ML20045A430
| ML20045A430 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1993 |
| From: | Stewart Magruder Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9306100244 | |
| Download: ML20045A430 (28) | |
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June 7, 1993 Docket No.52-002 APPLICANT: ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. (ABB-CE)
PROJECT:
CE System 80+
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON APRIL 26 THROUGH 30, 1993, CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF PLANT SYSTEMS OPEN ISSUES A public meeting was held between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and representatives of ABB-CE, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC), and Duke Engineering and Services, Inc. (DE&S) on April 26 through 30, 1993. The meeting was held in the DE&S office in Charlotte, North Carolina, to discuss outstanding items related to the staff's review of Chapters 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11 of the Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Report for Design Certification of System 80+ (CESSAR-DC). is a list of those who attended the meeting, either in whole or in part.
The primary focus of the meeting was to discuss each design-related open, confirmatory, interface, or combined license (COL) action item which had been identified by the Plant Systems Branch (SPLB) in the draft safety evaluation report (DSER), identify the current status, and if not completely resolved, develop a path to resolution. A total of 251 DSER items were reviewed during the week, and significant progress was made on closing them out.
In fact, 215 of the 251 items were resolved. Of these 215 items, 107 were open items, 64 were confirmatory items, 3 were interf ace items, and 41 were COL action items.
To help clarify the status of each item, the participants agreed to some definitions that describe, in more specific language, what is meant by the term resolved.
These new terms are:
- RESOLVED-VERBALLY Means that the issue has-been technically resobed through discussions and that all parties understand what work naeds to be done to close out the issue.
Since nothing written has been submitted, and in some cases much work is still needed, these issues are the farthest from being closed.
(Abbreviated as R-V.)
- RESOLVED-CONFIRMATORY Means that the issue has been technically resolved and ABB-CE has submitted a draft write-up that the NRC has reviewed and agreed with.
(Abbreviated as R-C.)
- RESOLVED-AMENDHENT Means that the issue has been technically resolved and ABB-CE has made the appropriate changes to CESSAR via an amendment.
(Abbreviated as R-A.)
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. Means that the NRC agrees with what ABB-CE has in
- RESOLVED-NO ACTION CESSAR currently and no further action is required by ABB-CE.
(Abbreviated as R-NA.)
. RESOLVED-NRC ACTION Means that no action is required by ABB-CE but action is required by the NRC. The NRC action generally involves explaining in the safety evaluation report why the issue is no longer a concern.
(Abbreviated as R-NRC.)
The following is a discussion of each of the chapters covered during the week with the status of each of the issues along with a summary of the commitments that were made by the participants.
Chapter 3 - DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS:
APPLICATION OF NATIONAL CODES AND STANDARDS IN DESIGN CERTI TION There were six open items, one confirmatory item, and two COL action items The status of these items is shown under review by the SPLB in this chapter. deals with the environmental qualification (EQ) below. Open item 3.11.3.2.1-3 of electronic components.
TYPE NUMBER STATUS COL ITEM 3.4.1-1 R-NA COL ITEM 3.11.3.3-1 R-NA CONF ITEM 3.11.3.2.2-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 3.4.1-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 3.4.1-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 3.11.3.2.1-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 3.11.3.2.1-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 3.11.3.2.1-3 OPEN OPEN ITEM 3.11.3.2.1-4 R-A Several commitments were made by ABB-CE in the 4Q area:
ABB-CEwillreviewtgedefinitionofaharshenvironment'forelectronic 1.
equipment (i.e., s10 R for electronic equipment and $10 R for all other equipment.)
ABB-CE will clarify, in Section 3.11.5.3 of CESSAR, the meaning of how 2.
humidity is considered in the first sentence of this section.
ABB-CE will review the guidelines of NUREG-0588 for qualifying for submer-3.
gence and will review qualification methods as specified in 10 CFR 50.49 (e.g., qualifying by analysis only is not acceptable.)
4.
ABB-CE will clarify Note 1 on Table 3.11A-1, sheet 8.
. 5.
ABB-CE will clarify Tables 3.11B-1, 3.11B-2, and 3.118-3.
6.
ABB-CE will incorporate the new source term in calculated radiation doses for EQ of equipment.
Chapter 5 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND CONNECTED SYSTEMS There were only two items under review by the SPLB in this chapter, one open item, and one COL action item. The items were related to the reactor coolant pressure boundary leak detection system. Their status is shown below:
TYPE NUMBER STATUS CONF ITEM 5.2.5-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 5.2.5-1 R-A Chapter 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES There were 20 open items, 4 confirmatory item, and 5 COL action items under review by the SPLB in this chapter. The status of these items is shown below:
TYPE NUMBER STATUS COL ITEM 6.2.3-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 6.4-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 6.4-2 R-V COL ITEM 6.4-3 R-NA COL ITEM 6.5-1 R-NRC CONF ITEM 6.2.3-1 R-V CONF ITEM 6.4-1 R-A CONF ITEM 6.4-2 R-A CONF ITEM 6.4-3 R-V OPEN ITEM 6.2.1.1.2-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 6.2.1.1.2-2 R-NA-OPEN ITEM 6.2.1.2-1 "R-C OPEN ITEM 6.2.1.3-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 6.2.3-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 6.2.3-2 OPEN OPEN ITEM 6.2.3-3 R-A OPEN ITEM 6.2.3-4 OPEN OPEN ITEM 6.2.4-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 6.2.4-2 OPEN OPEN ITEM 6.2.4-3 R-A OPEN ITEM 6.2.4-4 R-A OPEN ITEM 6.2.4-5 R-V OPEN ITEM 6.2.6-1 OPEN OPEN ITEM 6.2.6-2 OPEN OPEN ITEM 6.2.6-3 OPEN OPEN ITEM 6.4-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 6.5-1 OPEN
. OPEN ITEM 6.5-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 6.8-1 R-C There were several topics included in this chapter which generated commit-ments. These included:
Containment Systems (Section 6.2) 1.
NRC will review Amendment N of CESSAR and compare it to the DSER to make sure current values are used in review.
2.
Open item 6.2.3-2.
ABB-CE will revise CESSAR to meet the minimum instru-ment requirements in accordance with the guidance of SRP Table 6.5.1.
3.
Open item 6.2.4-2.
ABB-CE will either provide justification for having the inside chemical and volume control system (CVCS) letdown isolation valve so far away from the containment penetration or move the valve.
(Letdown orifices, regenerative and letdown heat exchangers are between valve and containment penetration.)
In addition, ABB-CE will address the isolation time of important isolation valves (such as purge valves) in CESSAR Table 6.2.4-1.
Containment Leak Testino (Section 6.2.6) 4.
Open item 6.2.6-1.
ABB-CE will update response to cover reduced probability of steam a.
generator tube leakage.
b.
NRC will resolve policy issue on need to test secondary side isolation valves with steam.
5.
Open item 6.2.6-2.
NRC (SPLB) will check with the Reactor Systems Branch on the need to perform Type C test and whether pressure boundary valve testing (inservice testing) will be acceptable.
Issue involves competing requirements of containment isolation versus shutdown risk.
Discussion provided is qualitative versus quantitative.
6.
Open item 6.2.6-3.
ABB-CE will revise CESSAR to address the testing of drawdown time and bypass leakage.
Annulus Ventilation System (Section 6.2.3) 7 7.
Open item 6.2.3-4.
ABB-CE will revisit bypass leakage in accordance with Branch Technical Position CSB 6-3.
8.
COL action item 6.2.3-1.
NRC will close this item based on the commitment made by ABB-CE to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J requirements.
. Control Room Habitability Systems (Section 6.4) 9.
COL action item 6.4-1.
NRC will close this item based on the fact that ABB-CE has committed that GDC 5 has been addressed by ensuring that there are no shared safety systems between units.
Containment Soray (Section 6.5)
- 10. Open item 6.5-1.
NRC will review Amendment N of CESSAR which provides revised analysis for mixing rates and removal coefficients.
Point of contact is Jim Metcalf of SWEC at (617) 589-1499.
- 11. COL action item 6.5-1.
NRC will close this item based on the fact that a pre-operational test is specified in Section 14.2.12.1.40 of CESSAR.
Chapter 9 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS There were 68 open items, 50 confirmatory item, 4 interface items, and 23 COL action items under review by the SPLB in this chapter. The status of these items is shown below:
11PE NUMBER STATUS COL ITEM 9.1.1-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.1.2-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.1.3-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.1.4-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.2.1-1 R-A COL ITEM 9.2.2-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.2.4-1 OPEN COL ITEM 9.2.5-1 R-A COL ITEM 9.2.5-2 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.2.9.1-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.3.1-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.5.1-1 R-C COL ITEM 9.5.1.5-1 R-C -
COL ITEM 9.5.4.1-1 h-C COL ITEM 9.5.4.1-2 R-C COL ITEM 9.5.4.2-1 R-A w0L ITEM 9.5.5-1 OPEN COL ITEM 9.5.5-2 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.5.6-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 9.5.6-2 R-NA COL ITEM 9.5.7-1 R-NA COL ITEM 9.5.8-1 R-NA COL ITEM 9.5.9-1 R-NA CONF-ITEM 9.1.1-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.1-2 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.1-3 R-A CONF ITEM 9.l.1-4 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.1-5 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.1-6 R-A 4
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. CONF ITEM 9.1.1-7 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.1-8 R-A CONF' ITEM 9.1.1-9 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.1-10 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.2-1 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.2-2 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.2-3 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.2-4 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.2-5 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.2-6 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.2-7 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.2-8 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.2-9 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.2-10 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.3-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.3-2 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.3-3 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.3-4 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.3-5 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.3-6 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.3-7 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.3-8 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.3-9 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.3-10 R-V CONF ITEM 9.1.4-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.4-2 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.4-3 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.4-4 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.4-5 R-C CONF ITEM 9.1.4-6 R-A CONF ITEM 9.1.4-7 R-A i
CONF ITEM 9.1.4-8 R-A CONF ITEM 9.2.6-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.3.1-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.3 3-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.3.3-2 R-A -
CONF ITEM 9.3.3-3 R-A CONF ITEM 9.4.2-1 R-C CONF ITEM 9.4.4-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.4.5-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.4.6-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.4.8-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.4.9-1 R-A CONF ITEM 9.5.4.2-1 R-A INTERFACE 9.2.4-1 OPEN INTERFACE 9.2.4-2 OPEN INTERFACE 9.2.8-1 R-NRC INTERFACE 9.2.10-1 R-NRC OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-1 R-V OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-2 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-3 R-V OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-4 OPEN
. OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-5 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-6 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-7 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-8 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.1-9 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-1 OPEN OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-2 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-3 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-4 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-5 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-6 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-7 R-V OPEN ITEM 9.1.2-8 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-3 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-4 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-5 OPEN OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-6 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-7 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-8 OPEN OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-9 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.1.3-10 R-V OPEN ITEM 9.1.4-1 R-V OPEN ITEM 9.2.2-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.2.8-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.2.9.1-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.2.9.1-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.2.9.1-3 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.2.10-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.3.1-1 R-NA OPEN ITEM 9.3.1-2 R-NA OPEN ITEM 9.3.1-3 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.3.1-4 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.4.1-1 OPEN OPEN ITEM 9.4.1-2 R-C -
OPEN ITEM 9.4.2-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.4.2-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.4.3-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.4.3-2 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.4.4-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.4.4-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.4.5-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.4.5-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.4.7-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.4.9-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.1-1 R-V OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.2.1-1 OPEN OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.2.1-2 OPEN OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.2.2-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.2.2-2 OPEN OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.3.1-1 R-C
. OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.3.2-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.3.3-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.3.3-2 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.4.1-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.4.2-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.4.3-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.4.7-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.6-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.6-2 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.6-3 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1-6-4 R-C OPEN ITEM 9.5.1.6-5 R-C As part of the resolution process, ABB-CE submitted marked up pages of Section 9.1 of CESSAR. These pages are included as Enclosure 2.
The staff expanded the discussion of fire protection to include safe shutdown issues. contains eight questions raised by the staff in this area.
The topics from this chapter which generated commitments included:
Fuel Handlina and Storaae (Section 9.1) 1.
Open item 9.1.1-4.
ABB-CE will look at analysis done for dropping a fuel assembly and show that it will not result in fuel separation of less than 10 inches.
2.
ABB-CE will add references for criticality safety analysis codes DOT-4 and KEN 0 IV.
3.
Open item 9.1.2-1.
ABB-CE will provide more detail on how it plans to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guides and ANS Standards that it has committed to in CESSAR.
4.
Open item 9.1.3-5.
ABB-CE will check on separation and flood analysis.
)
5.
Open item 9.1.3-8.
a.
ABB-CE will clarify system operation given the minimum water level in i
the spent fuel pool.
b.
ABB-CE will add specific component information (pump head, flow rates, j
heat exchanger size, etc.)
6.
ABB-CE will specify the features available in the design to monitor non-borated water in spent fuel pool cooling and purification system.
7.
ABB-CE will specify that CVCS is seismic Category 1 makeup water source.
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Potable and Sanitary Water Systems (Section 9,2.4) 8.
Interface items 9.2.4-1 and 9.2.4-2.
The portions of the system that are inside buildings that are part of the certified design should be in-scope. ABB-CE will make the appropriate changes to CESSAR.
Fire Protection System (Section 9.5,1) 9.
Open item 9.5.1.2.1-1.
N A (Holmes) will review this issue further to determine if ABB-CE response is adequate.
- 10. Open item 9.5.1.2.1-2.
NRC (Chandra) will review this issue further to determine if ABB-CE response is adequate.
- 11. Open item 9.5.1.2.2-2.
NRC (Holmes) will review this issue further to determine if ABB-CE response is adequate.
- 12. The subject of combustible loading within a fire area was discussed. NRC would like bounding analysis or limit of combustibles for certain important fire areas. This subject needs further discussion.
- 13. The Fire Hazard Assessment was discussed.
Both the NRC and ABB-CE agreed to research how much of it should be included in CESSAR.
Fire Protection - Safe Shutdown Issues 14.
ABB-CE will revise CESSAR Section 9.5.1 to include the following:
a.
The safety-related Division 1 shutdown path will be used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown following a fire in any plant fire area south of Column Line 17, and the safety-related Division 2 shutdown path will be used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown following a fire in any plant fire area north of Column Line 17.
For a fire in the control room, either of the two shutdown paths can be used.
b.
The control room is the only fire area which will require alternate shutdown capability should there be a f' ire in that area, c.
The reasons for deviation from Generic Letter 86-10 guidance regard-ing the location of the transfer switches (the Generic Letter guid-ance favors locating the transfer switches outside the control room.)
d.
The time required for initiating and completing manual acticns to achieve and maintain safe shutdown following a fire, and the manpower required for them, will not be any different than that required for a normal shutdown.
15.
In discussion of fire-induced spurious operation or hot shorts, DE&S committed to remove power from SDS depressurization valves and safety injection tank discharge and vent valves but ABB-CE doesn't assume this.
ABB-CE committed to review and resolve.
. 16. ABB-CE will address the following queitions regarding locating the transfer switch in the control room:
a.
How susceptible are the panels in the control room to a fire?
Specifically, are switches and associated wiring subject to a mode failure that would result in the operation of equipment?
b.
What about a fire at one transfer switch?
c.
How will fire develop and advance for worst case fire?
d.
How can you ensure that an operator can make the transfer from a human factors and habitability standpoint?
e.
What about alternate means of transfer? Discuss lighting, habitabil-ity, and reactor recovery (i.e., time and response.)
- 17. ABB-CE will verify that the concerns identified in Information Notices 85-09 and 92-18 were addressed in their design.
- 18. ABB-CE will provide a tabular list of all areas that will have increased combustible loading during shutdown and explain how they will be pro-tected from fire.
- 19. ABB-CE will identify the capabilities of the remote shutdown panel during reduced inventory and refueling conditions (either procedures for operating it or local control of equipment).
- 20. ABB-CE will provide information on fire protection for shutdown cooling equipment during shutdown.
- 21. ABB-CE will discuss how the Operation Support Information Program provides insights on fire protection during shutdown.
Diesel Generator Coolina Water System
- 22. COL action item 9.5.5-1.
NRC will re-review to determine if specific information is needed to be provided by COL.
- 23. COL action item 9.5.5-2.
NRC will close this based on fact that Sec-tion 8.3.1.1.4.11 states that the diesel generator will be loaded after no-load operation per manufacturers recommendation.
Diesel Generator Startina Air System
- 24. COL action item 9.5.6-1.
NRC will close this based on fact that testing and maintenance of all systems are done by COL.
. Chapter 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM There w. e 14 open items, 6 confirmatory item, one interface item, and 9 COL action items under review by the SPLB in this chapter. The status of these items is shown below:
11PE NUMBER STATUS COL ITEM 10.2-1 OPEN COL ITEM 10.3-1 R-A COL ITEM 10.3-2 R-NRC COL ITEM 10.4.4-1 R-NA COL ITEM 10.4.7-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 10.4.7-2 R-A COL ITEM 10.4.9-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 10.4.9-2 R-A COL ITEM 10.4.9-3 R-NA CONF ITEM 10.2-1 R-C CONF ITEM 10.2-2 OPEN CONF ITEM 10.3-1 R-A CONF ITEM 10.4.5-1 R-A CONF ITEM 10.4.7-1 R-A CONF ITEM 10.4.9-2 R-C INTERFACE 10.4.5-1 R-NRC OPEN ITEM 10.3-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.3-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.1-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.2-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.2-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.2-3 R-C OPEN ITEM 10.4.3-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.3-2 R-C OPEN ITEM 10.4.4-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.5-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.5-2 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.7-1 R-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.7-2 K-A OPEN ITEM 10.4.9-2 R-C The Turbine Generator (Section 10.2) was the only topic from this chapter which generated commitments.
The commitments included:
1.
COL action item 10.2-1.
NRC will revisit this item to determine whether this needs to be an action item or can be closed.
2.
Confirmatory Item 10.2-1.
ABB-CE will revise response to request for additional information to be consistent with changes made by Amendment N to CESSAR.
3.
Confirmatory item 10.2-2.
ABB-CE will revise response to be consistent with changes made by Amendment N to CESSAR.
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Since this section has been significantly revised by ABB-Baden, NRC will review it again to be sure that nothing has changed that would affect the DSER findings.
Chapter 11 - RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT i
There were 15 open items, 6 confirmatory item, and 4 COL action items under review by the SPLB in this chapter. The status of these items is shown below:
IyP1 NUMBER STATUS COL ITEM 11.1-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 11.4-1 R-NRC l
COL ITEM 11.5-1 R-NRC COL ITEM 11.5-2 R-NRC CONF ITEM 11.1-1 R-A l
CONF ITEM 11.2-1 R-V l
CONF ITEM 11.3-1 R-V CONF ITEM 11.3-2 OPEN CONF ITEM 11.4-1 OPEN CONF ITEM 11.5-1 OPEN OPEN ITEM 11.1-1 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.1-2 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.2-1 OPEN OPEN ITEM 11.2-2 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.2-3 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.2-4 R-C OPEN ITEM 11.3-1 R-C OPEN ITEM 11.3-2 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.3-3 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.3-4 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.3-5 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.4-1 R-V I
OPEN ITEM 11.4-2 R-V OPEN ITEM 11.5-1 R-V J
OPEN ITEM 11.5-2 R-V -
None of the COL action items were discussed; however, the staff has reviewed them and determined that there are no technical issues remaining to prevent -
their closure. Many commitments were made during the discussions on this chapter including:
1.
ABB-CE will review IE Bulletin 80-05 and verify that the required tank vents or vacuum breakers will be added.
2.
ABB-CE will justify value of I scfm used for carrier gas flow.
3.
ABB-CE will refer to Table 3.7-1 of NUREG-0017 and provide the GALE code input values in that format in Chapter 11 of CESSAR or reference the section of CESSAR where they can be found.
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4.
a.
ABB-CE will justify the effective DF values for various waste streams used as input for GALE code if different from those found in NUREG-0017.
i b.
ABB-CE will update CESSAR to reflect what equipment will be in place to provide the DF values used in the GALE code run for the different waste streams.
5.
ABB-CE will update Table 11.2-2 of CESSAR to show discharge fractions, DF values, and total flow.
6.
ABB-CE will review Section 4 of NUREG-0017 and incorporate portions as applicable, including providing more detail on release points.
7.
ABB-CE will revise Table 11.2-1 of CESSAR to make it more legible.
8.
ABB-CE will verify that primary sample drain value is included in clean waste.
l 9.
ABB-CE will improve Figure 11.2-2 of CESSAR to reflect actual fluid flows, processing for equipment drain wastes, and deletion of CVCS i
purification ion exchanger.
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- 10. ABB-CE will add note to Figure 11.2-1 of CESSAR stating that no credit is I
taken for the demineralizer in the GALE code.
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11.
Open item 11.2-1.
ABB-CE will review whether credit should be taken for i
the CVCS letdown purification ion exchanger when calculating the DF value i
for shim bleed.
t 12.
Confirmatory item 11.3-2.
ABB-CE will resolve discrepancies in CESSAR
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regarding whether or not the radwaste building exhaust is filtered.
- 13. ABB-CE will review Regulatory Guide 1.143 and add statements to CESSAR where appropriate to show compliance with the positions for liquid, gaseous, and solid radwaste systems.
14.
ABB-CE will provide information (of the kind provided in Table 11.3 of the GE Nuclear Energy advanced boiling water reactor draft final safety evaluation report) on design capacities of principal components in the I
liquid and gaseous radwaste processing systems.
Examples include, but should not be limited to:
flow rates through filters, demineralizers, and evaporators, and pressures and temperatures of charcoal delay beds.
- 15. ABB-CE will provide footnotes to CESSAR Tables 11.2-1 and 11.3-4 to correlate the liquid and gaseous radioactivity releases given in the tables under various columns with liquid and gaseous effluents given under various columns using the GALE output format in NUREG-0017, pages 3-9, 3-12, 3-13, and 3-14.
16.
Open item 11.3-3.
ABB-CE will provide details of the nitrogen system.
_ 17. ABB-CE will review GALE code input parameters such as clean waste generation rate, process time, and effective DF for shim bleed.
If these parameters have changed, ABB-CE will rerun-the GALE code and revise the applicable CESSAR tables.
- 18. Open item 11.4-2.
ABB-CE will use radwaste volume based on the Electric Power Research Institute guidelines but will design storage space with significant margin for more waste storage.
- 19. ABB-CE will verify that radiation monitoring system will automatically I
terminate waste gas flow.
- 20. ABB-CE will verify that for the unit vent:
a.
There will be continuous sampling provision for iodine and particu-
- lates, b.
TMI Action Plan Item II.F.1, Attachments 1 and 2 guidelines are satisfied including (but not limited to) the noble gas monitor range.
ABB-CEwille{plainwhyhighrangegas(solidstatedetector)is c.
limited to 10 pCi/cc for Xe-133.
21.
For the containment purge systein, ABB-CE will:
a.
Verify that high and low volume purge are continuously monitored.
b.
Explain why there is no grab sampling provision for iodine in the process stream.
c.
Clarify whether continuous sampling provision for iodine will be provided.
d.
Provide range in Ci/cc for Xe-133 and explain how it meets the TMI Action Plan, Item II.F.1, Attachment 1 guideline.
e 22.
For the condenser air removd system, ABB-CE will:
a.
Resolve inconsistencies in terminology, b.
Explain why the range of the radiation monitor deviates from II.F.1, guideline.
c.
Clarify whether grab sampling provision for iodine will be provided.
If not,, justify the deviation from the applicable standard review plan (SRP) table.
- 23. ABB-CE will explain why there is no provision for grab sampling for iodine in the following process streams:
i nuclear annex ventilation subsphere ventilation j
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ June 7, 1993 radwaste facility annulus fuel building turbine gland seal mechanical vacuum pump flash tank pressurizer and boron recovery vent system
- 24. ABB-CE will clarify whether grab sampling for tritium will be performed f
in the unit vent effluent.
i
- 25. ABB-CE will review delay time used in waste gas tank rupture analysis.
j
- 26. COL action item 15.3.10-1.
For a postulated liquid radwaste tank failure, ABB-CE will compare the source term used in its analysis (R 1
of GALE code) with the source term based on 0.12-percent failed fuel l
suggested in SRP Section 15.7.3.
If the comparison shows that 1
0.12-percent failed fuel basis source terms are significantly different, I
ABB-CE will revise its liquid radwaste tank failure analysis to meet the SRP guideline.
Further, smaller scale, meetings may be required to resolve some of the l
remaining open items. The dates and times of these meetings will be made available as they are agreed to.
Stewart L. Magruder,y)
(Oriqinal signed b Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directnrate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page l
DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:
Docket File PDST R/F DCrutchfield PShea PDR MFranovich TWambach SMagruder TEssig JLyons, 803 l
Distribution w/o enclosures:
l RBorchardt JMoore, 15B18 HWal ker, 801 TMurley/FMiraglia j
CMcCracken, 8D3 ACRS (11)
SGrant, EDO WBurton, 801
)
i EJordan, 3701 GBagchi, 7H15 JRaval, 801-TChandrasekaran, 801 CYLi, 801 JSGuo, 8D1 JHolmes, 801 DDiec, 8D1 l'
LA:PDST:ADAfSPLh3sfA PM:PDST:ADAR SC:PDSTpADA 0FC:
NAME: PShea (W1 JLyolbs SMagruder M TEssig f l
DATE: 05/]5/93 06/ //93 05/ag93 06/q/93 1
0FFICIAL RECORD COPY:
DOCUMENT NAME:
MSUM0426.SLM l
l
- a
i ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Docket No.52-002 cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch Nuclear Systems Licensing Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U. S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C.
20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 i
Washington, D.C.
20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037-1128 Mr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President Nuclear Systems Development Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 i
9
ABB-CE SYSTEM 80+
Plant Systems Meeting April 26 through 30, 1993 Charlotte, North Carolina NAME ORGANIZATION J. Lyons NRR/DSSA/SPLB H. Walker NRR/DSSA/SPLB W. Burton NRR/DSSA/SPLB J. Raval NRR/DSSA/SPLB T. Chandrasekaran NRR/DSSA/SPLB C. 1. Li NRR/DSSA/SPLB J. S. Guo NRR/DSSA/SPLB J. Holmes NRR/DSSA/SPLB D. Diec NRR/DSSA/SRXB S. Magruder NRR/ADAR/PDST L. Gerdes ABB-CE D. Matteson ABB-CE J. Robertson ABB-CE R. Mitchell ABB-CE S. Ritterbusch ABB-CE T. Crom DE&S J. Burnette DE&S G. Pollard DE&S S. Goradia DE&S M. Ceraldt DE&S C. Scott DE&S T. Oswald DE&S B. Eble DE&S J. Thornton DE&S D. Brandes DE&S L. Bruster SWEC S. Stamm SWEr e
s
C4-27-1993 13:27 203 265 4441 ABB MJC REACTOR ENO P,o2 CESSAR 8Hnnemo,.
(
9.1.1.3.1.3 Criticality Barety Margins criticality safety margins are maintained by:
A.
Limiting the capacity to 121 fuel assemblies.
B.
Defining an ovarall array configuration.
C.
Providing adequate nachanical separation of fuel assemblies in the array, aven under postulated accident conditions.
The mechgical separation provided is A iscussed in section 9 1.1.2.
In av untln ritic ty saf y, a al cal tions n periorm using e tv irans al tr port c DOT-4 lN4 (Referenc
),
to a
typi repe ng IT ce unit f the f 1
rack f a se tion unito water ensitis coverin the OA rang in w h rea vity ks oce Geo ries r iri th e-dime onal als ar analy.-.
using
- 0 IV efer ce
>, Maxi mX lues e calcul p d for t a stor ar and enricF nts uY o 5 wt vhich/is high than 235 ectad_J loa qs. [
Av.h 4 yske h4 4te teprethcA bdueenhel MieAbhef inihc,ty,Kj The rack structure provides at least 10 inches) etween the top of f-the activo fuel and the top of the rack to preclude criticality
(
in the event a fuel assembly is dropped into a horizontal position on the top of the rack.
The new fuel storage area is protected from the effects of missiles or natural phenomena as discussed in Section 3.5.
9.1.1.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 All requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.13 are cet excluding those regarding tne spent fuel pool water supply, since new fuel storage is dry.
~
9.1.1.3.3 Seismii. r!ia;ification The New Fuel Storage Racks, Storage vault, and the Rack Restraint System are qualified..as Seismic Category I.
The seismic category of other building components associated with handling fuel assemblics is noted in Table 3.2-1.
9.1.1.3.4 Storage Capacity Storage is typically provided for a total of 111 new fuel assemblies in two 50% density 11x11 racks.
Amendment N 9.1-0 April 1, 1993
04-27-1993 13:30 203 285 4441 ABB NUC REACTOR ENO P.05
$N Revisions to CESSAR-DC Chapter 9 Insert A (p. 9.1-6)
In evaluating cd6cality safety, the threedmensional Monte Carlo computer code KENO IV (Reference 2) is used to perform the criticality calcu!ations for the new fuel storage racks for the postulated accident condition of flooding with pure, unborated water for the full range of water densities. The calculations are performed for a typicai repeating lattice unit of the new fuel storage racks and a fuel enrchment of 5.0 wt.%, which envelops the design requirements for ary fuel management scheme. The calculations include an a!!owance in K eff for uncertaint!ss due to deviations from nominal conditions (e.g.,
variations in water temperature) and calculational uncertainties. Including uncertainties, the maximum K off is less than 0.95 for flooding with pure, unborated water and less than 0.98 for immersion in a foam or mist of the optimum moderation density.
l Insert B (p. 9.510) in evaluating cdticality safety, the two-dimensional transport code DOT 4 (Reference 1) is used to calculate the K-eff in the spent fuel storage racks for Region I and Region 11 for normal design conditions. The calculations are performed for a typical repeating lattice unit for Region I and Region 11 of the spent fuel storage racks. No credit Is assumed for tne boron norma!!y found in the spent fuel pool wa'er. For Region I, K-eff la calculated for 5.0 wt.% enriched fresh fuel, with afiowance for uncertalnties due to deviation from nominal condalons (e.g., variations in fuel rack pitch, rack steel thickness, spent fuel pool water temperature) and cafoulational uncertainties.
Including all uncertainties, the maximum K-eff for Region I is less than 0.95.
For Region ll, K-eff Is calculated for various combinations of fuel enrichments and fuel burnups, w!th eBowance for uncertaintics due to deviations from nominal conditions and calculational uncertainties. The Initial enrichments range up to 5 wt.%. These resutts conseNatively establish the minimum cumulative bumup as funct!on of initial enrichment for Region 11 fus! necessary to maintain K-eff lesa (han 0.95. (For conservatism, the minimum cumulative bumup represents 0.85 of the actual fuel bumup.)
The threedmensional Monte Carlo Computer code KENO-IV (Reference 2) Is used to calculate K-eff for the postulated accident condWon of a dropped fuel assembly In Region
- 11. The dropped fuW assembly is conservativeY assumed to be a fresh fuel assemb!y with 5.0 wt.% initial enrichment.
The assumed boron concentrations are significantly conservative (less than one haN of the minlmum boron concentration required by the Technical Specifcations) with respect to the actual boron concentrations that could occur during the postulated dropped fuel assembly accident. With these assumed boron concentrations, the maximum K-eff (including uncertainties) for the postulated dropped fuel assembly accident condition is substantia!!y less than 0.95.
i CESSAR !! ahoy i
cells similar to that shown in Figure 9.1-1.
The storage racks are stainless steel honeycomb structures with rectangular fuel j
storage cells.
The stainless steel construction of the racks is compatible ~ with fuel assembly materials and the spent fuel-borated water environment.
The spent fuel is stored in two regions 4 of the pool.
. Region-I Thisisl spent provides core off-load capability for approximately 363 fuel assemblies (equivalent to one and one-half cores).
achieved with 50% density storage in a checkerboard array using "L"
inserts in the usable cells (Figure 9.1-2).
The "L"
insert is a non-poisoned stainless steel insert which provides the needed flux trap water gap.
Region II provides 75% density storage for approximately 544 spent fuel assemblies.
The cells l that are not used are blocked to prevent improper ' storage.
A p -
total of approximately 907 usable gaces for gp nt fu 1 stora Q k
lY p,,
Both Region I and II storage areas are designed to accommodate fuel assemblies with initial enrichment up to 5 weight percent C2 U-235.
Region I has no restriction on burnup history of stored 9,1,7. - 5 fuel assemblics.
Region II is restricted for storage of _ fuel cr having a minimum cumulative burnup which is dependent on the l
9.87-7 initial enrichment for each fuel assembly.
This restriction on fuel storage in Region II will be imposed by administrative controls developed and implemented by the Owner-operator.
i cr Total Spent Fuel storage capacity represents approximately 376%
i
- 9. l.1d of a full core.
Region II represents approximately 226% of a full core.
The structural design of the spent fuel rack and pool includes provisions for accepting loads associated with 100% storage with neutron poison inserts in order to meet future expansion potential.
9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation The spent fuel pool storage rack design and location, discussed in Section 9.1.2.2, provides assurance that design bases of Section 9.1.2.1 are met as noted in the following sections.
i 9.1.2.3.1 Criticality Safety 9.1.2.3.1.1 Postulated Accidents are considered in the design The following postulated accidents of the spent fuel pool storage racks:
Amendment N 9.1-8 April 1, 1993
,.m,-.
_.x
C4-27-1993 13:2S ao3 203 4441 SSB NUC REACTOR E%
P.03 CESSAR Enhou W
(
1 9.1.2.3.1.2 Criticality Safety Assumptions The following assumptions are made in evaluating criticality safety:
A.
No control element assemblies (CEAs) are assumed to be present in the fuel assemblies.
B.
The rack is assumed to be filled to espacity with fuel assemblies of the type whose criticality safety is evaluated with the spent fuel pool filled with water.
C.
For normal operation, no credit is assumed for the boron normally found in the apont fuel pool water.
For the flooded spent fuel pool criticality analysis, an optimum temperature is assumed for the water noderator.
In evaluating the critica3ity limits of a dropped fuel assembly and tool accident, it.4 assumed that boron concentration in the opent fuel pool water is at least 2000 ppm.
D.
An infinite fuel assembly array is assumed for the flooded spent fuel pool analysis.
E.
Only one fuel assembly is assumed to be dropped in a fuel handling accident.
F.
It is conservatively assumed that four rows of fuel rods are damaged during a fuel assembly handling accident.
G.
Eighty-five percent (85%) of the actual burnup for a given initial enrichment is used for each fuel assembly in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis.
9.1.2.3.1.3 Criticality Safety Xargina criticality safety margins are assured by:
A.
Neglecting the neutron absorption effects associated with the baron normally in the spent fuel pool water during normal operations and assuming that spent fuel pool boron concentration is less than one-half of normal during a fuel assembly drop accident.
B.
When fuel is stored in the borated or mixed modes (freshly burned fuel assembly is inadvertently placed in Region II),
the minimum boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water is that defined by Technical speoirications that apply whenover fuel is to be moved in the storage pool.
uc, io r
Amendment J 9.1-10 April 30, 1992
p
_y e-a~,.
C4-27-1993 13:29 Po3 285 4441 ABS NUC REMTOR ENG P.04 CESSAR IIninemu DHPET.
I (Refe nc 1) d tr th
-din ional nta C lo c
, KP
-I (Re re e
to typ al r eating attic unit of t f
1 r
or se cti of iform ter nsiti cov n
the an s
whi re tivi peaks cour.
[ed MM P e uMeffo nrMt[pMg%
/
E conditions, i.e., normel and accident is shown to be substaddfally below the les,s than 0.93.
The X values are lini bing values allove8IIby ANS/ ANSI 51.1-1983 and provide adegaats margin for calculation uncertainty.
The spent fuel storage area is protected from the effects of I
missiles or natural phenomena by a seismic Category I structure, as discussed in Section 3.5.
9.1.2.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 The spent fuel storage facility complies with the intent of lz Regulatory Guide 1.13.
9.1.2.3.?
Seismic Classification i
(
The spor.c fuel pool c.torage racks and facilities (See section lg' 9.1.1. 3. 3) are Seismic Category 1.
l 9.1.2.3.4 Storage Capacity lI Storage is provided for up to 907 spent fuel assemblies.
This j
provides storage for approximately 10 years of unit operation.
9.1.2.3.5 Fuel Assembly cooling The spent fuel pool storage racks are, designed to prevent extensive bulk boiling in the rackscas well as maintain fuel cladding-temperatures well below 650*F for the fo116ving collective conditions:
E A.
Natural convecti.on water circulation within the spent fuel
- pool, B.
Maximum pool water temperature of 15 f. ' '/ at the fuel rack inlet flow passages, and C.
Maximum fuel pool heat load as described in Section 9.1.3.
Amendment L 9.1-11 February 23, 1993
CESSAR Ein%mou CE (Reference 1) and the three-dimensional Monte Carlo code, KENO-IV 9, l.1-(Reference 2) for typical repeating lattice units of the fuel rack for a selection of uniform water densities covering the ranges in which reactivity peaks occur.
Maximum K values are calculated for enrichments up to 5 wt.%
E ggg U-235.
normal and accident K (( ally is shown to be For all conditions, i.e.,
values are substaO below the less than 0.95.
The K f
I limiting values allowe8 by ANS/ ANSI 51.1-1983 and provide adequate margin for calculation uncertainty.
The spent fuel storage area is protected from the effects of I
missiles or natural phenomena by a seismic Category I structure, as discussed in Section 3.5.
9.1.2.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 The spent fuel storage facility complies with the intent of E
f;k.-- 7 l e-s' O i<Ipo,1co m 4s $5u"A b
Nl suff
- "0 f **
s" cg k
TheAspent fuel---poe4-storage racks b. l. I '
9 amF-faviMtican (M/d*" N cu S c c -- S c c t '
I*feb+ Mk
- ~'&*
+4e des,,naklre Seismic Catsers~tc caApnoned.
ne Medakanne L<s yyggs 57.I sa he/adedar Me Atl h<d <) epoy ut d*3f
Materials Handling and Storage, of 29 CFR
- 1910, Section 1910.179.
- However, this document has been used for guidance.
More than 95%
of the fuel handling machine does conform to the OSHA regul?tions.
Both machines have additional features to protect the safety of the operator and facility, and the features are a part of appropriate operational procedures.
Amendment L 9.1-28 February 28, 1993
CESSARnuhou LZ
. n.-.
, he two cavity transfer system fuel carrierf thetin-containmen 9.l.4-4
'temporaFy~f6elistorage rackjgd,.theyKs5FpTorsidontainerJsEcag)o T
L the spent fuel storage-(racksr a c k a r e,, d o31s n e'd ktl' en sMh ers,aE6 (Section.9.1.2).
IN5&TC 9.1.4.2.1.1 Refueling Machine The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks which will be contained in the refueling machine.
A.
Refueling Machine Holst Overload Interlock This interlock interrupts hoisting of a fuel assembly if the load increases above the overload setpoint.
The hoisting load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the withdrawal operation if an overload occurs and the hoist continues to operate.
The hoist motor stall torque is limited such that the cable load is less than the allowabic fuel assembly tensile load.
B.
Refueling Machine Hoist Up-Stop Interlock This interlock interrupts hoisting of a fuel assembly when the correct (full up) vertical elevation is reached.
A mechanical up-stop has also been provided to physically restrain the hoisting of a fuel assembly above the elevation which would result in less than the minimum shielding water coverage.
C.
Refueling Machine Holst Undericad Interlock This interlock interrupts insertion of a fuel assembly if the load decreases below the underload setpoint.
The load l
is visually displayed so that the operator can snually terminate the insertion operation if an underload occurs and the hoist continues to operate.
This interlock is y
independent of Item D below.
D.
Refueling Machine Holst Cable-Slack Interlock l
This interlock interrupts lowering of the hoist under a no-load condition.
The weighing system interlock is backed up by an independent slack cable switch which also lE terminates lowering under a no-load condition.
I E.
Refueling Machine Hoist Lock-out Interlock i
This interlock prevents hoisting during translation of the bridge and/or trolley.
No backup or additional circuitry is I
provided for this interlock.
Amendment L 9.1-29 Feb'ruary 28, 1993
J nserf* C The des.)n 05 4e Fad Ms..blin Qsfem llmits +he Impac.+ eney of oleda\\
g dropped loah on +be new fuel Sfora3e rseb, spen + fuel sfocaje neks aa,duje.,+ lal spe.,+ fael cask <* pren.ded from }<mlihy oac pool. Aedese&d 6:e, [Ee.
s the. nu %fedgs ud spe.,+ falsbesje eseks 47 meeknical shps and eledrieel fniulocks, h deCned load pal],fdoes not ps<-~&k;kiWh e Lu..,,2:
reyun es reis tity he, fpd [d ca'sk -6n~fM-abon f4e opealtny oer elev& hon, R
Loads 4h*4 my be. Inndled ovo + lee nw [a<el Norejc tacAsp spe.,4 hsl shys ryksU[hmtbY tv fire fl>ue havra,3 an anpae+ e ey cpol to or less
- ,an 1ks perials4sd deep of a hel esswhy wiYk tks fl,e [asi handliny ool ed f
hvilsny compensnts 1Ad are pH of +be Oft, 4' rom }he as e/ovellen o+4er ist.l asse nk is lAfsl aboa -lhe. ful mks dwir.3 nos,msl }andlin3,
/ha+ !!c / w Wn e Vfe I assemhfy & /4fd & 4 wl.u!ls! ll~l4sd by 4he.
% elssahs intuled,s on rke. sput fa.l iwthny mec%c a.,L ibs nc.J [al haniling hood (Secho.,9,f,4.1..I and +he. des)v, al lhe hendSny fools. 3W Ylis we)H 1hs4 ma)? be lifkd d listled by inle.elochs kd/or h M motee slall forpe,
~
I i
CESS AR !!ninemou E.
Fuel Carrier Rotational Interlock i
i This interlock prevents rotation of the fuel carrier unless I
the fuel carrier is correctly located in the upender.
Failure of this interlock may cause contact between the fuel carrier and the transfer tube assembly which will result in E
i an overload signal and termination of motion of the transfer carriage.
No damage to the fuel assembly will result since the fuel assembly is enclosed in the carrier.
The Owner-Operator will prepare and implement administr tri g controls to restrict operation of the fuel transfer tb valve J
during fuel handling operations.
i 9.1.4.2.1.3 Spent Fuel Handling Machine l
The spent fuel handling machine will be a refueling machine adapted for use in the spent fuel pool area.
It will contain the E
l same interlock features as described in Section 9.1.4.2.1.1, except as noted below for the Spent Fuel Handling Machine Translation Zone Interlock:
A.
Zone interlocks protect against running the load into walls
,l or the gate of the storage area.
I B.
If these interlocks fail, the spent fuel handling machine mast will protect the fuel assembly from damage in the event of wall or gate contact.
9.1.4.2.1.4 New Fuel Elevator The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks that are part of the new fue c1 v me &*f elW8M ca kols and as locake on M seen Mi he al~3 man. co.,mJ come9s.ator. 7Ae A.
New Fuel Elevator Hoist Cable-Slack Interlock Stops the elevator motor should the cable become slack.
If this interlock fails, the operator can stop the elevator motion from the. spent fuel handling machine console.
B.
New Fuel Elevator Hoist Lock-Out Interlock 4
Prevents raising of the elevator with a fuel assembly in the elevator box.
This interlock is a
backup for the administrative control, which prohibits the placement of a spent fuel assembly in the new fuel elevator.
Amendment J 9.1-32 April 30, 1992
CESSAR Ennncmou 9.1.4.2.1.7 Fuel Building Overhead Crancs I
A.
Cask Handling Holst The cask handling hoist is used to unload and transport new fuel shipping containers from the receiving bay area to the new fuel shipping container laydown area.
It is also used for movement of the empty spent fuel cask from the receiving bay area to the cask storage pit and for the~ return of the E
loaded cask.
The receiving bay area has sufficient room.o permit the cask to be upended with the cask transporter locked in place.
The hoist is equipped with a continuously variabic speed hoist controller.
The hoist accesses the spent fuel pool area to facilitate building construction and spent fuel rack installation.
Mechanical stops are installed on the bridge rails to prohibit the hoist from travelling over the spent fuel pool after fuel assemblies have been placed in the fuel racks.
t The hoist is provided with electrical interlocks to control bridge / trolley travel and to minimize possible damage to the spent fuel shipping cask and the spent fuel pool during equipment handling. Geh ** Nd '"'d'"*d 'I d' 9"# M Q
cask one ns nea M tick $e IlL B.
New Fuel Handling Holst The new fuel handling hoist is used to move new fuel from the shipping containers to the new fuel storage racks, the new fuel inspection stand, and the new fuel elevator.
The hoist is provided with electrical interlocks to control the transfer path of the new fuel assemblics and to restrict fuel handling loads.
The hoist is restricted mechanically from allowing movement of new fuel over the spent fuel racks.
9.1.4.2.1.8 Containment Polar Crane The polar crane is mounted on a circular crane wall and travels E
360 degrees.
The containment polar crane has a main hoist and an auxiliary hoist to handle the various loads during an outage.
Provisions are made to ensure safe load handling.
These provisions include automatic upper and lower hoist
- limits, overload limits, slow speed hoist operation, and a load handling path to prevent damage to any safety-related equipment from a I
heavy load drop.
The polar crane is used to move the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel internals between the reactor vessel and various storage areas during outages, as described in Section 9.1.4.2.3.3.
The polar crane hoist is able to operate at fast speed with an empty hook.
Amendment I 9.1-34 December 21, 1990
.