ML20044B951
| ML20044B951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1993 |
| From: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9303150216 | |
| Download: ML20044B951 (24) | |
Text
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'o UNITED STATES g
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
,y WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 k...l!../
March 10,1993 Docket No.52-001 APPLICANT:
PROJECT:
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON FEBRUARY 23-25, 1993, CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS OPEN ISSUES A public meeting was held between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and GE representatives on February 22-25, 1993, in the GE office in San Jose, California, to discuss outstanding items related to the staff's review of Chapter 8, Electrical Systems, of the standard safety analysis report (SSAR) for the ABWR. Enclosure 1 is a list of those who attended the meeting.
The primary focus of the meeting was to discuss each design related open, confirmatory, or combined license (COL) action item which had been identified in the draft final safety evaluation report (DFSER), to identify the current status, and if not completely resolved, to develop a path to resolution.
It was agreed that the open items related to inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) would be addressed during future meetings. is the list of 60 0FSER items which were identified as interim or completely resolved based on draft markups of the SSAR or SSAR amendments received before the meeting with GE. The 16 marked with an asterisk were completely resolved based on the information provided in Amendment 21. is the list of the remaining unresolved items which were discussed during the meeting with a brief summary of the commitments and' agreements which were made relative to each item. One item, 8.3.3.5-1, previously open, was reclassified as confirmatory based on the discussions. Tentative agree-ment was made on nearly every item, and GE committed to providing a markup of the SSAR by the end of March 1993, incorporating the agreed upon information.
The second item discussed was the framework for the upcoming meeting with the staff on electrical system ITAAC which is scheduled for March 8,1993.
GE indicated that no further progress had been made on the rewrite of the electrical ITAAC beyond the version provided to the staff about 2 months ago.
A proposal was made and accepted that the focus of the March 8, 1993, meeting be to develop the generic-type ITAAC for electrical systems.
GE further indicated that it would prepare the generic electrical subjects to be covered in the ITAAC with proposed descriptions to be included in the SSAR for the meeting.
It was also agreed that the electrical power distribution system would be one of the first non-generic areas to be addressed in the ITAAC meeting.
120035 O EEIA CSIC. pp i,2, 9303150216 930310 1
PDR ADOCK 05200001 A
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- March 10,1993 was provided and discussed to be a guide for the electrical ITAAC development to be used during the working meeting with the staff and subse-quently by GE when the remaining ITAAC are prepared.
Origina!SignMIF Chester Poslusny, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page DISTklBUTION w/ enclosures:
Docket File PDST R/F PShea CPoslusny PDR DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosures:
TMurley/FMiraglic DCrutchfield WTravers JMoore, 15B18 GGrant, EDO ACRS (11)
JNWilson SNinh WHuffman MJanus EJordan, MNBB3701 J0'Brien, RES BHardin, RES LShao, RESg JKnox, 7E4 DThatcher, 7E4 ru 0FC:
LA:PDST:ADAR PM:PDST:ADAR S:PDSj AR NAME: PShe
$5 CPoslusny:tz UNWi o DATE: 03/C'/
03/(3/93 03/p?)9 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY:
223 MEET.CP b
GE Nuclear Energy Docket No.52-001 cc:
Mr. Patrick W. Harriott, Manager Mr. Joseph Quirk Licensing & Consulting Services GE Nuclear Energy GE Nuclear Energy General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 782 San Jose, California 95125 San Jose, California 95125 Mr. Robert Mitchell General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Mr. L. Gifford, Program Manager Regulatory Programs GE Nuclear Energy 12300 Twinbrook Parkway Suite 315 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Director, Criteria & Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
20460 Mr. Sterling Franks U. S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C.
20585
.j Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Room 8002 Washington, D.C.
20503 l
Mr. Frank A. Ross U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Office of LWR Safety and Technology 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, Maryland 20874 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C.
20006 Marcus A. Rowden, Esq.
t Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20004
[
Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
4
-Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 1000 1
Washington, D.C.
20036
[
ABWR ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS MEETING 1
San Jose, California February 23-25, 1993 ATTENDING:
C. Poslusny NRC J. Knox NRC D. Thatcher NRC J. Fox GE R. Strong GE M. Nik-Ahd GE J. Chambers GE T. James GE N. Hackford GE R. Louison GE A. Beard GE C. Christensen GE N. Fletcher DOE f
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INTERIM AND COMPLETELY RESOLVED ISSUES SSAR CHAPTER 8 DFSER NO.
11EE DFSER NO.
11EE 8.2.1.1-1 CONF
- 8.3.2.2-1 CONF 8.2.1.2-1 CONF
- 8.3.2.3-1 CONF
- B.2.1.3-1 CONF 8.3.2.4-1 CONF i
8.2.1.3-2 CONF 8.3.2.4-2 CONF 8.2.1.3-3 CONF
- 8.3.2.9-1 CONF 8.2.1.3-4 CONF
- 8.3.3.9-1 CONF 8.2.1.3-5 CONF
- 8.3.3.11-1 CONF 8.2.1.3-6 CONF
- 8.3.3.12-1 CONF 8.2.1.3-7 CONF
- 8.3.3.15-1 CONF 8.2.1.3-8 CONF 8.3.3.8-1 COL 8.2.1.3-9 CONF
- 8.3.3.15-1 COL i
8.2.2.1-1 CONF
- 8.3.4.2-1 CONF 8.2.2.1-2 CONF
- 8.3.4.3-1 CONF 8.2.2.8-1 OPEN
- 8.3.6.1-1 CONF 8.2.2.7-1 CONF
- 8.3.8.1-1 CONF 8.2.2.9-1 CONF
- 8.3.8.3-1 CONF i
- 8.2.3.1-1 CONF 8.3.2.4-3 CONF 8.2.3.2-1 COL S.3.2.7-1 COL 8.2.3.3-2 CONF 8.3.2.9-2 OPEN 8.2.3.3-2 COL 8.3.3.7-1 CONF 8.2.3.3-3 CONF 8.3.3.7-1 COL-8.2.3.3-3 COL 8.3.3.10-1 COL 8.2.3.3-4 CONF 8.3.3.14-1 COL 8.2.3.3-4 COL 8.3.3.16-1 COL-i
- 8.2.3.4-1 CONF 8.3.7-1 CONF 8.2.3.5-1 CONF 8.3.7-1 COL l
8.2.3.5-1 OPEN 8.3.8.2-1 COL 8.3-1 CONF 8.3.8.5-1 COL 8.3-1 COL 8.3.8.6-1 COL 8.3.1-1 CONF 8.3.9.2-1 COL
- Completely resolved by SSAR Amendment 21 i
OpEN ITEMS New Item:
Interface discussion GE indicated that Section 8.2.3 will be renamed as Interface Requirements and numbers 1-16 will be included. Number 17 will be a combined license (COL) information section included in 8.2.44.
In addition, Section 8.2.5 will be renamed as Conceptual Design. This was acceptable to the staff.
New Item: Conceptual design The staff indicated that a separate titled section is needed on the conceptual design for the offsite power system. GE agreed to provide additional descrip-tion of the design with a cross reference to the interface requirements section. This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.3.5-1 Redundant Class IE systems (environments)
The staff indicated that in Table 9A.5.2 there is a list of reactor building special cases with redundant equipment or circuits in the same fire area.
Electrical codes are listed to provide separation guidance. Some circuits list N/A under applicable codes which do not indicate the basis for protection of the equipment or circuits.
GE indicated that the scram solenoids are addressed in 9A.5.
That was acceptable to the staff. For other examples, GE provided an explanation for clarification, and no revision to the standard safety analysis report (SSAR) was required.
The staff questioned the protec-tion of the power supply to the remote shutdown panel from a fire in the main control room.
GE indicated that in SSAR Section 7.4.1.4.4, it states that all necessary power supply circuits are manually transferred to other sources after a control room short circuit.
The discussion of the standby liquid control system (SLCS) in 9A.5 indicates that the SLCS will be lost in one fire. There is not discussion on the protection of the Class 1E electrical systems.
GE agreed to modify the writeup to address this issue and do similar for the flammability control system, standby gas treatment system (SGTS), among others to discuss the required protection of Class IE power supplies. This was acceptable to the staff. The staff indicated that SPLB and SICB should also review the section.
This becomes an interim confirmatory item based on the above items.
8.3.5-1 Lighting system under design-basis accident (DBA)
The staff indicated that GE needs to address lighting requirements for all essential areas and not just the control room. Further, the staff needs to address the battery pack lighting illumination after a seismic event.
GE-indicated that the illumination is 7 ft. candles for the battery pack. Other lighting information is included in Table 9.5-1-9.5-4.
This item will be evaluated by the staff in the human factors area.
yg 8.3.7-1 Reliability of systems GE indicated that safety equipment will not be taken out of service for testing during operation. GE needs to add a statement to address the-reli-ability of the components when determining testing periodicity similar to the discussion being added to the offsite system testing. This was acceptable to the staff.
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CONFIRMATORY ITEMS 8.2.2.2-1 Isolation of instrumentation and control (I&C) circuits The staff needs a discussion of the design of interlock interconnections. GE needs to explain why the interlocks do not violate the required independence and why it is acceptable. GE indicated that the circuits will be electrically isolated and separated to the extent practical. The staff indicated that a SSAR change to this effect would be acceptable.
8.2.2.3-1 Electrical independence t
This was tentatively resolved based on 8.2.2.2-1 above.
8.2.2.4-1 Testability requirements The staff did not approve of the use of the word " facilitate" and recommended the use of " capability" for testing. GE proposed the revision of the wording.
The staff was concerned that not all tests can be done at full power, and that GE has not specified all exceptions. GE agreed to revise its commitment and clarify the testability and when it will be conducted to not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.
In addition, a requirement for reliability will be added for equipment which will not be tested during power operation.
The staff indicated that this would be acceptable.
8.2.2.6-1 Capability / capacity ~of offsite power This confirmatory item required that GE include a set of commitments listed in the DFSER as bullets. All GE SSAR markups were found to be acceptable prior to the meeting with exception of the items which were discussed below.
Low voltage analysis did not apoear to the staff as a COL item.
GE indicated that this analysis will be an ITAAC item, and that it would include a discussion of the methodology in the SSAR.
In addition, GE committed to providing a reference to the IEEE Standard'141, Red Book, Chapter 3.
This was acceptable to the staff.
The staff indicated that GE neglected to address the DFSER bullet concerning normal and alternative circuits being subjected to steady-state and transient conditions. The staff stated that it would reconsider and reevaluate this item, and it remained unresolved.
The bullet related to performance and operating characteristics of normal and alternate preferred power circuits to meet operability and design-basis requirements including short circuits, equipment capacity, voltage and frequency transient response was not addressed in the recent Chapter 8 markup.
GE indicated the items listed in the bullet could be addressed by the set of analyses methodologies to be included in the SSAR in a future markup. This remained unresolved.
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c 8.2.3.2-1 Degraded offsite voltage The staff reviewed the recent GE submittal and stated that GE needs to add a statement about voltage less than 70-percent voltage. GE proposed a change to the SSAR to indicate that the Class IE equipment is qualified to sustain operation for 3 seconds at 70-percent voltage without damage. This was acceptable to the staff.
8.2.3.3-1 Automatic switch from test to operating i
The staff wanted the control logic for switchover from parallel to normal operation to have the capacity to be periodically tested reflected in the SSAR.
GE agreed to add a statement to SSAR Section 8.3.1.1.8.8 to reflect this capability. This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.1.1-1 Compliance with IEEE standards The staff stated that GE needs to commit IEEE Standards 741 and 946. GE has reviewed the standards and would be able to commit to them completely.
In addition, the utility requirements document (URD) has committed to these standards. The staff indicated that a discussion of the standards in the text of Chapter 8 would be acceptat,le in a SSAR smendment.
8.3.1.2-1 Protection requirement of GDCs 2 and 4 The staff committed to review the recent markup of the SSAR to determine if GE has clarified the number of divisions needed to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
8.3.2.1-1 Open tray separation The staff indicated that the use of barrier is not consistent with other commitments in the SSAR.
It was suggested that GE better define the separa-tion and what the barrier would be. GE wanted to allow for non-lE cables maintained in open raceways and agreed to provide the change in a markup.
i This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.2.5-1 Separation of cables outside panels The staff indicated that the cables inside panels need to be supported. GE stated that the SSAR would be amended to discuss support. This was acceptable t
to the staff.
8.3.2.6-1 Separation of cables inside panels The staff indicated that power cables need to be installed in a barrier separating them from I&C cables in accordance with IEEE 384.
GE stated that the 120 control cable and power cables could be included in the same raceway, and that the regulatory guide (RG) or IEEE does not specify this requirement.
GE proposed that a statement be added in the SSAR to guarantee separation of power cables from any low-power I&C cabling or appropriate barriers. This was acceptable to the staff..
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8.3.2.7-1 Separation of cables enter / exit cabinet This will be resolved based on resolution of 8.3.2.6-1.
8.3.2.8-1 Physical separation of equipment The staff indicated the need for a commitment for a 3-hour fire barrier and missile barrier for everything up to the power distribution panels. The staff l
has reviewed the writeup in Appendix 9A and found the following inconsisten-i cies.
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Section 9A.5 conflicts Chapter 8 statement that all Class IE busses, distribu-tion systems, and power and control systems are located in seismic Category I buildings.
GE agreed to list the exceptions listed in 9A.5.5 in Sec-tion 8.1.3.1.1.1.
GE committed to verifying if additional cross references to l
exceptions are needed in Chapter 7 and adding additional information to the SSAR, if required. This was acceptable to the staff.
Section 9A.5.5.1 indicates that there are multiple divisions of scram solenoid fuse panels in the same fire areas. GE committed to clarifying the discussion in the section to add a statement that the panels are in separate fire areas.
GE agreed to provide a statement in Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 indicating that the 3-hour fire barrier will be maintained from the power source up through the distribution panels.
Exceptions for the loads are provided in 9A.5.
This was acceptable to the staff.
l The staff provided a markup of 9A.5 to GE indicating sections which are inconsistent with other sections of the SSAR.
j 8.3.3.1-1 Protection of electrical penetrations The staff expected a commitment to bullets for protection of electrical penetrations in the design description.
In addition, a commitment to testing j
of fuses was also expected.
GE indicated that additional information would be added to the SSAR to address the fuse testing and inspection. This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.3.2-1 Protection of electrical equipment from design-basis events (DBEs)
GE indicated that it would modify the SSAR to include a reference to IEEE 323-1974 for all electrical equipment. GE committed to address the e
bullets in the DFSER by including them in the SSAR.
8.3.3.3-1 Seismic qualification of light bulbs The staff indicated that GE still needs to show how the non-seismic fixture l
will not affect the Class IE circuits. GE indicated that the breaker protec-
'l tion will protect the circuits in the design, and this information would be included in the SSAR. This was acceptable to the staff.
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The staff stated that it still has a problem with light bulbs not being seismically qualified. The staff will verify if this subject has been covered i
by the RG 1.29 review. This item remained open.
8.3.3.4-1 Submergence of electrical equipment The staff indicated that GE should list the fact that temperature monitoring cabling and their terminations in the suppression pool are qualified to be submerged. GE agreed to add this fact in the SSAR. This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.3.6-1 Associated circuits design information The staff indicated that GE had not included DFSER bullets in its SSAR markup clearly.
GE indicated that it would include the DFSER bullets in a SSAR revision and would identify lighting as the only associated. circuits with exceptions noted and justified. This was acceptable to the staff.
In addition, GE indicated that it would provide a further description of how it meets IEEE 384 relating to the fine-motion control rod drive circuits. GE still is seeking credit for the zone selective interlock, but the staff has problems with this.
GE indicated that it would describe the zone selective interlocks as Class 1E in the SSAR. The staff was concerned that the zone selective interlock transfer switches should be Class IE to protect the Class IE from parallel operation, but they are not. GE indicated that they would classify the transfer switches as associated IE, and the loads downstream of the switches and feeds from non-lE as non-Class IE. This would be acceptable to the staff to cover the final aspect of this item.
8.3.3.B-1 Overload protection of Class IE motor-operated valves (MOVs) i The staff indicated that it needed a statement that the bypass circuitry for the overloads needs to be addressed for testability and meeting the positions of IEEE 603. GE indicated that it would modify the SSAR to include this information.
8.3.3.10-1 Periodic testing of protective relaying A discussion concerning the need to clarify the meeting of the requirements of IEEE 603 was held.
The staff wanted the identification of Class lE equipment l
not performing a safety function. GE indicated that this could not be done until the final design has been completed.
GE needs to discuss the areas where they cannot meet IEEE 603 and committed to provide a general discussion of cases where the design will not meet IEEE 603.
l GE indicated that the commitment to the standard IEEE 603 Paragraph 5.2 will i
be provided in the SSAR.
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8.3.3.13-1 Fire protection of cable systems The staff had expected additional detailed information about separation in accordance with IEEE 384. GE committed to adding a reference to the specific 3-feet, 5-feet separation included in another section of the SSAR (8.3.1.1.5.1).
This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.3.14-1 Reactor protection system (RPS) scram and main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoid valves The staff indicated that the internal protection (EPA) needs to be added to the text discussion to be consistent with the corresponding drawing in the SSAR.
GE committed to adding a paragraph to specify the internal protection characteristics. This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.3.16-1 Control access to Class IE power equipment GE committed to adding a statement that Class 1E equipment will have provi-sions for access control as specified in the DFSER. This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.4-1 Electrical independence The staff had expected DFSER design commitment bullets to be included in the SSAR markup.
Both GE and the staff committed to review the SSAR to identify where each bullet is included.
8.3.4.1-1 Interconnection between redundant divisions GE indicated that the SSAR provides information in the SSAR that addresses the interlocks in Section B.3.2.1.3.2, and the staff found it acceptable.
8.3.4.4-1 Transfer of leads between redundant divisions The staff determined that the design implies that the design has one non-one lead tied to the Class IE division. This was acceptable to the staff as marked up in the SSAR.
8.3.4.4-2 Isolation between safety bus & non-safety lead This item was tentatively closed based on the discussion in Section 8.3.3.6-1.
8.3.5-1 Lighting s,vstems The staff still believed this was unresolved and committed to review the basis for this finding.
8.3.6.2-1 Control of electrical design bases This will be evaluated by the staff after the final certified SSAR submittal is received.
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8.3.8.2-1 Capacity of IE 125 volt de battery The staff indicated that the DFSER bullets would need to be added to the SSAR, but GE had not added all of them. The bullets need to be reviewed to deter-mine where they are addressed. The staff indicated that 1-4, 6-10 and 13 had not been addressed. GE indicated that it would review the bullets to deter-mine where they were included and would add the ones which have not been included to the SSAR.
8.3.8.4-1 Class IE ac standby de power The staff indicated that local manual start without load sequence capability had not been included in the SSAR. GE indicated that this information would be added to the SSAR. This was acceptable to the staff.
Regarding air starts, the staff indicated that the capability for four air starts will be available without recharging the air tanks was not adequately addressed in the SSAR. An agreement was made to the rewording to be included in the SSAR which was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.8.5-1 Constant voltage / frequency supply capacity The staff indicated that the testability requirement had not been included in the SSAR.
GE indicated that it would add the statement about the capability to test the capacity of the constant voltage constant frequency. This was acceptable.
8.3.8.6-1 Battery charger The staff indicated that GE should indicate the time for return to full charge for minimum charge should be included in the SSAR. GE indicated that they would provide the design basis number for the recharging time.
This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.8.7-1 Distribution systems The staff wanted a statement concerning the capacity of each distribution system and the capability to be testable as a design commitment.
Ia addition, GE needs to generate a discussion of the distribution design capacity require-ments. GE proposed revising the Section 8.3.1.1.5.2 discussion of the design basis to indicate that the capacity and voltage drop analyses will be per-formed in accordance with IEEE 141 to assure that power sources and distribu-tion systems will be capable of transmitting sufficient energy to start and operate all required loads for all plant conditions. GE also indicated that this type of discussion would be considered for addition to several places in the SSAR. This was acceptable to the staff.
Regarding the testability of the systems, GE' agreed to change the statement'in Section 8.3.1.1.5.3 to replace sensing devises with power supplies. This was acceptable to the staff.
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8.3.9.1-1 Reestablishing ac power The staff expected the DFSER design comitment bullets to be all addressed in the SSAR. GE was asked to clarify how they meet the station blackout (SBO).
They have submitted the combustion turbine generator (CTG) and the coping capability in the design. The staff stated that it believes that the CTG is sufficient to meet the rule and the coping is not required.
GE originally was not ready to discard the coping argument until tha reliability and avail-ability requirements on the CTG in the technical specifications (TS) are firmed up by the staff and may want to receive credit for both features. The staff committed to revise its finding to indicate credit for the CTG as an alternative ac source which meets the SB0 rule requirements.
8.3.9.2-1 Coping crpability GE indicated that they may not meet the full requirements of RG 1.155 because the analysis cannot be done without final as-purt.hased equipment. The staff committed to have the final safety evaluation report (FSER) reflect its revised evaluation.
8.3.9.3-1 Combustion turbine generator GE identified where the bullets included in the DFSER are in the SSAR. The staff indicated that the GE discussion needs to be revised to remove all discussions of the coping capability based on the staff approval of the CTG as the alternate ac source. GE needs to clean up the bullets to better meet l
Further, the staff indicated that the following sections of I
RG 1.155:
C, 3.3.5, 3.5, and Appendix A and B for the CTG.
Specifically, for the CTG Bullet No. 5 regarding the time to place the CTG on line to feed one train of shutdown loads being less than one hour. GE agreed to provide additional description of the capacity and capability to do the required functions less than one hour in Section 9.5.11.
In addition, GE agreed to provide a comprehensive description of how the SB0 and RG 1.155 are met to address the electrical and plant systems aspects of the regulatory require-ments. This was acceptable to the staff.
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COMBINED LICENSE (COL) ACTION ITEMS j
8.2.2.4.1 Procedures for inspection and maintenance The staff indicated that GE needs to revise items listed-in.the DFSER to address the scope of inspection and maintenance of item (h) of 8.2.3 of the.~
SSAR to include terminals and insulators. GE agreed to do this.
8.2.2.5-1 Procedures for generator breaker requirements l
The staff requested that GE revise paragraph (g) to clarify the intent of-the "i
testing of the generator breaker..GE agreed to.do such.
8.2.2.6-1 Capability and capacity of offsite power Operational restrictions for the reserve auxiliary transformer needed to be.
l revised. GE indicated that when the reserve auxiliary is out.of service,.
f restrictions would be imposed on the length of operation in' this mode. The staff indicated that GE should add a statement to the SSAR,. and GE agreed.to do so. Restrictions will apply whenever the normal and alternate. offsite -
sources are not available to a Class IE division..GE would need to indicate-how the configuration would be established, and include a COL action item to establish the procedure ^ to configure the power sources and a means.to address.
SB0. This was acceptable to the staff.
Operational restrictions on-the reserve auxiliary transformer supplying.the i
non-class IE load. groups should prohibit the secondary winding from supplying -
loads greater than the winding oil / air rating. The staff indicated that GE :
.,1 should provide a clarification in the SSAR about the capacity limits on the reserve auxiliary transformer, and that all' preconceived abnormal allowed configurations should be included in the ~ design discussions.
GE committed to.
adding the information to the SSAR.
Regarding the separation bullet, GE indicated that alternate configurations do not violate separation requirements. The staff indicated that this is part of-l the design, and no action is required. The staff committed to revise the i
DFSER.
l GE agreed to address the remaining bullets in a revised SSAR submittal..
l 8.2.3.3-1 Periodic testing of interlock design J
.GE committed to add a COL. action item to require procedures.to perform the periodic. testing of the interlocks in Section 8.3.4.21.
This was. acceptable to the staff.-
8.2.4-1 Operating procedures for offsite preferred' power' circuits l
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~GE provided a markup of the SSAR which was acceptable.
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E 8.3.3.1-1 Periodic test of protective, current limiting devices The COL item was addressed in the confirmatory item 8.3.3.1-1 above.
8.3.4-1 Electrical independence GE indicated that key interlocks to insure that two breakers are always open would be provided along with administrative controls over the use of keys would be a COL action item, as specified in the SSAR markup. The staff found this to be acceptable.
8.3.4.1-1 Administrative control of interlock keys This item was resolved in item 8.3.4-1.
8.3.4.4-1 Periodic calibration of fault interrupt coordination I
GE agreed to provide a discussion of the periodic testing requirements for protective and/or current limiting devices. This was acceptable to the staff.
i 8.3.5-1 Periodic testing and replacement of light bulbs The staff indicated that the COL needs to have a program to replace inspect and replace light bulbs. GE disagreed with this requirement.
It remained unresolved.
8.3.8.4-1 Procedures for testing of diesel generators (DGs)
The staff indicated that all the DFSER bullets for tests had not been included in the SSAR.
GE indicated that it would revise the discussion in Sec-tion 8.3.4.36 to clarify the reference back to Section 8.3.1.1.8.2.
This was acceptable to the staff.
8.3.8.7-1 Distribution system GE indicated that a statement in Sections 8.3.4.30 and 8.3.4.33 indicates that procedures would include periodic testing in accordance with IEEE 308. 'The staff found this acceptable.
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ABWR SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:
PROPOSED TIER 1 TREATMENT DESIGN TECHNICAL ISSUE DESCRIPTION ITAAC BASIS SYSTEM NAME, SCOPE AND YES YES GENERAL TIER 1 PATTERN CONFIGURATION (CONFIGURATION) 0A'76 C#'A'#47/ *d r ItrrK cnv' cq 7tf8L M 6 i4F o f-0 ().
SYSTEM FUNCTION YES NO COVERED BY OTHER ITEMS 1
OVERVIEW KEY' INTERFACES YES YES (PART OF CONF 16URATION) e SAFETY-RELATED STATUS YES NO COVERED BY OTHER ITEMS E2 8
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ABWR SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:
PROPOSED TIER 1 TREATMENT L
l DESIGN TECHNICAL ISSUE DESCRIPTION ITAAC BASIS SYSTEN FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS POWER SOURCES AND LOADS RATING ISSUES; (E.G.,
VOLTAGE DROP. ANALYSIS)
LOADING FAULT PROTECTION (E.G.,
YES YES MOST SAFETY-RELATED FAULT CURRENT ANALYSIS)
FEATURES TO BE COVERED REDUNDANCY TESTABILITY GROUNDING SPECIAL STUDIES I
(HARMONIC DISTRIBUTION ANALYSES) i SETPOINTS NO NO COVERED BY I&C DAC CODES AND STANDARDS NO-NO CODES AND STANDARDS NOT-BEING IDENTIFIED IN TIER 1 2 26L 2:c\\ettoch Z-
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ABWR SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:
PROPOSED TIER 1 TREATMENT DESIGN
' TECHNICAL ISSUE DESCRIPTION IIMC BASIS SEISNIC CLASSIFICATION YES NO COVERED BY THE CONFIGURATION-FvrL C2Et 7(2 inta_
(ogv4/DCd ITEN l 9:_
C&L-rNA o uT CL A% /6, y
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EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION YES NO COVERED BY THE CONFIGURATION P/T/RH ITEM K DEf!Mh 64 VSE LOCATION / LAYOUT YES YES y N F76,v H P an/
PER_
(CONFIGURATION)
Dp i
PHYSICAL SEPARATION YES-YES I) ON f7) A
$6t T /E r r dL-POWER. SUPPLIES; ELECTRICAL
-YES YES
-INDEPENDENCE 2 26L-2:e\\ettsch 3 -
ABWR SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:
PROPOSED TIER 1 TREATMENT DESIGN
[
TECHNICAL ISSUE DESCRIPTION ITAAC BASIS INSTR ENTATION, CONTROLS,
////
- oM-y' i F NC LARNS z_
- NRC M(A-YES YES
- RSS YES YES (IF APPLICABLE)
PROTECTION AGAINST:
INTERNAL EVENTS (FLOODS, FIRES, PIPE NO NO COVERED BY BUILDINGS, FIRE BREAKS, ETC.)
PROTECTION AND OTHER SYSTEMS.
EXTERNAL EVENTS (FLOODS, TORNADOES, ETC.)
SECURITY.' PROVISIONS
NOT DISCUSSED-IN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS -------
1 (SABOTAGE)
NANUFACTURING AND NO NO NOT TIER 1 MATERIAL (g'A;p(f(ift INSTALLATION PROCESSES 10c 6 k(
PRA m - 15
,ES r
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ABWR NON-SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:
PROPOSED TIER 1 TREATHENT DESIGN TECHNICAL ISSUE DESCRIPTION ITAAC BASIS SYSTEM NAME, SCOPE AND YES
-YES (CONFIGURATION)
BASIC TIER 1 STRATEGY-CONFIGURATION SYSTEM FUNCTION - OVERVIEW YES NO KEY INTERFACES YES YES (CONFIGURATION)
SAFETY-REL'ATED' STATUS YES NO
- BASIC TIER 1 STRATEGY 6
2-26L-Itc\\ettech 1
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ABWR NON-SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:-
PROPOSED TIER 1 TREATMENT DESIGN TECHNICAL _ ISSUE DESCRIPTION ITAAC BASIS SYSTEM FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS POWER SOURCES AND LOADS YES, BUT ONLY
- RATING ISSUE-KEY ITEMS
- LOADING WITH SOME
.YES LIMITED TIER 1 COVERAGE'
- FAULT PROTECTION SAFETY
- GROUNDING SIGNIFICANCE SETPOINTS NO
'NO NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS CODES AND STANDARDS NO NO TIER 1 NOT IDENTIFYING.
CODES AND STANDARDS I
SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION N0/YES NO SOME SYSTEMS MAY IDENTIFY NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I ITEMS 2-26L 1 c\\ettsch 2
ABWR NON-SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:
PROPOSED TIER 1 TREATMENT DESIGN TECHNICAL... ISSUE DESCRIPTION ITAAC BASIS EQUIPNENT QUALIFICATION NO NO NOT APPLICABLE LOCATION / LAYOUT-YES YES-(CONFIGURATION 7)
PHYSICAL SEPARATION N
N0' h
_. M F"_IC E"~C - d
/
I POWER SUPPhIES AND YES-YES A k ROPRIATE FOR TIER ELECTRICAL INDEPENDENCE INSTRUNENTATION, CONTROLS, ALARMS
- JIRC' M (rt.
YES YES AS APPROPRIATE FOR TIER 1
- RSS NO NO NOT APPLICABLE 2 26L+1:e\\ettech-3
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l ABWR NON-SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS:
PROPOSED TIER 1-TREATMENT DESIGN l-TECHNICAL ISSUE DESCRIPTION ITAAC BASIS l
PROTECTION'AGAINST:
NO NO NOT APPLICA8LE
- INTERNAL EVENTS
- EXTERNAL EVENTS l
l SECURITY PROVISIONS
NOT DISCUSSED IN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS -------
MANUFACTURING AND NO NO NOT TIER 1 MATERIAL INSTALLATION PROCESSES PRA INSIGHTS YES YES IF IDENTIFIED BY PRA 2 26L-itc\\ettech 4
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