ML20045A836
| ML20045A836 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1993 |
| From: | Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045A825 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-93-16, NUDOCS 9306150048 | |
| Download: ML20045A836 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1993016
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APPENDIX B
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-382/93-16
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Operating License:
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Incorporated
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P.O. Box B
Killona, Louisiana 70066
Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)
Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: April 4 through May 15, 1993
Inspectors:
E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector
J. L. Dixon-Herrity, Resident Inspector
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K. M. Kennedy, Project Engineer
S. J. Campbell, Resident Inspector, Arkansas
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Nuclear One
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W. M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector
T. Reis, Project Engineer
Accompanying Person 1:
D. M. Garcia, NRC Intern
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Approved:
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Thofnas F. Stetka, Chief, Project Section D
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Inspection Summary
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant status,
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operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance observations,
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engineered safety feature system walkdown, followup on previous inspection
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findings, and review of licensee event reports.
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Results:
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The storage of items outside of a designated storage area was
identified as a housekeeping concern (Section 2.1.2). however,
other housekeeping in the plant was found to be very good
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(Section 5.1).
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Failure of the operators to identify loose. valve handwheels or vibration
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noise in the charging pump rooms are examples of a lack of a questioning
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attitude (Section 2.1.4).
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Operators exhibited an appropriate degree of professional awareness of
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potential hazards in the surrounding industrial community
(Section 2.1.5).
The failure to be aware of procedural guidance pertaining to the control
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of compressed gas cylinders within the protected area was considered a
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weakness (Section 2.1.6).
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An Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) concern was-
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identified in that the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) requirements
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for paint being used in the auxiliary building were not being met
(Section 3.2).
Routine maintenance was properly conducted and maintenance personnel
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demonstrated a good questioning attitude.regarding an abnormally warm
motor operator (Section 3.3).
Good communications were observed during the performance of Emergency
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feedwater Pump A and main turbine steam inlet valve surveillances
(Section 4.1).
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A violation resulted from the failure of licensed operators to enter an
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off-normal procedure as required by the surveillance procedure they were
following (Section 4.2).
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Summary of Inspection Findings:
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Violation 382/9316-01 was opened (Section 4.2).
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Violation 382/9227-01 was reviewed and remained open (Section 6.1).
Inspection Followup Item 382/9316-02 was opened (Section 2.1.4).
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Inspection Followup Item 382/9316-03 was opened (Section 3.2).
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Inspection Followup Item 382/9008-03 was closed (Section 7.1).
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Inspection Followup Item 382/9125-05 was closed (Section 7.2).
Inspection Followup Item 382/9008-01 was reviewed and remained closed
(Section 7.3).
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Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS
1 PLANT STATUS
The plant was operating at full power at the beginning and at the end of this
inspection period. On April 7 and again on May 11, 1993, power was reduced to
92 percent for several hours to allow for surveillance testing.of the main
turbine steam inlet valves.
2 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that this facility was being
operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and to ensure
that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging the
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licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation.
2.1
Plant Tours
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2.1.1
Control Room Observation
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Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors observed control room
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activities, monitored plant status, and attended the plan-of-day meeting on a
regular basis.
On April 22, 1993, while observing activities in the control room, the
inspector noted that there were extra auxiliary operators in the control room.
The shift supervisor explained that the additional personnel were doing part
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of their on-the-job training for their qualifications.
The inspector noted
that, although there was an increased level of activity due to the training,
there was positive control of the plant.
The acting operations superintendent
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also stated that he would ensure that the on duty operators were fully aware
of their plant duties and responsibilities.
2.1.2 Plant and Site Tours
On April 22, 1993, while observing the preparations for postmaintenance
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testing on Charging Pump B, the inspector noted that auxiliary-operators
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attempted to make radio contact with the control room several times, but
received no response.
It was determined that the radio in the control room
had become inoperable.
The licensee determined that the control room radio
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had become inoperable when the wire pair that cross-connected the radio
handset in the control room to the radio base station in the communications
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room had come loose from the terminal block while a contractor was working on
the phone system. The problem was identified and corrected, restoring the
radio service to the control room after a 15-minute lapse.
The shift
supervisor assured the inspector that communications could be established by
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other means (e.g., telephone or Gaitronics paging system).
Condition
Report 93-043 was initiated to enter the problem in the corrective action
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program for evaluation and root cause determination.
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During the week of May 10-14, 1993, while touring the reactor auxiliary
building, the inspectors noted several welding machines, carts, ladders, and
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other items that were not stored in a designated storage area. This
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observation was discussed with the fire protection engineer, the individual
responsible for the. control of designated storage areas. He stated that the .
procedures addressing designated storage areas dealt only with the storage of
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combustibles.
Procedure UNT-007-006, Revision'5, " Administrative Procedure
for Housekeeping," required that equipment being temporarily stored for a
specific task or job be identified by a Temporary Storage Tag. None of the
items identified outside a designated storage area appeared to be set aside
for a specific task.
The practice of storing equipment outside of a
designated storage area was identified to the licensee as a housekeeping
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concern.
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2,1.3
The Loss of the Plant Monitoring Computer and Subsequent Loss of
Emergency Assessment Capability
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On April 22, 1993, a loss of emergency assessment capability occurred when the
plant monitoring computer failed for more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Critical plant
conditions used for emergency assessment were unavailable on the . safety
parameter display system due to the failure of a plant monitoring computer
peripheral switch power supply. The licensee made a 1-hour telephone report
as required by 10 CFR Section 50.72 (b)(1)(v).
The 12-volt power supply for
the peripheral switch was replaced and the plant monitoring computer was
restored to service.
2.1.4
Excessive Charging Pump Suction Line Vibration
On April 28, 1993, the inspector noted abnormal noises, similar to cavitation
sounds, emanating from piping inside Charging Pump Rooms A/B and B.
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Pump A/B nor B was in service.
The inspector reported the condition to the
shift supervisor who confirmed the noises but could not identify them. The
shift supervisor initially thought that the noise may be due to make up
operations to add water to the refueling water storage pool, however, upon
temporarily securing this evolution, the noise persisted.
The inspector then inspected the site with the cognizant system engineer.
The
engineer didn't consider the noise a cavitation issue, but possibly a
vibration problem associated with the charging pump suction header causing the
discharge relief valve piping to vibrate against seismic supports.
The system
engineer was not familiar with this specific problem but explained to the
inspector that there had been a history of vibration and hydraulic problems
that have led to weld and charging pump block cracking.
The licensee has undertaken'a program to test the system for pressure spikes
and pulsation frequencies at the charging pumps during plant operations.
While this effort should more accurately identify the fluid dynamics and
ultimately determine the cause of block cracking, it was inconclusive whether
the effort would encompass the problems identified by the inspector. The
system engineer indicated that engineering personnel would address the current
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concern by lifting various deck plates and inspecting piping supports to see
if the cause of the excessive vibration could be determined.
At the end of
this inspection period, the licensee's corrective actions were still being
formulated. The licensee's activities to resolve this issue will be tracked
by Inspection Followup Item 382/9316-02.
During a tour of the charging pump rooms on May 10, 1993, the inspector heard
a metallic noise in Charging Pump Room A.
The inspector observed that the
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handwheel on Valve CVC MVAA190A, the Charging Pump A suction pressure switch
root valve, was vibrating and the handwheel nut was rotating.
The inspector
found a similar condition in Charging Pump Room B on Valve CVC MVAA1908.
The
control room supervisor was notified and he dispatched an operator to tighten
the nuts.
The inspector expressed concern to licensee personnel that, while auxiliary
operators were aware of the noise, they did not report it to the shift
supervisor. The inspector identified the failure of the operators to identify
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the loose handwheels or the vibration noise as examples of lack of a
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questioning attitude.
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2.1.5
Trip of Neighboring Chemical Plant
On April 28, 1993, the inspector noted large stack flames from a nearby
chemical industrial facility.
The inspector questioned whether this would
have any affect on the control. room toxic gas monitors. The licensee
responded that the local industrial network line had been queried and no toxic
gas monitor alarms or indications had been noted.
It was reported that the
chemical plant had tripped offline for an unknown reason and, as designed, the
process stream was burning off.
The network information also indicated that
no hazardous releases had occurred. The operators exhibited an appropriate
degree of professional awareness of potential hazards in the surrounding
industrial community.
2.1.6
Storage of Compressed Gas Cylinders
During a tour of the radiologically controlled area on April 29, 1993, the
inspector observed argon and oxygen compressed gas cylinders which were not
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properly secured.
The cylinders were located outside of Emergency Diesel
Generator Room B and were chained to each other but not secured to a fixed
support. The inspector asked the mechanical maintenance supervisor whether
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there was an administrative procedure that provided guidance on the control of-
compressed gas cylinders within the protected area.
He indicated that he was
not aware of any procedural guidance, although it was management's expectation
that compressed cylinders should be secured to a fixed object with spring-
loaded chains.
The cylinders were subsequently secured correctly.
The
inspector.noted that numerous other cylinders in the protected area were
properly secured.
After further discussions with the senior safety engineer and licensing
personnel, the inspector determined that procedural guidance was provided in
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both the " Industrial Safety Manual" and Site Directive W5.303, Revision 0,
" Handling and Storage of Hazardous Materials," and that personnel should be
aware of their contents. The licensee committed to perform safety briefings
to reemphasize the contents of this procedural guidance. The lack of
awareness of procedural guidance pertaining to the control of compressed gas
cylinders was considered a weakness.
2.2 Conclusions
The storage of items outside of designated storage areas was
identified as a housekeeping concern.
The failure of operators to identify loose handwheels or vibration noise
in the charging pump rooms are examples of a lack of a questioning
attitude.
Operators exhibited an appropriate degree of professional awareness of
potential hazards in the surrounding industrial community.
The failure to be aware of procedural guidance pertaining to the control
of compressed gas cylinder was considered a weakness.
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MONTHLY MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION (62703)
The station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and
components listed below were observed and documentation reviewed to ascertain
that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved. work
authorizations, procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry
codes or standards.
3.1 Chargina Pump Maintenance (WA 01106578)
On April 22, 1993, the inspector observed a portion of the postmaintenance
testing on Charging Pump A.
The operability check was performed using
Surveillance Procedure OP-903-003, Revision 8, " Charging Pump Operability
Check." After the pump had run for 5 minutes, the technician measured
vibration from several points on the motor and the pump.
The inspector
reviewed the test results and verified that they were within.the acceptable
range for the pump. .The calibration date on the hand-held vibration
measurement instrument was verified and recorded. No-concerns were
identified.
3.2 Painting of Auxiliary Building Stairwell (WA 01104566)
On April 28, 1993, the inspector noted strong fumes emanating from the south
auxiliary building stairwell.
The fumes were most pronounced on the lower
level s.
The inspector determined that the fumes originated from painting
activities in the stairwell and noted that the craft personnel were not
wearing respirators and that there was no forced ventilation.
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The inspector questioned the supervisor of the painting activities and was
informed that the paint was water-based and that no hazardous solvents were
evaporated in the curing process. The inspector requested the MSDS for the
paint and determined that the coating did contain hazardous ingredients which
would be subject to evaporation during curing.
The MSDS stated in Section 07
that respiratory protective devices must be used when engineering and
administrative controls are not adequate to maintain threshold limit values
and permissible exposure limits of airborne contaminants below the values
listed in Section 02 of the MSDS. The licensee was unable to demonstrate that
the values were below those specified in Section 02 of the MSDS.
On April 29, 1993, the inspector learned that the shift supervisor had raised
a concern about the fumes 2 weeks earlier to the industrial safety department.
The safety department inspected the work site and informed the shift
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supervisor that the condition was safe.
The inspector questioned the
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conclusion of the safety department representative who inspected the
situation.
The safety representative indicated he was inexperienced in
painting technology and took the word of the painting supervisor that the
paint was water-based and posed no health hazard from inhalation.
During a tour of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room B on May 10, 1993, the
inspector observed personnel painting various components in the room. The
inspector observed that the painters had respirators available for use but
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were not wearing them.
Environmental monitoring for paint fumes had not and
was not being performed in the EDG room. During an intervies on May 11, the
paint foreman responsible for this painting activity indicated he had given
verbal instruction to the painters to wear respirators while painting.
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- a tour the following day, the inspectors observed that all but one of the
painters were wearing respirators, and that this individual donned a
respirator when the inspector entered the room.
The licensee indicated that they were informed by the paint manufacturer that
the paint did not present a toxicity problem. The licensee generated a
condition report and is reviewing the accuracy of the MSDS information. The
problems identified with the painting activities and the licensee's corrective
actions will be tracked as Inspection Followup Item 382/9316-03.
In addition,
the OSHA was notified of this issue with respect to the effect of the paint
fumes upon personnel safety.
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The inspector was also concerned that the paint fumes could have had an
adverse impact on the charcoal beds of the safety-related filters in the the
emergency control room air conditioning and the controlled area ventilation
systems.
This concern was discussed with licensee personnel and a review of
the air flows and differential pressures in the affected spaces, the filter
train flow paths, and the potential ingress points to those flow paths was
conducted.
As the result of these discussions and reviews, the inspector.
determined that there was sufficient isolation to preclude communication
between the paint-affected ventilation zone and the filter systems.
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3.3 Repair of Inlet Damper 0perator AH-25 (WA 01108544)
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On April 29, 1993, the inspector observed portions of work performed on
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Switchgear Ventilation Inlet Damper Operator AH-25. During some unrelated-
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inspections of the switchgear ventilation system, craftsmen noted that the
motor operator for Damper AH-25 was abnormally warm. The problem was
documented and a work authorization generated to rework the operator. The
inspector witnessed the electrical isolation of the operator prior to it being
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removed from the damper and taken to the shop for rework.
No problems were
noted.
The craftsmen were working to documented instructions and the work was
properly authorized.
3.4 Conclusions
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An OSHA concern was identified in that the MSDS requirements for the
paint being used in the auxiliary building were not being met.
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Routine maintenance was properly conducted and maintenance personnel
demonstrated a good questioning attitude regarding an abnormally warm
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motor operator.
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4 BIMONTHLY SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATION (61726)
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The inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related systems and
components listed below to verify that the activities were being performed in
accordance with the licensee's programs and the Technical Specifications.
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4.1
Safety Verification of Emergency Feedwater Pump A
On April 26, 1993, the inspector observed a. surveillance on Emergency
feedwater Pump A, which verified that this pump developed a discharge pressure
greater than or equal to 1298 psig on recirculation flow. The operator used
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Operating Procedure OP-009-003, Revision 7, " Emergency feedwater," for
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manually starting and stopping the pump.
The surveillance was performed in
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the control room by a reactor operator in-training, under the direct guidance
of a licensed reactor operator. The inspector noted that there was good
communication between the operators and the operator in-training. The pump
met all the acceptance criteria and no concerns were identified.
4.2 Control Element Assembly (CEA) Operability Check
On May 11, 1993, the inspector observed a portion of Surveillance
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Procedure OP-903-005, Revision 7, " Control Element Assembly Operability
Check." The surveillance was performed by an operator in-training under the
direct supervision of a licensed reactor operator. During the course of the
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surveillance, operators determined that part-length CEA 28 would not move.
Operators declared the CEA inoperable, entered Technical Specification 3.1.3,
" Movable Control Assemblies," and determined that no action was required.
Upon discovering that the CEA was immovable, the operators failed to refer to
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Off-Normal Procedure OP-901-102, "CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction," as required by
Surveillance Procedure OP-903-005, Step 3.2.1.
When the inspector asked the
shift supervisor about entry into the off-normal procedure, the shift
supervisor reviewed the procedure and determined that, although it had not
been entered, the requirements of the procedure had been satisfied during the
performance of the surveillance. The inspector verified that the requirements
of Off-Normal Procedure OP-901-102 had been satisfied by the crew.
The cause
of the immovable CEA was determined to be a failed optical isolator board, on
which the licensee replaced and restored the CEA to an operable status.
The failure to enter Off-Normal Procedure OP-901-102 upon identification of an
immovable CEA, as required by Surveillance Procedure OP-903-005,
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identified as a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c, which requires
adherence to written procedures (382/9316-01).
4.3 Turbine Steam Inlet Valve Cycling Testina
In preparation for performing Surveillance Procedure 0P-903-007, " Turbine
Inlet Valve Cycling Test," the control room operators reduced turbine load to
92 percent.
Prior to the start of the power reduction, a crew brief was
conducted to discuss the evolution and expected plant response.
The power
reduction, conducted in accordance with Procedure OP-010-001, Revision 15,
" Plant Shutdown to Hot Standby," was performed by operators in-training under
the supervision of licensed operators. A portion of the turbine steam inlet
valve cycling test was observed by the inspector. The evolution was well
controlled and the operators used good communications.
4.4 Quarterly In-Service Testing (IST) of Valves
The inspector observed the performance of Surveillance Procedure OP-903-032,
Revision 8, " Quarterly IST Valve Tests," conducted on the main steam isolation
valves and the main feedwater isolation valves. During the testing of
Valve FW-184 for Accumulator B, the operators noted that white Test Light B on
Control Panel 8 illuminated as designed, but that white Test Light A
simultaneously illuminated, which was not expected. The test should have only
illuminated the respective white test light on low nitrogen pressure in it's
respective accumulator (less than 2000 psig).
When the accumulator recharges,
the respective white test light will go out, signifying the end of the test.
Both white Test Lights A and B properly extinguished, indicating that the
nitrogen pressure had been restored. The operator performing the test
generated a Condition Identification to determine the cause of white Test
Light A illuminating while testing Accumulator B.
The inspector noted no
other concerns.
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4.5 Conclusions
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Good communications and controlled training were observed when
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performing safety verification of Emergency Feedwater Pump A and turbine
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steam inlet valve surveillances.
A violation resulted from the failure of licensed operators to enter an
off-normal procedure as required by the surveillance procedure they were
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following.
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5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM WALKDOWN (71710)
During this inspection period, the inspectors performed a detailed procedure
and drawing review and walkdown of the system below to determine its overall
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system condition and operational readiness.
5.1
Emergency Feedwaifr System
The inspector reviewed the Design Basis Document, W3-DBD-003, " Emergency
Feedwater System," Revision 0, with Changes E9002397, E9102538, 19101981,
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19200303, M9101667, M9102538, M9102656, M9102741, M9102775, M9102775,
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M9102835, M9200448, and M9202122.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the
"Waterford 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment," August 1992, and Valve Lineup
Procedures OP-009-003, Revision 7,
" Emergency Feedwater"; OP-002-001,
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Revision 8, " Auxiliary Component Cooling Water"; OP-003-003, Revision 10,
" Condensate-Feedwater"; and OP-005-004, Revision 8, " Main Steam."
The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the emergency feedwater system to
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determine whether the system condition and lineup was in accordance with the
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above references. A sample of 31 valves and 4 breakers identified in the
probabilistic risk assessment study were inspected. These valves were in the
emergency feedwater system or supported that system as identified by the
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probabilistic risk study. This activity included verification that the
information in the documents listed above was consistent on function,
identification, and position.
System valves and power supply breakers were in
the proper position for the standby readiness mode.
The new labeling system
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aided greatly in the identification of valves in the system. The operations
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personnel demonstrated knowledge of the system and its status.
Housekeeping
of the plant areas visited was very good.
5.2 Conclusions
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The emergency feedwater system was found to be in proper alignment for
operation.
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Housekeeping was found to be very good in the spaces inspected during
the system walkdown.
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6 FOLLOWUP ON CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS (92702)
6.1
(0 pen) Violation 382/9227-01:
Failure of Corrective Actions
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The licensee has identified the root cause of this violation to be personnel
error because the procedure was not followed.
Systems engineering verified
the status of temporary alterations and control room drawings as a part of the
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corrective action.
Procedure UNT-005-004, " Temporary Alteration Control," is
to be revised by July 1993, to ensure that temporary alteration request
numbers on logs and on drawings are updated and to provide a checklist of
requirements.
In M ition, the temporary alteration request tag numbering
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scheme is to f
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rovided.
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The in,pector ; . w d the 13 current temporary alterations on April 15, 1993,
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and identified no
w icms. The drawings and aperture cards were correctly
identified.
The "lemporary Alteration Affected Drawing" list and the file of
Temporary Alteration Requests were current.
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This violation will remain open until Procedure UNT-005-004 is revised.
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7 FOLLOWUP (92701)
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7.1
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 382/9008-03:
Establishment of an
Enhanced Preventive Maintenance and Testing Program for Air Operated
Valves
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This inspection followup item addressed a licensee initiative to develop a
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preventive maintenance program for air-operated valves.
The inspectors found
that Procedure MI-004-298, Revision 1, " Guidelines for Air Operated
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Valve (A0V) Diagnostics," was in place. This program was implemented before
Refueling Outage 5.
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7.2
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 382/9125-05:
Revision of Special
Report 91-002 by November 30, 1991
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This inspection followup item dealt with the revision of Special
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Report 91-002, written following the March 1991 crankcase explosion on EDG A.
The licensee had committed to revise the special report by November 30, 1991,
to update the root cause, and to better describe the plans for EDG disassembly
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and inspection.
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The inspectors determined that Revision 2 of Special Report 91-002 was issued
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on November 27, 1991. This revision identified that the crankcase
overpressurization was caused by stuck piston rings and that additional
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inspections were to be performed during Refueling Outage 5.
The reason for
the stuck piston rings was indeterminate.
The NRC has since issued
Information Notice 92-78 which addressed wear problems that may lead to
crankcase explosions.
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The licensee did not consider wear problems to be the cause of their crankcase
explosions. The inspectors learned that the licensee will submit a third
revision of the special report to document the results of the refueling outage
inspection. The licensee identified that the root cause of the pis, ton ring
failure was carbon build up within one cylinder caused by a firing imbalance
between cylinders.
7.3
Inspection Followup Item 382/9008-01:
Inspection of the Handling of
Out-of-Tolerance Conditions
This inspection followup item was previously closed in NRC Inspection
Report 50-382/93-015.
The inspectors have since received information on an
additional commitment made by the licensee regarding this item.
Reviews
completed by the inspector established that equipment was calibrated
differently depending on whether it was permanent plant equipment or
ncninstalled equipment, however, the Quality Assurance Program Manual did not
reflect this difference.
The licensee committed to make a distinction between
the two types of equipment in the Quality Assurance Program Manual by
May 31, 1993, to ensure that, in both cases, the requirements of Appendix B
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are satisfied.
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ATTACHMENT
1 PERSONS CONTACTED
1.1
Licensee Personnel
- R. E. Allen, Security and General Support Manager
- R. A. Crawley, Safety and Fire Protection
T. J. Gaudet, Operational Licensing Supervisor
P. A. Gropp, Systems Engineer Supervisor
- L. W. Laughlin, Licensing Manager
- A. S. Lockhart, Quality Assurance Manager
D. E. Marpe, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- D. F. Packer, General Manager, Plant Operations
- J. A. Ridgel, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- R. S. Starkey, Operations and Maintenance Manager
- D. W. Vinci, Operations Superintendent
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the above
personnel, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection
period.
2 EXIT MEETING
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 19, 1993, with those
persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the
inspectors' findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.