ML20043G012

Requalification Exam Rept 50-344/OL-90-01 on 900123-0406. Exam results:6 of 8 Reactor Operators & 11 of 12 Senior Reactor Operators Passed

ML20043G012
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	05/25/1990
From:	Miller L, Morrill P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20043G011	List: ML20043G010 ML20043G012
References
50-344-OL-90-01, 50-344-OL-90-1, NUDOCS 9006180418
Download: ML20043G012 (14)

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S ENCLOSURE 1 l

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EXAMINATION REPORT 50-344/0L-90-01 i

Examination Report No.:

50-344/0L-90-01

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Facility Licensee:

Trojan Facility Docket No.:

50-344 Facility License No.:

HPF-1

- Licensed operator requalification examinations administered at Trojan, Rainier, Oregon.

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Chief Examiner:

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Approved:

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. T. Miller,9f.,, Chief Date Signed i

Operations Section c

i Sunnary:

During the period January 23, through April 6,1990, the NP.C j

~y conducted a validation review of the Trojan Licensed Operator Requalification Program testing materials. Subsequently, during the period of April 16, through April. 26, 1990, the NRC conducted the formal program evaluation (ReportNo. 50-344/0L-90-01).

Results:- The facility Licensed Operator Requalification Program was.

determined to be satMsfactory.

Examination Results Suninary: The following table sunnarizes the test results of individual operators and operating crews as graded by the NRC.

Total Total Total Tested Passed

' Failed Operating Crews:

5 5

0 Individual Operators:

Vi' R0 8

6 2

SRO:

12 11 1

Total:

20 17 3

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Licensee and NRC Examination results are in agreement except that the licensee ' t failed one crew in the operating simulator portion of the. examination.

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Q' 1-REPORT DETAILS t-

.1.

Personnel NRC Personnel:

L. Miller, Chief, Operations Section

'P. Morrill, Chief Examiner

• R. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector

• J. Melfi, Resident Inspector

• T. Sundsmo. RV Examiner

• M. Lintz, NRC Contract Examiner, Pacific Northwest Laboratory

• T. Bardell, NRC Contract Examiner, Pacific Northwest Laboratory Trojan Personnel:

'T. Walt, Acting Vice President, Nuclear J. Frewing, Senior Strategic Analyst, Generation Division

• D. Hicks, General Manager Plant Support

• J. Reinhart, Operations Manager i

• R. Russell, Operations Branch Mantger l

• S. Nichols Training Manager

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• G. Ellis, Operations Training Superviscr 1

• M. Westman, Training Specialist S. Bauer, Regulation Branch Manager 1

R. Amundson, Training Staff S. Carrick,-Training Staff T. Cerafici, Training Staff K. Davison, Training Staff M.:Dawson, Training Staff j

S. Frantz, Training Staff f

R. Hines, Training Staff

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G. Laughlin, Training Staff E. Lazier, Operations Staff J. Rizza, Training Staff J. Torgeson, Training Staff S. Vanover, Training Staff Other Personnel:

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. H Moomey, Oregon Department of Energy, Reactor Safety Manager' l

A. Bless, Oregon Department of Energy, Resident Inspector R. Mazurkiewiez, Bonneville Power Administration i

• Identifies personnel present at the April 26, 1990 exit meeting.

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i 2.

-PurposeofProgramJva_lua_ti_on The evaluation was conducted to determine the effectiveness of the Trojan -

Licensed Operator Requalification Program and to evaluate licensed I

operators for renewal of their six year term licenses.

p The valuation was administered in accordance with NUREG-1021. ES-601, Revision 5. " Administration of NRC Requalification Program Evaluations."

3.

Program Validation and Exami_ nation Developme,ntt A.

Ge_neral A preliminary walk-through of job performance measures, scenarios, and review of the written examination questions was conducted at the Trojan site on January 23-25, 1990 with material available at that

time, j

On February 19, 1990, the licensee's examination reference material, i

including a com measures (JPMs)plete set of simulator scenarios, job performance i

, and banks of questions for Category A (static

, simulator), and Category B (classroom written) examinations were received by Region-V. On March 15, 1990 the licensee's complete draft Requalification examination was received by Region V. This l

material was reviewed in the Region V office and subsequently at the j

Trojan si,te on March 19-22, 1990. All of the JPMs and scenarios to be used were walked-through and all of the questions used for the i

examination'were. verified in the simulator and/or with the ap-4 s;

i propriate> reference material. For the examinations, twelve of the seventeen scenarios provided were used and seventy-four of the s

seventy-six JPMs were used. The NRC review effort identified many I

required changes to the proposed operating and written examinations.

These _ corrections were indicative of general weaknesses in the t

examination banks; and are described below. A final walk-though of all:the operating test material was conducted on April 2-6, 1990 at the site.

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frelimina_ry R,ev,iew

11) Job Perfemance Measurements During the preliminary review on January 23-25, 1990, JPM Numbers 023, 024, 025, and 028 in the simulator and JPM 088 in e

the 31 ant were walked down. The examiners observed that most of tie control room JPMs concentrated on emergencies and

. requested that some additional JPMs should be available for i

off-normal and normal operations. The examiners stated that JPMs involving the rod control system, electrical plant operations, and chemical and volume control system should be added to the licensee's bank. NRC examiners identified that the JPM critical elements needed to be reassigned since some critical elements were not identified and some items marked critical were not really critical elements. The cues to the PGE evaluator also needed to be clearly marked. Some JPMs were changed to cause the operator to take action based on abnormal i

or unexpected equipment response. This ensured that the operators were properly completing procedural verifications and could manually operate automatic controls.

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,, Tid NRC examiners identified that most JPM. questions required oortrue/f61se'enswers,(2)questionswhichexhibited=(1)_yes/no modificatioh to eliminate.too low a level of difficulty, and-

-(3) open ended questions (poorly. focused with many potentially correct answers).-In addition, many of the questions did not have references to a source. The facility personnel agreed to.

correct the JPMs, rewrite.the questions where appropriate, and-add references for-the questions.

(2)-WrittenExaminations Written exemination questions exhibited the same problems as be eliminated. " Double jeopardy" questions (questions needed to the JPM questions. Specifically: True/ false asking the same thingtwicewithdifferentwording)hadtobeeliminded.

Questions that required an operator to find a misaligned switch or light without any apparent cause had to be corrected. Ques.

tions with two parts needed to have partial credit clearly indicated. Open ended questions which asked the operator to

" explain why..." or " discuss...." needed to be focused to ensure the answer corresponded to the question which was asked. In z

general, the questions needed to make it clear what was required for full credit, number of responses, and type of answer.

Category A (Plant Proficiency) written examination questions were significantly weaker than the Category B (Limits and Controls) questions, both in femat (described above) as well as technical accuracy. One Category A examination had to be total'y rewritten, while the other three examinations' required signi N ant modifications or rewriting of more than 50% of the quest.as.

While correcting and rewriting the written examination questions, the written examination content was found to have two other problems. First, the examination content was not consistent with the ES-601 model in that'there were very few system and instrument and. controls type questions in the

' Category A examinations, and second, many Category A questions i'

did not use the simulator as a reference. Both problems were solved by adding s'ome additional equipment malfunctions into the frozen simulator to allow additional questions on systems, controls, and' instruments.

Greater luse of objective questions (multiple choice) to reduce

~the. possibility?of disagreement between NRC and licensee.

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evaluators was strongly recommended to the facility training staff.'A consistent format'for questions and answers was a

discussed-and it'was agreed that multiple choice questions 4.;

(would:have four choices with only one correct answer. Other q'uestions would be written to require a short answer type response. The licensee agreed to correct and rewrite the

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questions based on the examiners' criticisms.

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(3) Simulator Scenarios Simulator scenario NRC-006, a main steam line break outside containment, was walked though completely on the running -

simulator. The simulator appeared to operate well except that thefailedsteamgenerator(S/G)depressurizationratefrom600 psig to atmospheric pressure appeared too fast. Licensee personnel also informed the examiners that the electrical modeling for component failure on loss of busses was not complete. Neither of these problems appeared to affect the scenario.

1 The facility agreed to run the simulator to the starting point of each scenario and then take a " snap-shot" of those conditions to run the examination in a reasonable time frame.

The NRC examiners requested additional simulator scenarios to 1

have one more S/G tube break or tube leak events and a steam line break inside containment event for more balanced coverage. The facility's criteria for individual and team critical items were based on those used previously at other Region V facilities and appeared acceptable. Several possible ambiguities in the emergency procedures were observed and discussed with the facility personnel.

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Fi_nal: Review i

Final! reviews of the licensee's testing material were completed by the examination team in March and April 1990. An Operations Department SR0 was involved to determine the correct use of the emergency procedures. Some' difficulty was experienced by the examination team in retaining this individual due to other work for the refueling outage. No operators attended the Facility Pre-Briefing conducted by the NRC. Reportedly, this was due to the operators' schedules. The Chief Examiner told the facility personnel that Operations' involvement was vital for a successful requalification program and asked.if the facility had enough licensed operators. Facility training and operations personnel stated that the problem was a temporary shortage of licensed operators due to both the requalification test and the outage falling -in the seme time frame. They went on to state that after July 1990 the facility would have several more licensed operators which should help the problem. The Chief Examiner expressed his concern again that the facility may be over-extending the operations staff if they had difficulty sparing one senior operator for several days.

(1) Job Performance Measurements The emphasis on JPMs related to emergencies was maintained L

since the facility had based the JPMs on maintaining the health and safety of the public (primarily accident situations) and I

had written JPMs based on the sample plan of the material I

taught during the last requalification cycle. Since this was consistent with ES-601, the examiners accepted the licensee's position.

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Two JPMs were not used due to deficiencies in the procedures.

JPM 95 " Local Start of Instrument Air Compressor" was dropped-due to incomplete and missing steps in the procedure identified by the licensee, JPM 103 "Line up the Spent Fuel Pool to the Reactor, Coolant System" was also dropped by the licensee due to

'the deletion of the relevant procedure ONI-47 " Backup Decay Heat Removal Without RHR Pumps", and the fact that the other relevant procedure, ONI 4-1 " Residual Heat Removal" did not fully cover the operator actions required.

The examiners found that in several-other JPMs the "in-plant" JPM steps were different from the steps in the procedures used s

to accomplish the JPM. Consequently, all the "in-plant" JPMs were walked-down a second time and a representative sample of v

" control room" JPMs were walked-through to verify the procedures and JPMs were consistent. Most of the "in-plant" JPMs had to be corrected, while all of the " control room" JPMs were found to be consistent with plant procedures. The examiners found that the licensee's corrections were acceptable, gl' While conducting the "in-plant" walk-downs described above, the examiners noted that during the walk-through of JPM-88,;" Local:

' Start of EDG Following Over-speed Trip," some changes.had to l

be made to ensu're the procedure referenced by the JPM would.

accomplish the objective of the JPM. In EFP-1 " Alternative Shutdown for Evacuation of Control Room Caused by Fire", the procedure had steps in " Attachment E" to locally start an emergency diesel generator. One of the steps " Place the maintenance switch in maintenance", appeared to be incorrect.

for a fire in the control room leading to the use of the procedure. Compliance with the procedure would have resulted in the diesel starting at reduced speed for warm-up. As a consequence ONI-32 "12.47 KV and 4.16 KV System Faults" which has~the correct emergency 5 tart procedure, without warm-up, was used for conducting the JPM. Facility personnel agreed that the local start procedure in EFP-1 would be corrected as soon as possible.

The examination team added two in-plant electrical JPMs to make up for the two JPMs dropped. The JPM questions had been substantially improved, and were acceptable. However, many of the questions were at a low cognitive level. The licensee's personnel had corrected the other previously identified problems.

(2) Written Examination The final written tests agreed to by the team were consistent with the licensee's sample plan and reflected the requalification training completed during the last cycle. As previously discussed, the questions selected from the examination bank needed considerable work before they were acceptable. The examiners stated that most of the questions in the examination bank needed considerable work to make it usable. The final examinations agreed to by the examination team appeared objective and well written.

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1 (3).SimulatorScenarios

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-During the final reviews, the apparent fast steam generator depressurization-problem previously observed had been corrected

.and the electrical buses were fully modeled on the simulator.

The simulator operated as expected, but did have to be occasionally restarted to clear input-output errors.

Due to the examiners' previous comments, two additional scenarios had been added to the scenario bank, making seventeen scenarios available for use. All scenarios were found to be properly-corrected and ready to be used for the examinations.

4.

Operato_r Selection The operating crews were initially selected by the licensee in accordance with NUREG 1021,- ES-601. However, at the same time, the NRC was conducting a special inspection of PGE's January 1989 requalification written examination and apparent discrepancies in the grading of that examination identified by PGE Quality Assurance personnel in January 1990

.(NRCReportNumber 50-344/90-05 dated 3/28/90). As a result of the NRC

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saecial inspection, the licensee agreed to modify crews to include six of tie eleven SR0s who initially. failed the January 1989 written examination in the April 1990 NRC requalification examination. The licensee also agreed to include three SR0s in the April 1990 test who had either failed both the 1988 and 1989 facility written requalification examinations, or who failed one of these tests. and nearly failed the other.

1. Subsequent to these changes, the operator selection and crew c r

'were reviewed and approved by the chief examiner as well as the

..or who conduc'ted the specia1Hinspection. One individual who was or w

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' inter 4d-to be inithe special sample was dropped when he was reassigned

,and..k, longer; required a license. This resulted in testing five personnel V

'whoshadffailed the PGE January 1989 requalification examination or had xhibited weakness on both the 1988 and 1989 PGE written tests.

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.None of the five SR0s of this gr'oup failed.either the NRC written r

examination or the job performance measures. However, one of the five

'i4 SR0s failed the' simulator portion of the requalification' examination.

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Based on these results of the April 1990 NRC requalification testing, it appears that the SR0s'who did poorly on the 'PGE 1989 or 1988 facility requalification examinations were successfully remediated.

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Examination Administration The Trojan site specific simulator operated satisfactorily during the performance of the scenarios, job performance measures, and the Category 4

A static scenarios selected for this evaluation. Enclosure 4, " Simulation facility Report", is enclosed to document the known differences from the plant and problems which have occurred in the past.

Written examinations were administered to three operating crews on April 16, 1990, and to the remaining two operating crews on April 23, 1990.

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During the operating examinations the examiners observed several j

difficulties with the licensee's procedures.

i During scenario NRC-008 which included a main feed line break inside l

containment, the operator acting as Assistant Shift Supervisor had some

' difficulty interpreting the " response not obtelned" portion of Step 2 to l

EI-'1." Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant". The operator identified that one steam generator was completely depressurized, which indicated he should go to the "RN0" column.' The statement in the "RN0" column just j

opposi_te that> step read "If NOT, THEN go to EI-2. FAULTED S/G ISOLATION, Step l'."

Th,is was1 initially the correct thing to do since EI-2 is used to i

isolate the faulted steam generator.

El-2 then returns the crew to El-1,

' Step 1., When the crew went to repeat step 2 of El-1 thry read the same procedure step and repeated the same loop. What they failed to recognize was that the "RN0"> statement did not stand alone and was intended to be

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part of a ' step to " Verify allL faulted S/Gs isolated." The crew jl subsequently realized that they had to get out of the loop and went to ES-0.0, "Re-diagnosis", which then directed them to the correct emergency procedure. The chief examiner stated that this type of situation could be l

avoided by writing the E0Ps-consistently to prevent the operators I

misunderstanding the entry point into a step.

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I During scenario NRC-011 in which a large break primary loss of coolant accident and ECCS flow caused a rapid coal-down, the crew implemented ES-1.3 " Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation" even though a RED condition existed indicating that FR-P.1 " Response to Inninent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition"_had to be implemented first. Initially, it appeared that going to ES-1.3 was a mistake. However, after reviewing the Westinghouse j

ERG Executive Summary it was clear that the operators had taken the q

correct actions. The chief examiner stated that it would be appropriate to place guidance for the high priority for switch-over to cold leg recirculation in some more obvious place, such as the " reference page j

for the EI. The importance of this item is currently written as a NOTE d

in ES-1.3.

J During scenario NRC-027 in which a steam generator tube leak greater than 50 gpm and main steam line break outside containment had occurred, i

the operator acting as the Shift Supervisor correctly classified an event 2, Step 5 (which was the correct follow-on step)y Classification" Module as a site area emergency.

RERP EP-001 "Emergenc lists'three events (loss of fuel cladding, coolant leakage greater than 50 gpm, and loss of containment integrity), any two of which require an event classification of site area emergency. Module 2, Step 5 lists three items associated with loss of containment integrity:

failure of isolation valves, failure l

of an equipment hatch, and failure of an airlock. Module 2, Step 5 does not include steam generator tube leaks combined with a faulted secondary system as loss of two fission product barriers. This apparent omission could have led to a misdiagnosis of the event.

At the exit meeting the chief examiner stated that the facility should review their other E0Ps, ONIs, and Ols to ensure the procedures were correct and clear. The licensee personnel stated that training on the new simulator should solve the observed problems and that a procedure review and upgrade program was being conducted which would ensure that procedures were adequate.

g During the simulator scenarios the examiners also observed that two of the simulator crews (simulator evaluations conducted on April 17 and April 19,1990) exhibited weaknesses in connunications. The first crew appeared poorly coordinated, in that, individuals acted independently, without communicating with other team members. The shift supervisor appeared isolated, and both the shift supervisor and the assistant shift supervisor talked too softly during their discussions for other team members to hear. Spoken communications appeared informal and orders were not repeated back. The second crew was more vocal. However, orders were not acknowledged and some team members completed steps of the emergency procedures by themselves without informing the other team members.

Some team members appeared to focus on a few specific indications and not hear or understand information being stated by other operators. The examiners discussed these observations with the licensee representatives at the exit meeting. The licensee personnel agreed that operator.

cornunications needed improvement and stated that the simulator. training over the next year should eliminate this problem.

6.

Evaluation of Licensee Evaluators The licensee evaluators selected by the licensee for this examination were satisfactory as evaluated by the criteria of ES-601, Attachment 5.

Some initial difficulty was exprienced by both the evaluator 5 and the operators being tested in completing answers to questions. The evaluators were waiting for the operator to say "I'm done," while the operators'were looking for some clue that the evaluator had enough information for the answer. The chief examiner told the licensee evaluators to explain t_o the operators that they, the operators, needed to tell the PGE evaluator when their answers were complete. The evaluators did not lead the operators, cued properly, and asked followup questions when appropriate.

7.

Operator and Crew Performance.

f Seventeen of the twenty operators were judged to be satisfactory by NRC examiners, and will be eligible for renewal of their six year term licenses. The licensee confirmed that the operators that were determined by the NRC as failing the written and operating portions of their respective examinations were removed from licensed duties, remediated in the areas of identified weakness and then reexamined by their staff prior to being returned to licensed duties in accordance with NUREG 1201, ES-601. The NRC has scheduled a reexamination of these three individuals in the areas of identified weaknesses within six months of the initial notification of failure letters. Licensee and NRC examination examination results are in agreement except that the licensee failed one simulator crew in the operating portion of the examination. The licensee stated that this crew was also removed from licensed duties, remediated in the areas of identified weakness and then restested, in accordance with their program.

All five of the operating crews were evaluated as satisfactory by the NRC. Two of these crews were marginal, in the competency of communications.

Subsequently, the licensee documented their written and operating test results to the NRC Region V office by a letter dated May 8, 1990. The

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facility did not make any changes to the written examination keys.

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8(.. Exit Meeting 1

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.'An ex'it meeting was held with the NRC examiners, the~ Trojan-resident-ainspectors..and representatives of the: licensee's-staff on April'27, 1990 f

.to discuss the program evaluation ~and the NRC findings.

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The licensee staff acknowledged the examination team's findings and.

indicated,that-the three personnel who~had failed the requalification examination:would be retrained and tested again (satisfactorily) before beings returned to 1_icensed duties.

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e-4 g9 ENCLOSURE 4 SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT 6

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=0 SIMULATION FACILITY FIDELITY REPORT 0

Facility Licensee:. Portland General Electric Company, Trojan Facility l

Facility Docket No.:

50-344 i

Operating Tests administered on: April 17, 18, 19, 24, and 25, 1990 i

This form is to be used only to report observations.

These observations do f

not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).

These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the I

simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations.

No licensee action is required in response to these observations.

NOTE Part (1) is a listing of the simulator fidelity problems identified during this examination's review and validation period.

These deficiencies were

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initially identified by the licensee.

The scenarios were prepared to avoid these deficient areas while maintaining adequate competency coverage and examinationobjectivity.

A.

These items are significant deviations or problems which may affect evolutions performed by trainees and operators on the simulator.

Simulator Difference / Problem Operator Action Required i

1.

Annunciator panels:

a.

The simulator alarm panels are the la.

N/A new design; the plant is converting during the outage, b.

Panel K40 (Fire Protection) on-C17 lb.

Use fire protection is not simulated.

computer display

• c.

K13-A.3 "Subcooling <25 F" has been Ic.

N/A changed to "Subcooling <15 F" in the plant.

• d.

The CRTs and the SER arinter will Id.

Allew for slight always slightly scramale the time error millisecond order (resolution the simulator is to second).

• 2.

'A' Train RVLIS is out of service.

2.

Use 'B' train.

(Assume TS met)

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The Fluke T/C Data Logger (Incore 3.

Use-P2500, SPOS Temperatures on Back Pcnels) does not-or P250 print or display correctly.

I 4.

Containment humidity rises slightly 4.

Verify with during Rx trip.

other indications of leakage 5.

Any NIS failure caused PERM 13 (Letdown 5.

Verify by sample Line) to ramp up.

(completeONI-12) 6.

Closing "Al" normal-feeder in parallel 6.

Do not backfeed with EDG supplying (to backfeed A5) causes a bV trip.

7.

PRT level alarms occur spuriously.

7.

Monitor for~ actual level increase 8.

Containment pressure sometimes spikes 8.

Verify actual after a LBLOCA.

pressure with recorder tape 9.

Sometimes a dropped rod picks up all 9.

Verify all NI rate trips, inappropriate rate trips are reset 10.

The simulator receives spurious and 10.

Inform crew members silent channel failures indicated by of lost control no control of some digital switches.

features 11.

If Load Set is > Actual turbine load 11.

Anticipatejump, when the Load Decrease P.B. is presse,d, Consider use of the load suddenly increases to oad Set load limit to value before decreasing, minimizejump.

12.

The PDP power supply / station service 12.

N/A breaker change made in plant last.

outage (swing pump) is not done in the simulator yet.

• 13.

The Vibration and Lose Parts Monitor 13.

N/A does not function.

• 14.

The Bell and-ROLM phones use the 14.

Use printed list incorrect numbers.

for communications 15.

The CIS status lights have not been 15.

Locate status changed yet to that of the plant, lights in old which moved CIS phase B lights to positions the lowest row.

16.

PERM 17 is not in the simulator 16.

Verify radiation by using PERM 6 10, or 16

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i NOTE:

The simulator operated satisfactorily during all the scenarios and JPMs.

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The deviations and problems described above did not appear to affect the

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o)erators performance.

Specific simulator malfunctions which occurred during tie examination are described below.

B.

Noted malfunctions and anomalous events identified during the examination implementation, i

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DuringtheactiveJPMsthesimulatorstoppedduetoan" input-output j

error.

The problem was corrected by "re-booting" the simulator and a

resetting the switches and controls.

This required about' ten minutes.

2.

At the end of one simulator scenario one of the vertical boards I

controls did not function due to an "inaut-output error".

The.

l problem was corrected by "re-booting" tie simulator before the next i

scenario.

This required about ten minutes.

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