS S
OPERATIONAL SAFETY CULTURE O
PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE d
S TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION O
CONTROL ROOM CONDUCT S
(IN PLANT) OPERATOR INSTRUCTION / OVERSIGIrr G
DEGRADED EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION AND CONTINGENCY OPERATION O
CONTROL ROOM / OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT TEAMWORK O
ROLE RESPONSIBILITIES (SS/COF/STA)
~
3l
~^~
9 ENHANCE OPERATIONS OVERSIGHT o
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT o
QA o
TRAINING t
o SELF ASSESSMENT o
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT 9
STP REVIEW o
INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY ON COMING SRO/STA o
STP GROUP i
o SYSTEM ENGINEERING (ACCEPTABLE WITH COMMENTS)
)
-l 9
ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON IST PROGRAM 1
o WHAT IS IST?
o
. WHAT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTABLE RESULTS?
i o
ACTION IF NOT ACCEPTABLE 3t
\\
i
)
i 9
ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON CRITICAL TROUBLING j
COMPONENTS - FOR EXAMPLE o
MSIV o
TARGET ROCK SOLENOID o
MOV'S 9
DEVELOP & IMPLEMENT
" PROFESSIONAL OPERATORS DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION PROGRAM" 9
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE TRAINING i
e IMPROVE PROFESSIONAL DEMEANOR IN CONTROL ROOM o
COMPLETE CLEANUP IN CONTROL ROOM o
RELOCATE WORK MANAGEMENT OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM o
COMPLETE PURCHASE OF UNIFORMS o
COMPLETE PAINTING'OF CONTROL ROOM PANELS o
COMMUNICATIONS IN CONTROL ROOM o
ACCESS IN THE "AT THE CONTROLS" AREA 33
y i
CONCLUSION 9
DEFAILED INVESTIGATION 9
ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFIED 9
CORRECTIVE ACTION BEYOND EVENT O
PREVENT REPEAT OF PROBLEM 6
3+
e.
Y e
SAFETY SIGH 1FICANCE OF STUCK OPEN MSIV J. L. BURTON, P.E.
SUPERVISOR - NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEERING RIVER BEND STATION GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
PRESENTED TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE JULY 6,1993 w
3 >_
r.
I SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AETHODS/ ASSUMPTIONS DOSE IMPACT
)
PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSNENT (PSA)
CONCLUSION
~
ACCIDENTS ANALYZED WITH STUCK OPEN INBOARD MSIV (LER 93-006)
DESIGN BASIS REALISTIC MAIN STEAM LINE POTENTIALLY OK*
BREAK OUTSIDE RISK SIGNIFICANT CONTAINMENT (MSLB-OC)
RECIRCULATION LINE OK OK BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT (DBA-LOCA)
OK = EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB) AND MAIN CONTROL ROOM (MCR) DOSES BELOW REGULATORY LIMITS
MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK @UTSIDE CONTAINMENT (MSLB-OC) PIPING SCHEMATIC i
Guard Pipo I
Drywell Bu ig i
I I
^
[j A
A Flow Restrictor From F
RPV 1821*AOVF0228 1821*AOVF0288 1821*MOVF0988 l
/
/
Containment Uner
()J M
Break Exclusion Zone X
93062mk Atsis_V.Gt 1
o MSLB-OC ANALYSES CASE DESCRII' TION *AOVFO22B
- AOVF028R EAB DOSE MCR DOSE PROBABILITY IA DBA STUCK SINGLE OK REGULATORY LOW OPEN FAILURE LIMIT 1B DBA STUCK SINGLE OK OK VERY-LOW W/ ACTUAL OPEN FAILURE IODINES 2
DBA STUCK IIIGli OK OK LOW OPEN LEAKAGE
r MSLB - OC SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TBIE (SEC) 0 MSLB 3-5 MSIV ISOLATIONS 30 LEVEL 2 (-43")
HPCS/RCIC INITIATION HVC LOCA INITIATION NS4 ISOLATION 60 HVC FILTRATION OPERATING 1000 REACTOR PRESSURE
=
ATMOSPHERIC (100 %
IODINES RELEASED)
N
MSLB - OC METHODS / ASSUMPTIONS DJA DBA W/ ACTUAL IODINES MSIV FAILURE ASSUMES INUOARD STUCK OPEN ASSUMES INBOARD STUCK OPEN l
ASSUMES OUTBOARD STUCK OPEN AS OUTBOARD FAILS OPEN SINGLE FAILURE (INDUSTRY PROBABILITY CONSISTENT WITII RBS EXPERIENCE)
MSLB LOCATION OUTSIDE BREAK EXCLUSION ZONE DOWNSTREAM OF IB21*AOVFO28B (DOWNSTREAM OF JET IMPINGEMENT (MAXIMUM TIIOMAS CORRELATION WALL, UPSTREAM OF IB21*MOVF098B)
BREAK PROBABILITY)
MASS RELEASE ADJUST DBA MASS RELEASE FOR MSLB SAME AS DBA INSIDE DRYWELL TO ACCOUNT FOR FLOW RESTRICTOR, IIEAD LOSS TIIRU MSL AND MSIVs IODINES REG. GUIDE I.5 USES TECII. SPEC. LIMIT MAXIMUM MEASUREDIODINES ATRBS AND 20 TIMES TIIE TECII. SPEC. LLilIT DUE TO 1993 LEAKERS AND 20 TL4fES (IODINE SPIKE) ON IODINES TO CALCULATE MAXIMUM FOR IODINE SPIKE DOSE X/Q PUFF RELEASE.
CLOUD REACIIES MCR PUFF RELEASE.
PROBABILITY OF INTAKE PRIOR TO IIVC FILTER TRAIN g WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION TO OPERATION. WIND SPEED = I M/SEC TO REACII MCR BEFORE IIVC FILTER ALLOW TRANSIT WITIIOUT DISPERSION OPERATION BASED ON RBS MET.
TOWER DATA
MSLB - OC DOSE RESULTS IRIA DBA WITII ACTUAL IODINES MASS RELEASE (LBS)
MCR (60 SEC) 129,000 129,000 EAR (1000 SEC) 276,000 276,000 IODINES ( ci/gm)
TECII SPEC SPIKE 1993 SPIKE LIMIT (T/S *20)
LEAKERS (LEAKER
- 20) 0.2 4.0 0.016 0.33 TIIYROID DOSE (REMS)
MCR N/A 78 N/A 6.3 MCR LIMIT N/A 30 N/A 30 EAB 12 220 0.9 18 EAB LIMIT (NU' REG-0800) 30 30 (10CFR100) 300 300
MSLB - OC PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS (PSA)
O PROBABILITY OF MSLB:
-l l
THOMAS CORRELATION FOR 192 FEET OF MSL
= Pusi.s = 7.6 x 10'5/yr l
O PROBABILITY OF MSIV FAILURES:
INBOARD
= P = 1.0 i
OUTBOARD
= P = 3 x 10-3 DEMAND
/
1 PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REACHING MCR:
~
WINDSPEED RANGE 1.0 TO 2.4 M/SEC = P., = 0.48 WINDSPEED DIRECTION RANGE 161* TO 273
= P., = 0.25 e
RESULTS PROBABILITY OF UNISOLATED MSLB-OC = P, P, = P usi.s
- P
- P, i
= 7.6 x 10 5/yr
- 1.0
- 3 x 10-3 = 2.3 x 10-7/yr PROBABILITY OF MCR DOSE = Puca Puca = P,
- P.,
- P.,
4
= 2.3 x 10-7/yr
- 0.48
- 0.25 = 2.7 x 10 / T 3
b
' S MSLB-OC PSA CONCLUSIONS 1)
THE PROBABILITY OF UNISOLATED MSLB-OC IS 23%
OF THE NRC SAFETY GOAL FOR A LARGE RELEASE 4
FOLLOWING A CORE DAMAGE EVENT (1 x 10 PER YEAR). SAFETY GOAL IS FOR MUCH MORE SEVERE EVENT THAN THE MSLB-OC 2)-
THE PROBABILITY OF MCR PERSONNEL RECEIVING l
ANY DOSE DUE TO THE UNISOLATED MSLB-OC IS ONLY 2.7% OF SAFETY GOAL.
3)
FOR iHE ACTUAL IODINE LEVELS AT RBS, THE DOSE TO MCR OPERATORS WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS THAN REGULATORY LIMITS. COUPLED WITH VERY LOW PROBABILITY, THIS EVENT WOULD HAVE LOW SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
i i
i 5
,(
l's t.
OPERATIONS POLICY # 14 REVISION 0 May 20,1993 OPERABILITY OF EOUIPMENT IN A DEGRADED CONDITION
"... Decisions made concerning Operations, Maintenance and Engineering must always be made such that nuclear and personnel safety are ntytt compromised...."(Standards and Expectations)
It is the Shift Supervisors responsibility to determine operability of equipment and systems as it relates to the Operating License including the Technical Specifications. The requirements for operation of safety and many nmi-safety related components /sydems are included in the River Bend License.
Operability is verified by day-to-day operation, plant tours, control room observation, surveillance test program, and other similar activities.
Whenever the ability of a system or structure to perform its specified function is called into question, operability must be determined from a detailed examination of the deficiency. The detertninstion of operability is to be made promptly. If initially the system is not declared inoperable, we must have a reasonable expectation that the system is operable and that the review process ("A' level CR if required) will support this expectation. Otherwise the system or component should be declared inoperable.
Guidelines The SS/COF shall consider the following effects of operating a component / system in a degraded condition. (This includes annunciators and indicators).
personnel safety equipment protection system operation integrated plant operation Where appropriate increased surveillance of component / system parameters should be considered Develop, implement and maintain a special log as appropriate.
STP's shall be performed and reviewed using verbatim procedure comp < s. ce (ADM-0015).
if a portion of the equipment doen't function as required, ensure the appropriate level of i
review is conducted to ensure equipment operability (i.e., formal documentation).
i
's o
and degree of follow-up. Evaluation of the condition should repah{
Repetitive testing to achieve acceptable test results without id e
\\
correction of any problem in a previous test is not acceptable a use or !
verify operability.
or >
The use of PRA or probabilities of the occurrence of acciden e
b acceptable for making operability decisions.
s not e
Memorandums, Condition Reports and EEAR's shall not b s
determinations unless an Initial Safety and Environmental Eva a
y completed with an Unreviewed Safety Question Detertnination (U as been (10CFR50.59 review).
essary e
Review the System Design Requirement Document (SDRD's) fo
+
previous operability evaluations (Reference ENG-3-028 on on DESIGN REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS).
PROCESSING OF SYSTEM Q
Wd. Trudell Assist. Operations Sur %
t p.
t F
h i
4 7
46
k i
1 OPERATIONS POLICY # 15 REVISION 1 May 24,1993 CONTROL ROOM CONDUCT Professionalism is a standing practice or method of a professional as distinguished from those of an i
amateur.
" Professionalism is a concept that we will strive to implement at all levels of our organization. In this application the concept is simple. We want everyone to do theirjob the very best that it can be done. This of course, requires not only doing the obvious, but also paying attention to the details. The type of professionalism I am referring to starts with an individual's attitude. This attitude mud. be inspired with a great respect and sense of responsibility for the reactor core, for reactor safety, and for the accomplishment of each and every task...." (River Bend Standards and Expectations) i Tlie r llowing guidelines are being implemented to provide an environment of minimal personnel o
distractions and allow our licensed operators to maintain a high degree of attentiveness.
COMMUNICATIONS All ATC area communications shall be in accordance with Operations Policy #003.
i This policy is applicable to all personnel (i.e., Ensure the maintenance technician is using formal closed loop communication. (Demand it!))
All personnel interfaces shall be courteous, formal and not present a distraction to the ATC i
area operators.
Loud, boisterous outbursts am not to be tolerated.
l Non-work related conversations are not allowed in the ATC area.
Use of all communication devices shall be in a professional manner.
[
Only work related telephone calls are allowed from the ATC area.
Paging (gaitronics) of plant personnel for other departments shall not be performed for l
routine requeds.
Communications with the ATC area operators shall be avoided when an evolution is in progress (i.e., an SNEO should not be providing information fedoack to the ATC operator when a 1/2 SCRAM,1/2 ISOLATION STP is in progress).
ACCESS CONTROL Access to the ATC area shall be for plant related busf. ness only.
SS, COF, STA and on-shift licensed RO's have free access. (Additional Personnel identified in ADM-0022 retain free access prhileges).
The Reactor Engineer (RE) is considered part of the Control Room crew during power manipulation and plant startup. Ons RE trainee is allowed the same access as the on duty RE with the UO snd SS perinission.
Shift personnel are expected to ask and understand the nature for access, paying attention to current evolutions and activities in progress prior to granting access.
On Shift SNEO's will remain outside the ATC area. (Crew briefs, requested entries, use of the kitchen and rest rooms are allowed).
,M
I:
O Extensive shift or evolution briefs shaU be held outside the ATC area.
e Turnovers shall be cunducted in a manner to minimize operator distraction. A formal e
statement of assuming the duties shall occur.
All personnel should be sensitive to preventing and eliminating operator distractions.
e IILO trainee's shall have free access, as required, by the assigned training position. The e
requirements of Operations Policy #007 shall be adhered to.
Maintenance workers may be granted continuing access while performing work of short durations (i.e., a new STP requires requesting permission for continuing access).
Congregation of personnel at the SS/COF desk shall be minimized. Access control to this e
area shall be the same as for the ATC area.
The Control Room shall be periodically monitored for unnecessary distractions. Personnel without official business should be asked to leave, During periods of increased activity (i.e., outages) Control Room personnel shall ensure o
work activities are adequately controlled to reduce operator distractions.
Visitors to the ATC area shall be given a brief as appropriate to ensure the proper concern e
for reactor safety is understood.
Conversation and distractions are to be minimized.
Maintain an acceptable distance from control panels.
Extensive questioning of RO's on shift should be discouraged.
GINIUtAL Operaton shall remain alert and attentive to plant parameters at all times.
e Control Room personnel shall maintain a professional environment at all times.
e communication appropriate attire proper use of furniture housekeeping Procedures shall be used for all normal equipment manipulations.
e Anm;nciator alarms shall be communicated per Operations Policy #003.
e Non work-related material shall not be allowed in the Control Room.
Magazines (i.e. Nuclear News, EPRI, Power Engineering, etc) and newspaper articles sball not be allowed in the ATC area.
Self Checking shall be deliberate and observable for all equipment manipulations.
The COF shall maintain ovenight of all Control Room activities.
e Chairs in the ATC area are limited to the follow'mg:
e On duty licensed operators Re ATC/UO may authorize one additional person permission to sit in this area during long periods of activity. The ATC/UO shall be responsible for this individuals conduct and assure business is efficiently performed.
h i
%fJ. Trudell Assist. Operations Supervisor h